The Ulster question in international politics, 1968-1978 by McKinley, Michael
Australian
National
University
THESES SIS/LIBRARY 
R.G. M ENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO :2 
TH E A USTR ALIAN  N A TIO N A L UNIVERSITY 
CANBERRA A C T  0200 A USTR ALIA
TELEP H O N E: +61 2 6125 4631 
FACSIM ILE: +61 2 6125 4063 
EM AIL: library.theses@anu.edu.au
USE OF THESES
This copy is supplied for purposes 
o f private study and research only. 
Passages from the thesis may not be 
copied or closely paraphrased w ithout the 
written consent o f the author.
T h e  U l s t e r  Q u e s t i o n  in In t e r n a t i o n a l  P o l i t i c s
1968 - 1978
by
Michael McKinley
Thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of International Relations 
The Australian National University 
June 1981
This thesis is my own original work.
Michael McKinley.
A b s t r a c t
This thesis has three general concerns. They relate to the 
processes by which the Ulster Question became 'internationalised'; 
the extent to which it became an international issue; and, the extent 
to which it was subject to international influences.
In 1968, the island of Ireland had been partitioned for some 
forty-seven years into two states: a twenty-six county, predominantly 
Catholic, Republic; and a six county, mainly Protestant, state —
Northern Ireland —  which was constitutionally subordinate to the United 
Kingdom Parliament at Westminster. Within the latter, the minority 
Catholic community had been subjected to various forms of discrimination, 
including infringements and deprivations of their civil rights. As a 
result, a campaign was mounted to remedy their grievances. In these terms, 
therefore, the issue at stake was essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom Government.
The civil rights campaign, however, provoked extreme Unionists (also 
known as Loyalists) to respond violently. Civil disturbances thus became 
common, and on such a scale that it was only a short period before the 
real questions were not of civil rights, but of the continued existence 
of the state of Northern Ireland and the political re-integration of the 
island itself.
In this transformation, the central roles were played by the 
governments of Britain and the Republic of Ireland. Through the years 
1968 — 1978, both made approaches to the 'national' question and failed.
Yet they failed, not because the problem was demonstrably insoluble, but 
because neither individually nor together did they adopt the type of 
policies which may have brought success, albeit limited. The conduct 
of Anglo-Irish relations, therefore, was one of the great sadnesses of 
modern Ireland.
Outside of the politics between these two countries, the Ulster 
Question diminished in importance. Despite occasions when the world 
seemed genuinely shocked or revolted by what was happening in the North
and despite attempts by the Irish Government to win international support 
for various of its objectives there, the community of states simply did 
not regard the Ulster Question as an issue which required anything 
approaching a sustained attention and activity. The 'troubles',
evidently, were such a morass that it had no wish to enter —  besides 
which, to have done so was to risk offending one of the central parties. 
Even in the area of international organisation this was true, except 
that here, the question proved more amenable to atomisation, and so 
pressing aspects of it frequently gained a currency, particularly in the 
forums of Europe.
Notwithstanding the overall response of states to the Ulster 
Question in its entirety, there were instances of quite sustained 
interest being shown in the conflict it gave rise to. Libya was thus 
prominent for a period, for the financial and other assistance it 
provided to the Provisional Irish Republican Army. So, too, were several 
non-state actors who were similarly inclined, such as the Irish- 
American support network in the United States, and the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation. Their contributions, however, substantial as they 
might have been in terms of cash and arms, did not change in any major 
way the direction or the magnitude of the unique war being waged within 
(and sometimes without) the Six Counties.
It is, therefore, a central conclusion of this thesis that the 
Ulster Question was an issue of but limited international significance.
As long as Ireland is partitioned it is certain to remain as an out­
standing question for only two countries, Britain and Ireland. But as 
long as Northern Ireland continues to provide a situation within its 
recent and current dimensions —  i.e. one that can, for all practical 
purposes, be kept at some distance by its European neighbours —  it will 
also remain on the periphery of international concern. Hence, it may be 
Ireland's misfortune to compare unfavourably with various contemporary 
misfortunes —  such as Vietnam or the Middle East —  and to be deprived of 
urgent considerations and initiatives. But this at least throws the 
Ulster Question back upon those who are most intimately concerned with it. 
In the final analysis it is a question which requires both an Irish and, 
perhaps inappropriately and perversely, a British answer.
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In t r o d u c t i o n
2Ireland, like Dracula's Transylvania, is very 
much troubled by the undead.1
Ulster is not a nation but a province. As such it is an unlikely 
focus for a thesis within the discipline of International Relations.
More precisely, however, Ulster is a partitioned province, created by a 
treaty in international law. Three of its nine counties -  Cavan,
Donegal, and Monaghan -  lie within the Irish Republic; the remaining 
six -  Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and Tyrone —  form 
part of the United Kingdom. The six are claimed by the former under the 
1937 Constitution; they are also claimed, but significantly they exist, 
as an 'integral part' of the latter, as the entity known as Northern 
Ireland.^
According to the Constitution of Ireland, this division is temporary,
3
'pending the re-integration of the national territory'. Unity is also 
taken as the aim of the 500,000 plus Catholics who make up approximately 
one-third of the northern population. It is also the non-negotiable 
demand of the Irish Republican Army, a paramilitary organisation which is 
outlawed in both parts of Ireland.^
However, for the one million or so Protestant Unionists (or 
Loyalists as they are sometimes called) of the Northern Ireland population,
A.T.Q. Stewart, The Narrow Ground: Aspects of Ulsters 1609-1969 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 15.
2 In the following pages the terms Northern Ireland, the North of 
Ireland, Ulster, the Six Counties, the Province, the State will be used 
interchangeably and without political intent, depending on the context, 
the documents being cited, contemporary usage, and the requirements of 
euphony.
 ^ Article 3.
There is also a problem of nomenclature within the state occupied 
by the Twenty-Six Counties. The people within tend to refer to it as 
Ireland; in the North, the tendency is to refer to it as 'the Free State', 
or sometimes, 'Eire'. Elsewhere, 'the Republic' or 'the South'is also 
used. In this thesis, the terms 'Free State' and 'Eire' will not be used 
unless a citation is involved; the remaining terms will be used inter­
changeably as the circumstances and context demand.
3Unity is anathema because of a deep fear that, in a united Ireland, 
their identity would be insecure and subject to discrimination and 
erosion by a government closely attuned to the Catholic Church. So 
strongly did this fear operate in the first half-century of Northern 
Ireland's existence that Unionists staunchly opposed any formal power- 
sharing arrangements with Catholics. But as in the Catholic community, 
there are paramilitary extremists such as the Ulster Volunteer Force, 
who see sectarian violence as an acceptable method of making their 
political points.
This situation admits no compromise because to compromise, 
according to the opposing factions, is to lose all. The result, or 
rather its surface manifestations, has been defined by Richard Rose as 
follows:
In law, it is a subordinate part of the United Kingdom, 
ruled by the authority of the British Parliament at 
Westminster. In fact. Northern Ireland is an insubordinate 
part of the United Kingdom —  governed without consensus when 
it is governed at all. That is the Northern Ireland
problem.^
In 1968, this problem was seen most clearly in an area of politics 
which were of domestic concern: the denial of civil rights to the 
minority Catholic community, and the campaign that was induced to rectify 
it. The question of civil rights, however, could not be put without 
challenging Protestant/Unionist hegemony, and thus, the very existence 
of the State itself. When extremists responded violently to the civil 
rights campaign, this immediate issue became joined by (if it was ever absent 
from) the older question of unity. Gradually, and then with greater force 
civil rights were overborne by re-statements of the 'national question'.
In this process the past came powerfully into play. Indeed, the 
international politics of the Ulster Question since 1968 are deeply rooted, 
and can only be fully understood, in the context of Ireland's history 
and the international political history of Europe. And this history 
contains far more complexities than can adequately be conveyed in a thesis 
defined such as this is.
Richard Rose, Northern Ireland: A Time of Choice (London: Macmillan, 
1976), p. 9.
4The Ulster Question is far older than the 1921 partition of 
Ireland. It invokes memories of a few heroes, more villains, and 
multitudes of victims. It goes back at least to the sixteenth century 
and, many have ventured, beyond then to the twelfth century invasion 
mounted by Henry II to secure the western extremities of his Kingdom.
Even then, there is no need to accept the twelfth century as the 
starting point of it all that has become the Ulster Question: in 
Irish history, as in the mechanics of avalanches and other geological 
dramas,- there is such a geometric progression between cause and effect, 
that effects are also causes and there is no stopping the search for 
an unmoved and unmovable first principle. Yet a start must be made
v
somewhere in time, and because, in 1968, there were developments which 
were to re-vitalise the Ulster Question, the selection of that year is 
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
The following analysis therefore presumes a knowledge both of Irish 
history and of the signal events in, and related to, Northern Ireland 
since 1968. References to the former, however, are not sprung upon the 
reader, and are in any case occasional; similarly the latter is made 
available in some small way by the Narratives which precede each of the 
first four chapters and cover the entire period. The Narratives could, 
perhaps, have formed one of the appendices, but I thought that placing 
them at the back of the volume would lead to a lack of continuity. If 
they appear unduly lengthy, or even unnecessary, then I offer my apologies 
for proffering more background than is required.
The thesis itself, 'The Ulster Question in International Politics, 
1968 —  1978', is concerned with the contemporary transformation of an 
issue which was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont, or at least at no further 
remove than the United Kingdom Parliament at Westminster, to one of 
limited, but nonetheless real international proportions and significance. 
It is concerned, in the first instance, with an inquiry into the behaviour 
of states and international organisations which seek to reconcile demands 
for justice and self-determination with countervailing demands for order 
and stability, all within the particular requirements of national and 
international self-interest. It is also concerned with the extent to 
which the Ulster Question is an international issue —  in other words its 
international standing —  and conversely, with the scope of external
influence which has been brought to bear on it. And finally, it is 
concerned with defining the international boundaries of Ulster's 
internal violence and with the relations between state and non-state 
actors directly involved or interested in the conflict and its 
possible outcomes.
Of foremost importance is the relationship between the Republic of 
Ireland and the United Kingdom — Anglo Irish relations. Ever since Ireland 
was partitioned in 1921 the theme of the former's longest lamentation in 
this most sensitive diplomatic liaison has been when, if ever, and how, 
if at all, the country could be politically re-united. There is, 
therefore, no one 'Ulster Question'; there are several. These deal with 
the fundamental questions of politics —  'who governs?' and 'how?'. It is 
the interplay between the division of Ireland and the questions which 
gives rise to the international political dimensions of Ulster. Indeed, 
in the above terms the Ulster Question is deceptively straightforward 
as being concerned with the process of decolonisation, perhaps complicated 
to an extent by what the current literature refers to as the 'asymmetric 
diad' nature of the relationship —  much the same as may be found between 
Canada and the United States, or New Zealand and Australia.
The problem is that very little about the Ulster Question is so 
straightforward. As one citizen of Belfast warned in 1970: 'Anyone here 
who isn't confused simply doesn't understand what's going on.'
To take a more pessimistic note from Gladstone, Ireland comprises 
the 'sad exception' —  not only in Britain's record of conduct towards the 
country, or in the uniqueness of the current 'troubles', but more 
abstractly, in the sense of attempting to define just what the Ulster 
Question is in terms of a subject for study within the discipline of 
International Relations.
For a start, Anglo-Irish relations are unique; at best they but 
superficially resemble other asymmetric relations. The nature of their 
iniqueness is, however, well documented by historians, and attested to 
once more in Chapters 1 to 4, which cover four relatively distinct 
phases they have passed through since 1968.
Beyond Anglo-Irish relations, the nature of the Ulster Question
6imposes an unacceptable stress on all existing analytical models, 
theories, and paradigms within International Relations. Indeed so 
great is this stress that virtually a separate model, theory, or 
paradigm would be required for each of the subject areas under 
consideration. In all, this would amount to nine, exclusive of Anglo- 
Irish relations. The thesis, therefore, would be dominated by 
theoretical considerations, which I believe is neither necessary nor 
desirable. In view of the fact that the international political aspect
of the Ulster Question has not been well analysed, and because of my 
belief that it is an important subject, it is my intention that the actual 
politics, and not political science theory, should dominate this study.
But this should not be taken to imply that there is a proliferation, 
or even a reasonably wide choice of models, etc., to choose from. In 
fact there is a certain poverty within International Relations when it 
comes to this point: only two works, or rather parts thereof, proved at 
all useful. The first was the collected papers from a symposium held
g
at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, in 1963.
The second also took the form of collected papers, and was the result of 
presentations to the Thirteenth Annual Conference of the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, in 1971.^
While both suggest avenues of inquiry and possible areas or 
dimensions which might be examined, they lack coherence. There is no 
attempt to organise the available data in anything like a model.. (And 
this is only to be expected given the nature of the original undertaking). 
Moreover, both collections,as their respective titles indicate, focus on 
the general relationship between civil violence and the world at large.
In the case of the Ulster Question this would be both inappropriate and 
distorting. It is inappropriate because it emphasises the consequence of 
a failure to resolve an underlying issue, rather than the issue itself, 
and it leaves to one side the other forms of diplomacy which that issue 
has given rise to. The focus is therefore upon the symptoms at the
James N. Rosenau, ed., International Aspects of Civil Strife 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964).
Civil Violence and the International Systems Parts I and II, Adelphi 
Papers, Nos. 82 and 83, respectively (hereafter cited as Adelphi Papers, 
No. ... ).
7expense of the causes. And it is distorting because it postulates 
that there is a relationship between violence and the 'international 
system', whereas the evidence which will be presented in this thesis 
suggests that the external nexus from the strife in Ulster is more towards 
two or three countries, and in other cases tenuous and not of primary 
importance. As a result, the works cited are only marginally useful.
Thus, what propositions of a 'critical', 'speculative' or
g
'constructive' nature (to use Hedley Bull's terminology) are to be 
advanced will be derived from the repository of historical knowledge 
rather than from those forms of inquiry which are not temporally based.
But to the marked extent that there are established modes of behaviour 
in certain relations, there is what may be termed a 'model in time' which 
synthesises both the essential need for an historical awareness —  which 
is demanded by the subject —  and the obligation to organise that study 
systematically and according to contemporary interstate politics, in the 
main —  which is the requirement of the discipline of International 
Relations.
A similar application is made in respect of the 'troubles' themselves. 
They are, to use terms popular in the 1960s and 1970s, examples of 'civil 
violence' or 'internal war', although the fact of having stated this does 
little to further the understanding of the conflict which has been waged 
between the IRA and the British Army since the autumn of 1970. This, 
however, should not be surprising. The American sociologist, Harry 
Eckstein, in a book published in 1964, affirmed that he had found in the 
pages of the New York Times between 1946 and 1959 over 1200 instances 
g
of 'internal war'. This description covered 'civil wars, including 
guerrilla wars, localised rioting, widely dispersed turmoil, organised 
and apparently unorganised terrorism, mutinies and coups d ’etat. 
Suprisingly, neither Eckstein, nor the scholars who collaborated with him 
to produce Internal War3 saw fit to mention the particular case of a
Hedley Bull, 'International Relations As An Academic Pursuit', 
Australian Outlook 26 (December 1977): 257.
g
Harry Eckstein, ed., Inteimal War: Problems and Approaches (New 
York and London: The Free Press and Col 1ier-Macmi11 an, resp., 1964).
ibid., p. 3.
8resurgence of civil violence in Northern Ireland which was, in 1959, 
mid-way through its six-year course.
The reason for this appears to have less to do with the 
deficiencies of scholars than it does with what Pierre Hassner refers 
to as 'the diversity and elusive character of civil violence, the 
complex and contradictory character of international power relationships 
and hence about the essentially indirect, ambiguous and largely 
unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of the connections between the 
two.' * From this, I thought that the most worthwhile avenue of 
inquiry was to raise two implicit questions concerning Northern Ireland:
(1) What most closely, if anything, does the conflict 
in the Province conform to, in terms of an 
international conflict?
(2) What has been the impact of the conflict on the 
international community?
Underlying these questions there is a deeper one which both of them 
beg. As Bull observed in 1971:
What is most striking about ... political violence ... is 
not its 'civil' character, but the way in which it cuts 
across the distinction between what is 'civil' and what is 
'international'.12
Thus, the deepest question in relation to the Northern Ireland 
conflict as a subject for study within the discipline of International 
Relations concerns the extent to which previous conventions of the 
community of states have been preserved, and/or what has replaced them.
Furthermore it is this same question which is so relevant in the 
Northern Ireland related activities at the level of international 
organisations. Not only do they supply interesting illustrations of how 
the assumed veto power of Article 2:7 of the United Nations Charter may 
be diminished, but they also suggest how it may be circumvented, in so far 
as an international 'hearing' is concerned, by recourse to more localised
Pierre Hassner, 'Civil Violence and the Pattern of International 
Power', Adelphi Papers, No. 83, p. 16.
12 Hedley Bull, 'Civil Violence and .International Order', Adelphi
P a p e r s No. 83, p. 27.
9(European) forums without any significant disadvantage to the plaintiff 
parties.
The structure suggested by this approach is an examination of the 
Ulster Question according to the loci within which its standing as a 
subject of diplomacy between sovereign states was determined. As a 
general rule, this aspect was directly related to proximity to Ulster.
For these reasons, which also fortunately coincide with convenience and 
efficiency, the analysis is organised principally by geographical 
areas and, within these areas, chronologically. As was mentioned 
earlier, Anglo-Irish relations are the most significant of these and 
are, therefore, the concern of the first four chapters. Therefore 
Western Europe (four chapters), the United States (two chapters), and 
three countries of the 'Old Commonwealth' (one chapter in all) are 
treated in succession. There are two exceptions. The United Nations is 
placed after Anglo-Irish relations and before Western Europe because of 
the importance the Irish Government accorded its initiative there in 
1969, and because the experience Dublin gained then appears to have 
determined some of its subsequent courses of action in Western Europe.
And the two chapters relating to the contacts, operations, and supplies 
of the paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland are placed last for 
the reason that the level and style of analysis within them is somewhat 
separate from the remainder of the thesis.
There are three additional notes I would make on the organisation 
and make-up of this thesis. The first concerns the time frame, which 
is described as '1968-1978'. In some areas this period has been 
exceeded for the reason that there were events or developments about 
which I had information, and which, if included, enabled me to provide 
a more logical termination than would have been the case by abruptly 
finishing 31 December 1978. Furthermore, in many cases where this cut-off 
date was adhered to, it was not because I had tired of asking the 
question posed by the old man in Sean 0' Casey's 'Drums Under the 
Windows':
What th' hell are th' up to now?
Rather it was because of another of his questions, i.e.:
How th' hell can you expect a fella to hear from here?
10
The second point concerns evidence. As Louis McRedmond has
noted, the Irish tend to hide from all would-be interpreters of their
past, part of their history in a 'Gaelic strongbox ... to which
13[they] alone possess the key.' The same attitude not only prevailed 
in relation to their more recent past, as was evidenced in the Dail on 
many occasions,^ but was the modus operandi of all the central parties 
to the Ulster Question. For example, many of the details of Anglo- 
Irish discussions were either kept confidential, or released 
selectively, so that interpretation and understanding relied very 
heavily upon nuance and interpolation.
In this enterprise, however, one is very much alone. With but few 
exceptions the international politics of the Ulster Question as a 
comprehensive area for sustained inquiry has attracted no great 
interest. That of course has its own consolations —  otherwise whence 
this thesis? But both of these factors —  confidentiality and academic 
isolation - are compounded by the speed at which events sometimes occur 
in relation to Northern Ireland. As Oliver MacDonagh wrote of the 
years since 1967:
... it was the day of the instantaneous. The course of 
events so twisted and darted, at times, that yesterday 
seemed irrelevant by mid-day and tomorrow unknowable at 
nightfal1.^
Fortunately, even if the scholars were seldom to the fore, it was 
not always unrelieved darkness. The newspapers made the effort, 
attempted the coverage, some of them to a high level of understanding, 
as MacDonagh also testified:
The babble of explanation was too loud for thought, and, 
in immediate exposition and analysis, the best of 
journalists proved themselves superior to the scholars.16
Louis McRedmond, review of Landlord Or Tenant: A View of Irish 
History3 by Magnas Magnusson, in the Irish Times, 14 October 1978.
14 ,
The exchange between Dr O'Connell and Dr Hillery in Dail Eireann
following the latter's 1972 international visit to several capitals is 
very much to the point (see Chapter 10, p. 442).
15 Oliver MacDonagh, Ireland: The Union and its Aftermath, rev. and 
enl. ed., (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 142.
11
And this brings me to the third point, which is that of certainty. 
Very often the Scottish juridical prerogative of 'not proven' is 
exercised. This is not always because I am unsure or undecided about 
the argument in question, but because there are limits to which even 
the most conscientious of reporting can sustain conclusions which might 
be held in pectore.
Mention of conclusions or opinions held in the heart, or in reserve, 
prompts a final, personal note. It stems from the wish to make 
explicit my own assumptions and morality with regard to the subject of 
this thesis. As my name might suggest, I am, to the best of my 
knowledge, of Scotch-Irishdescent; indeed, three of my four grand­
parents held names that are commonly found in Ulster. Whatever their 
confessional affiliations were there (and there are grounds for thinking 
that my paternal grandfather was a Protestant), they were Catholics in 
New Zealand. I was raised as one accordingly. I have, furthermore, 
lived in Ireland for extended periods of research and study and made 
many friends there. My interest in the country, therefore, is both 
academic and personal-spiritual if you like.
Because of this attachment, I am more acutely aware of the need 
to exercise a rigorous undiscriminating scepticism in the following 
analysis. If some readers may think that I have not always succeeded, 
it was not for want of trying. I have demanded of myself a similar 
(moral) rigour with respect to the violence, and the talk of violence, 
which sometimes seems to be all pervasive. My position is this: I dearly 
wish to see a united Ireland to which all Irish men and women, North and 
South, have freely given their assent. This, I know, is but the remotest 
of possibilities given the current state of affairs; perhaps it is even 
chimerical. Nevertheless, it is my instinct. I do not, however, believe 
that those who demand a united Ireland, and who then kill indiscriminately 
other Irish men and women should be looked upon as agents of this state. 
Similarly, I hold no brief for those other parties, state and non-state, 
who demand some other liberty and behave in no better way. At the core 
it is a question of moral responsibility, portrayed most eloquently by 
Albert Camus:
12
I am not one of those who long for people to take up 
arms again in an uprising doomed to be crushed under 
the eyes of an international society that will spare 
neither applause nor virtuous tears before returning 
to their slippers like football enthusiasts on Saturday 
evening after a big game. There are already too many 
dead in the stadium.I7
As this Introduction began with a reflection upon the historical 
nature of the Ulster Question, so it closes. Throughout the following 
inquiry into the various facets of the issue, it will be necessary to 
bear in mind that, fundamentally, it is an ancient question restated. 
Moreover, whatever it was in the distant past, it has been for some 
time a question of prime concern for but one nation, and the 'troubles' 
which have grown out of it are small in the scale of recent and current 
conflicts. It is important, therefore, not to exaggerate its 
importance as an issue in international politics. Clearly it is an 
issue: it is not, nor is likely ever to be, one of the more pressing 
issues in the world.
For this reason the results of the inquiry are to be seen in the 
same light as the Ulster Question itself —  essentially sui generis —  
and possessing only peripheral relevance to the great issues which 
constitute the stuff of international politics. But that is no great 
failing: if they represent progress along a path towards the 
discernment of what Lecky termed the 'great permanent forces that are 
steadily bearing nations onwards to improvement or decay' they are yet 
worthwhile.
^  Stefan Kanfer, review of Notebooks, by Albert Camus, in Time3 
10 July 1978, p. 49.
Na r r a t i v e , 1968-Ma r c h 1972
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N A R R A T I V E
The decade of the 1960s, in particular the second half of it, is 
frequently described as radical, largely because of the movements which 
grew to prominence in this time, and their legacies. Perhaps it is 
possible to say almost anything about an age, and therefore fruitless 
to make the attempt, especially since time has yet to exert the fullness 
of its discriminating influence. But certainly much of an identifiable 
nature seemed to be happening in these years. And a discussion of the 
Northern Ireland Question would be incomplete without brief reference 
to the international milieu at the time it re-appeared. Although the 
decade of the 1960s was heralded by the lure of Camelot and the challenge 
of the New Frontier, its history, more often than not, records the 
failure of noble aspirations and of peaceful evolution as against violent 
revolution. If the '60s saw the age of Martin Luther King and the 
potential of non-violent protest, they also saw his assassination and 
the rise of Eldridge Cleaver, Stokely Carmichael, and the Black Panthers. 
It was a time when Woodstock was eclipsed by Altamont, the 'days of rage' 
and Kent State. An era of protest, assertiveness, and revolution had 
dawned to live but briefly, but its dimension, for all of its short 
life span, was international.
In the United States the President succumbed, in large part, to 
protests against a war he could not end. In France, what is now 
delicately called 'the events of May' (1968) shattered the monarchic 
authority of De Gaulle and, momentarily, brought the country to a 
standstill. In China the Red Guards staged a revolution from which the 
country has still to fully recover. In Biafra, Britain, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Spain, and Yugoslavia there were, in varying degrees and 
combinations, instances of the playing out•of the same themes of protest, 
assertiveness, and revolution, and in each of which violence was an 
inevitable consequence. This is not to say that every instance conformed 
to a specific type of political phenomenon or, indeed, that they were all 
political, but it is to suggest that each supports the claim that the 
'60s were a time of widespread dislocation and upheaval within societies. *
* See note 1 below.
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At a time when the demise of the nation state was mooted, and in 
many cases accepted, a resurgent nationalism appeared in Wales, Scotland, 
among the Palestinian Arabs, the French of Quebec, and in the land of 
the Basques. Established states, thought to be stable, were challenged 
and in the process nearly every conceivable condition within them was 
polarised to its extreme as though this was the only remaining 
alternative for the further evolution of man.
In Northern Ireland the contemporary beginnings of this process 
appeared in the summer of 1968 as a reaction against various forms of 
discrimination. ^  The previous year had seen the founding of the 
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), a predominantly Roman 
Catholic organisation whose aims were to obtain an equality of treatment 
for Catholics in the state. In the period between August and October 
1968, with the aid of counter-campaign violence and hence, publicity by 
the media, it grew into a mass movement.
That there existed actual and widespread discrimination mainly
against Catholics was accepted by both the Cameron Commission established
2to inquire into the causes of disturbances in late 1968-early 1969, and 
by the Northern Ireland Government, whose announcement, in November 1968, 
of various reform measures was an explicit acknowledgment of the justice 
of the complaints. Amongst those grievances which the Cameron Commission 
accepted were:
Although the influence of external events is generally accepted 
by many scholars and commentators on Northern Ireland, it is denied by 
one of the leading personalities of that time. Bernadette Devlin, in a 
tenth anniversary (of the civil rights campaign) interview, claims she 
was not inspired by such outside examples or the events of May 1968 in 
France. She adds 'I never met Cohn-Bendit; Eamonn McCann (a Socialist- 
Republican then prominent in the civil rights movement) raged because the 
time we v/ere to meet Alain Krivine we went out the night drinking! ' 
She is also of the opinion that the reasons for the Civil Rights 
Movement are to be found in sociology and not politics. 
'The Generous Anger That Lit the Flame', Irish Times, 6 June 1978. 
2 
A three-man Commission, chaired by Lord Cameron, authorised by the 
Governor of Northern Ireland to report on disturbances in the state from 
5 October 1968 until early 1969. See note 3 below.
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(1) A rising sense of continuing injustice and grievance 
among large sections of the Catholic population in 
Northern Ireland3 in particular in Londonderry and 
Dungannon3 in respect of (i) inadequacy of housing 
provision by certain local authorities (ii) unfair 
methods of allocation of houses built and let by such 
authorities3 in particular refusals and omissions to 
adopt a rpoints ' system in determining priorities and 
making allocations (iii) misuse in certain cases of 
discretionary powers of allocation of houses in order 
to perpetuate Unionist control of the local authority.
(2) Complaints3 now well documented in fact3 of discrimination 
in the making of local government appointments3 at all 
levels but especially in senior posts3 to the prejudice 
of non-Unionists and especially Catholic members of the 
community3 in some Unionist controlled authorities.
(3) Complaints3 again well documented3 in some cases of 
deliberate manipulation of local government electoral 
boundaries and in others a refusal to apply for their 
necessary extensions3 in order to achieve and maintain 
Unionist control of local authorities a>id so deny to 
Catholics influence in local government proportionate to 
their numbers.3
The Cameron Report also noted the more specific complaints of the
siting of most new economic developments in the mainly Protestant area
east of the River Bann3 and of the foundation of the New University of
Ulster at Coleraine rather than at Derry. Further3 it referred to the
resentment among the Catholic community at the continued existence of the
Special Powers Act and the exclusively Protestant Ulster Special
4
Constabulary ('B ' Specials).
As a result of these grievances NICRA demanded a programme of six 
basic reforms which were3 by liberal3 democratic standards moderate and
Government of Northern Ireland, Disturbances in Northern Ireland: 
Report of a Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland3 
Cmd. 532, (Belfast: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, September 1969), p. 91, 
(hereafter cited as Cameron Report).
Note: Although discrimination v/as found to be predominantly against 
Catholics, the Report (p. 64) notes that 'certain authorities which were 
controlled by Catholic majorities pursued precisely analagous policies' to 
Protestant authorities which were discriminating against Catholics. The 
example cited (p. 60) is that of Newry Urban District which, controlled by 
non-Unionists, employed very few Protestants.
4
Cameron Report3 pp.  6 2 - 3 .
anything but revolutionary. But in the context of Northern Ireland 
they were essentially revolutionary in both tactics and substance.
The civil rights groups reversed the tactics of 
Sinn Fein. Instead of trying to change the regime 
by refusing recognition of British sovereignty3 they 
sought to change it by claiming full rights as 
British citizens.
The reforms3 therefore could be regarded as ’unionist’ demands. Indeed 
it was Lord Cameron’s estimate that they constituted nothing that would 
’in any sense endanger the stability of the (Northern Ireland) 
Constitution’J  The demands were:
(1) Universal franchise in local government elections in 
line with the franchise in the rest of the United 
Kingdom.
(2) The redrawing of electoral boundaries by an independent 
Commission to ensure fair representation.
(3) Legislation against discrimination in employment at local
goverrunent level and the provision of machinery to remedy 
local government grievances.
(4) A compulsory points system for housing which would 
ensure fair allocation.
g
(5) The Repeal of the Special Powers Act.
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Later, a seventh demand was added: the withdrawal of the Public 
Order (Amendment) Bill.
' Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1971), p. 156 (hereafter cited as Rose,
Governing Without Consensus).
Sunday Times 'Insight' Team, Ulster (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1972), p. 49 (hereafter cited as Sunday Times3 Ulster).
Q
It is interesting to note that Mr Vorster, as Minister of Justice in 
the Republic of South Africa, when introducing that country's far-reaching 
security law, the Terrorism Act, was quoted as saying he would exchange 
his entire Act, for just 'one clause of the Northern Ireland Special Powers 
Act'. Times, 30 August 1971.
For brief accounts of the Special Powers Act, see (1) K. Boyle,
T. Hadden, and P. Hillyard, Law and State: The Case of Northern Ireland 
(London: Martin Robinson, 1975), pp. 37-9 (hereafter cited as Boyle et.al., 
Law and State); (2) John J. Kane, 'Civil Rights in Northern Ireland', 
Review of Politics (Notre Dame), 33, No.l (January 1971), pp. 62-4.
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(6) The disbanding of the USC (The Ulster Special 
Constabulary, also known as the ’B' Specials).
The methods employed by NICRA to publicise the discrimination 
which existed and the reforms to remedy it, owed much to exemplary 
influences and forces outside Northern Ireland.
It is very important to note that these developments 
occurred in an international environment sensitized 
to anticolonial struggles and followed the fullblown 
emergence of the civil rights struggle in the United 
States. Northern Irish Catholics, closely linked to 
the outside world by the media, were profoundly 
influenced by these events, especially the struggle 
of black Americans to achieve racial equality. Some 
Irish students had actually observed American protest 
marches firsthand and urged the adoption of similar 
tactics in Ireland. ^
To this extent, therefore, it was not surprising to note that marches, 
demonstrations, and a general commitment to non-violent forms of expression 
were the modes by which the civil rights campaign in Northern Ireland 
were to be conducted. But there was a basic difference between what 
happened in the United States and in Northern Ireland, although it took 
some time for this to emerge and for its impact to be felt upon the 
pattern of events since 1968. In the United States, in places like 
Alabama, no one, black or white, seriously questioned the existence of 
the state itself, or its consititutional status within the union of 
American States. In Northern Ireland, however, the civil rights movement 
received support from a minority which traditionally opposed the every 
existence of the State, and which had cultural, emotional, religious, and 
sporting ties with another constitutional entity to the south. Thus, in 
this context, it is important to appreciate that the civil rights campaign
A paramilitary force designed in the 1920s for border protection 
duties. So called because there v/ere once 'A' and 'C' Specials as well. 
By 1969 it had become such an instrument of anti-Catholic repression that 
Lord Hunt, after inquiring into its workings, recommended, and the 
British Government obtained, its disbandment.
Demands taken from Cameron Report, p. 78.
Richard Ned Lebow, 'Ireland', in Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned 
Lebow and John G. Stoessinger, Divided Nations in a Divided World (New 
York: David McKay, 1974), p. 223 (hereafter cited as Lebow, 'Ireland').
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wasj as Richard Rose emphasises3 'better described as a movement than as
an organization'. He continues3 1It drew together3 in temporary
alliance, individuals with many different political backgrounds3 ranging
from Republicans to a few Protestants'.  ^ Equally3 it should be
appreciated3 as it was by the Cameron Commission3 that in addition to
being non-violent in policy and 'non-sectarian in origin and purpose'3
12
its programme was sought 'within the framework of the Constitution'.
Evidence supporting this conclusion was also suggested by a 'Loyalty
Survey' undertaken in the summer of 19683 which forms the basis for
Richard Rose 's Governing Without Consensus. According to this source3
33 per cent of Catholics interviewed supported the Northern Ireland
Constitution3 as against 34 per cent who disapproved and 32 per cent
13who '(didn't) know about the Constitution'.
The significance of these developments was not readily accepted by
a large proportion of the Protestant population3 who saw in Civil Rights
only a disguised attack upon the status of the six northern counties3
and the designs of the Irish Republican Army. i4s William Craig3 the Home
Secretary dismissed the movement: 'bogus and made up of people who see
14in unrest a chance to renew a campaign of violence'. Such opposition 
notwithstanding 3 the tactics of the movement appeared to be vindicated 
by O'Neill's proposed reforms3 although their efficacy has also to be 
assessed in the light of sympathetic pressure from London and from the 
moderate Unionists supporting the Northern Ireland Prime Minister. In 
theory3 the O'Neill reforms met the major Catholic grievances3 and in 
one case exceeded them: Craig3 who had come to symbolise the inherent 
oppressiveness of the Special Powers Act and other Protestant excesses3 
was dismissed from the Cabinet. Nevertheless3 Catholic reaction3 bred 
from half a century of mutual mistrust between them and a Protestant 
government3 was cautious. In the Catholic view this attitude was 
justified in view of the fact that the promise of reforms constituted 
neither their actual passage into law3 nor their realisation. It remained
12
Rose, Governing Without Consensus3 p. 189. 
14
Sunday Times3 Ulster3 p.  47.
Richard Rose, Northern Ireland: A Time of Choice (London: 
Macmillan, 1976), p. 53.
Cameron Report3 p. 79.
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current3 much to Protestant annoyance 3 after the Londonderry Borough 
Councily probably the most blatant example of gerrymandering in 
Northern Ireland3 was replaced by a development Commission.
These moderate and qualified successes had two immediate
consequences. The first was that it produced a split within the civil
rights movement. NICRA3 concerned at the violent Protestant reaction
to the marches and their apparent success3 favoured a moratorium on this
type of activity while Stormont worked on the implementation of reform.
In this they were opposed by more militant groups —  such as People's
Democracy —  a socialist student group from the Queen's University3
15Belfast. People's Democracy3 like the civil rights movement to which
it gave support3 was quite amorphous3 but in keeping with the generally
more radical tone of its membership3 argued for a continuation of protest
activity until all the original aims of the campaign had been achieved.
16
To this end they organised the 'Long March' between Belfast and
Londonderry over New Year 1969. As this involved passing through areas
of Protestant majority3 resistance to it was anticipated and may even
have been welcomed in a perverse way by some. ^  But on 4 January at
Bumtollet Bridge outside Londonderry it was attacked by off-duty 'B'
Specials and followers of the Reverend Ian Paisley with such viciousness
18that the lives of a number of the marchers were endangered. That
evening3 after the march was over3 members of the Royal Ulster
Constabularly combined with a Protestant mob to invade the Bogside3 the
largest Catholic quarter in the city3 and conducted what Richard Ned Lebow
19refers to as an anti-Catholic 'pogrom' which3 according to the Cameron 
Commission3
For an account of this movement see Paul Arthur, The People's 
Democracy3 1968-1973 (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1974), which is based 
upon this author's thesis for the M.Sc. degree at the Queen's University, 
Belfast. 
^  Seventy-five miles. 
17 The Cameron Report3 p. 47 and p. 80 infers this from the evidence 
presented to it.
18 ibid., pp. 46-7, Sunday Times3 Ulster3 pp. 65-7; and Lebow, 'Ireland', 
p. 225.
i b i d . , p.  225.
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involved assault and battery, 
malicious damage to property ... 
giving reasonable cause for apprehension 
of personal injury among other innocent 
inhabitants, and the use of provocative 
sectarian and political slogans. ^ 0
Although violence had attended upon civil rights demonstrations
as early as 5 October 1968 —  indeed, it contributed to their eventual
success — the period which followed Bumtollet was to differ markedly
from those earlier days. Of this Lebow writes, 'For all practical
purposes, this pogrom put an end to the era of civil rights marches and
21ushered in a more violent kind of confrontation'.
The second consequence was the division of the Unionist Party
between those who, like O'Neill, recognised the need to meet some of
the Catholic demands, and those who saw in them the destruction of the
Northern Ireland State. By early 1969 support for O' Neill's policies
had been so eroded that he called a General Election for 24 February
which, instead of granting him a mandate for reform, served only to
polarise Northern opinion and to emphasise his tenuous position as Prime
Minister. It was no position from which to satisfy Catholic demands, nor
22one from which to resist the pressures of extreme Unionists. On the
Catholic side many civil rights leaders ran for office and their success,
at the expense of the old Nationalist and Labour parties, appeared to
Protestants as a portent of what a united Catholic community could
23achieve. When, in the following April, Bernadette Devlin, a twenty-one 
years old undergraduate active in the civil rights movement took the 
Mid-Ulster constituency in a Westminister by-election, Protestant fears
20 Cameron Report, p. 73.
^  Lebow, 'Ireland', p. 225. 
22 
For the outcome of this election see Sunday Times, Ulster, p. 71, 
and T.W. Moody, The Ulster Question, 1603-1973 (Dublin and Cork: 
Mercier, 1974), p. 37.
Two leaders in the civil rights movement, John Hume and Ivan Cooper 
were elected at the expense of incumbent Nationalist MPs who had been too 
slow to respond to the growing activism of the Catholic community.
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were again accentuated. They found expression once more in a lawless
police attack upon the Bog side of Derry, in the course of which
substantial damage and injury to residents was inflicted. Despite
Lord Cameron's recommendation that the incident 'should be rigorously
24probed and investigated', it was not. As a result the Catholic
community found it increasingly difficult to distinguish between official
and unofficial reactionary violence and to seriously doubt the ability
25of the government to implement its policies.
In this context of steadily deteriorating inter-communal relations
anti-O'Neill Unionists sought to move against the Prime Minister by
exacerbating them even further in the hope that Stormont would be panicked
into a return to 'strong govemmeyit', i.e. a refusal to concede to
Catholic demands. To this end a bombing campaign was conducted against
public utilities in east Ulster by the Protestant para-military
organisation, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), but presented as the 
26work of the IRA. Deceived, the Northern Ireland Government declared
a state of emergency and thereby provoked even more violent confrontations
between Catholics and Protestants. In turn, the violence brought renewed
pressure upon O'Neill from the British Government to placate the Catholics
27by implementing the principle of one-man-one-vote. Although he managed
to obtain from Cabinet its acquiescence in such a proposal it was with
some difficulty. In the face of this indication that he could no longer
guarantee executive command, Terence O'Neill resigned on 28 April 1969,
28and was replaced by a distant cousin, Major James Chichester-Clark.
The change of government purchased a period of respite for Stormont, 
and a brittle peace which persisted, despite underlying tensions, through 
until the 'marching season' of July-August 1969. Starting on 12 July,
Cameron Report, p. 74.
25 For an account of the reasons behind this attitude see Boyle et.al.,
Law and State, pp. 26-36.
26 
Sunday Times, Ulster, pp. 78-9; Lebow, Divided Nations, pp. 225-6; 
and Liam de Paor,- Divided Ulster (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1973), 
p. 190 (hereafter cited as de Paor, Divided Ulster). 
^  Lebow, 'Ireland1, p. 226. 
28 
de Paor, Divided Ulster, p. 191.
23
the traditional date for Orange parades3 violent confrontations
between Catholics and Protestants reappeared3 culminating in five
days of almost continuous rioting3 known now as the Battle of
Bogside. In Belfast3 in August, a similar eruption was set off and
the Catholic Lower Falls area was attacked and fired by a mob which
included the RUC3 the 'B' Specials, and civilians armed by the
29latter. In the realisation that the RUC and 'B' Specials could 
not contain the situation3 assistance from the British Army was 
sought3 and received3 in both cities. Initially3 it was welcomed 
by the Catholic community as their protectors3 but recent experience 
had also demonstrated to the Catholics their vulnerability to extreme 
Protestant attacks. The result was the split3 in December 19693 of 
the, IRA into 'Official' and 'Provisional' wings. The differences 
between them were3 in the main3 concerned with tactics although 
ideological differences also came to the fore. Where the former 
countenanced radical agitation and mass confrontation3 the latter 
were more interested in 'military ' action in defence of the Catholic
30areas. Nevertheless3 in August 19693 neither option was really 
open to the two IRAs —  who lacked both the strength and the 
organisation to carry them out. Hence the intervention of the Army 
at this time brought a further period of relative tranquility to 
Northern Ireland.
With the help of British pressure upon Stormont many of the 
reforms demanded by NICRA came to pass. In 19693 one-man-one-vote 
in local elections finally became law; the 'B ' Specials were abolished 
and the RUC disarmed (although they were inevitably re-armed during 
the disorders of 1971). In 19693 also3 a Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Administration3 or Ombudsman3 and a Commissioner for Complaints3 
both completely independent of the Government3 were appointed to 
investigate complaints of maladministration3 including discrimination3 
against government departments and against local authorities and 
public bodies respectively. In 19703 a Central Housing Authority and
Sunday Times3 Ulster3 pp. 126-72, and de Paor, Divided Ulster3 
pp. 192-7/
30
Sunday Times3 Ulster3 pp. 176-97.
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Yet3 with the approach of another marching season3 the potential,
and then the actuality of inter-communal violence increased once more.
With this development the British Army began to concentrate its
attention more and more upon the Catholic community. In July 1970 a
curfew was imposed upon the (Catholic) Falls Road in Belfast when an
arms search met with armed resistance. The Government also responded
by introducing further measures of a legal and military nature which
in turn led to both an increase in the incidence of clashes between
the Army and the Catholics3 and a growing hostility towards the
military3 who were now seen by that community as instruments of
31Stormont repression. In the prevailing conditions of this period
the Provisional IRA thereby gained the necessary sympathy of the
Catholic community and the confidence to take the offensive against
the Army. In February 1971, following the death of the first British
soldier in the current ’troubles’ 3 Chichester Clark announced on
televisiony 'Northern-Ireland was at war with the Irish Republic Army 
32Provisionals’.
To counter the reprisal campaign Chichester-Clark came under
strong pressure to demand from the British Government actions which
33bordered upon3 and in some cases weres extreme. When such measures 
were not forthcoming from Westminstery Chichester-Clark3 like O'Neill 
before hims found his position as Prime Minister untenable3 and 
resigned on 9 March 1971. He was replaced by Brian Faulkner.
JJnlike the previous change of leadership at Stormont3 Faulkner’s 
succession did not presage a period of diminished tension. Despite 
moves by his government to transfer the responsibility for prosecuting 
other than minor summary offences to a Director of Public Prosecutions 
and despite attempts by him3 in the summer and autumn of 19713 to
community relations agencies were created.
31 
Lebow, 'Ireland', pp. 229-30. 
32 Sunday Times3 Ulster3 p. 245.
33 ibid., p. 249.
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involve the parliamentary opposition in the governmental process, 
both Catholic-Army and Catholic-Protestant relations increased in 
hostility in the first six months he was in office. Correspondingly, 
Catholic support for the IRA increased.
But it would have been unreasonable to have expected the change
of leadership or Faulkner's package of reforms to have effected
another peaceful interlude. By early 1971 the Provisionals had gone
35over to the offensive. Between March and August they undertook a 
bombing campaign against British commercial interests in Northern 
Ireland with the objective of driving them out by inflicting 
unacceptable economic costs, while at the same time, achieving the 
abolition of Stormont. In the process they also injured a substantial 
number of civilians and soldiers, and killed four of the latter.
In the face of this escalation Faulkner, in August 1971, obtained
from the British Government, approval to institute a policy of internment
without trial of people suspected of terrorist activities. Both
36militarily and politically internment was a disaster. For the first
eighteen months of its operation it applied exclusively to Catholics.
This fact, and the manner in which it was conducted, effectively
completed Catholic estrangement from Stormont, the British Army, and
for many, Westminster as well. Reports, later substantiated, that
some internees were tortured inflamed their passions even more. Deaths
and bombings increased dramatically: in the six months following
internment 174 people were killed; in August alone there were 36
. 3 7violent deaths and over 100 bomb explosions.
ibid., pp. 254-5 and 305-06. 
35 For an account of this transformation, and other developments 
concerning the IRA in this period, see J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: 
The IRA, 1916-1974 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1974), 
pp. 355-92. 
36
Sunday Times, Ulster, pp. 252-68.
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The misuse of internment powers also presented the IRA with
further opportunities to extend its influence to Catholic areas in
which it had previously been minimal or precarious. As the tension
mounted3 the IRA campaign against British interests3 and its clashes
with the British Army3 developed into urban guerrilla warfare —  a
mode of fighting which was not expected when the troops were sent in3
38and in which they were neither trained nor experienced anyway. In
this uncertain and stressful situation British para-troopers killed
39thirteen civilians at a demonstration in Derry on 30 January 1972.
40'Bloody S u n d a y a s  the eveyit became known3 signalled the final 
chain of events which were to lead to the prorogation of Stormont.
Irish reaction3 in the North and in the Republic3 was immediately and 
angrily expressed. Both Official and Provisional wings of the IRA 
announced an intensification of their campaignsy with the former 
mounting an operation in Britain itself. In Dublin3 a vengeful mob 
burned down the British Embassy and the Taoiseach3 Jack Lynchs recalled 
his country 's ambassador to London. Elsewhere on the international 
scene the attitude towards Britain was questioning where it was not 
plainly condemnatory. The British public's shock at the allegations 
now being made concerning the conduct of the Army prompted an intense 
national debate on Northern Ireland. The Cabinet was3 therefore3 
required to choose between continued support of a government whose 
ability to govern could be ensured only with a massive (for the size 
of the state) infusion of force3 or the imposition of direct rule.
ibid., pp. 280-1. 
39
For an account of the events of this day see Report of the Tribunal 
appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday 30 January 19723 which 
led to loss of life in connection with the procession on that day3 by 
the Rt. Hon. Lord Widgery, OBE, TD HL 101, HC 220 (London: HMSO, 1972), 
and also Samuel Dash, Justice Denied: A Challenge to Lord Widgery 's 
Report on 'Bloody Sunday' (New York: Defense and Education Fund of 
the International League for the Rights of Man, 1972).
40 
This was not the first occasion to be so described: 21 November 
1920 attracted this description with the killing of 14 British undercover 
agents and the reprisals, conducted by the 1Black-and-Tans', who fired 
into a crowd during a football match at Croke Park, killing 12. The 
second occasion was in Belfast on 10 July 1921 during which 161 Catholic 
homes were fired and 15 killed.
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While both options were regarded as extreme, the latter appeared to 
offer less likelihood of an increase in an already high level of 
violence, and a greater correlation of political risks with 
ultimate political responsibility. Thus, on 24 March 1972, Prime 
Minister Edward Heath put to Faulkner a proposal that required the 
Northern Ireland Government to surrender the responsibility of 
maintaining law and order in the Province to Westminster. In reply 
he was advised of the Stormont's Cabinet's unamimous decision to 
resign if this was insisted upon. In these circumstances Heath 
announced the suspension of Stormont, and the direct rule of Northern 
Ireland from London through a newly-created Cabinet position, a 
Secretary of State, Mr William Whitelaw.
But by this time, if not earlier, the original demands of the 
civil rights movements had been eclipsed. What had started out as a 
campaign for equality under the Crown had been overtaken by an ancient 
quarrel. As John Hume, the Social Democratic and Labour Party MP, 
stated on BBC television on 31 January 1972, the settlement to problems 
was a 'united Ireland or nothing'.
Thus, what essentially took place between 1968 and 1972 —  in 
Northern Irish politics, indeed in Anglo-Irish relations, and all 
politics concerned with the troubles — was the transformation of an 
issue from one which was clearly within Britain 's domestic 
jurisdiction, to one which was just as clearly characterised as 
international. And it is with that transformation that the following 
Chapter is concerned.
CHAPTER ONE
A n g l o -I r i s h  R e l a t i o n s , 1968 -  M a r c h  1972
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Anglo-Irish relations, or more particularly, Ireland's relations 
with Britain, pervade virtually every level of Irish public life.
Indeed, so pervasive has become this influence since the hallmark 
events of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and the Ireland Act 1949, 
that one commentator noted the irony that Britain, 'never able to 
conquer Ireland during almost eight hundred years of colonial rule, 
has almost succeeded during fifty years of her independence'.* This, 
of course, is neither a condition peculiar to the Republic of Ireland,
nor one that was unforeseen before either of the two events mentioned
2
above. It does, however, point to a basic imbalance in the relations 
between Britain and the Republic of Ireland in such fields as population,
3
economic development and dependency, and international influence.
But this is not to suggest that the imbalance bestows only 
'enjoyment' upon the predominant, British, party and only sufferance 
upon the Irish —  for it is often perceived in contrary terms. Speaking
Richard Ned Lebow, 'Ireland', in Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned 
Lebow and John G. Stoessinger, Divided Nations in a Divided World (New 
York: David McKay, 1974), p. 221, (hereafter cited as Lebow, 'Ireland').
2
The socialist revolutionary James Connolly, for example wrote in 
Shan Van Vocht (The Poor Old Woman), in January 1897, what many have 
viewed as a profound prophecy for the modern Irish State:
'If you remove the English army tomorrow and hoist the 
green flag over Dublin Castle, unless you set about the 
organization of the Socialist Republic, your efforts 
would be in vain, England would still rule you. She 
would rule you through her capitalists, through her 
landlords, through her financiers, through her array of 
commercial and individualist institutions she has planted 
in this country ...'
(As cited in P. Beresford Ellis, ed., James Connolly: Selected Writings3 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin (Pelican), 1973), p. 124).
3
For brief accounts of these factors see: Patrick Keatinge, The 
Formulation of Irish Foreign P o l i c y (Dublin: Institute of Public 
Administration, 1973), p. 5, (hereafter cited as -Keatinge, Formulation 
of Irish Foreign Policy); Lebow et al, Divided Nations, pp. 215-21; 
and R.K. McKenzie, 'The Republic of Ireland: not an extension of the 
home market', Trade and Industrys 13 February 1975, pp. 370-2.
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in an adjournment debate on Northern Ireland in 1971, Mr Merlyn Rees, 
a future Secretary for the State, noted that 'Relations with Ireland 
are illogical', by which he meant that the Republic, vis-a-vis 
Britain, enjoyed the seemingly ambiguous status of being both a 'foreign
4
country' and a member of the Commonwealth. By this Rees was referring 
to the anomalous situation in which Britain and Ireland shared 
virtually a common currency, common travel area (no passports are 
required for travel between the two) and in which citizens of each
5
may settle in the other without any special permit.
There v/as, therefore, a basic ambiguity, even absurdity, in 
Anglo-Irish relations. In part this was based upon the failure, or 
reluctance, to integrate recent Irish history into the British public 
consciousness -  so that leading British newspapers, for example, 
continue, as they have since prior to 1920, of printing news concerning 
what is now the Republic of Ireland under the section head of 'Home 
News'.** Sir John Peck, the British ambassador to Dublin between 
April 1970 and February 1973 refers to this effective refusal to 
recognise the independent status of the Republic as the 'Isle of Wight 
syndrome1.^
In part this ambiguity resulted from a general lack of awareness, 
even ignorance of Ireland among what might be termed 'establishment' 
and official circles in Britain, but more so, it resulted from the 
formal and institutional ambivalence with which Irish matters were 
treated. It was not until October 1968 that the Foreign Office assumed 
responsibility for diplomatic relations with the Republic. Throughout 
the proceeding nineteen years these remained the prerogative of the
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report3 vol. 826, 
25 November 1971, col. 1666, (hereafter cited as House of Commons,
Official Report).
5
There is an inequality as regards voting rights. Irish citizens, 
living in Britain, may vote in British General Elections, British 
citizens living in Ireland may not vote in Irish General Elections.
^ For example, the Guardian and the Times.
John Peck, Dublin From Downing Street3 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 
1978), p. 18 (hereafter cited as Peck, Dublin From Downing Street).
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Commonwealth Office despite the fact that Ireland was clearly not a 
member of the Commonwealth. According to Peck, the traditions and 
requirements of each Office differed so markedly that this arrangement 
'misinterpreted the unique relationship that exists between Ireland and 
Britain1
Thus, expressions of irritation, such as that by Rees, and 
reciprocal complaints of suffocation by the Republic should not obscure 
the recognition by both parties, of the need to maintain high levels
9
of friendly and co-operative relations. At times this has taken more 
the form of symbolic gestures —  such as the return of Sir Roger 
Casement's remains to Dublin in 1965 —  but it has also prompted more 
tangible expressions of a community of interests -  such as the Anglo- 
Irish Free Trade Area Agreement, also in 1965.^ And it should be 
noted that the British Prime Minister of this period regarded both 
achievements as contributing to the 'best level' of Anglo-Irish 
relations 'since the Government of Ireland Act nearly half a century 
earlier'.** What Harold Wilson admitted, thereby, was the existence of 
the issue of partition, of the island of Ireland, which had confounded 
those relations since 1920, and which had caused them so frequently to 
be conducted in acrimonious and violent terms. Of the importance of 
this constant factor Patrick Keatinge writes
ibid., pp. 16-17.
Mote: although it would not invalidate the general observation as to 
the ambiguity mentioned above, it is possible that the institutional 
arrangement was mutually acceptable to both parties. Certainly this 
is an inference which may be taken from Lord Garner's The Commonwealth 
Office 1925-68 (London: Heinemann Education, 1978), p. 320, in 
conjunction with J.D.B. Miller's Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems 
of Expansion and Attrition (London: Oxford University Press, for the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1974), p. 406.
9
Keatinge, Foiwulation of Irish Foreign Policy3 p. 5, and Lebow,
'Ireland1, pp. 248-9.
"" Harold Wilson, The Labour Government3 1964-70: A Personal Record 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin (Pelican), 1974), p. 110,
(hereafter cited as Wilson, Labour Government).
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... a large part of the content of Irish foreign policy 
has been concerned v/ith a readjustment of relations 
with Britain, a readjustment which has demanded both acts 
and gestures of independence and sometimes opposition 
towards the state upon which Ireland is so economically 
dependent. The emotionalism, ambivalence and confusion 
associated with this persistently frustrating situation 
have helped make Anglo-Irish relations an obsession of 
Irish politics.
Thus, on the British side, the improvement in Anglo-Irish relations
noted by Wilson represented the operability and effectiveness of two
underlying modes of thought. The first of these, instanced by the
return of Casement's remains, is characterised by Oliver MacDonagh as
a self-perceived, but ready willingness to forgive past transgressions,
13
and an expectation to be similarly pardoned. The second, of which
the Trade Agreemnt is an example, is located within that spirit of
British political parties which Enoch Powell described as the 'healthy
instinct ... to take account only of present issues and substantial
opponents'.*^ Insofar as the Republic of Ireland was concerned, this
achievement was rendered possible by a variety of factors, not the
least of which was the passing from active politics of Eamon de Valera
and his succession, in 1959, by Sean Lemass. Against a background of
economic development, material prosperity and growing religious
ecumenism, Lemass attempted, through personal diplomacy and proposals
for functional co-operation and constitutional reform, to achieve a
15
rapprochement between the two political entities in Ireland. His view
Keatinge, The Formation of Irish Foreign Policy3 p. 6.
13
Oliver MacDonagh, 'Time's Revenge and Revenge's Time: A View of 
Anglo-Irish Relations', Anglo-Irish Studies IV (1979): 15, (hereafter 
cited as MacDonagh, 'Time's Revenge').
*^ Enoch Powell, as cited in Patrick O'Farrell, England and Ireland 
Since 1800 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 109. Powell 
made this observation in a speech to the North Wales Conservative 
Advisory Council, Prestatyn, 27 September 1968 (see Enoch Powell, Still 
To Decide (Kingswood, Surrey: Elliot Right Way Books, 1972), p. 170.
15
Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations: Issues In Irish 
Foreign Policy (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1978), 
pp. 113-14, (hereafter cited as Keatinge, Issues in Irish Foreign
Policy).
33
expressed the hope that 'from the extension of useful contacts at 
every level of activity, a new situation would develop ... the solution 
of the problem of partition is one to be found in Ireland by Irishmen.'*^
To the extent that this strategy relied upon developments within 
the island of Ireland it had the advantage of de-emphasising the 
partition issue in Anglo-Irish relations. It also removed the inherent 
absurdity which the existence of the Northern Ireland state lent to them. 
According to Articles Two and Three of the Irish Constitution, the Six 
Counties were part of the sovereign territory of the Republic, from 
which it followed that they were not the concern of the Irish Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. In fact, Northern Ireland affairs were handled by 
the Taoiseach personally. Similarly, in the British view, the Six 
Counties were an integral part of the United Kingdom and, therefore, 
the concern of the Home Secretary and not the Foreign Secretary.
But to the extent that it was formulated during a period of 
relative indifference, towards partition, in the Republic at least, and 
was dependent upon the unchallenged supremacy of the Ulster Unionist 
Government, it was an inadequate strategy. It was incapable of coping 
with the challenge to political autonomy in Northern Ireland into which 
the civil rights campaign developed. In this event the emergence of 
short-lived understandings between North and South, but particularly 
between Ireland and Britain, became threatened, if not drowned, by what 
MacDonagh refers to as 'the noises of old coercion, old condescension, 
old colonialism and old battles for parity and the rule of ordinary 
law.'17
The mid-August riots of August 1969, in Derry and Belfast, mark a 
turning point in contemporary Anglo-Irish relations. Throughout the 
preceding year the Republic of Ireland Governent, led by John M. Lynch, 
had taken a sustained interest in developments in Northern Ireland but 
its pronouncements on them were generally in accordance with the spirit
16
Speech in Tralee, July 1963, as cited in John Magee, Northern 
Ireland: Crisis and Conflict (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 
p. 109.
^  MacDonagh, 'Time's Revenge', p. 15.
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of rapprochement pursued by Lemass. In part this was a result
of the restraint with which relations between the Republic and
Northern Ireland were conducted but it was also the result of the
fact that the civil rights campaign was, initially at least,
operating outside the traditional and inter-governmental framework
of Irish nationalism. Consequently, although partition was seen as
19
the 'root cause' of the disturbances, the Taoiseach and other
official spokesmen continued to emphasise that a solution was to be
found 'in Ireland by aqreement between Irishmen, North and South, and
20
with the goodwill of the British Government and people'.
As the Northern situation deteriorated, in 1969, to the point 
where law and order could be maintained only with the presence of the 
British Army, the Irish Government renounced its previous policy and
assumed the interventionist role of protector of the minority
.. 21 
community.
Following 'the Battle of the Bogside', in Derry, the Taoiseach
22
addressed the nation over Radio Telefis Eireann, in the course of
which he claimed 'that the Irish Government [could] no longer stand by
and see innocent people injured and perhaps worse'. In addition,
Lynch gave notice of his Government's intention to apply to the United
Nations for a peace-keeping force and to request the British Government
to enter into early negotiations with it to 'review ... the
23
constitutional position of the Six Counties ...'
18
Lemass resigned as Taoiseach in November 1966.
19 Taoiseach's Statement on Derry Incidents, Eire — Ireland: Bulletin 
of the Department of External Affairs, No. 789, 15 October 1968, p. 4 
(hereafter cited as Eire -Ireland).
20
Luncheon address to House of Commons Anglo-Irish Pariiamentary 
Group, 30 October 1968, as cited in Eire — Ireland, No. 791, 8 November, 
1968, p. 4.
21
Throughout this text the term 'Irish Government' will apply to the 
Government of the Irish Republic.
22
Irish Radio and Television, abbreviated form: RTE.
23
The Taoiseach, John Lynch, T.D., Speeches and Statements on Irish 
Unity, Northern Ireland, Anglo-Irish Relations, August 1969-October 1971 
(Dublin: Government Information Bureau, 1971), p. 2, (hereafter cited
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which had existed throughout its period of office, took the form of
abrupt and adamant refusals that the Republic of Ireland was in any
way entitled to intervene. The final two paragraphs of the statement
issued by Home Secretary, James Callaghan, on the actual deployment
24
of the British Army in aid of the civil power', and the first two
25
paragraphs of the Downing Street Declaration, explicitly and without 
reservation rejected any suggestion that the situation was 
international.
By a strictly legalistic construction, the British Government's 
exclusion of the Republic of Ireland rested on a solid foundation.
But in the practise of its relations with Northern Ireland, and the 
perceptions and assumptions upon which this was based, it is apparent 
that the Downing Street Declaration concealed an increasing level 
of disingenuousness. In the area of assumptions it is significant 
that Callaghan opposed the deployment of British troops in Northern 
Ireland in early August 1969, in part, because of the anticipatedpc
'sensitivity that would be aroused South of the border,' and the
27
actions that the Irish Government might take at the United Nations.
And it was the assumed Irish reaction at the United Nations which, in
August 1969, decided the British Government against the blowing up of
28
border roads. Both anxieties were justified. The introduction of the 
British Army, although a domestic prerogative of Westminster, entailed
The British Government's reaction to this departure from a policy,
as Lynch, Statements and Speeches). There is some controversy as to 
the accuracy of this version of Lynch's speech. According to many 
Lynch actually said '... can no longer stand idly by ... ' (emphasis 
added). For example, Conor Cruise O'Brien in States of Ireland (St. 
Albans, Herts: Panther, 1974), p. 171, states that video-tape 
recordings verify this allegation.
24
As cited in James Callaghan, A House Divided: The Dilemma of 
Northern Ireland} (London: Collins, 1973), p. 44 (hereafter cited as 
Callaghan, A House Divided),
25
Downing Street Declaration, as cited in Callaghan, A House 
Divided3 pp. 191-2.
7 ibid., p. 28.
28 ., . , co 
ibid., p. 52.
Callaghan, A House Divided, pp. 19-20.
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the internationalisation of the situation in Northern Ireland in
29
precisely the terms Callaghan had foreseen.
In practice the British Government revealed a curious attitude
by appointing a succession of Foreign Office diplomats as what
30
Callaghan termed,'its representative at Stormont'. The first of
these was Oliver Wright, appointed in August 1969; the second was
Ronald Burroughs, who succeeded Wright in February 1970. Other
Foreign Office officials filled posts below this level throughout the
period 1968-1972 as Westminster's indirect role in Northern Ireland 
31
increased. Furthermore there is a considerable body of evidence
which points to a growing understanding of the Northern Ireland Question
in this initial period, by Labour Government Cabinet Ministers, in terms
of the eventual re-unification of Ireland. In practice, also, there
was little doubt in Sir John Peck's mind that the position taken by the
British Government in this period was other than 'an initial attempt to
32
treat an international situation as if it were a domestic one'.
(emphasis added). Indeed, it was the acceptance of the inadequacy of 
this position by the Labour Government between 1968 and 1970, and 
increasingly by its Parliamentary Party in Opposition thereafter, that 
was a major theme in Anglo-Irish relations throughout this first period. 
It was, as suggested by the preceding passage, a process interrupted by 
the change of government as a result of the British General Election of
18 June 1970. In the immediate period following this, Anglo-Irish 
relations, with regard to Northern Ireland, reverted to a pattern of 
claim and counter-claim, the resolution of which was effected only in 
the second period of analysis. What successive British governments 
failed to account for, in the periods in which they denied the Irish —  
and hence international dimensions of the situation —  was the existence 
of compelling reasons for the Republic to intervene which could take 
little or no cognisance of attempts to limit the scope of its interests.
See Chapter 5, 'The United Nations'.
30
Callaghan, A House Divided> p. 65; a more formal title of this 
position, if it had one, is not given in any of the reference works of 
the period.
"31
Dublin Trish Times, 18 October 1971.
Peck, Dublin From Downing S t r e e t p. 100.32
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Of the immediate considerations, the first related to the
perception, by the Irish Government, of the Catholic community in the
Six Counties; they were, in Taoiseach John Lynch's terminology, 'our
33
Northern brethern'. The second related to the failure of the
0'Nei11-sponsored civil rights reforms to be implemented in such a
way that they represented the reality, rather than the legislative
34
intention, of reform to the Catholic community. The third reason 
was a corollary of the first two: in the absence of reform, and in 
the face of extremist Protestant violence, the obvious place for 
Catholics to turn to for refuge, protection, and even arms, was the 
Republic. And if the Taoiseach had attempted to neglect his 
'obligations' in this matter, then it is evident from the Official
Report accounts of the times set aside for Questions in Dail Eireann
35 .
that there were numerous TDs who were willing to ensure his attention
returned to them. Finally, there was the assertion of a 'legitimate
interest' which stemmed from the Irish Government's perception that its
views 'on how peace and justice [could] be ensured in such a small
36
island as ours [were] relevant and entitled to be heard'.
The long-term reason was provided by the objective of Irish 
re-unification, which was seen not only as an end in itself, but also 
as a means by which short-term objectives, such as equality of treatment 
for Catholics, could be effected. As the Taoiseach told a London 
audience on 30 October 1968 in relation to the recent violence in 
Derry:
Taoiseach's Statement on Civil Rights and Irish Unity, Eire — 
Ireland, No. 797, 12 February 1969, p. 4.
34 Sunday Times 'Insight' Team, Ulster, new ed. (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin, 1972), p. 59, (hereafter cited as Sunday Times, 
Ulster).
35
TDs -  in Irish Teachtai Dala —  Delegates to Parliament, commonly 
referred to as Deputies.
36 *
Dail Eireann, Pariiamentary Debates, Official Report, vol. 241, 
22 October 1969, col. 1407 (hereafter cited as Dail Eireann, Official
Report).
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... those incidents are surface manifestations of a 
sense of injustice felt by a large proportion of the 
population of Northern Ireland for many years ... The 
clashes in the streets of Derry are an expression of 
the evils which partition has brought in its train.37
More explicitly, but to the Irish nation on 13 August 1969, he said
'... the re-unfication of the national territory can provide the only
38
permanent solution for the problem ...' The civil rights campaign
and its attendant violence was, therefore, integrated by the Irish
Government, within a perspective which viewed Irish unity as the
outstanding political question in its relations with Britain. The
force of both of these in conjunction was a point well made by the
39
Taoiseach in his address to the Fianna Fail Ardfheis of February 
1971:
The basic issue remains what it has always been. No 
words of mine could express it better than Yeats in his 
speech to the Seanad^^ in 1925 when he said 'it is 
perhaps the deepest political passion with this nation 
that the North and South be united in one nation.'^!
The Irish Government's objective of a united Ireland, however, 
determined more than its conviction that the 'troubles' were its 
legitimate concern and that it had a right to intervene in the 
situation; re-unification also ensured that its subsequent course of 
action would be guided by principles of nationalist doctrine, of which 
two were important. The first was Dublin's refusal to recognise the
37
Luncheon address to House of Commons Anglo-Irish Parliamentary 
Group, 30 October, 1968 as cited in Eire -Ireland. No. 791, 8 November 
1.968, p. 4.
3ft **
Lynch, Address over Radio Telefis Eireann on 13 August 1969,
Statements and Speechess p. 3.
39
Ardfheis: High (or Principal) Gathering; in this context, the 
Fianna Fail Party annual conference or convention.
^  Se(anad Eireann: the Irish Senate.
^  'Fianna Fail Ardfheis Statement by the Taoiseach', Eire—  Ireland3 
No. 835, 31 March 1971, p. 7. Lynch here is unnecessarily modest: his 
own Address to the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis the previous year contained a 
reference to Partition that is both eloquent and moving. Statements 
and Speechess p. 16, para 1.
39
Stormont Government as other than 'the executive instrument of a
42
subordinate Parliament'. The second was explained by Patrick 
Keatinge, as follows:
Given the essential, 'natural' Irishness of northern 
unionists, the fact of partition was seen as the 
fulfilment of deliberate and skilfully executed British 
policy. The conclusion is drawn that 'partition can only 
be ended constitutionally as it began, by an Act of the 
British Parliament', ^ and the first priority is therefore 
to persuade the British government to abandon its 
imperialistic claim.44
The strategy which resulted, therefore, was known as the 'Britain
first' strategy which, as Keatinge observed,1 tended to cast the question
45
of unity in a diplomatic mould'. It was, moreoever, a strategy 
which was supported by the restrictions placed upon Stormont by 
Westminster, particularly since 1969. Paragraph 2 of the Downing 
Street Declaration states:
The United Kingdom Government again affirm that 
responsibility for affairs in Northern Ireland is 
entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The United 
Kingdom Government will take full responsibility for 
asserting this principle in all international 
relationships.46
The reasons for so constraining the Northern Ireland Government from
an international role related, in the first instance, to its subordinate
position vis-a-vis Westminster and secondly, to the international
47
embarrassment caused by the Northern Ireland disturbances. Britain 
and the Republic of Ireland were, therefore, in agreement, albeit for
Taoiseach's Speech in Tralee, Co. Kerry, 20 September 1969, Eire — 
Ireland., No. 813, 1 October 1969, p. 5, and Lynch, Statements and
Speeches, p. 12.
43
Eamon de Valera, Partition of Ireland, as cited in Kevin Boland, 
’We Wont ’t Stand (Idly) By', (Dublin: Kelly Kane, n.d.), pp. 89-90.
44
Keatinge, Issues in Foreign Policy3 pp. 101-02.
45 ibid., p. 102.
46
As cited in Callaghan, A House D i v i d e d p. 191.
47
ibid., pp. 105-06, and Wilson, Labour Government3 p. 845.
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different reasons, that Northern Ireland was to be excluded as an 
international actor. At the time (August 1969), however, this implied 
less an acceptance by each of the other's position than a common 
consequence of their respective and opposed positions.
A common feature of Anglo-Irish relations was thereby emphasised: 
as it was Britain which exercised de jure and de facto sovereignty 
over Northern Ireland, the Republic, in its dealings with Britain, 
has frequently been in the positon of being able only to react to 
British stands or initiatives. Thus, in addition to the achievement 
of short-term (civil rights) goals in Northern Ireland which could be 
shared by both despite their fundamental disagreement as to interest, 
it became the major diplomatic objective of Irish foreign policy to 
achieve a change in British attitudes. (While it might be argued that 
Britain's position constituted an attempt to effect a change in the 
status quo of Irish attitudes, this is not confirmed by the evidence. 
Indications are that it was only the British position, with its adamant 
refusal to acknowledge the Irish Government's interest in Northern 
Ireland, which underwent a process of 'softening' as the period 
unfolded.)
In pursuit of these objectives the Irish Government relied upon
48
what Lynch called 'quiet diplomacy and personal conversation', —  
which v/as a natural extension of the unique relationship between 
Ireland and Britain and, indeed, of the former's reliance upon the 
latter for the continuation of the favourable treatment it received 
therein. Insofar as the achievement of civil rights reforms was 
concerned the Irish Government's policies found two types of diplomatic 
expression. The first took the form of contacts between it and the 
Catholic community in the Six Counties and v/as, according to Keatinge, 
characterised by
Speech at the Special Commemorative Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, 22 October 1970, Ireland at the United Nations:
Text of the Main Speeches (Dublin: Browne and Nolan, n.d.), p. 11; 
also cited in Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations: Issues of 
Irish Foreign Policy (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1978, 
p. 118, hereafter cited as Keatinge, Issues of Irish Foreign Policy).
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... exhortations on the part of the government to the 
minority to show patience, a repudiation of violence, 
and a trust in the reform programme. ... gestures which 
include[d] a measure of diplomatic risk, such as 
Dr Hillery's^9 visit to Belfast in July 1970, but it more 
often [was] seen in direct public appeals of which 
Mr Lynch's speech of 11 July 1970 was a notable example.51
The second expression was more orthodox and took the form of
appeals to the British Government as regards, in the Taoiseach's words,
'matters of concern to this country in relation to the North,
52
including the pace and quality of reforms'. In essence this was
a summary of the Irish Government's concern with the implementation
of reform measures and is sometimes referred to as its 'guarantee' of
53
this programme. (But this is a retrospective description: the 
extension of the Irish Government's asserted interest in Northern 
Ireland affairs, in these terms, was not made until July 1970).
This concentration upon civil rights reform —  what Dr Hillery
54
referred to as '[dealing] with the immediate problem' — should not 
obscure the fact that unity continued to be expressed as a long-term 
goal, as the Taoiseach took care to emphasise:
But let nobody be under the illusion that these 
sentiments or our efforts to promote good relations 
between North and South or our sincere desire to see 
the vital forms ... speedily implemented —  let nobody 
be under the illusion that all this in any way indicates 
the abandonment by us of our just claim that the 
historic unity of this island be restored.
Dr Patrick Hillery, Irish Foreign Minister, 1969-73.
50
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Taoiseach's Statement on Civil Rights and Irish Unity, Eire —  
Ireland, Uo. 797 , 12 February 1969, p. 4. Statement v/as made to the 
Fianna Fail Ard Fheis, 28 January 1969.
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'permanent solution', but the way to this objective was to be by
56 57
agreement, by reconciliation. By these terms force was rejected.
We are talking of land and people —  and not of land 
and people alone, but of trust, goodwill, brotherhood.
Land and people can, and have been, grabbed by force 
but by force one cannot win the confidence, the 
cooperation, and the brotherhood that will make all our 
land and all our people united and happy.
59 60
There were times, however, notably in August and December 1969
61
and between May and October 1970, when Anglo-Irish relations were 
complicated by an uncertainty, in the British Government's mind, as to 
whether 'quiet diplomacy', agreement and reconciliation were accurate 
expressions of Irish Government policy, or whether they were intended 
only to conceal designs of a sinister nature.
Even in 1981, well over a decade after Lynch's first dramatic 
statements on the North, it is still difficult to understand exactly 
why he was so prone to avoid a precise outline of his Government's 
policies. On balance, however, the reason must be ascribed to the 
Taoiseach's political personality. Had the 'troubles' fully erupted 
before the Irish General Election of mid-1969 it would have been 
tempting to have attributed the uncertainties of his pronouncements 
to the fact that Lynch was in a somewhat shaky position as leader of 
Fianna Fail ('the Republican Party'): he had succeeded Sean Lemass in 
1966 only as a compromise candidate, and as might be expected of such a 
leader, was regarded as a moderate. He had, therefore, a need to reach
Unity, as was noted earlier (p. 38) was seen as providing the only
Lynch, Speech at Tralee, 20 September 1969, Statements and Speeches, 
p. 10.
57
Lynch, Speech at Bray, Co. Wicklow, 3 November 1969, Statements
and Speeches, p. 14.
Jl’ Lynch, Address to the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis, 17 January 1970,
Statements and Speeches, pp. 16-17.
^  Lynch's 'We Won't Stand (Idly) By' speech.
tj° Blaney speech, Irish Times, 9 December 1969 (see pp. 53-4).
61 The period of what is now known as the 'Arms Scandal' (see pp.54-7).
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an accommodation with those in his Cabinet who were variously
62 6 3
described as ‘hard men' or 'broody hawks'. But the troubles
didn't fully erupt until August 1969, and by that time, the objective
constraints which otherwise may have limited Lynch in the exercise
of his leadership did not obtain, as John A. Murphy observed:
In the 1969 general election he won back an overall 
majority for Fianna Fail, despite the predictions of the 
pundits. The Labour programme for a socialist Ireland 
was rejected overwhelmingly by a cautious electorate, 
and Fianna Fail's triumph was very much a personal 
victory for Jack Lynch whose whistle-stop convent circuit 
tour revealed him as a consummate campaigner. ... the 
result enormously strengthened his hand against his 
rivals ...°^
In these circumstances, it is useful to turn to the views of 
political commentator, Brian Farrell, who wrote of the Taoiseach:
Despite his performance at the polls, Lynch appeared 
an inert governmental leader. It is known that he 
indicated to members of his cabinet that he did not 
approve of the emphasis on personal public relations 
which had been such a marked feature of the Lemass 
years. Lynch preferred the concept of the cabinet as a 
team to the more brilliant solo runs favoured by Lemass.
But he was also conscious of the strength of the men about 
him and (perhaps unduly) impressed by the organisational 
talents of some party managers.
... The result was a change in the pace of government.
Instant decision [as per Lemass] was replaced by longer 
periods of gestation.65
To this point, the cameo that is presented of Lynch in late 1969 
is that of a man who, objectively, enjoyed a strong position both as the 
leader of a recently victorious Party and as Taoiseach in his own right, 
but who was, personally, inhibited by the stronger of his colleagues.
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If to this is added the 'impression he gave of having power thrust
66
upon him rather than seeking it out', the suggestion that he was 
also not by habit a decisive man appears justified. Certainly his 
style —  negative and imprecise -  was consistent with this. As one 
account noted:
When Lynch went on record throughout 1969, it was 
frequently to say what his Government would not do 
about the position in the north: it could not long 
stand aside, and so on. What Lynch's Government would 
do was never made clear either to his country or to 
his Cabinet. ^
This failure, and others derived from essentially the same causes, 
were to become characteristic of Lynch's statements throughout the 
period.
It was, noticeable, for example, in the period of the Arms
Crisis, when he succeeded only in creating ambiguity on the issue of
Irish unity. As Conor Cruise O'Brien noted, the Taoiseach behaved 'as
much as possible like a pragmatist ... while sounding as much as
68
possible like a Republican.' And to the dichotomy this gave rise
to, a further dichotomy arose between his 'conciliatory' and 'Republican' 
statements. ^
On 11 July 1970 he appealed to the 'Irish people, North and South, 
Protestant, Presbyterian, Catholic and simply Irish', in markedly 
conciliatory terms:
This whole unhappy situation is'an Irish quarrel. I 
admit that others come into it either because they 
misunderstand it or because they misuse it —  but 
they are not an essential part of it. We must settle 
this quarrel among us ...
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Let us not appeal to past gods as if past generations 
had said the last v/ord about Ireland. We have our 
opportunity to say for our generation what is in our 
hearts and minds. I think that there is in us an 
instinct for good, for enjoyment, for beauty, and above 
all, for peace with our neighbours.™
Exactly one year later, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Anglo- 
Irish Truce, Lynch changed his whole perspective —  from one that saw 
the 'whole unhappy situation' as an 'Irish quarrel' —  to one in which 
it was essentially Anglo-Irish.
In doing so he quoted one of the foremost of 'past gods', Eamon 
de Valera. 'We cannot admit the right of the British Government to 
mutilate our country'. * According to Cruise O'Brien these, and other 
statements of the early period, reflected Lynch's capacity 'to reassure 
simultaneously two sets of people who could not possibly both be
72
reassured if they were both in possession of the same set of facts'.
In view of Cruise O'Brien's political opposition to the Taoiseach, it
may be suggested that this and his previous citation, constitute an
overly harsh, if not inaccurate, characterisation. However, their
73
substance is found in other sources and in the emergence of the 
term 'Lynchspeak' which was later coined to describe the obfuscatory 
style of pronouncement which Lynch used. That this term probably 
achieved its greatest currency in the six months following the massive 
Fianna Fail election victory of 1977, when once more Lynch was
70 Lynch, 'Address over Radio Telefis Eireann, 11 July 1970',
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The origin of the term 'Lynchspeak' is unclear. It appears to 
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his interview on R.T.E., (9 January 1978).
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personally acclaimed* and when once more his position appeared 
unchallenged and unchallengeable, was testimony to its potential for 
disturbing Anglo-Irish relations. Until the British Cabinet, and 
indeed, the people of Ireland came to appreciate that the Irish 
Government's actions were not necessarily to be inferred from the 
Taoiseach's statements, the potential was frequently realised —  with v 
resulting irritations and misunderstandings. This is not to imply 
that this was the only source of misunderstandings —  rather, that it 
was but one other source to those which were the legacy of eight 
centuries of English and British rule over Ireland —  and without 
mention of which an account of the influences upon Anglo-Irish 
relations since 1968 would be incomplete.
The first major occasion on which Anglo-Irish relations were
subject to these influences was the Taoiseach's speech of 13 August
1969 in which he announced, '... the Irish Government can no longer
75
stand by and see innocent people injured and perhaps worse'.
Lynch went on to declare the RUC and the British Army unacceptable,
gave notice of a request to the British Government to apply for a
United Nations Peace-keeping Force, and for early negotiations towards
the 'restoration of the historic unity' of Ireland. He also announced
the establishment of field hospitals by the Irish Army in areas along
76
the Border adjacent to Derry.
To further these aims, and to underscore the gravity with which 
the Taoiseach and his Government regarded the Northern Ireland 
situation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Patrick Hillery, was 
despatched to London on the following day. Hillery arrived without 
prior arrangements having been made at the Foreign Office, which in 
terms of ministerial exchanges between Britain and other friendly 
nations, was regarded as unprecedented. (At the same time the only 
apparent parallel was the alleged visit by Mr Selwyn Lloyd, to Paris,
75
Lynch, 'Address over Radio Telefis Eireann', 13 August 1969,
Statement and Speeches, p. 2.
ibid., pp. 2-3.
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before the Suez invasion in 1956).77 His brief included a slight
expansion of the Taoiseach's requests; in particular this included
the suggestion that a joint Irish-British force be deployed as an
alternative to a UN force; a request that the 'B' Specials held in
reserve not be used, and that those in service be withdrawn; and
the urging of 'immediate implementations of some measure or measures
78
of civil rights' in the Six Counties.
According to de Paor, Lynch's announcement was 'received with
jubilation in the Bogside, where the arrival of Irish troops was
79
eagerly anticipated'. He also noted that it was 'greeted with extreme
annoyance by Major Chichester-Clark, who [then] sent 'B' Specials into
80
the streets of Derry'. This estimation of the effect of Lynch's 
speech accords with two other authoritative sources. By Conor Cruise 
O'Brien's account
Catholics interpreted it as meaning that the hour of 
their liberation was at hand. Irish troops or U.N. 
troops, or both together, were coming in, the walls 
of Jericho as well as of Derry were coming down ...
To Protestants, the Speech meant that the Dublin 
government was stirring up a Catholic insurrection 
in order to overthrow Northern Ireland.81-
In retrospect, both interpretations appear fanciful and overly
influenced by the atmosphere of the time. But it is worth recording
82
that the Irish Army did have a contingency plan for an invasion of
Irish Timess 15 August 1969.
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the North, and that there were members of Lynch's cabinet who
83
advocated its implementation. Furthermore, Irish front-line troops,
the Sixth Brigade, had been deployed in the Donegal border area since
84
the RUC's incursion into the Bogside the previous April, and its
85
first-line of reserves mobilised.
Thus British Home Secretary, James Callaghan, had reasons for 
finding the speech disturbing, as did members of his department. As 
he later wrote:
It really seemed to be putting the fat in the fire.
Following Lynch's statement, and a call by the Civil 
Rights Association for diversionary demonstrations, 
riots and disturbances took place on a wider scale 
throughout the province that night than at any time 
since the civil war of 1921-2.
We had to consider the possibility that within the 
next twenty-four hours we might face both civil war 
in the North' and an invasion from the South.86
It is obvious from Callaghan's record, and the British Army's response,
that the second possibility (i.e. invasion) was regarded as an
87
'unlikely contingency'. Whether Whitehall knew of the Irish invasion
plan is uncertain, but in considering the remote possibility of such a
move, Ministry of Defence officials allocated only half of an armoured
88
car squadron to deal with it. But Callaghan is also substantially in 
agreement with Cruise O'Brien's and de Paor's assessment of the reaction
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in the majority community — many of whom he saw as being in 'an 
ugly and aggressive mood to wreak serious destruction and damage on
the minority if they suspected Mr Lynch's call might be listened to
90
by the British Government ...'
In response to these developments the British Government's
reaction was predictable: a statement issued on 14 August 1969 sought
both to reassure the Protestant community, by way of repeating the
guarantees embodied in the Ireland Act 1949, and to preclude any and
91
all foreign intervention. Hillery's visit, however, was less a
failure than the circumstances of his arrival could have occasioned.
Although he received what he described as 'a courteous brush-off', he
was successful in meeting with both Lord Chalfont, Minister of State
at the Foreign Office, and Lord Stonham, Minister of State at the
92
Home Office.
In itself, this indicated that Westminster was becoming aware of
the political pressures faced by the Irish Government. Four days later,
at the United Nations, the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs moved to
place the Northern Ireland situation on the agenda of the Security
Council, and failed. But, as Keatinge notes '... the way in which this
diplomatic confrontation was handled suggested that some measure of
93
diplomatic consultation would not be ruled out altogether'.
Within weeks an improvement in Anglo-Irish relations was further 
assisted by developments in the British Government's Northern Ireland 
policies which suggested that remedying many of the Province's basic
89
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ills was high on its list of priorities. These included the Downing
94
Street Declaration of 19 August, and the Communique issued at the
95
end of Callaqhan's visit later that month; the establishment of an
96
Advisory Committee on Police, and of joint Stormont/Whitehall working
parties on housing allocation, job discrimination, and community
97
relations; and the publication of the Cameron Report on the
98
disturbances which had taken place between October 1968 and April 1969.
Within weeks of the mid-August crisis there were, therefore,
grounds based on a demonstration of British good faith and intentions,
for Lynch to resume the earlier, conciliatory approach which
characterised Anglo-Irish relations with regard to the North. In a
speech at Tralee, Co. Kerry, on 20 September, he set out the 'basis of
99
[his Government's] thinking and policy': it was, once more, defined 
in terms of 'unity through agreement'.*^ Of greater significance, he 
stated:
We are not seeking to overthrow by violence the Stormont 
Parliament or Government but rather to win the agreement 
of a sufficient number of people in the North to an 
acceptable form of reunification.101
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Callaghan found this a 'notably conciliatory' assurance and
102
accepted it accordingly. Indeed, the occasion of his doing so
103
publicly —  a debate on Northern Ireland - —  indicated the greater
understanding which British politicians had come to with respect to
the pressures under which Lynch was operating his Northern policy. By
some reports this had been demonstrated by the 'courteous' reception
104
accorded Dr Hillery on his arrival in London in August, and by the
similar lack of acrimony during the proceedings at the United Nations 
105
later that month. But speeches in the Westminster debate
provided more explicit examples to this effect. Quentin Hogg (later 
Lord Hailsham) displayed what might advisedly be termed a statesman-like 
recognition of the problems besetting Anglo-Irish relations, which was 
characteristic of his pronouncements on Northern Ireland throughout his 
period as shadow Home Secretary:
I hope that Her Majesty's Government will think seriously 
about bridge building with the Republic to the South. ...
I am sure that some of the bitterness which exits in the 
six counties of Northern Ireland has been the result of a 
coolness, an alienation, between our nation and the Republic. 
... I hope that they, too, will respond to a gesture of 
friendship and to a suggestion from the Westminster 
Government that we may open a new page of happiness to us
all.106
In the same debate, Mr Kevin McNamara, a Labour Party back-bencher 
who paid a close attention to the Northern Irish situation, was 
particularly understanding of the Taoiseach's actions.
To have expected the Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Ireland to have done other than put hospital field stations 
on the border when the troubles were taking place in
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Londonderry and Belfast was to suggest that he should 
sell his birthright and the ideals for which he and the 
parties in the south of Ireland have always stood in quite 
proper constitutional form and legitimate constitutional 
aspiration to see divided Ireland re-united as one country.
To have expected him to have done less than send hospital 
aid to the frontier where people he knew looked to the 
south and rightly or wrongly were being injured and were 
in fear of going into hospitals in the north -  for him to 
have denied the setting up of refugee bases would have been 
a complete negation of that man's political standing in the 
south.107
More significantly, the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Denis 
Healey, followed with an unqualified endorsement of the sentiments 
expressed by Hogg and, generally, by McNamara.
There is not one word in the moving and generous speech 
by ... [Hogg] with which I could possibly disagree, and I 
particularly welcome the vision he displayed in his closing 
remarks about relations between the United Kingdom and the 
Irish Republic.
Lynch, in turn, reiterated the Irish Government's disavowal of 
force and paid tribute to the
... thorough and objective manner in which Mr Callaghan 
set about his task of examining the situation ... to the 
recommendations he made, and to the steps he initiated 
towards reform and restoring peaceful c o n d i t i o n s . 109
There then followed a period, coincident with a period of relative 
tranquility in Northern Ireland, in which Anglo-Irish relations 
returned to the diplomatic modes and conventions of 'quiet diplomacy'.
They were challenged, if not seriously threatened, in the remainder 
of 1969 by only two minor incidents. The first concerned an 
initiative taken by the Irish Minister of Defence, Mr Jim Gibbons, to 
provide rudimentary training in the use of fire-arms to men from various
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(Catholic) citizen's defence committees in Northern Ireland. In a 
thinly-veiled attempt to- avoid being seen as training an illegal 
armed force, those elected for training were required to enlist for 
seven days' service in the FCA (Forsai Cosanta Aitula), the Irish Army 
Territorials. When this became public knowledge it proved too great 
a source of embarrassment to be continued. Lynch, in any case, was 
unaware of it. After only one week in operation, during which time 
nine men from the Bogside had been instructed at Fort Dunree in 
County Donegal, the practice was abandoned.*
A dinner in December to honour the Irish Minister of Agriculture
and Fisheries, Mr Neil Blaney, for his twenty-one years as a member of
Dail Eireann, marked the second incident. During his speech he
claimed that the Fianna F3il Party had never taken a decision to 'rule
out the use of force if the circumstances in the Six Counties so
demanded.'*** While it is clear that this speech was an expression of
112
a deep rift in Fianna Fail, it is also clear from a close examination 
of Blaney's reported speech that he was, first, referring to the Party 
and not the Government, and, second, that the 'circumstances' he alluded 
to were hypothetical, though not impossible.
If a situation were to arise in the Six Counties in 
which the people who do not subscribe to the Unionist 
regime were under sustained and murderous assault, then 
as the Taoiseach said on August 13, we 'cannot stand 
idly by' . 113
The nature and substance of the speech appear to have been 
understood by all concerned. It received little coverage in British 
newspapers,**4 and no mention of it is found in the political memoirs
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of three British Cabinet members closely involved in Northern 
Ireland affairs at the time -  Callaghan, Richard Crossman, and 
Harold Wilson*^ -  or in those of Brian Faulkner.**^
The second major threat to Anglo-Irish relations from internal
political forces in Ireland was the occasion of the 'Arms Crisis' of
May 1970. In the early hours of the morning of 6 May the Taoiseach,
Mr Lynch, acting 'on the basis of information ... which was got through
117
the agency of our Garda authorities', called for the resignations
of two of his Cabinet, Charles Haughey, Minister for Finance, and
118
Blaney (Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries). A few days earlier
Lynch had sought, and procured the resignation of the Minister of
Justice, Mr Micheal O'Morain, on the grounds of ill-health, and there
119
are suggestions that this related to the later dismissals. Later on
6 May the Taoiseach informed the Dail that he had received reports from 
the security forces of a plot to import arms into the country in breach 
of Irish law, and that a prima facie case existed which implicated two 
members of the Government.
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Blaney and Haughey, together with an Irish Army officer, Captain
120
James Kelly, a Belgian-born Dublin businessman, Albert Luykx, and 
a young Belfastman with a record of IRA activism, John Kelly, were 
arrested on 27 May and charged with conspiring to import arms and 
ammunition illegally into the State. In the period between the 
dismissals and the arrests a third Cabinet member, the Minister of 
Health, Kevin Boland, resigned in sympathy with his two dismissed 
colleagues. The matter was further complicated in this period by the 
controversy which surrounded the position of the Minister of Defence,
Jim Gibbons; in particular as to whether he authorised the arms 
purchases, and so rendered them legal.
Informations were refused against Blaney who was, accordingly, 
discharged at a preliminary hearing. The other four arrested were 
returned for trial which started at the Four Courts in Dublin on 
22 September 1970.
From trial evidence and published sources it appears that, as a 
result of contacts earlier in the period between the Irish Government 
and the minority community in the North, representatives of Catholic 
organisations had approached the former, in 1969, with 'urgent and
persistent' requests for arms with which to defend themselves against
121 . 
attacks by Protestant extremists. Of the steps the Irish Government
took in subsequent events, the least which can be said of them, with
any degree of certainty given the information currently available, is
122
that they were 'collectively ambiguous'. Without too much imagination,
however, it is possible to view these actions as part of a deliberate
policy by a small number of influential members of the (then) Irish
Government to materially, but covertly,intervene on the side of the
minority community in the North in a manner which directly contravened 
British, Irish, and international law.
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At issue is the alleged role of Fianna Fail during 1969 in
effecting the split of the IRA into Official and Provisional wings,
and in the appropriation of funds, by the Irish Government, for
propaganda purposes and for the 'general relief of suffering'. From
the latter appropriation the arms purchases were financed. Although
the evidence that there were two unsuccessful attempts to import
consignments of arms and ammunition from the Continent was never
contested, there was, and remains, considerable dispute as to who was
123
responsible. On 23 October 1970, all four of the accused were 
acquitted. On 4 November, Haughey and Gibbons —  each of whom had 
sworn that the other's sworn testimony was untrue —  joined Blaney and 
the remainder of the Fianna Fail Parliamentary Party in supporting a 
confidence motion in the Dail, proposed by the Taoiseach, in support of 
himself and his Ministers.
In the immediate aftermath of the trial, however, the verdict was 
less significant than either the events which required the trial in the 
first instance, or the matters which it revealed. Both, as they were 
disclosed, acted immediately upon the situation in the North and upon 
Anglo-Irish relations, and in a sense which the verdict v/as unlikely to 
modify retrospectively. Thus Callaghan notes the allegations concerning 
Blaney and Haughey contributed to 'increased tension in Belfast and
123
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renewed outbreaks of violence1. It is difficult to isolate more
precisely the effect of the Arms Crisis upon the situation in the
North and upon Anglo-Irish relations because, although they were both
seriously deteriorating after mid 1970, this process owed much to other
factors —  such as the continued failure of the British Government to
implement policies which represented the reality of reform to the 
125
Catholic community and, after 18 June, the appearance of the new
Conservative Government as 'less sensitive to Catholic susceptibilities,
126
and more amenable to Unionist pressure'.
To an extent the latter observation applied also to the Labour
127
Government during its last few months in office but, after the
change of Government, the decision not to ban the Orange Parades
128
scheduled for the last week of June, and the pronounced change in
129
direction of British military operations gave it additional substance.
Not only was this change apparent in the land operations within 
Northern Ireland but also at sea.
Between July 1970 and April 1971 the Royal Navy undertook the
occasional boarding of Irish vessels (mainly trawlers) in the waters off 
130
Northern Ireland, in order to prevent the illegal importation of arms.
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Government. Since Ireland did not, in law, recognise the State of
Northern Ireland, it could not recognise its contiguous territorial
waters or, it follows, the right of the Royal Navy to hinder innocent
131
passage therein. Yet it was virtually powerless to do anything about
the matter. Such incidents, therefore, were a source of slight
embarrassment to Dublin, more so in the knowledge that they were
introduced without prior notification by London, and followed closely
132
upon an appropriate opportunity for the latter to have done so.
But their full significance is to be seen less in this, or even in the
133
minimal reactions they drew from the Irish Government, than in the 
attitudes they were injecting into Anglo-Irish relations, as illustrated 
by the following exchange in Dail Eireann on the matter of boardings:
Mr M. O'Leary: [Labour, Dublin North-Central 1 
Would the Minister agree that relations between the two 
countries are in a rather sorry state when we see the 
British taking action without consultation with us?
Would it be true to say that relations are worsening 
when the security forces of one country act in this way 
without any consultation with a friendly state nearby?
Dr Hillery: [Minister for External Affairs!
If it became common practice for other nations of the 
world to behave as Britain has behaved in this case, 
civilised relations between Governments would become very 
di fficult.
Dr O'Connell: [Labour, Ballyfermot]
Have we any assurances that this will not recur?
Dr Hillery: We have no assurance. All I can say is 
that I hope the nations of the world will not take this 
as a model for their behaviour.
Domestically, this presented a dilemma to the Irish (Fianna Fail)
There is no record of any arms being discovered on these 
occasions.
13?
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 249, 17 November 1970, 
cols. 1432-3. (Lynch and Heath had had two meetings in New York the 
previous month.)
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Mr M. O'Leary: Would the Minister agree that the 
British Government are taking a rather crude assessment 
of this Cabinet in terms of their gun trading and so on?
Does the Minister think this has any bearing on the 
incidents?
An Ceann Comhairle: [Speaker of the House]
That has no relevance.
Dr Hillery: No, we have no interest in the British 
Government's interest in our Government.134
The force of these two factors —  the failure of Britain's
Northern Ireland policy and the dispositions of the new Government —
in combination, may be gauged from two actions by the Irish Government
in the spring and summer of 1970. The first was the transfer of five
hundred rifles, by the Ministry of Defence, to.the town of Dundalk,
just south of the Border, when it was feared that the Catholic community
135
might be endangered. The same fear prompted the second, which was 
Dr Hillery's 'secret' visit to Belfast on 6 July, and the response it 
drew from Ministers in Whitehall.
In the circumstances of the violence in Belfast which had preceded
136
the visit, Lynch termed it 'an initiative for peace'. An 
entirely different view was taken by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who found it
'a serious diplomatic discourtesy',
and
an error of judgement ... which ... has had 
the effect of making the task of everybody 
engaged in reconciliation more diff i c u l t.1 3 7
Yet, as with the mid-August 1969 crisis, Anglo-Irish relations 
suffered no lasting damage as a result of the actions and disclosures 
of this period. Indeed, if Callaghan's reaction to the Hillery visit 
was any indication of the bi-partisan approach to Northern Ireland at 
Westminster, they may have redounded to Lynch's advantage by
134 .
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138demonstrating the pressures he was operating under.
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What distinguishes these actions by the Irish Government, or by
members of it who may have acted independently, is that they were
responses to exceptional circumstances. Contemporary and considered
accounts of events in Derry and Belfast in August 1969, for example,
139
are virtually unanimous in this regard. This applies whether it
be in the reserved language of the Scarman Tribunal's Report that
there were 'six occaions [between March and August 1969] ... when
the police ... were seriously at fault' in their failure to discharge
their responsibilities and obligations, particularly with regard to
140
the Catholic community; or in the genocidal sentiments reported 
of a Unionist Senator in the members dining room at Stormont in 
August 1969:
If only the bloody British Army hadn't come in. 
we'd have shot ten thousand of them by dawn.141
Given the irredentist perceptions held by the Irish Government 
of the Catholic community in the North there were always strong 
arguments for it to act in a more interventionist manner -  as Rose 
observed:
One argument was moral: Catholics threatened with 
attack by arson or gunfire had a right to arms in self 
defence. A second was strategic: as Protestants were
1 38
Callaghan, then in Opposition, supported Lynch's 'initiative for 
peace' claim for the reason that Hillery's visit was arranged so as to 
pre-empt a proposed, and probably more inflamatory visit by Blaney
[A House Divided3 pp. 148-9).
139
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already armed, then Catholics required arms to maintain 
a balance of power. A third argument had immediate 
appeal in Dublin, because it was prudential: by 
supplying arms and training men in their use, the Irish 
Government could see that guns got into the 'right' rather 
than the 'wrong' hands.142
But, as Rose also notes, Dublin had to act with deference on this
single issue for fear of giving 'overt offence' to London over the
143
wider range of the two countries' bi-lateral relations. This 
required, therefore, the Irish Government to take the least disturbing 
options —  essentially compromises —  available to it at each juncture.
Thus the attempt to import arms into the Republic for 
distribution in the North must be seen as essentially a compromise, 
albeit a controversial one, between 'standing idly by', and the invasion
of the North earnestly sought by an influential bloc (Blaney, Boland and
\ 144
Haughey) within the Irish Cabinet. Even if this example is held to
be too fraught wi th doubts to be admitted as 'policy-directed', then the 
term compromise remains an appropriate description of what was under­
taken for the reason that the options, both of invasion and of the 
supply of arms to Northern Catholics, were finally rejected in favour 
of more humanitarian measures (such as the establishment of field
, 145
hospitals) and diplomatic initiatives.
That these actions were not only compromises, but that they were 
viewed by some as a betrayal of the 'Republican tradition' in Fianna 
Fail was confirmed by subsequent events. Kevin Boland, the former 
Minister for Local Government and Social Welfare, resigned from the
142
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A compromise was also effected between Britain and the Republic of 
Ireland at the United Nations, and a consideration of it is found in 
Chapter Five, 'The Ulster Question and the United Nations'.
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Party in November 1970 to found Aontact Eireann in order to
promote the traditional republican principles. From the North, the
Dublin regime became, as in MacDonagh's description, 'the god that
failed' - which had the effect of forcing the nationalist-Catholic
community back upon the general Irish tradition of alternative govern- 
147
ment; of seeking 'to create, so far as they might be, self- 
governing and mass-governed enclaves'.* ®
Equally, the term compromise applies to the actions taken in
July 1970: in the face of the violence promised by the forthcoming
Orange Parades Lynch did not press for their cancellation, but chose^
instead, after receiving assurances of maximum security for the
Catholics from Sir Alec Douglas-Home, to make an eloquent nationwide
149
plea for tolerance, re-unification and Anglo-Irish friendship.
It might be suggested that Ireland, out of a need to satisfy the 
requirements of Anglo-Irish relations in general, and indeed, to do 
v/hat would be most effectual, was required to drastically reduce its 
options vis-a-vis the North and this ensured that Britain was the sole 
beneficiary in any exchange. This, however, would be an overly 
cynical judgment for it would exaggerate the punitive capabilities 
which Britain clearly had regarding Ireland, at the expense of the 
joint concern which both shared over the province. As Keatinge 
observed in 1971:
Undoubtedly, both the Westminster and Dublin Governments 
have a common interest in restoring peace in the North, 
and the British government clearly has an interest in 
supporting moderate policies in the Republic; they are 
reluctant to say or do anything which might adversely 
effect Mr Lynch's domestic position. Both sides,
146
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therefore, have taken pains to keep the diplomatic 
channel open at all levels and to stress the 
existence of co-operative and constructive 
relations.
Furthermore, as the above passage suggested, a cynical judgment
would take no account of the real benefits to the Republic of
Ireland which accrued from a strategy of compromise and diplomacy.
During the period of the Labour Government (i.e. until June 1970), this
amounted to less than a full acceptance of the Republic as an actor
in Northern Ireland matters, but nevertheless, an implicit admission
that it would not be excluded from some measure of consultation 
151
altogether. Moreover, the statements of the shadow Home Secretary
(Hogg) offered some measure of support for the strategy, and the hope
that (what came to be known as) the 'Irish dimension' would be
152
recognised under a Conservative Government.
In the event, developments in the immediate period following the
June 1970 Conservative victory proved that hope to be less well-
153
founded than Hogg's statements may have promised. If less than 
full recognition was accorded the Irish dimension, there was at least
a record of outcomes in Northern Ireland which served to vindicate
154
the Irish Government's strategy. In August 1969, and, more so, in
Keatinge, 'Irish Foreign Policy', p. 63.
151
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For example, Hogg was not appointed by Prime Minister Edward Heath 
to the Home Office. The position was filled, instead, by Mr Reginald 
Maudling whose previous knowledge of, and enthusiasm for, his 
responsibilities in Northern Ireland was, perhaps, most accurately 
captured by his reported statement following a visit in June-July 1970:
For God's sake bring me a large Scotch. What a bloody 
awful country.
As cited in Sunday Times, Ulster, p. 213.
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July 1970, Lynch could justifiably associate his diplomatic 
initiatives with British policies for the amelioration of the 
conditions of the Catholic community.
Significantly it was from Lynch's 11 July 1970 address that the 
Irish Government's expl icitassumption of the role of 'second
156
guarantor' of the rights and safety of the Catholic community dates.
In addition, this partly reflected a growing sense of dissatisfaction
regarding the speed at which the civil rights reforms were being
implemented, and partly an apprehension concerning the consequences
1
of the approaching Orange Parades. Yet it also appeared to have 
its origins in a sense of optimism that Britain and Ireland, together, 
could create the pre-conditions for reconciliation between Irishmen, 
and for the reunification of the country.
There is a fund of goodwill between Ireland and Britain, 
derived from a surer and deeper understanding of each 
other, reached through quiet diplomacy and personal 
conversation. I am satisfied that it is intended to 
restore peace with justice in Northern Ireland and to do 
this quickly and generously as the situation demands.
I am confident that, when this is accomplished, the Irish, 
North and South, will themselves put an end to ignoble 
relics of ancient disagreements and create the conditions 
which will fully restore the Irish nation, in all its 
diversity and cultural r i c h n e s s . 159
On this basis, Anglo-Irish relations developed to include 
initiatives, towards medium-term goals which were 'intended to 
contribute towards a long-term solution, but could be embodied in
155
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policy in a less remote future'. ^ They included suggestions
concerning the 'constitutional' status of Northern Ireland and for
constitutional reform within the Republic,*^* and general proposals
for the expansion of functional co-operation between North and
South. But these proposals, in common with the entire strategy
of 'quiet diplomacy', were rendered inappropriate, even irrelevant,
by the internal dynamics of the situation at which they were, in
the first instance, directed. Almost co-incidentally, that situation
163
deteriorated throughout the twelve month period following July 1970.
It included a third phase of violence which began as early as January
1971 and culminated in the introduction of internment without trial 
on 9 August 1971.
Internment, or measures substantially similar to it, had been the
recourse of Governments in Ireland in times of emergency on at least
eight occasions since 1 9 1 6 . On all of them it had been introduced,
for the greater part of their respective durations, on an all-Ireland 
165
basis and, in 1971, it was generally accepted, by the Northern 
Ireland Cabinet, that this was a necessary condition if the measure 
was to be effective. For this reason it is strange that the Irish 
Government was neither approached by the British Government to
i fin
Keatinge, 'Irish Foreign Policy', p. 60.
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internment itself, nor advised of its introduction in the North
1 £-]
until after the operation had begun.
The most likely explanation for this appears to have been a
prevailing pessimism that the Irish Government would not agree to such
a proposal, from which it follows that internment was introduced by
the Stormont administration (but with Westminster's sanction) with the
168
fore-knowledge that it would fail. In the once again exceptional
circumstances the Taoiseach's reaction was predictable; publicly he
denounced internment as 'deplorable evidence of the political poverty
169
of the policies' which had been pursued in Northern Ireland and, 
privately, informed the British Ambassador to Ireland, Sir John Peck, 
that there was not the 'remotest possibility' of internment being 
introduced in the Republic.*7^
Several reasons may be advanced for this response. The Lawless 
decision of 1961;*7* a lack of comparable (to the Six Counties) IRA 
activity in the Republic; Lynch's desire, less than a year after the 
Arms Trial, not to further alienate either the more militant 
Republicans in his own Party, or the Northern Catholics; and possible 
public reaction to an extreme measure must all have been inhibiting 
factors. Yet in 1980, the Berry Papers again question the relevance 
of such conventional explanations. According to Berry, in November —  
December 1970, both the Taoiseach and the Minister for Justice,
John Peck, Dublin from Downing Street (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan,
1978), p. 127, (hereafter cited as Peck, Dublin from Downing Street). 
Donal Barrington ['After Sunningdale?', Administration 24 (Summer 1976): 
248] claims that prior to the introduction of internment in the North, 
the British Ambassador visited Lynch to request that it be introduced 
in the Republic simultaneously. Yet Peck is clear that he approached 
the Taoiseach only some hours after the round-up had begun.
168
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Peck, Dublin from Downing Street, p. 127. (The phrase quoted is 
that of Peck, not Lynch.)
A decision which resulted from a complaint filed with the European 
Commission of Human Rights by Gerard Lawless, a Republican prisoner 
interned in 1957. In it, the Commission ruled that it had the power to
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Desmond O'Malley, were intent on introducing internment to counter 
172
plans by Saor Eire to kidnap a number of senior Government
173
officials (including Berry himself). Contrary to the reasons 
cited above, one of the more persuasive factors in this proposal was 
the imminence of a by-election in Donegal
which Fianna Fail hoped to win with the help of a 
substantial Protestant vote which would be attracted 
by the Government's evident determination to put an 
end to violence.174
For a period of ten days after internment was introduced,
however, the Irish Government continued to respond in restrained
terms. In a major statement on 12 August 1971, Lynch explicitly
disavowed 'armed activity' in favour of 'determined political action',
which now had as an additional immediate objective, the replacement
175
of the Stormont Government by a power-sharing administration.
Although Lynch appeared to acknowledge the lack of effectiveness of
what he termed his Government's record of 'responsibility and 
176
restraint', he nevertheless appeared to have expected, as in times 
previous, a 'satisfactory response' to his statements.*77 When such a 
response was not forthcoming, and when it appeared that there was a 
'danger that the views of the Irish Government were to be excluded
pronounce on whether or not 'a state of emergency' exists, and hence, 
whether or not internment was justified (Sunday Times, Ulster, pp. 20-1).
172
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from consideration', the Taoiseach's concern became more urgent.
He abandoned the conventions of quiet diplomacy and reliance upon
the goodwill of the British Government for an approach referred
179
to as the 'diplomacy of protest'. Within this the Irish 
Government pursued a more forceful strategy in its relations 
with Britain and attempted, through an international campaign, to
influence other governments to support the objectives outlined in
180
Lynch's 12 August statements.
The first expression of this changed strategy, and of the
deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations, took the form of an exchange
of telegrams between the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister,
181
Edward Heath. The central point of Lynch's telegram stated:
In the event of the continuation of existing policies 
of attempting military solutions I intend to support 
the policy of passive resistance now being pursued
by the non-unionist p o p u l a t i o n . 182
[It is sometimes inferred from statements such as this that the Irish 
Government acted in the North through the agency of the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Lebow, for example, describes it as 
Jack Lynch's 'major vehicle of communication with the Northern
1 O')
Catholic community'. While the SDLP was 'well connected' with 
the Government of the Republic, it also enjoyed close relations with 
the British Labour Party and, later, with the Northern Ireland
178
This perception appears to have arisen after Faulkner, the Northern 
Ireland Prime Minister, had met with Edward Heath in London on 18 and
19 August 1971 without the latter having responded to Lynch's state­
ments of the 12th.
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Secretary, William Whitelaw. Thus, although there were instances.
185
in which the SDLP may have been strongly influenced, or even 
186
used, by the Irish Government, it also acted, on occasions,
187
independently and to the prospective embarrassment of Dublin.
According to Dr Garret Fitzgerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs
between 1973 and 1977, and now Leader of Fine Gael, no Irish
political party can afford to disregard the SDLP for fear of losing
188
support within the Republic. Moreover, it v/as his view that the 
SDLP, rather than getting their brief in Dublin, do their briefing 
in Dublin.189
In 1971, however, there v/as no requirement for the Irish
Government to be apprised of the situation by the SDLP; its reaction
was assured by its own perceptions of internment as an attempt at the
190
'outright-repression' of the Catholic community, and by the 
arrival within its borders of 'many thousands of refugee women and 
children'. 1
184
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Heath's reply, rather than acknowledging even the minimal Irish 
dimension which British behaviour implied existed until then, 
indicated a return to the exclusively domestic viewpoint of the 
Northern Ireland situation which prevailed prior to mid-August 1969.
Your telegram is unjustifiable in its contents, 
unacceptable in its attempt to interfere in the 
affairs of the United Kingdom and can in no way 
contribute to the solution of the problems of 
Northern Ireland.192
Similarly, Lynch's suggestion of a 'meeting of all the interested
193
parties' was rejected:
... I cannot accept that anyone outside the United 
Kingdom can participate in meetings designed to 
promote the political developments of any part of the 
United Kingdom.
For a short time, the British Prime Minister then appeared to
lend the Taoiseach's intervention a degree of both justification and
acceptability by inviting him for talks at his official country
estate. Chequers, on two occasions in September 1971. But an Anglo-
Irish summit had been scheduled even before internment (although not
for the same days as the eventual talks) and any appearance that Heath
195
was about to modify his position vis-a-vis Ireland was misleading.
On the first meeting, on 6 and 7 September, Peck noted:
1Q?
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The positions adopted by Mr Heath and Mr Lynch [were] 
very clearly set out in [their telegrams] ... it would 
be an abuse of the English language to describe the 
talks as negotiations. 196
Nor could the term be applied with any accuracy to the second, 
notwithstanding the fact that it followed only three weeks upon the 
first, and the presence of Brian Faulkner, the Northern Ireland Prime 
Minister. Its purpose, as defined by the Home Secretary, Reginald 
Maudling, was:
to make possible the frank exchange of views in depth 
between the three Prime Ministers and, against a 
background of mutual understanding, to enable the 
three Governments to work more effectively to improve 
the situation in Northern Ireland.
In the event, the talks concluded with only the first 
possibility —  the frank exchange of views —  a reality. As they were 
obituarised by one commentator
... the Chequers talks fizzled out ignominiously, with 
an agreement which, in effect, reported the existence 
of a common problem rather than any progress towards 
an agreed solution.19°
Any hope occasioned by references in the joint statement to the
existence of a 'greater' understanding between the three parties, or
to the agreement between Heath and Lynch to remain in 'close
communication', was clearly demonstrated by subsequent events to be
199
i11usory.
Peck writes of the situation in this period (late 1971) that it 
was 'by any standards confusing'. ^  If anything, this was a 
conservative judgment.
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In Britain, the Labour Party, which claimed to adhere to a 
bi-partisan approach on Northern Ireland, assumed a position which 
attempted to be sympathetic to the aspirations of the Irish Government 
while also rigidly supportive of the status quo. As Harold Wilson 
elaborated it:
I believe that the situation has now gone so far that 
it is impossible to conceive of an effective long­
term solution in which the agenda at least does not 
include consideration of, and which is not in some 
way directed to finding a means of achieving, the 
aspiration envisaged half a century ago, of progress 
towards a united Ireland, to which statesmen of all 
views in Northern Ireland have expressed their 
support, in the right conditions and on the right terms, 
within the parameters of the Attlee Declaration.201
(In passing, it might be noted that the imputation of support for Irish
unity from 'statesmen of all views in Northern Ireland' is, like his
earlier claim that political leaders in the Irish Republic, and leaders
of nationalist community in the North, had accepted that 'the Border
202
[was] not an issue', indicative of attitudes which existed in 
Wilson's statements rather than in the statements, writings and 
actions of those to whom they were attributed.)
Within the Government the confusion was apparent, heightened, and 
perhaps personified, in the statements of the Home Secretary.
What I am saying is that the issue in the battleline of 
politics may be the Border, but in reality it is not 
the Border, because everyone knows that the Border will 
not be changed in the foreseeable future ...203
If the logic of Maudling's claim is not readily apparent (and it was 
not to some of his 1 isteners) then this must be seen as the result 
of his attempt to promote, for both communites in Northern Ireland
201
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an active, permanent and quaranteed position in ... 
life and public affairs 205
from the exclusive standpoint of one only:
... one cannot create a cohesive Government if people 
... are not prepared to accept the will of the 
majority on the fundamental point about the Border 
which people have always accepted in this country.206
His advice to the other, minority community was, as he explained it
... a variant on [the] theme of putting the Border 
on one side for a time and meanwhile getting on and 
working together to restore the life of Northern
Ireland.207
The idea of Irish unity v/as, in any case, seen by Maudling as 
1 radical' , ^ b u t  by Heath as 'understandable' and ' 1 egitimate'209_ 
if somewhat irrational. This last mentioned perception was recorded 
in an interview with Anthony Lewis of the New York Times.
The people in Northern Ireland are different in type 
and religion from the South. There is no historical 
or logical justification for saying that it must be 
one country; you might as well say Spain ought to 
absorb Portugal, and so o n . 210
In sum, there existed, in late 1971 at WeSfainster, the rudiments 
of a debate on the Ulster Question, but it was a debate which as well 
as being confusing in itself, was also truncated. On the Labour side
?ns
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 823, 22 September 1971, 
col. 4.
206 ibid., cols. 15-16.
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House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 827, 29 November 1971, 
col. 38.
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Heath, Speech at the Guildhall, 15 November 1971, as cited in 
Times, 16 November 1971.
210
As cited in Irish Times, 28 February 1972.
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this was due to its avoidance of the irreconcilability of Irish 
unity (this century, anyway) with the Attlee Declaration; on the 
Government side it was a result of its manifest inability to 
maintain a consistent argument even in support of the status quo.
It hardly represented a bi-partisan approach, but then as one 
observer (Simon Winchester of the Guardian) of the Northern Ireland 
scene in this period noted:
it was bipartisan simply because neither party had 
the faintest idea what to do with Ireland, and the 
policies that were shared were policies of ignorance.211
Insofar as an operating principle can be discerned in these
policies it was in the form of a negative. The prospect of
possible Irish unity, even if the majority of people in Northern
Ireland were to express their desire for it within the terms of the
Attlee Declaration, was not to be encouraged. Heath stated only that,
if ever they did, 'I do not believe any British Government would 
212
stand in the way.1
The claim of a state of a state of confusion, alluded to earlier 
by Peck, was therefore understandable. So, too, was the feeling of 
frustration and deep dissatisfaction in Dublin. And as the following 
extract by the Fine Gael leader Liam Cosgrave indicated, it was 
widespread:
It is no exaggeration to say that British policy 
towards Ireland has been characterised for centuries, 
and for the last 50 years, at times by malice, at 
times by ignorance, but almost always by stupidity and 
that stupidity has been shown clearly in recent actions
—  let me be impartial in this —  by all British political 
parties. It is illusory to imagine we will get a bit 
more out of one than out of another. Once you scratch 
them they are all the same. There are some individual
Simon Winchester, In Holy Terror : Reporting the Ulster Troubles 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1974), p. 177.
212
Heath, Speech at the Guildhall, 15 November 1971, as cited in 
the Times3 16 November 1971; and Peck, Dublin from Downing Street3 
p. 135.
exceptions to this, though most of them give vent 
to these views when they are out of office rather 
than when they are in it.“3
In the remaining five months of the period under review, 
Anglo-Irish relations reached their lowest level since the Republic 
had been proclaimed, in 1949. The diplomacy of protest which the 
Irish Government had taken recourse to in the wake of internment was 
continued; indeed, from an Irish perspective, reinforced, by two 
further incidents in British security operations in Northern Ireland.
The first concerned the decision of the Irish Govenrment,
in November 1971, to file with the European Commission of Human
Rights, an application in accordance with Article 24 of the European
214
Convention of Human Rights. In general terms, the Irish Government
submitted a series of complaints against the British Government
alleging breaches of the Convention —  the most publicised being
215
allegations of torture, or inhuman and degrading treatment. This 
action arose from the introduction of internment in general, and 
out of allegations made by some of those arrested, of ill-treatment 
by the security forces during their arrest, interrogation and period 
of confinement.
Reports of these allegations were carried, initially, in Irish 
newspapers, and subsequently, in the newspapers of Northern Ireland 
and Britain, which prompted the establishment of an inquiry by the
p 1 r
British Government. The reports based on these inquiries 
concluded that 'questioning in depth by means of the five techniques 
constituted physical ill-treatment, that certain other actions taken 
in regard to prisoners constituted measures of ill-treatment or of
75 .
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unintended hardship, but that in no case had any of the ...
217
complainants suffered physical brutality.' For reasons relating
to their terms of reference, conduct, and conclusions, the Irish
Government found them unsatisfactory. Its concern, stated the
218
Tanaiste, was 'not in any way ... alleviated by the Compton
219
Report', and persisted in its case accordingly. Given the lengthy 
procedures involved at Strasbourg, this ensured that the 'interstate 
case' became the source of occasional friction and intermittent 
embarrassment between Britain and Ireland until the judgment of the 
Court was handed down in January 1978.
The second incident was 'Bloody Sunday', the response to which 
was determined by the general circumstances prevailing in Northern 
Ireland as well as the particular circumstances of the shootings in 
Derry.
What swept the country at the end of January and in 
early February as a great wave of emotion, compounded 
of grief, shock, and a sort of astonished incredulous 
rage against an England which seemed to be acting in 
the way we often accused her of acting but of which we 
had not, for decades, really believed modern England
capable.220
Thus, the Irish Minister for Finance, Mr George Colley, concluded that
... Mr Faulkner, the Security Committee and the 
relevant British Ministers must have approved of a 
contingency plan which led to what happened in Derry.221
Report of the Enquiry into allegations against the security forces 
of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of events on the 
9th August 1971> Cmnd. 4823 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1971), pp. 71-2.
218
Tanaiste —  Deputy Prime Minister: in Irish, literally 'heir 
apparent'.
219
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 257, 23 November 1971, col. 2.
220
Cruise O'Brien, States of Ireland3 p. 264. See also Bowyer Bell,
The Secret Army3 pp. 384-5.
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c Dail Eireann, Official Report3 vol. 258, 4 February 1972, 
col. 1177.
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This mood, unified and condemnatory, dema nded an appropriate 
expression by the Irish Government —  inevitably so if the initiative
was not to pass to the IRA, whose response would assuredly not be
222
diplomatic. But Lynch, while holding to a belief that British
Army repression of Catholic areas had been the primary cause of the
223
situation which Bloody Sunday culminated in, was also concerned that
the nation should express its grief and its support for the minority
224
community with 'dignity and restraint'. This, however, was
complicated by the lack of reliable information the Irish Government
possessed in regard to the incident: as Mr Colley's statement
suggests, and as Dr Hillery later confirmed, there was doubt in
Dublin as to whether it had resulted from an accident or from an act
225
of deliberate policy. Nevertheless, in accordance with both 
concerns the Irish Government made four proposals to the British 
Government, as follows:
(i) an immediate withdrawal of British troops from 
Derry and Catholic ghettos elsewhere in the North and 
cessation of harassment of the minority population;
(ii) an end to internment without trial;
(iii) a declaration of Britain's intention to achieve 
a final settlement of the Irish Question and the
226
convocation of a conference for that purpose; and
222
The IRA, Official and Provisional, did take 'retaliatory' action 
but, in the period following Bloody Sunday, sympathy for the victims 
in Derry appears not to have implied, or resulted in, support for that 
organisation. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Armyy pp. 384-5; and Cruise 
O'Brien, States of Ireland, pp. 265-7.
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 258, 3 February 1972, col. 911.
224
ibid., col. 909.
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Report of an interview with the President-elect, Dr Patrick 
Hillery, on RTE, 12 November 1976. Irish Times, 13 November 1976, p.14. 
(Hereafter cited as Hillery Interview)
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Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 258, 1 February 1972, col. 825.
(iv) the amendment of Northern Ireland Legislation 
to include, specifically, the provisions which would 
secure the equal treatment of persons in the 
enforcement of the law and prohibit discrimination in 
the exercise of various voting rights, access to 
employment in government and semi-government bodies,
227
housing allocation, and access to the public service.
In addition, funds were promised 'for political and peaceful action
by the minority ... designed to obtain their freedom from Unionist
228
misgovernment.' Ireland, furthermore, withdrew its ambassador
229
from London, but Britain, whose Embassy had been fired, albeit by 
a small group acting under the cover of a large demonstration, 
maintained its representative (Sir John Peck) in Dublin.
On the international diplomatic front an offensive was mounted
with two purposes. The first was to focus world attention on the civil
rights meeting in Newry the following week so as to ensure that there
230
would be no repetition of what happened in Derry. The second was
to obtain support for the Irish proposals. To these ends the Irish
Foreign Minister undertook a tour of Western Europe and the United
231
States which was reinforced by a propaganda campaign contracted out
232
to the Swiss public relations agency Mark Press.
78
ibid., cols. 912-13. This fourth proposal was added two days 
after the first three, and appears above in a summarised form.
228 • i • i •, QOr
ibid. , col. 826.
229
ibid., col. 910. This action did not constitute the breaking 
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Hillery Interview, Irish Times, 13 November 1976, p. 14.
231
This tour is discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Ten.
232
This campaign did not relate solely to Bloody Sunday and its 
aftermath. Mark Press's initial contract ran from 15 November 1971, 
and would appear to have been established as a result of the 
introduction of internment. Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 262, 
13 July 1972, col. 1618.
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It was in this area of international diplomacy that the 
language used by Dr Hillery was in sharp relief to the dignity and 
restraint so besought by the Taoiseach. At the United Nations the 
Foreign Minister condemned the 'lunatic policies' followed by Britain 
in Northern Ireland and accused it of escalating aggression with a
military policy consisting of 'torture, internment, and the shooting
233
of unarmed civilians'. Not surprisingly, this drew one of the 
sharpest replies of this first period from the British Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home.
I must give a warning to the Irish Government that 
if they were to maintain the attitude they have taken
—  for example, Dr Hillery's speeches in New York 
yesterday —  they could do serious and lasting damage 
to the relationship between our two c o u n t r i e s . ^34
Clearly, this reflected British annoyance not only with the
language used by Hillery but also with the attempts by the Irish
Government to bring its case before a wider, and they feared, an
inevitably hostile audience. Yet the developing animus between
Britain and Ireland was arrested in the short term, by the relatively
uneventful passing of the Newry demonstration which had been arranged
to protest against Bloody Sunday. On this event, according to
Dr Hillery, he reverted to 'private diplomacy' in putting his
235
Government's case on Northern Ireland.
* In the Anglo-Irish imbroglio which existed that was an 
achievement. Indeed, it is deserving of comment that the Northern 
Ireland situation did not, even infrequently or with low intensity,
give rise to the 'conflict of arms' between Britain and Ireland which
7
Hillery feared it could. The reasons for suggesting the possibility, 
if not the probability of such an exchange lay in the nature of the
233
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Hillery Interview, Irish Times, 13 November 1976.
236 Report of an interview on US television, 2 February 1972, as
cited in the Times, 3 February 1972.
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Northern conflict as a 'transnational security challenge' and the
238
occurrence within this of what Keatinge called 'awkward incidents', 
and Peck 'reasons for widespread and justifiable irritation in London 
and Bel fast'.
From a Dublin perspective these evolved from the 'Northern 
brethren' perception of the minority community in the North, and the 
general unacceptability of the British Army in the Six Counties, to 
include a concern with virtually every facet of British military 
policy in the province. It was expressed over such matters as the
deployment of (predominantly Protestant) Scottish Regiments in Catholic
240 241
areas, the partiality of arms searches, the large number of
242
licensed guns held by the Northern population, and the disfavour
243
with which the formation of the Ulster Defence Regiment was regarded.
Hence, the concern tended to reflect the change in role of the British
Army in Northern Ireland from primarily a peace-keeping force to that
of an army in support of the Unionist Government. It therefore came
to include not only a ’concern with the boarding of trawlers (mentioned 
. ?44
earlier), but also with incursions by British forces into the 
territory of the Republic while on patrol, or in pursuit of the IRA, 
and the cratering and spiking of cross-Border roads so as to make them
237
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Keatinge, Issues in Irish Foreign Policy3 p. 122.
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impassable. As regards the former, in early February 1972, the Irish
Government claimed that a total of 46 incursions and 27 overflights
had been made since August 1969. Of some of these occasions the very
least which could be said, if British replies that they were
accidental are to be accepted, is that they denoted not only an
extremely poor ability at practical map-reading, but also a standard
245
of visual acuity not normally found in serving soldiers. Thus,
although the Border is, as some members of the Dail admitted, difficult
246
to locate, there were occasions when it appeared to the Irish
Government that the incursion in question could not be other than 
247
deliberate.
Perhaps predicatably, there was neither the substantial 
acceptance of the allegations made by each government concerning the 
forces of the other (a very few incursions were reported of Irish 
troops), nor of the arithmetic upon which they were based. Yet for all 
that, the majority of incursions and Border violations were relegated 
to the 'trivia' of Anglo-Irish relations. As Peck recalled:
Week after week, it seems in retrospect —  perhaps less 
often, but at any rate with tedious regularity - one of 
us [from the British Embassy! would go down and trade a 
bundle of complaints, regrets, promises to investigate, 
requests for information. A British armoured car had 
invaded Irish sovereign territory. A helicopter had 
invaded Irish air space. Irish villagers had filled in
For example, on 25 January 1971, units of the British forces 
crossed the Border near Swanlinbar, Co. Cavan, on the main road 
between Enniskillen and Longford, despite the fact that there were 
tourist signs indicating to motorists that they were leaving Northern 
Ireland.
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 251, 10 February 1971, col.989; 
and Times, 31 August 1971, p. 1.
247
ibid., and Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 256, 27 October 
1971, col. 284. Sometimes they were even humorous: on the morning of
23 July 1970, 22 British soldiers, in uniform, arrived by ferry at Dun 
Laoghaire, near Dublin, en route to duty in Northern Ireland. They 
had been sent, according to Peck, 'by some transport officer from a 
bygone age', and were required, for his sins, to change into civilian 
dress and return to Britain for a less embarrassing attempt to rejoin 
their regiment. Peck, Dublin from Downing Street, pp. 46-7; and 
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 248, 29 July 1970, cols. 2403-04.
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a crater in Northern Ireland. It isn't in Northern 
Ireland. It is. It isn't. Why didn't the Irish 
police catch those gunmen in the Cortina? (True 
answer —  it goes quicker than one unarmed policeman 
on a bicycle). The Department of Justice has fully 
investigated your complaints of six weeks ago and 
finds them unfounded. The British Army has made a 
detailed enquiry and can find no evidence that any 
unit had come within five miles of the Border on the 
day in question. The regiment concerned is now in West 
Germany.
a j 248And so on.
But in Anglo-Irish relations, 'trivia', especially 'trivia' 
concerned with the security situation, frequently assumed a 
significance which was out of all proportion to the particular event 
in question. Furthermore, it did so in an unpredictable fasion. Some 
instances, ostensibly serious, resulted in brief and almost diplomatic 
exchanges; others, to all appearances of a less serious nature, loomed 
large and were disruptive. This, moreover, was to be a constant 
feature of Anglo-Irish relations. Indeed, much of the analysis of 
them in the following pages is concerned with the ways in which the 
recurring, and inconclusive debate on security matters was manipulated 
and distorted to the (usually short-term) detriment of Anglo-Irish 
relations in general. The following instances illustrate both the 
characteristics outlined above —  and some of their unintended 
consequences.
On 29 August 1971 two Ferret armoured scout-cars crossed into
the Irish Republic on an unapproved road in the vicinity of Hackball's
249
Cross, Co. Louth. Accounts provided by the British and Irish
Governments, respectively, differ in detail from each other but it is
a matter of record that the scout-cars were blocked from returning
across the Border, one of them set ablaze, and the other then allowed
250
to return with the crew of the first on board. Upon crossing the
Peck, Dublin from Downing Street} p. 125.
249
Irish Times, 1 September 1971, pp. 1 and 8; and Times,
30 August 1971, p. 1.
250
The burned vehicle was stockaded by the Irish Government an^ l 
returned to the British authorities on 11 September 1971. Dail Eareann, 
Official Report, vol. 256, 4 November 1971, cols. 1257-8.
83
attack, in the course of which it received fire and casualties were 
251
incurred. According to the British account this attack was mounted
from both sides of the Border; by the Irish account, the soldiers
252
were shot by fire originating from within the Six Counties.
Nevertheless, despite extremist pressure upon both Governments,
particularly the British, this incident was not, of itself, permitted
to exacerbate the already strained relations between the two countries.
It did, however, point to an important implication of Border
violations, one that was probably not foreseen and certainly one that
could not be conceded by the British Government if it was to maintain
its claim that the Northern Ireland situation was essentially domestic,
i.e. that cross-Border violence (as opposed to incursions') could be
construed, as Ireland had argued at the United Nations, as a threat to
253
international peace and security. Subsequent actions tended to 
undermine the British position even more.
In 1971, the decision was taken by the British Government to
crater, and otherwise render impassable, cross-Border roads. By the
end of that year, 121 unapproved crossings had been cratered or
254
spiked. As a means of preventing the transfer of arms and material
from the Republic to the North, it was a counter-productive measure.
It resulted in an almost comical (were it not for the seriousness of
the situation) cycle of crater-filling (by the local population) and
255
re-cratering (by the British Army) activities which could have no
Border into Northern Ireland this vehicle came under a second
251 Irish Times3 1 September 1971, pp. 1 and 8; and the Times>
30 August 1971, p. 1.
252
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other effect than to generate, unintentionally, support for the IRA 
on both sides of the Border. As Conor Cruise O'Brien recounted:
As the border generally runs through homogeneously 
Catholic territory —  having been drawn at a time of 
maximum Protestant influence -  the cratering was equally 
resented on both sides of the border, both because of 
its practical inconvenience, and because of a more 
basic biological feeling about a relationship to the 
soil: the foreigner was deliberately inflicting wounds 
on our land.256
Cruise O'Brien emphasises that this was not a fanciful inference
257
taken from his visit to the Border areas which is confirmed by the
attention cratering received from the Irish Government. Throughout
late 1971 the policy from which it stemmed was frequently denounced,
by Opposition and Government alike, in terms more vehement than those
used to describe internment, and which were repeated, albeit less
frequently, in reference to only one other occasion —  Bloody Sunday.
Thus, it was seen by the Fine Gael Leader, Liam Cosgrave, as a
258
'lunatic enterprise' — a view that was shared by the Foreign 
259
Minister, Hillery — and by the Minister for Transport and Power, 
Brian Lenihan, as an inconvenient and generally futile exercise 
conducted by 'stupid, bovine people in the Stormont and Westminster 
regimes' . ^
In Dublin, therefore, cratering was regarded as 'a most 
serious situation' in which the respective Governments were taking
Cruise O'Brien, States of Ireland3 p. 260.
257 . . . .
ibid., note.
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Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 257, 1 December 1971, 
cols. 1061-8. Although Hillery also found cratering to be 'folly'
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to 'lunatic' (or lunacy.) -  which finds expression no less than seven 
times in this short adjournment debate.
ibid., col. 570. Lenihan later succeeded Hillery as Foreign 
Minister and was, on this occasion, replying in that Minister's absence.
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'totally opposing attitudes'. For this reason it may be something
of a triumph that, while the Irish Government were to claim in early
1972 that 'gas canisters, smoke bombs and bullets' have been fired
by British troops at people on the Republican side of the Border,
there is no record of other than insults having been exchanged between
British and Irish forces placed in antagonistic positions in the
263
execution of their orders.
From a British Government perspective its Border interdiction 
policy was justified by an imposing body of evidence and by the 
obvious impracticability admitted to by Maudling, of closing the
264
Border over which the IRA was held to be travelling with impunity. 
Initially this attitude resulted from
... the notorious fact that the chief of staff of the 
Provos, Sean Mac Stiofain, ... lived openly (till May
1972) in the Republic, and that I.R.A. communiques, 
claiming or disclaiming responsibility for the latest 
bombings and killings in the north, issued in a steady 
stream from headquarters in Dublin [which] seemed to 
prove the hollowness of Mr Lynch's repeated condemnation
of violence.265
Moreover, it was exacerbated by some 157 border incidents alleging
266
'violence originating south of the Border' and by 'occasions when 
shooting occurred and the Gardai [sic] or the Irish Army unaccountably
261
Hillery, ibid., col. 1064.
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For example, at Mullanahinch on 19 March 1972, Dail Eireann,
Official Report3 vol. 259, 23 March 1972, col. 2338.
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For example, the 'Munnelly Bridge episode', as cited by Deputy 
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failed to play as vigorous a role as might be hoped1.
Nevertheless, the force of this claim was diminished by the 
realistic acknowledgements, by both Labour and Conservative Governments,
that the IRA were 'as much an enemy to the Republic of Ireland as to
268
the Stormont Government'. Moreover, and to the delight of the
Irish Government, Lord Windlesham, the Conservative Minister of State
at the Home Office, undermined the stated necessity for such policies
as cratering by stating that there were 'relatively few crossings by
269
terrorists' of the Border. This in turn was consistent with the
270
view held by the Taoiseach, by former Home Secretary, James
271
Callaghan, and by the British Ambassador for most of the first
272
period, that the IRA's activities were less dependent upon support
from the Republic than they were on the persistent feeling of the
Catholic community in Northern Ireland that their social, economic,
and political rights were being systematically denied and indefinitely 
273
postponed.
Out of discretion and sound political sense this understanding 
of the Northern situation was never allowed to imply recognition of 
the IRA, in either the Republic or Northern Ireland, as a legitimate
267
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Mr An^nony Royle, on behalf of the Secretary of State for Foreion 
and Commonwealth Affairs, House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 828, 
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The Minister of State for Defence, Lord Balneil, House of Commons, 
Official Report3 vol. 823, 23 September 1971, col. 208. For a previous 
statement, by Prime Minister Wilson, and in agreement with this see 
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 800, 30 April 1970, col. 1447.
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actor. Notwithstanding the former, a central element in British
attitudes to cross-Border violence which re-emerged in this period
was that the Irish Government, through the default of the Garda
Siochana and the Irish Army, was declining to face an open challenge
to the authority of the state by armed usurpers. Surprisingly, in
the circumstances, the Irish Government held that the British were
also remiss in this regard —  in one case involving the Leader of
Her Majesty's Opposition, Harold Wilson —  inexusably. Until early
1972, with a conviction bordering on piety, British Ministers
proclaimed their refusal to negotiate, or even meet, members of
274
either Official or Provisional persuasion of the IRA. It was
significant, therefore, that in 1972, the IRA was not an illegal
organisation in Britain, nor were there any restrictions upon the
British electronic media from broadcasting material supplied by, or
interviews with spokesman of, the two organisations. Given the heavy
penetration of the east coast of Ireland by programmes of British
origin, this situation effectively resulted in the media services
in, and of, One friendly nation broadcasting material which was
275
prohibited within the second and moreover, which v/as intended
276
to undermine the authority of the State therein.
Callaghan, A House Divided, p. 103; Wilson, House of Commons, 
Official Report, vol. 826, 25 November 1971, col. 1572; and 
Maudling, House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 823, 22 September 
1971, col. 4. But not quite pious for, in Northern Ireland, senior 
military officers and the Chief Constable of the RUC had frequently 
to talk to the IRA in the execution of government policy. Sunday 
Times, Ulster, pp. 153-7, and p.236.
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For two of the most lucid accounts of the issues involved in this 
matter, from an Irish Government perspective, see the following two 
addresses by the then Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Dr Conor 
Cruise O'Brien.
1. Speech by the Minister in the Irish Senate on the introduction
of the Broadcasting Authority (Amendment) Bill, 27 March 
1975; and
2. Keynote Address to the Dublin Symposium on Direct Satellite 
Broadcasting organised by the European Space Agency and the 
European Broadcasting Union, 23 May 1977.
Both appear in Conor Cruise O'Brien, Herod: Reflections on Political 
Violence (London: Hutchinson, 1978), pp. 110-27, and pp. 141-54, 
repectively.
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with prominent members of the Provisional IRA on 13 March 1972 was
seen by former Minister for Foreign Affairs and current Leader of
277
Fine Gael, Dr Garret Fitzgerald, as a 'treacherous act' .  Wilson
claimed, of course, that he met with Provisional Sinn Fein and at the
278
initiative of a member of the Irish Labour Party. But if there was
ever an instance which confirmed Cruise O'Brien's description of that
organisation as 'the open, civilian legal expression of a secret and
279
illegal army', this occasion at Inchicore, Dublin , did so. Those
he met were Joe Cahi 11 ,^^John  K e l l y , a n d  Daithi 0 Conail 1:^®^
little wonder, then, that Provision Chief of Staff Sean MacStiofain
283
described them as 'our people'.
It was for this reason that Harold Wilson's lengthy meeting
Garret Fitzgerald, 'Five Years of British muddle', Sunday Times,
18 December 1978.
278
Times3 21 March 1972, p. 8. The member of the Irish Labour 
Party in question was almost certainly Dr John O'Connell, but whether 
he initiated the meeting is doubtful. Conor Bruise O'Brien records 
only that O'Connell 'acted as intermediary' [States of Ireland, p. 269), 
while Sean MacStiofain [Memoirs of a Revolutionary (n .p . :  Gordon 
Cremonesi, 1975), p. 239, (hereafter cited as MacStiofain, Memoirs)] 
claims that it v/as at Wi 1 son's request the meeting took place.
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Cruise O'Brien, States of Irelands p. 308.
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One time Provo Leader in Belfast, later to be jailed for his part 
in the 1973 'Claudia' (cargo vessel) arms smuggling attempt.
P81
Belfast IRA. One of the defendants in the 1970 Arms Trial.
Served six years in Crumlin Road jail for possessing arms and ammunition 
during the abortive 1956-62 IRA campaign.
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In 1971, the Adjutant-General of the Provisionals. Later, if not 
in March 1972, a member of the 7-man Army Council which formulated the 
policy on IRA campaigns: and to become Provisional Chief of Staff.
MacStiofain, M e m o i r s p. 239.
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first, and in direct contradiction to his own presence, to make clear
to Sinn Fein that violence would achieve no political objectives;
second, to advise them that no British Government could accept the
terms of their peace plan; third, to propose a truce when the
anticipated British ' initiative1 was made; and fourth, to request that
• ?84
the spokesmen of the minority community be free from intimidation.
In view of the Leader of the Opposition's dramatic interest in
285
solutions to the Irish Question, it is reasonable to include Cruise 
O'Brien's claim that Wilson also sought an extension of the 72-hour
ooc
truce which the IRA had called on 10 March.
This truce, however;, had been called by the IRA to demonstrate
that it was 'under effective control and discipline';  that as a result,
it expected 'a positive response' from the British Government to its
287
revised Republican peace terms and, finally, in tacit recognition
that Wilson's visit would be more easily facilitated during a lull in
288
military operations. From IRA accounts it is clear that Wilson's 
visit was never likely to presage an indefinite suspension of 
operations but he appeared not to have understood this sufficiently.
289
Dave [Daithi U Connaill] told me afterwards that in 
political terms the meeting was quite unproductive . . .
Wilson seemed to be more concerned with creating a 
favourable image, behaving in a hearty manner, slapping 
the three of us on the back and using words like 
'bloody' and 'Christ'.  Presumably, he thouoht the 
Provisionsals swore this way.
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Times, 21 September 1971, p. 8.
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For example his 15-point plan for the constitution of a United 
Ireland. House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 826, 25 November 1971, 
cols. 1571-93; and his decision, in December 1971, to assume the 
spokesmanship on Northern Ireland.
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Cruise O'Brien, States of Irelands p. 268.
oo 7
MacStiofain, Memoirss pp. 238-9.
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Maria McGuire, To Take Arms: A Year in the Provisional IRA (London 
and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1973), p. 101, (hereafter cited as McGuire,
To Take Arms).
289
In some texts, Daithi 0 Connaill is referred to by his Anglicised 
name — Dave O'Connell.
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According to Wilson his purpose in meeting the IRA was fourfold:
McGuire, To Take Arms3 p. 101.
90
Rather, the 'Inchicore summit' adds strength to Richard Crossman's 
characterisation of the (then) Prime Minister during the period of 
his intense desire to visit Ulster in April 1969.
He has a passion for being on the spot, being in 
the news. Perhaps that isn't fair. It is, rather, 
that he sees himself influencing events personally.
He wants to be active in international affairs rather 
in the way that he has stopped one or two strikes at 
home.291
In the injudicious indulgence of this passion he clearly exceeded 
the bounds of candour and courtesy in Anglo-Irish relations.
According to Bowyer Bell, Wilson
. . .  left the impression that a satisfactory end to the 
Provos struggle was in sight. He also left an outraged 
Irish Government which had, as Dave O'Connell gleefully 
pointed out, been used as a cover for the meeting with 
the Provos. The Provos were now in the big time 
politically. At a minimum they had veto power and at 
best they had bombed themselves ahead of Lynch in the 
queue to the bargaining table.292
Further, as Cruise O'Brien noted
It must be conceded that here the IRA had a point.
Mr Wilson, like many another British statesman before 
him, was helping the argument of those in Ireland who 
hold that power must come from the barrel of a gun.
And he did so, at a moment when that power was 
beginning to wilt from that which alone can cause it 
to wilt — the disapproval of the people of whom the 
gunmen were part. In other words — that is, using 
another metaphor of Chairman Mao's — this untoward 
visit came at a moment when 'the water' was just 
beginning to turn a little unhealthy for 'the fish' 
of the guerrilla. The 'Inchicore summit' put a little 
sparkle back into the water again . . .  3
291
Richard Howard Stafford Crossman, The diaries of a Cabinet 
Minister vol. 3: Secretary of State for Social Services (New York: 
Holt Rinehard and Winston, 1977), p. 458.
292
Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army, p. 386.
293
Cruise 0;Brien, States of Ireland3 p. 268.
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The full implications of this meeting, unintended though they
were, were felt at a later date. Perhaps fortunately, it occurred
at a time when Anglo-Irish relations could hardly have been worse, and
were pre-occupied with the anticipation of an 'initiative' on
Northern Ireland by the British Government. In these conditions the
immediate effect was to establish a precedent, later to be repeated
by Wilson, and followed by Northern Ireland Ministers William Whitelaw
and Merlyn. Rees, of treating with the IRA. Reflection upon it was
postponed, and then over-shadowed by the prorogation of Stormont on
24 March 1972 — an objective which had been sought by the Irish
Government since the introduction of internment without trial. Even
if anti-British sentiments in the Republic were not completely
dissipated by this measure, or that it was, in Dublin terms,
294
incomplete, expressions of displeasure with particular British
politicians were rendered inappropriate in the atmosphere of goodwill
295
and optimism which prorogation injected into Anglo-Irish relations.
294
Incomplete because it v/as not accompanied by a power-sharing 
administration as Lynch had proposed in his 12 August 1971 statement 
(see p. 67-8).
295
The Taoiseach had been advised by the British Ambassador in early 
February that rumours of an initiative 'were not totally unfounded' 
(although its specific form remained unknown) and further, was advised 
of the prorogation of Stormont the day before it was announced. Peck,
Dublin from Downing Street, pp. 142 and 144.
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The prorogation of Stormont was one of the hallmark events of 
modem Irish history: it compassed for all the justifiable criticism 
that could be levelled against the institution itself, the death of 
an Irish Parliament. Moreover, prorogation, and the further 
polarisation of the two Northern communities which followed it, 
dominated not merely Irish politics but Anglo-Irish relations as well.
Every political group in the North underwent a dramatic change. 
Foremost to be affected were the Unionists. For them the abolition 
of what had been, in effect, their Parliament, signalled the 
fragmentation of their once apparently monolithic power structure.
The Official Party continued to be led by the former Prime Minister, 
Brian Faulkner, but it was in reality no more than a remnant of what 
it had been. On the one hand, some of the more ’liberal' Unionists 
distanced themselves from a Party which they saw as incapable of 
providing a focus for political progress on communal lines, while on 
the other, the extremist Vanguard movement emerged to rally the 
disaffected who were in no way disposed to accommodate Catholic/ 
Nationalist aspirations.
The anti-Unionists, however, were not immune from fissiparous 
tendencies. The old Nationalist Party was rendered virtually defunct 
in 1973 while liberal/Catholic support for the Northern Ireland 
Labour Party (NILP) was withdrawn in favour of the moderate non­
sectarian (but still Unionist) Alliance Party. In both cases the 
chief beneficiary was the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), 
founded in 1970y which had risen to be the principal opposition 
Party in the North.
Nevertheless it was between these widely divergent shades of 
opinion, and the Northern Ireland Secretary, William Whitlow, that 
continuous discussions were held in search of the conditions under 
which home rule might be restored to the Province. In September 1972 
they culminated in a conference in Darlington, County Durham, attended 
by three of the seven Northern Ireland political parties invited — the 
Ulster Unionist Party, the Alliance Party, and the Northern Ireland
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Labour Party. (The SDLP3 Nationalist Party3 Republican Labour 
Party3 and. Democratic Unionist Party were not present because of 
their non-fulfilment of various conditions they had stipulated 
for their attendance).
As the list of absentees foreshadowed, this conference was not 
a. particularly productive exercise. It did3 however, in October 19723 
lead, to the publication of a discussion paper which reviewed the 
background, set out the proposals made up to that time by Northern 
Ireland political parties and other interests, established the basic 
factors — political, economic, and security — which would have to be 
taken into account in moving towards a settlement, and stated the 
criteria which firm proposals for the future would have to meet. * 
Subsequent consultations held between the Northern Ireland Secretary 
and a wide range of political parties (including SDLP) and other 
groups and individuals in the Province failed to produce any single 
agreed set of proposals for a constitutional settlement3 but to the 
British Government, they did suggest
the possibility that important aspects of a settlement 
could be framed in a way likely to gain the acceptance 
of the Northern Ireland people as a whole. 2
Of particular significance for Anglo-Irish relations was the
recognition of what the Discussion Paper called the 'Irish Dimension’.
Essentially this was an attempt to reconcile the Attlean guarantee of
1948 with, the reality of (the country of) Ireland’s geographic and
economic integrity, and the need to accommodate the legitimate
3
aspirations of the minority community.
It should, be emphasised that these developments took place 
against a backdrop of endemic violence. Internment, as was noted in 
the previous chapter, did not prevent either the Official or
The Future of Ndrthem Ireland: A Paper for Discussion (London: 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972), hereafter referred to as
Discussion Paper, 1972.
2
Northern. Ireland, Central Office of Information Pamphlet 135,
2nd ed. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979), p. 14, 
(hereafter cited as Northern Ireland).
3
Discussion Paper, 19723 pp. 33-4.
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in their campaign against the British presence — indeed, it
escalated the conflict to a higher level of violence than had
existed prior to August 1971. Ironically, both wings of the IRA
were also involved in a struggle for supremacy which bred its own
internecine violence. A truce, however, enabled them to renew their
main campaigns but with the announcement (and subsequent observance)
by the Officials of a ceasefire on 29 May 1972, the initiative and
responsibility for operations against the British passed almost
exclusively to the Provisionals. In this same general period, the
emergence of militant Protestant organisations such as the Ulster
Volunteer Force (UVF), which had been intermittently active in Belfast
since 1966, and the Ulster Defence Association, which was formed in
1971, led to a growth in ' loyalist' violence and killings classed as
4
sectarian murders. In the five years from 1972 to 1976 out of a 
total of 1,120 civilian deaths, 569 were classed as sectarian or 
inter-factional killings, although many of these were by persons
acting as individuals rather than as members of organisations carrying
5 . .
out orders. By the end of July 1972, there were 21,000 British troops
in Northern Ireland — the highest number throughout the entire period 
under review — to counter this trend. Their immediate task of 
exercising tighter control over the security situation was demonstrated 
at the same time with the mounting of a large scale military operation 
which opened the Catholic and Protestant 'no-go' (paramilitary 
controlled) areas of Belfast and Derry. Thereafter, the influence of 
the British Army, in terms of a reduction in the incidence of violence, 
was gradually more apparent.
Such optimism as may have been felt in London because of this was, 
however, served a reminder of the strength of certain feelings in 
Northern Ireland by the Border plebiscite of 8 March 1973. ^ In it, every
Provisional wings of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from continuing
See Martin Dillon and Denis Lehane, Political Murder in Northern 
Ireland (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1973).
5
Northern Ireland, pp. 8-9.
h Held under the provisions of the Northern Ireland (Border Poll) Act 
1972 in fulfilment of a pledge given by the United Kingdom Government at 
the time of the introduction of direct rule.
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citizen of the Province aged 18 or over was asked to state whether he 
or she wished Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom 
or to be joined with the Irish Republic outside of the United Kingdom. 
More than 600,000 voters representing 58.7 per cent of the electorate 
went to the polls and, of these 591,820 voted to remain part of the 
g
United Kingdom. The miniscule expression in favour of the contrary 
preference was explained by the decision of anti-partition parties and 
groups to advocate a boycott of the poll amongst their supporters on 
the grounds that the questions posed failed to give their respective 
opinions about future forms of government in Ireland an adequate 
opportunity to be expressed.
Yet, within a year of prorogation, the series of negotiations 
which Whitelaw had embarked on led to the publication of a White Paper 
by the United Kingdom Government entitled Northern Ireland Constitutional 
g
Proposals. This document proposed the restoration'of devolved govern­
ment to Northern Ireland but with fundamental differences to the 
traditional Westminster system. Inter alia, it called for the creation 
of a new legislature — a Northern. Ireland Assembly — elected by 
proportional representation, and an Executive which was required to 
admit minority participation. To underline the promise placed in this 
principle of 1 power-sharing ', it was stipulated that the United 
Kingdom Government would not recognise an Executive if it was to 
represent only one community. The White Paper also proposed additional 
safeguards to protect the rights of the whole community and of groups 
within it, and stressed once more the community of interests that 
existed between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland — the 'Irish 
Dimension 1.
These now constitutional arrangements were subsequently embodied 
in the Northern Ireland Assembly Act, passed on 3 May 1973, and the
There were 1,030,084 electors entitled to vote.
g
See Northern Ireland Border Poll 1973, Cmnd. 5875, by R.J. Lawrence 
and S. Elliot (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1975).
9
Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals, Cmnd. 5259 (London:
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1973).
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In this time3 also3 the reform of the electoral system3 another 
of the original demands of the civil rights movement3 took effect.
In May 1973 elections to the 26 new district councils were held 
based on a system of universal adult suffrage (single transferable 
vote) — the first such arrangement in local body elections since the 
foundation of the state.
Elections to the new Assembly were held in June 1973 and the 
results gave the 1pro-White Paper' Unionist Party 24 seats; the SDLP 
19; Alliance Party 8; and NILP 1. The coalition of 'loyalist' 
interests which3 whatever the extent of their disagreement on other 
points of policy3 were united in rejecting as unworkable the proposals 
of the White Paper and Constitution Act3 gained 26 seats. Thus while 
no one party won an overall majority of seats3 there was a majority of 
seats held by parties favouring the new constitutional proposals.
By November 1973 this majority of 'pro-White Paper' Unionists3 
SDLP and Alliance Party had agreed on the formation and membership of 
the Executive. The following month3 at a conference at Sunningdale 
College in England3 the Governments of Britain and the Republic of 
Ireland3 together with the parties represented in the Northern Ireland 
Executive3 agreed to the establishment of a Council of Ireland with 
powers to represent the entire island in matters of common interest.
On 1 January 1974 the United Kingdom Government delegated certain 
powers to the Assembly and the Executive was sworn in.
In so far as the security situation was concemed3 this was an 
auspicious period. Since mid-1973 shootings and explosions had 
decreased as part of a general trend which continued through to the 
end of 1974 towards the point where the level of violence was lower 
than it had been for two to three years.
Northern Ireland Constitution Act3 passed on 18 July 1973.
1(1 The agreement was approved by the Assembly on 14 December 1973, 
by a vote of 43 to 27.
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Throughout the latter half cf 1973, however, the 'loyalist' 
opposition to power-sharing had been growing — so much so that
1 January 1974 was also the day cn which the policy-making body of 
the Unionist Party chose to repudiate the Sunningdale agreement, 
forcing Faulkner’s resignation as its leader in the process. He 
continued to serve as Chief Executive and leader of the Party in the 
Assembly, where he still commanded the support of 18 of the elected 
Unionists.
Further opposition to the new arrangements continued into 1974 
until, in February, the United Kingdom General Election presented the 
'loyalists' with the opportunity of testing public opinion. In the 
event, they received 51 per cent of the votes cast, which translated 
into victory in 11 of Northern Ireland's 12 (Westminster) constitituencies.
Although the composition of the Assembly and the Executive were not 
affected by this outcome, there was an understandable hardening of 
attitudes in Northern Ireland following it. The anti-power sharing/ 
Executive force came closer together under the banner of the United 
Ulster Unionist Coalition (UUUC), and there also developed, outside 
the party-political spectrum, the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC). It 
was this latter organisation which called a general strike throughout 
Northern Ireland, in May 1974 with the purpose of forcing a renegotiation 
of the Sunningdale agreement. With the support of loyalist para­
military organisations and the withdrawal of electric power, the 
Province was effectively immobilised to the point where even essential 
services were threatened.
In the stand-off which developed between the Executive, the United 
Kingdom Government, and the UWC, the position of Brian Faulkner and his 
Unionist colleagues became increasingly untenable. He and they resigned 
from the Executive on 28 May 1974, thereby bringing the power-sharing 
administration effectively to an end. On the following day the Northern 
Ireland Assembly was prorogued, initially for a period of one year from 
July 1974, but in practice indefinitely, and Direct Rule was re-introduced.
The Council of a Protestant organisation which claimed to represent 
300,000 workers in Ulster. Although it had its origin in the Loyalist 
Association of Workers, which collapsed in 1973, it was a more cohesive 
and tighter organisation than its predecessor.
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The progoration of Stormont — in effect its abolition — 
represented the assumption by Westminster of an inescapable 
responsibi1ity for the political direction of Northern Ireland which 
had existed de facto ever since the British Army had been called to 
aid the civil power in August 1969. It was, nevertheless, a compromise 
between unambiguously and indefinitely sustaining the Protestant 
majority and its British allegiance, and accepting the logic of Irish 
history as it is propounded by nationalists — that peace and good order 
are impossible in a territorially divided Ireland.* For most of the 
period under review the British Government, in particular the Conservative 
Government of Edward Heath, tended in its actions towards the latter 
while denying in its statements that the former was in any case 
repudiated.
Prorogation, however, did not denote a sympathy for, or even an
understanding of the Northern Ireland situation in terms of Irish unity.
As the British Government's attitudes in late 1971 and early 1972
demonstrated, such sentiments patently did not exist. But prorogation
did serve notice that Heath, having completed the formalities of the
United Kingdom's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC), was
2
about to take a more active interest in Northern Ireland.
Paradoxically, it also indicated that Britain had 'no vital interest in 
retaining power in Ireland, but on the contrary [wasl committed to a
3
settlement on a consensual basis'.
Prorogation, therefore, brought about an immediate improvement
For a brief account of the possible strategies open to the British 
Government after August 1969 see T .J .O .  Hickey, 'Northern Ireland', 
Times, 29 March 1974.
2
The Accession Treaty was signed in Brussels on 22 January 1972.
3
T.W. Moody, The Ulster Question: 1603-1973, (Dublin and Cork: 
Mercier, 1974), p. 101 (hereafter cited as Moody, The Ulster Question).
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in Anglo-Irish relations. For Lynch it was a 'positive step' 
because it 'meant a recognition that it was not possible to work
5
through existing structures'. Yet, no doubt because of previous 
British 'initiatives' which had failed, it was also greeted with 
caution. Prorogation was seen only as a 'necessary preliminary
g
to a solution and not as itself a solution'.  That could be achieved 
only within a new (United) Ireland towards which a commitment was 
required by the British Government.7 If the Irish response to 
Stormont's demise was in any way flawed, it was so in the less than 
full recognition it accorded Protestant interests, which that 
institution had faithfully (and almost exclusively) served for over 
half a century. In 1972 the Taoiseach wrote:
The real issue is not that of Northern Ireland.
That was never the question - it was an ansv/er, 
or part of an answer, to a larger question.
Now that it has been proved inadequate that 
larger question remains. That larger and still 
outstanding question is how to achieve a settlement 
between the two islands which will ensure good 
relations between them — granted that Union did not 
work; that the division of Ireland has not worked; 
and that the incorporation of Northern Ireland, or 
any part of it, fully within the United Kingdom cannot 
work.°
4
It was a neglect, perhaps a conceit in Ireland's relations with 
Britain that was not shared, at least to the same extent, by the 
recently appointed Northern Ireland Secretary, William Whitelaw, who 
claimed that the question would require 'sensible work' between North
The Irish Ambassador to London, withdrawn after Bloody Sunday, 
returned on 24 March 1972, the day the suspension of Stormont was 
announced.
5
John M. Lynch, 'The Anglo-Irish Problem', Foreign Affairs, 50 
(July 1972): 614, (hereafter cited as Lynch, 'The Anglo-Irish Problem').
ibid. , pp. 614-15. 
i b i d . , p. 613.
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g
and South. But this did not become apparent until the end of the 
period; for just over the two years which followed the British 
actions of March 1972 Anglo-Irish relations were primarily concerned 
less with the differences which clearly persisted between each 
government than they were with establishing the terms by which the 
Irish Question could be answered. So great was this promise perceived 
that outstanding differences on transnational security matters seemed 
to be either overborne in the spirit of co-operation or de-emphasised 
in the interest of its realisation, as two developments in 1972 
i 1 lustrated.
In response to a continuing and substantial folio of allegations
regarding cross-Border and Border-area Violence,*^ and to numerous calls
by the British Government for 'closer coordination between the forces
responsbile for maintaining law and order on both sides ' , **  the Irish
12
Government, in May 1972, established a Special Criminal Court. Yet 
curiously Whitelaw was, throughout this same period, lending further 
status to the political role of the IRA.
Prior to prorogation the British Government had proclaimed
11
adamantly that there 'can be no concession to violence'.  More
Report of the BBC Radio programme, ' I t ' s  your l ine ' ,  of 9 May 
1972, Irish Times, 10 May 1972.
For example, between 1 August 1971 and 29 April 1972, a total 
of 221 IRA attacks from the territory of the Republic of Ireland were 
alleged. Pariiamentary Debates, House of Commons Official Report, 
vol/ 8 3 6 ,  9 May 1972 , cols. 349-50 (hereafter cited as House of Commons,
Official Report) ,
** Prime Minister Edward Heath, Official Report, vol. 835, 25 April 
1972, col. 1273.
Such a measure is authorised by Article 38 (3) (3) of the 
Constitution. The governing legislation is the Offences against the 
State Act 1939, Part 5, which provides that it can be brought into 
force by Government proclamation whenever the Government decides that 
the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective 
administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and 
order.
*^ House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 835, 25 April 1972,
col. 1242.
explicitly, and in reference to the IRA, it was stated by the Home 
Secretary, Reginald Maudling:
In this case there can be no settlement by discussion 
and agreement. Force must be defeated. There can be 
no compromise with violence. On this, I think that 
there is general agreement.^
Despite approving citations that to do other than condemn the IRA
15
was 'moral cowardice', prorogation clearly served to qualify the
generality of agreement. On 28 March, only four days after assuming
office, Whitelaw announced that the Army would be prepared to reduce
its activities in return for a reduction in violence by the IRA.
Furthermore, he promised that, in the event of de-escalation he would
16
phase out internment and release the remaining internees. The
mounting toll of explosions, deaths and destruction appeared3 in mid
1972, to place the March statements in sharp relief as expressions of
unfounded hope.*7 On 6 July 1972 Whitelaw went so far as to declare
that 'there was no question of negotiating with people who are shooting
18
at British troops'. Contemporary developments seriously challenged 
both the Government's resolve and the Secretary's intentions. On 
7 July a Provisional IRA/Sinn Fein delegation was flown, by courtesy 
of the Royal Air Force, from Belfast to London. In a house in Chelsea 
belonging to junior minister, Paul Channon, they met with Whitelaw and 
three members of his ministerial team for secret discussions on three
103
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 823, 22 September 1971, 
cols. 4-5.
A term used by Mr Gerard Fitt (SDLP, Belfast, West), and repeated 
by Maudling, ibid . ,  col. 5.
1 6
Report of an interview on the BBC Television programme 'Panorama', 
of 27 March 1972, Irish Times, 28 March 1972, p. 7.
By June 1972 the violence in Northern Ireland had led to 1600 
explosions, over 7000 injuries, and claimed 400 lives. Richard Ned Lebow, 
'Ireland' ,  in Divided Nations in a Divided Worlds ed. Gregory Henderson, 
Richard Ned Lebow and John G. Stoessinger, (New York: David McKay,
1974), p. 240 (hereafter cited as Lebow, ' Ireland ') .
18
Irish Times} 7 July 1972, p. 1. The Officials had suspended 
operations on 30 May 1972.
104
Government's decision to talk with representatives of what may
accurately be termed 'the enemy'. If the conditions are such that it
or they are nearing the point of exhaustion or destruction, it may be
considered essential to ensure that contacts are established and that
20
someone is left with whom to treat when capitulation is imminent.
Or, more pragmatically, it may be argued that the IRA, as wielders
of de facto power in certain areas of the North, and as an organisation
21
which had demonstrated its ability to sustain a type of war against
(at that time) up to 17,000 British troops, had acquired standing as
22
an actor and were an essential presence at any conference seriously
23
attempting a lasting solution to the state's problems.
In July 1972 the first condition was unfulfilled; although
1 Q
IRA demands.
There was, of course, a case to be made for the British
James Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916-1974,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1974), p. 390, (hereafter cited 
as Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army).
20
Such a point was made in a leading British military publication.
See T.A. Coutts-Britton, ' Clausewitz*on Ulster' ,  British Army Review,
43, (April 1973): 12.
21
The phrase 'a type of war' is used to avoid the objections which 
might arise if one of the several terms which are found in the 
literature was used. Indeed it is a characteristic of the literature 
on Northern Ireland that few rigorous attempts have been made to under­
stand the military operations in terms of established types of warfare.
22
E.g. Lieutenant-Colonel P.W. Graham ['Low-Level Civil/Military 
Coordination, Belfast, 1970-73', RUSI, 119, (September 1974): 80-841 
referred tc the British Army's role in Ulster in Counter Revolutionary 
Warfare which, by exclusion, described the IRA as revolutionaries, and 
by implication, lent to them a legitimacy which the British Government 
have publicly denied.
23
Cecil King, former chairman of IPC Publications (Daily Mirror, 
Sunday Mirror),  in an interview with Donall Corvin, 'King and the North', 
Dublin Sunday Independent, 5 November 1976. However, King's advocacy of 
talking to the IRA because they were 'reasonable men' not 'just 
murderous thugs' appears never to have been a widely shared perception. 
See also Sunday Times, 'Insight Team', Ulster, new ed.,  (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin, 1972), p. 310, (hereafter cited as Sunday Times, 
Ulster) .
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Ruairi 0 Bradaigh and Joe Cahill had been arrested in the Republic
during May, the most telling pressure the IRA were subject to appears
to have been exerted by sections of Northern Republican opinion against
pr
the bombing campaign. It was beyond dispute, however, that the IRA 
were the de facto 'authority' in such areas as 'Free Derry'. Both 
sides appreciated these conditions. According to MacStiofain
Our meeting with Whitelaw was to take place in 
secret. An imperialist government does not agree to 
negotiate with representatives of a revolutionary 
movement without good reason. The reason was the 
continued ability of the IRA to fight the massive 
British occupation forces and to bring home to the 
English people the hard price that must be paid for 
the foolishness of propping up a colonial system 
which could not survive.27
Essentially, Whitelaw concurred. In his belief that 'the first
28
essential is that the violence should end',  and that he 'might be
able to save lives and prevent damage to property' he was prepared to
29
'talk to anyone at a l l ' .  And go further besides.
By early June 1972, in response to the suspension of operations 
by the Officials, and in an attempt to encourage the Provisionals to 
follow their example, he freed 470 internees, and followed this, within 
a fortnight, by the release of fifty more. On 21 June he was reported 
as considering further concessions which included, in return for a 
Provisional cessation of operations, an order to the Northern Ireland 
security forces not to move against 'men on the run',  to release the
Then President of Provisional Sinn Fein.
9C
One time Provo leader in Belfast; according to Sunday Times,
Ulster, p. 261, he became Provisional Chief of Staff in March 1971.
Sean MacStiofain, Memoirs of a Revolutionary (n .p . :  Gordon 
Cremonesi, 1975), pp. 253-69, (hereafter cited as MacStiofain, Memoirs3 
and Lebow, ' Ireland' ,  pp. 239-40.
27
MacStiofain, Memoirs, p. 269.
op
House of Commons, Official Report, vol . 839, 22 June 1972, col .723.
OQ
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 940, 10 July 1972,
col. 1183.
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remaining 300 plus internees, and to review the sentences of
30
terrorists already convicted.
Thus, even if the IRA was not approaching a state of exhaustion
caused by military attrition it appears that the British Government
was exhibiting symptoms approaching frustration and desperation to be
quit of the troubles which Northern Ireland was bringing to it. It
might otherwise be difficult to account for the cheering in the House
of Commons which accompanied the Home Secretary's announcement that
'her Majesty's Forces [would] obviously reciprocate' to a cessation of 
31
IRA violence. It would also be difficult to account for the 
consideration given to the demands by that organisation, particularly 
the first.
1. The British Government to recognize publicly 
that it was the right of the whole of the people of 
Ireland, acting as a unit to decide the future of 
Ireland.
2. An immediate declaration of intention to with­
draw all British forces by 1 January 1975, and the 
immediate withdrawal of British forces from sensitive 
areas, and a
3. General amnesty for all political prisoners in 
Irish and British jails ,  all internees and detainees 
and all persons on the wanted l i s t . 32
Whitelaw claimed that he 'could not accept' any of the demands — 
which was predictable — yet he agreed to 'consider' them 'in case some
Irish Times, 21 June 1972, p. 1. The first of these concessions 
was confirmed in House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 842, 7 August 
1972, col. 291. The remaining two appear not to have received 
attention at Westminster in this period but the Irish Times report is 
in keeping with the developments then under way — see the Times, 23 
June 1972, pp. 1 and 5.
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 839, 22 June 1972, 
col. 722. Reports of cheering which was on one occasion limited to 
Labour members, are found in the Irish Times, 23 June 1972, p. 1; and 
the Times, 23 June 1972, pp. 1 and 5.
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 840, 10 July 1972,
cols. 1179-80.
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peaceful way forward might be found' — and that was not 
34
predictable. The key phrase in the first demand was 'acting as a 
unit '.  As the British Government had given repeated assurances that 
the position of Northern Ireland, as an integral part of the United 
Kingdom, would not be changed without the consent of a majority of the 
people of Northern Ireland3 it was difficult to understand how those 
assurances were to be honoured if the future of the state was to be 
determined in terms of the IRA demand. It v/as surprising, therefore, 
that Mr Whitelaw felt able even to consider such a proposal, for it 
was, and remains almost inevitable that any reference to an all-Ireland 
electorate would yield vastly different results to that purely to a 
Six-Counties electorate.
Potentially, the implications of the developments for Anglo-
Irish relations were considerable. As the first Provo demand and part
of the second were substantially planks in the Irish Government's
Northern Ireland policy, the British Government's decision to treat
with the IRA effectively allowed the men of violence not only to bomb
their way to the conference table but also to outflank Dublin. The IRA
— an organisation proscribed in the Republic of Ireland, and Sinn Fein,
its political wing, whose views on Irish Entry into the EEC had just
35
previously been rejected out of hand — had achieved what no Government 
of either the Free State or the Republic had achieved: an agreement,
33
ibid ., col . 1179.
34
Seamus Twomey, Commanding Officer of the Belfast Brigade of the 
Provisional IRA, later claimed in an interview with the German news 
magazine, Der Spiegal3 that Whitelaw 'signed' a 'truce document' with 
two lav/yers as witnesses (cited in the Irish Times3 3 August 1972).
A similar claim is found in MacStiofain, Memoirss p. 293. Whitelaw, 
when questioned by Enoch Powell in the Commons denied the claim.
Both Official and Provisional Sinn Fein (and the Irish Labour 
Party) took the 'Mo' position in the 10 May 1972 Common Market 
Referendum. It was rejected by more than four to one against. In the 
Border areas where Sinn Fein was reputed to be strong the 'Yes' vote 
was recorded overwhelmingly. Many observers are of the opinion that this 
reflected a rejection by many people, of IRA/Sinn Fein as well as, or 
instead of, a preference for Europe. Bov/yer Bell, The Secret Army3 
p. 388; and Conor Cruise O'Brien, States of Ireland3 (Frogmore,
St. Albans, Herts: Panther, 1974), pp. 273-4.
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by a British Minister responsible for Northern Ireland to consider 
unification on a nation-wide basis. The Provo/British Government 
meeting was, therefore, an unencouraging response to the Government's 
stronger measures against the IRA.
It could furthermore, have disrupted Anglo-Irish relations by
forcing the Fianna Fail Government of Jack Lynch to adopt a more
forceful strategy in an attempt to retain its 'Republican' credibility.
That the people of the Irish Republic may not have been enthusiastic
in their support for Northern Catholics nor, perhaps, even Irish unity,
36
was irrelevant. Given the leadership style of Lynch (mentioned 
earlier) and a mood in the Republic which had been conditioned by the 
publicity attendant on internment and Blood Sunday, Fianna FaiT was in 
no position, domestically, to do other than at least sound like the 
'Republican Party' it claimed to be.
Anglo-Irish relations, however, were not prejudiced. An attempt
by Catholics to forcibly occupy empty houses in Lenadoon Avenue,
Belfast, on 9 July brought a confrontation with the British Army which
steadily deterriorated and resulted in the termination of the truce
37
which had existed since 27 June. The resumption of operations by 
the Provisional IRA forced the British Government to reassess its 
attitudes towards the organisation, and it did so with alacrity.
In May 1970 the Dublin magazine This Week found that only 17 per 
cent of those interviewed in an opinion poll were in favour of sending 
the Irish Army into Northern Ireland, if the pogroms of August 1969 
should be repeated. Cited in John Magee, ed.,  Northern Ireland:
Crisis and Conflict (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 22. 
Furthermore, during six months in 1972, a survey was conducted in Dublin 
with 3,000 respondents which casts some doubts on the traditional 
assumptions that a majority of the total population of Ireland were in 
favour of unity; see Michael MacGreil, Pi'ejudice and Tolerance in 
Ireland (Dublin: Research Section, College of Industrial Relations, 
1977). Obviously, since the results of the survey were not published 
until 1977, it is not here claimed that they were common knowledge, or 
even that they would have been accepted if they had been published; but 
the sentiments they recorded may have been sensed.
37
For further details of this event see Bowyer Bell, The Secret 
Army3 p. 391; and MacStiofain, Memoirs3 pp. 287-9 and 292-3.
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[Characteristically, the Leader of Her Majesty's Opposition,
Harold Wilson, v/as out of phase with this reversal. On 18 July, he 
and the Opposition spokesman on Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees, spent 
five hours talking to senior members of Provisional Sinn Fein in
London and, it is claimed, with the prior knowledge of the Prime
38
Minister and the Home Secretary.!
. However, by late July 1972 the British Government's stated and 
operational view of the IRA conformed very much with that of the 
Government of the Republic of Ireland. As Whitelaw told the Commons
. . .  Her Majesty's Government have now an absolutely 
unchallengeable right to ask the House, the country 
and, indeed, the whole world for their support in an 
absolute determination to destroy the capacity of the 
Provisional IRA for further acts of inhumanity. It has 
degraded the human race . . . .
Moreover, in reply to a question from Captain L.P .S .  Orr, the Home
Secretary gave a clear undertaking that 'neither he nor his Ministers,
advisers, or any emissary on his behalf [would! ever again sit down
40
with representatives of the IRA'.
For the British Government, talking with the IRA was always a
practice fraught with danger, even outside the confines of Anglo-
Irish relations. Domestically, it ran the risk of alienating
41
Conservative backbench support in the Commons, while in Northern
Ireland, it both aggravated Protestant anxieties and increased the
possibility of an escalation in sectarian conflict and open hostilities
42
between the Army and the Ulster Defence Association. When the
Times, 19 July 1972, p. 1.
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 841, 24 July 1972, 
col. 1327.
i b i d . , col . 1373 .
41 / \
The Times of 19 July 1972 (p. 13) carried a letter from nine
Conservative and Unionist backbenchers demanding a 'new and
understandable policy for the province', and implying thereby, a call
for Whitelaw's removal from his Northern Ireland Secretaryship.
Lebow, ' Ireland' , p. 241.
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interlude of talking failed and v/as exposed, the British Government 
returned to the security challenge in Ireland v/ith all the zeal of 
the reconverted. And this was certainly manifest in the relations 
between Britain and Ireland.
Perhaps appropriately, it first found expression on the occasion
of the 20th Olympic Games in Munich, in September 1972. In the course
of a meeting at the British Consul-General's office on 4 September the
Prime Minister and the Taoiseach discussed a wide range of Northern
Ireland security matters as v/ell as Anglo-Irish relations and both
nations' prospective membership of the EEC. It v/as from the first-
mentioned of these that a minor furore arose. When he left the
Consulate-General, Lynch made it quite clear that he did not intend
to make any comment on the discussions beyond a general statement that
43
they were 'useful' and included matters of mutual interest. At the 
subsequent press conference the Taoiseach stated
My meeting today with Mr Heath was a continuation of a 
series of confidential discussions and consultations 
that we have been having in relation to the Northern 
Ireland situation . . .  But in so far as we had discussions 
today, the subject matter must remain confidential 
because it is on a confidentially basis that these 
discussions and consultations can continue to be useful.44
The British Government, however, did not feel so constrained. In an
official release it was stated that 'closer cooperation and firmer
45
action' were sought from the Republic. There was furthermore 
the definite suggestion of a threat
. . .  unless it were felt both in Great Britain 
generally and in Northern Ireland in particular that 
the South is taking action against the IRA there is 
little hope of an acceptable solution.46
Irish Times, 5 September 1972, p. 1. 
ibid. 
ibid. 
ibid.
43
44
45
46
Ill
Given the pressures upon Lynch from within his own Party and
from the Opposition in the Dail, this statement inevitably was
interpreted as a serious breach of confidence and an attempt by the
47
British Government to 'dictate' to the Irish Government. The
former was an obvious inference from the Taoiseach's remarks at his
press conference, as was the latter — which he did not convincingly
deny. But, although the occasion presented him with an opportunity
to point out the glaring inconsistencies in recent British behaviour,
he chose instead a more subdued and understated reply. Thus, he
noted only that one of those named, against whom the British Government
sought 'firmer action',  had attended the Whitelaw-IRA meeting and was,
by the Home Secretary's admission, not wanted for the preferment of 
48
charges. Further, that the Irish Government 'had taken and would
continue to take every action available to [it] within the law in
49
relation to IRA activities within [its] territory.
In this context, Lynch's opinion that the Munich incident had
not caused any 'deterioration or disimprovement' in Anglo-Irish
50
relations may have appeared surprising. It was, however, to be seen 
within an expanded view of British intentions towards Northern Ireland 
and the sense of urgency which accompanied them. From the official 
British statement it is clear that Lynch was generally aware of both, 
and from his subsequent actions, clear that he understood, even if he 
did not welcome Heath's pre-occupation with transnational security 
matters.
Basically this pre-occupation reflected a three-fold concern.
The first was that the British were attaching considerable importance 
to the forthcoming conference of Northern Ireland political parties
John Peck, Dublin from Downing Street (Dublin: Gill and 
Macmillan, 1978), pp. 149-50, (hereafter cited as Peck, Dublin from
Downing Street).
48
Report of a Press interview at Dublin Airport, 8 September 1972, 
Irish Timer,s 9 September 1972, p. 1. [Whitelaw's admission is contained 
in the answer to a Pariiamentary Question, House of Commons, Official 
Report3  vol. 841, 18 July 1972 , cols. 97-8].
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at Darlington, County Durham, in late September. They were, therefore,
anxious to achieve an improvement in the security situation before
51
then so that internees could be released. The second was to placate 
Unionist anxiety about the conference by demonstrating that the 
Republic were acting against the IRA. Finally, but somewhat less 
immediate, was the concern that all that could be done was seen to be 
done, in the field of security co-operation, prior to the presentation 
of interim draft proposals for the future of Northern Ireland, 
scheduled for late in 1972.
In the event, these fears were well grounded: the failure, or
more accurately, the inability of Whitelaw to end internment and to
release all internees, ensured that the conference took place without
52
the presence of the SDLP. Furthermore, the three parties which did 
attend (Alliance, Northern Ireland Labour, and Unionist) emerged from
the three days of talks with precisely the same positions they had on
53
entering them. Yet the British Government, and particularly Prime 
Minister Heath, remained undeterred in its resolve to effect an 
accommodation between all parties (para-militaries excluded) to the 
Northern Ireland question.
Whereas previously Heath had disclaimed any 'historical or
logical' basis for Irish unity, on the grounds of racial and
54
religious differences, his Government on 30 October 1972, published
55
'a paper for discussion' which contained a considerably different 
understanding of the issues involved. In a notable section headed 
'The Irish Dimension' the paper affirmed the passive support of Irish
ibid. SDLP were threatening to boycott the conference if the 
internment had not ceased.
52
But the Party submitted its own formal proposals to Whitelaw who, 
in turn, presented them to the conference.
^  Lebow, ' Ireland' ,  p. 245.
54
In an interview with Anthony Lewis of the New York Times, as cited 
in the Irish Times, 28 February 1972.
55
Northern Ireland Office, The Future of Northern Ireland: A paper 
for discussion (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972), also 
known as the 'Green Paper', (hereafter cited as The Future of Northern
Ireland. )
113
No United Kingdom Government for many years has had 
any wish to impede the realisation of Irish unity, 
if it were to come about by genuine and freely given 
mutual agreement and on conditions acceptable to the 
distinctive communities.56
More significantly it stated
A settlement must also recognise Northern Ireland's 
position with Ireland as a whole . . .  it is a fact that 
Northern Ireland is part of the geographical entity of 
Ireland; that it shares with the Republic of Ireland 
common problems, such as the under-development of 
western areas; and that, in the context of membership 
of the European Communities, Northern Ireland and the 
Republic will have certain common difficulties and 
opportunities which will differ in some respects from 
those which will face Great Britain.57
Whatever arrangements are made for the future 
administration of Northern Ireland must take account of 
the Province's relationship with the Republic of Ireland: 
and to the extent that this is done, there is an 
obligation upon the Republic to reciprocate. Both the 
economy and the security of the two areas are to some 
considerable extent inter-dependent, and the same is 
true of both in their relationship with Great Britain.
It is therefore clearly desirable that any new 
arrangements for Northern Ireland should, whilst meeting 
the wishes of Northern Ireland and Great Britain, be so 
far as possible acceptable to and accepted by the Republic 
of Ireland which from 1 January 1973, will share the 
rights and obligations of membership of the European 
Communi t ies .58
unity which Heath had voiced at the Guildhall in November 1971.
In these terms Irish unity was still not encouraged, but there was 
a suggestion in the Green Paper of slightly more than the non-committal
ibid. , p. 33.
57
This economic aspect also represented a convergence with the views 
of the Taoiseach, who noted in his 'The Anglo-Irish Problem' (p. 615) 
that 'the real dividing line in Ireland so far as economic prosperity 
is concerned has always been an East-West and not a North-South one'.
The Future of Northern Ireland3 pp. 33-4.
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59
attitude towards it which was imputed, by some observers,to Britain.
Not only had the Irish dimension been recognised, but more, the old
restraints born of imperial necessity were in erosion. Ireland had
no longer, as in Lord Salisbury's 1872 declaration, to be 'kept at 
fin
all hazards': all that remained of that heritage was the negative
condition 'that Northern Ireland should not offer a base for any
61
external threat to the United Kingdom'.
Notwithstanding the advances which these developments represented
in Anglo-Irish relations, they were not purchased entirely at the
expense of the Ulster Unionists. In their anticipation the Taoiseach
had, in July, indicated his willingness to begin preparatory work on
62
the drafting of a Constitution in the context of a new Ireland.
Moreover, two days following the publication of the Green Paper, Heath 
demonstrated the limits to which the people of Great Britain were to 
be accorded an opportunity for the popular expression of their views
CO
on the 'new arrangements' for Northern Ireland. On 1 November 1972
a plebiscite Bill was issued for the purposes of determining, among
the people of Northern Ireland, what their wishes were in respect to
either continued union with Great Britain or unification with the
64
Republic of Ireland.
Such a self-referential device was, of course, never likely to 
find acceptance with the Irish Government. From the beginning of 
Partition it had remained an article of Republican dogma that no section 
of the population of the island of Ireland had any right, in
E.g. Moody, The Ulster Question, p. 92.
60
As cited in Patrick O'Farrell,  England and Ireland Since 1800 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 37.
fi 1
The Future of Northern Ireland, p. 32.
^  Lynch, 'The Anglo-Irish Problem', pp. 615-16.
63
i.e .  as per Whitelaw's statement on p . 107.
64
There is no record, in the decade under review, of any suggestion 
that the people of Great Britain and Northern Ireland should be consulted 
on the former's continued position within the United Kingdom.
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de Valera's description, 'to mutilate our country'. Accordingly, 
it was rejected, as in the Taoiseach's contribution to an Oxford 
Union Society debate on Irish Unity.
My Government could never accept that it is a valid 
or useful exercise to consult only the people of 
Northern Ireland by a plebiscite on Irish unity.
Such a plebiscite . . .  can contribute nothing, is 
completely predictable and can only widen the rift 
between the two communi ties. 65
It did not, however, serve to retard the increasingly close 
co-operation between Britain and the Republic regarding the North.
Nor could it. According to Lynch the opportunities presented by the 
Green Paper imposed a 'duty . . .  and a responsibility' upon his 
Government 'to respond in a constructive way'.
Once again this found expression in the security field and, as
before, it revealed an interesting juxtaposition in attitudes. From
-October through December 1972 the Irish Government introduced a series
of strong measures against the IRA: on 19 November Provisional
Chief of Staff Sean MacStiofain was arrested; three days later a
draconian amendment to the Offences Against the State Act was 
67
introduced, which was passed in December, and in the same month many 
prominent members of Provisional Sinn Fein/IRA were arrested, including
'Oxford Union Society Debate on Irish Unity',  Eire — Ireland: 
Bulletin of the Department of External Affaire,s No. 854, 18 December
1972, p. 4, (hereafter cited as Eire — Ireland). On 8 March 1973, 
the poll was held throughout Northern Ireland. The result declared on 
9 March 1973, was that 591,820 electors voted in favour of continuing 
Union, while 6,463 electors voted in favour of severing the link with 
Britain and joining the Republic of Ireland. In other words the 
Protestants voted overwhelmingly for the Union while the Catholics did 
not vote. See also Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,
Northern Ireland Border Poll 1.973, by R.J. Lawrence and S. Elliot,
Cmnd. 5875 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1975).
^  i b i d . , p. 5.
67
This provided for the conviction of a suspect solely on the 
testimony of a police officer, i . e . ,  his belief alone that a man was a 
member of an illegal organisation.
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Ruairi 0 Bradaigh^ and Martin McGuinness.^ Yet this period had 
been prefaced — before the Munich meeting of Heath and Lynch — by a 
refusal on the part of the British Government, in the face of 
increasing activity by the IRA, to reconsider its decision not to 
introduce legislation which would proscribe the organisation in Britain 
and permit the arrest of its members.7^
What this suggests, and other evidence confirms, is that 
security — the third level of issues between Britain and Ireland — 
was not to be allowed to inhibit progress towards both Catholic rights 
and national unity. Thus although Border-road cratering was still an 
issue, its importance no longer held the proportions it had when a 
Unionist Government v/as in power at Stormont.7 * Even demands for the 
withdrawal of the British Army v/ere couched in terms calculated to 
minimise offence or even to suggest that they were formal rather than 
earnest demands.
The beginning of this attitude was apparent, if only just, in the
last days of the previous period. And surprisingly, only five weeks
after Bloody Sunday, they were apparent in relation to the British
Army's presence in Northern Ireland. While in Washington, in March,
at the time of the House Foreign Affairs sub-committee hearings on
72
Northern Ireland, the Taoiseach criticised Senator Edward F. Kennedy's 
insistence upon an immediate and total withdrawal of British troops 
from the Province. Although Lynch advocated their immediate withdrawal 
from the Catholic areas, in a Northern Ireland context he went so far as
Then President of Provisional Sinn Fein.
69
Derry IRA. Later when released, to become Commanding Officer of 
the Provisionals Northern Command. David Blundy, 'The Stark, Hard Facts 
of Life — and Death - Inside the IRA Today', Canberra Timess 14 July 
1977, p. 2.
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 842, 1 August 1972, c o l .110.
See, for example, the brief exchange between Mr Bill Fox and the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs on this subject, Dail Eireann, Parliamentary 
Debates, Official Report), vol.260, 13 June 1972, c ol .1325 (hereafter 
cited as Dail Eireann, Official Report).
See Chapter 10, pp. 422-7; 435; and 440-1.
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It required some period of time before the soldiers 
could be pulled out . . .  to dampen down and reconcile 
feelings in the two communities.73
By the end of July,. Dublin's acquiescence in the British
military presence was extended, in part because of a resurgence in
IRA activities and in part because of prior briefing of the Taoiseach
74
by the British Ambassador, to include a tacit acceptance of
Westminister's need to subdue the 'no go' areas of Belfast and Derry.
75
Accordingly, 'Operation Motorman' attracted no formal protest by the 
7fi
Irish Government. Less than three months later, this attitude towards 
the British Army had further ameliorated to the point that the 
Taoiseach then expressed the desire that it should not be 
peremptorily withdrawn.
It is a very difficult situation for the [British Army]
. . .  But I should greatly regret it, if the Army were 
to be pulled out. It would lead to very serious 
trouble. I don't think the British Govenrment would 
want that to happen.77
For Lynch and the Fianna Fail Government which he led, the 
effort against the IRA had proven costly. In February 1973, hoping 
to take advantage of various economic and political upturns and also 
out of the need to ensure his Government of a Pariiamentary majority, 
he called a General Election. And lost. He and Fianna Fail were not
to announce
73
Lynch, in an interview with the Washington Post, as cited in 
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 259, 9 March 1972, cols. 1353-7.
For an additional reference to the controversy surrounding this 
statement see the Irish Timesy 4 March 1972.
74
Peck, Dublin from Downing Street, pp. 147-8.
75
Undertaken in the early hours of 31 July 1972, and in which 
British security forces removed the barricades to these areas and then 
occupied them.
Ian McAllister, The Northern Ireland Social Democratic and Labour 
Party: .Political Opposition in Divided Society (London and Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, 1977), pp. 118-19, (hereafter cited as MacAllister, SDLP).
Daily Telegraph, 19 October 1972.
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defeated on the basis of their Northern policies; indeed, as with 
the General Elections in Britain and in the Republic of Ireland 
throughout the decade under review, such issues were not central or 
even relevant to their outcome.
The new Government, a coalition of Fine Gael and Labour, was 
headed by Liam Cosgrave, the son of W.T. Cosgrave, a former Taoiseach 
who had imposed the death penalty upon various members of the IRA 
durina his period in office. This hereditary distinction apart, Liam 
Cosgrave's succession as Taoiseach brought several prospective 
advantages to Anglo-Irish relations. As Patrick Keatinge observed, he
. . .  was not inhibited by as many broody hawks among 
his backbenchers as Lynch had been, and his own 
party's background allowed him to take full credit 
for action against the IRA . ' °
In addition his Cabinet contained two leading appointments,
Dr Garret Fitzgerald as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Dr Conor
Cruise O'Brien as Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, both of whom were
79
knov/n for their conciliatory views on the Northern issue. These
factors are sometimes held, as by Moody for example, to be the cause of
80
the ensuing 'appreciable' improvement in Anglo-Irish relations. Sucn
claims are to be accepted with caution. Although Anglo-Irish relations
did improve throughout the early period of the National Coalition
81
Government, an improvement v/as, as Kyle rightly observes, under way in
Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations: Issues of Irish 
Foreign Policy (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1978), 
p. 120, (hereafter cited as Keatinge, Issues of Irish Foreign Policy).
79
See their respective books on the issue: Garret Fitzgerald,
Towards a New Irelands (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1973), and Conor 
Cruise O'Brien, States of Irelands (Frogmore, St. Albans, Herts: Panther,
1974). Both were published by different publishers in 1972. Since then 
Cruise O'Brien has published a further book which extends some of the 
themes of his earlier work, i .e .  Herod: Reflections on Political 
Violence, (Hutchinson, 1978).
80
Moody, The Ulster Question3 p. 93.
81
Keith Kyle, 'Sunningdale and after: Britain, Ireland and Ulster',  
The World Today3 31 (November 1975): 440, (hereafter cited as Kyle, 
'Sunningdale and after ' ) .
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the last four months of the Lynch Government — in reflection of the 
measures previously outlined.
However, in three areas the Coalition's Northern policies were
a distinct departure from its predecessor's, and contributed
positively to the Republic's relations both with Britain and Northern
Ireland. In the first instance. Fine Gael had from as early as
September 1969, accepted that re-unification should depend on a
82
majority vote in Northern Ireland. Second, the recently appointed
Taoiseach had, in his first St. Patrick's Day message, clearly
indicated that his Government's emphasis lay on reconciliation rather
83
than unity. And third,the Coalition was less concerned to continue 
the role of 'second guarantor' of the rights of the Northern 
Catholic minority.^4
Aside from these Irish factors, Anglo-Irish relations were
considerably assisted in March 1973 by the publication of the White
Paper which contained the proposals for the future government of
85
Northern Ireland. As such, it necessarily reflected a careful 
balancing of four principal concerns.
1. The long-neglected needs of the Catholic minority 
for justice and equality.86
2. . The determination of the Protestant majority to 
maintain the Union.87
82
Keatinge, Issues of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 247, note 85.
83
Irish Times3 17 March 1973; also cited in Keatinge, Issues of 
Irish Foreign Policyy p. 247, note 85.
84
MacAllister, SDLP3 p. 150.
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland 
Constitutional Proposals, Cmnd. 5259 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1973), (also known as the 'White Paper' and hereafter cited as 
that or as Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals).
86 ., . , 1 0 
ibid. ,  pp. 1-2.
ibid. , pp. 5-6.
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3. The overriding imperative of ending nearly 
four years of sectarian violence and bloodshed.88
4. The Irish Republic's concern for an 'Irish 
Dimension' in Northern Ireland's future.89
It contained suggestions, moreover, for the abolition of
Stormont as a Westminster replica in mi nature, and its replacement
v/ith a more modest provincial Assembly and an Executive of limited
90
powers on which both communities would be represented. Insofar as
the Republic of Ireland's long-term objective of national unity was
concerned, this v/as provided for by the familiar prescription that it
91
could be effected only 'on a basis of consent',  and by the proposal
92
to establish a Council of Ireland. This latter proposal may be 
attributed to both Prime Minister Heath's claim that 'full account' was
to be taken of the Irish Government's views in framing the proposals in
93 94
the White Paper, and that Paper's claim (repeated by Whitelaw) that
. . .  virtually all the Northern Ireland political parties 
have envisaged some sort of scheme for institutional 
arrangements betv/een North and South which many 
described as a 'Council of Ireland', although there were 
different concepts of such a Council, and in some cases 
an emphasis upon conditions which would have to be met 
before it could operate successfully.95
On balance, it appeared to deserve the bouquet bestowed by a generous 
trans-Atlantic observer.
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In the White Paper, Prime Minister Heath and Mr Whitelaw 
have clearly gone about as far to right old wrongs and 
ensure equality in Ulster as the feelings of their own 
British Conservative party and the temper of a million 
Ulster Protestants would allow.96
This is to say it neither met fully with the ultimate aspirations of 
the Ulster Unionists nor with those of the Irish Government. Cosgrave, 
foreshadowing what was to be a substantial item for negotiation later 
in 1973, saw the need for the Council to be an instrument of
reconciliation, and was concerned that it 'should contain within
97
itself the seeds of evolution'. But these, as he took care to
emphasise for the benefit of the Unionists (and to change his metaphor),
98
were to be seen not 'as a Trojan horse', but within the general
99
'basis for hope' which the White Paper offered. As he explained it 
in June 1973
If a broad and genuine consensus transcending community 
differences could now emerge as a basis for definitive 
settlement, I for one would welcome it. But such a 
broad consensus seems unlikely at present. So it is 
necessary to work towards it by seeking to promote 
reconciliation as the essential preliminary basis for 
a settlement. This is more likely to be a gradual 
process rather than a single event. The great need 
therefore is for political institutions that will 
favour and encourage this process.100
Thus it was only conditionally true to claim, as Cosgrave did claim, 
that his Government was prepared to enter into talks with the 
proposed Northern Ireland Executive 'without pre-conditions'.* *
96
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98
99
100
New York Times, 23 March 1973.
Dail Eireann, Official Report} vol. 265, 8 May 1973, cols. 578-9. 
ibid.,  col. 580. 
ibid. ,  cols. 581-2.
Northern Ireland: Text of a speech given by an Taoiseach 
Mr Liam Cosgrave T.D., on 21st Junes 1973 (Dublin: Government 
Information Services, n .d . ) .
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That these talks took place at all testifies to the determination
of Edward Heath to reach some form of long-term settlement in Northern
Ireland . Although he has so far failed to attract either biographer
or hagiographer and although he has so far declined to produce his own
account of his premiership, it is difficult not to view many of the
developments in Britain's relations with the two divisions of Ireland,
between 1972 and early 1974, as expressing the idiosyncratic Heath
rather than (say) the less definable 'personality' of his Cabinet.
But again, it must be stated, and with no intention of diminishing
his endeavours, that they appear not to have sprung from any great
affection for the Irish or even sympathy with their aspirations, be
they nationalist or unionist. Indeed from one knowledgeable Irish
observer Heath earned the title 'the world's most insensitive.
politician' for commencing a St. Patrick's night address in London by
saying, 'I know a great deal about the Irish. After all, my housekeeper 
102
is one'.  Yet it was his determination which frequently transcended 
any imputed insensitivity and characterised the close of the first 
period and the beginning of the second. As Sir John Peck noted:
The battle of the British Government to join the Common 
Market, which was in large measure a personal battle of 
Mr Heath's, had not yet been finally won, and crucial 
votes in the House of Commons were still to come. I 
believed then, and I believe now [1978], that the 
decision of the Leader of the Conservative and Unionist 
Party to suspend Stormont the fifty-year old instrument 
of Unionist domination, before the battle of Europe was 
won v/as one of the most courageous and honest political 
acts of the century.103
Such evidence as that cited may, of course, justify very little 
by way of conclusion. Nevertheless it is here suggested that an 
understanding of events throughout the last two years of the Conservative 
Government is more easily facilitated by reference to the political 
personality of Prime Minister Edward Heath. In particular, it is
Thomas J. 0 ' Han Ion, The Irish: Sinners3 Saints3 Gamblers3 Gentry3 
Priests3 Maoists, Rebels, Tories, Orangemen3 Dippers3 Heroes, Villians3 
and Other Proud Natives of the Fabled Isle (New York: Harper and Row,
1975), pp. 121-2.
Peck, Dublin from Downing Street3 p. 145.
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suggested that Heath, while having neither a deep understanding of 
Irish history, nor a sympathy for the aspirations to unity of the Irish, 
was disposed to effect a radical transformation in Ireland so as to be 
rid of a problem on the periphery which was deflecting Britain's 
attention from issues which were central. And towards this he was 
prepared to allocate much valued political talent and expend 
considerable energy.
A notable manifestation of this attitude occurred — indeed, was
required - in September 1973 with Heath's visit to the Republic of 
104
Ireland. As implied, it was more than a friendly and relatively 
inconsequential diplomatic exchange. In fact it was necessitated, from 
a British perspective, by a concern with the intransigence of Ulster's 
political parties, IRA operations in Britain, and differences with the 
Irish Government over the proposed Council of Ireland. Furthermore, 
Ireland's relations with Britain had become unsettled because of a 
reactivation of Border-area incidents and evidence which at least 
suggested the existence of British espionage operations in the Republic.
The first mentioned of these concerns — intransigence of political
parties in Ulster — had been the cause of Heath's visit to the
Province in late August. With the failure of the first Assembly
meeting in July — mainly due to extremist opposition by the Rev. Ian
Paisley and William Craig — the Prime Minister gave notice, in
characteristically blunt fashion, that such an impasse could not be
tolerated for very much longer. Ulster's leaders, he prescribed, should
105
'thrash out their differences and get on with i t ' .  He went on to
suggest that while attacks on Britain would not shift British policy, the
failure of Ulster's political leaders, especially the moderates, to
1 Ofi
come to terms, might well try the patience of the British public.
To emphasise this point Heath announced his impending visit to
Known as 'The Heat visit' by those responsible for the heavy 
security coverage which was deployed at the time.
Times, 30 August 1973, p. 1.
ibid., pp. 1 and 2; and Times, 29 August 1973, pp. 1 and 2.
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Dublin within days of the Belfast meeting.*^7 In becoming the first 
British Prime Minister to officially visit the Republic, Heath also 
transmitted an unmistakable message beyond the Border that his 
Government's efforts to resolve the problems of Northern Ireland would 
not be thwarted.*^
109
At Baldonnel the principal matter for discussion was the 
Council of Ireland. Although the language of the joint statement put 
an unruffled surface on the evidently friendly but firm talks it 
blurred what was a major difference between the Prime Minister and the 
Taoiseach.**^
In the preparatory studies for the talks the Irish Government
proposed the creation of the Council of Ireland simultaneously‘with the 
creation of the new Executive.*** Indeed, Dublin suggested that the 
Social Democratic and Labour Party in Northern Ireland would find
112
this an enticement to move towards participation in the Executive. 
Heath, however, resisted this timetable while in no way deprecating 
the concept of a Council:
Our view is that what the parties in Northern Ireland 
ought to do is to discuss these matters together — 
those who are going to form the Executive — and decide 
what they want to see in the Council or Ireland. They 
will then be able to have discussions with the two 
governments. The parties in Northern Ireland must work 
out the framework in which they are going to operate.113
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E.g. Christian Science Monitor (London Edition), 7 September 1973
Clement Attlee, as Prime Minister, had trade talks in Dublin 
during a holiday he spent in Ireland, but this was in the period of the 
Irish Free State.
109
The talks took place in the Irish Air Corps Officers' Mess at 
Casement Aerodrome, Baldonnel, some ten miles from Dublin.
The text of the statement is reported in the Times, 18 September
1973, p. 1.
*** Keith Kyle, 'Heath's historic trip to Dublin',  Observer,
16 September 1973; and Times, 18 September 1973, p. 1.
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We as a government are committed to the proposal for 
a Council of Ireland v/ith the government here in 
Dublin . . .  11*
That is, despite a common commitment of intent, Heath's view 
fundamentally opposed Cosgrave's who, at a press conference after the 
discussions, stated
I have explained that in our view, in order to carry 
conviction on all sides, it was essential to proceed 
at the same time v/ith both proposals.^ 5
Given such a divergence in views it was understandable that the
Council issue dominated, and perhaps accounted for, the unexpectedly
11 fi
long session of talks at the expense of immediate security matters. 
But, as pressing as these other matters were, they appear not to have 
been accorded the attention which they would otherwise have received.**7 
Nevertheless the occasion did serve to bury several issues in the 
security area which had resulted in increasing dissatisfaction between 
the two Governments, particularly on the Irish side.
For Heath, whose country, in August and September 1973, was the
118
target of the Provisional IRA's 'English campaign', the meeting
yielded little beyond the understanding and vague promise recorded in
the joint statment: 'Means of containing and eliminating violence in
119
Northern Ireland, irrespective of its source, were discussed.'
**4 ibid . ,  p. 2.
115 ibid.
116
The talks were originally scheduled for five hours but took more 
than nine.
* *7 Accordingly Mr Brian Faulkner, leader of the Unionist Party in 
the Northern Ireland Assembly described the talks as 'disappointing' 
because they did not deal, inter alia, with the matter of extradition 
of fugitive terrorists. Times, 18 September 1973, p. 2.
118
For brief accounts thereof see Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army3 
pp. 399-400; and the New York Times} 2 September 1973.
Times3 18 September 1973, p. 1.
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required explanations, if not expiation, were two separate cases
involving Englishmen who claimed to be working for British intelligence
120
in the perpetration of their criminal activities. Known as the
Wyman and Littlejohn brothers' affairs, respectively, they resulted in
convictions before the Special Criminal Court in Dublin — in the
121
former, of trying to obtain official information, and in the latter
of armed robbery. In the Wyman case the accused is reported as having
122
claimed to be a British agent, while the Littlejohns consistently
123
claimed they were working for the British Ministry of Defence, in
124
support of which a body of circumstantial evidence was produced.
According to their testimony they were recruited by British military
intelligence to infiltrate the IRA; their activities were controlled
by the Ministry of Defence; and their task was to foment public and
125
official opinion in Ireland against the IRA — hence the bank raid.
The difficulty in accepting such claims against the strenuous 
denials of the British Government that they had in any way condoned 
a bank robbery is that the Littlejohns' testimony is a melange of 
the factual, the plausible, and the improbable. For example, it was 
admitted by the British Government that the Defence Secretary, Lord 
Carrington, had through the mediation of Lady Onslow, received an offer
Foremost among the actions for which the Irish Government
120
'Separate' inasmuch as they relate to two distinct incidents 
but reports of the Littlejohns' trial indicate that Wyman may possibly 
have been in communication with them.
121
Times, 3 August 1973.
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Unfortunately for scholarly research, Wyman's trial was held 
'in camera' but the claim to which this note refers is widely accepted. 
Daily Telegraph, 14 February 1973.
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of IRA arms information which would be forthcoming only at a meeting
127
between Kenneth Littlejohn and a Government Minister. It was also
admitted that Lord Carrington acted upon this and arranged for the
Junior Minister of the Army, Mr Geoffrey Johnson-Smith, to meet with
128
Littlejohn. However, because the Wyman case was heard 'in camera',
and because the greater part of the Littlejohn brothers' extradition
proceedings in London were also heard in secret, it is unlikely that
a full and reliable account of either will be available for some
129
time. Nevertheless, as these incidents occurred at a time when 
the British Government was concerned about Czech and Russian arms 
reaching the IRA, when it was also (in 1972) requesting that the Irish 
Government take more effective action against the Provisionals, and 
when the incidence of raids had increased dramatically in the Republic, 
it was difficult to allay the suspicion, faint or otherwise, that the
Littlejohn's attempted heist of £67,000 could have been officially
. . 130 
inspired.
A variation on the intrusion of Bond culture into Anglo-Irish 
relations was also evident in the activities of the British Army in 
the Border areas. On 25 May 1973, a number of armed British soldiers, 
some of whom were in civilian dress and travelling in an unmarked 
'civilian' van, were apprehended by the Garda Siochana after spending 
some time in the Republic, on entering Clones, Co. Monaghan, from a
127 ibid.
128 ibid.
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This situation was further complicated by developments within the 
Republic of Ireland. In reply to a call from the Leader of the 
Opposition, Mr Lynch, for the Taoiseach to demand a full disclosure 
from the British Government, the Coalition publicly revealed, from 
inherited files, that Lynch, as Taoiseach, had been told of the 
Littlejohn's connection with the British Government in the early stages 
of the affair. Times, 26 January 1974.
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Louis McRedmond, 'The Irish are not impossible just suspicious', 
International Herald Tribune3 9 October 1973. For a less conservative 
appreciation of the Wyman and Littlejohn affairs, see James Kelly,
The Genesis of Revolution, (Dublin: Kelly Kane, 1976), pp. 89-92.
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lost was found by the Minister for Foreign Affiars to be 'less than
132
satisfactory from any point of view'.
In part, therefore, Heath's visit to Ireland in September 1973
was required by the British Army's understandable insensitivity to
the nuances of the Irish Dimension. (Conversely, it may have been
thought, albeit mistakenly, that the increasingly hard line taken with
the Provisionals implied a tacit understanding that certain liberties
133
could be taken on the Border. ) Thus there persisted in Dail
Eireann, calls for the Foreign Minister to take the Irish Government's
views before the British Government on not just the outstanding events
as outlined in the foregoing pages, but also on such matters as 'the
134
behaviour of the British Army in the Six Counties, the living
135
conditions and eventual release of internees in the North, and the
136 137
proposed use of CR Gas by Northern security forces.
That Heath, by his historic visit was able to 'bury' these concerns 
in the interests of Anglo-Irish relations may be regarded as a mainly 
negative achievement. It required, by this view, only that the Irish 
Government did not pursue them at any, or too great a length. But this 
would be to understate the positive benefits to Anglo-Irish relations
131
southerly direction. Accordingly, the explanation that they were
131
They were released from custody the same day after being 
detained for explanations. Dail Eireann, Official Report , vol. 266,
13 June 1973, cols. 307-10; and ibid. ,  14 June 1973, cols. 583-94.
132 ibid. col. 592.
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Minister for Defence had permitted three overflights — two involved 
landings — by British military aircraft 'to save lives'.  Dail Eireann, 
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which it effectively produced. Given the state of antipathy with
which the British public increasingly regarded Ireland, it served to
counter any incipient hostility which may have existed towards the
i th
139
138
Irish community in Britain — who were in e terms of the Minister
for Foreign Affairs 'a hostage community'
Finally, and with a mind to the excluding sections of the 
Downing Street Declaration and the acrimonious terms of the Lynch- 
Heath exchange following internment, the British Prime Minister's visit 
was notable as much for the items on the agenda as for the substance 
thereto. As Keith Kyle noted:
The fact that such matters would come before British 
and Irish Prime Ministers . . .  shows what the suspension 
of Stormont, the fight against terrorism, and the joint 
entry of Britain and Ireland into the EEC, have between 
them done to old notions of what is domestic policy and
what is not.140
The contrast between previous positions — both British and Irish
— was even sharper in December 1973 when a delegation from the two
Governments met with those parties from Northern Ireland which had
141
agreed to serve in the first power-sharing executive, at the Civil
Service College, Sunningdale Park, in Berkshire. The main topics
discussed at the conference were the financing of the Executive; the
functions of the Council of Ireland; policing; law enforcement; and
142
the status of Northern Ireland. Of these the Council, the status of
138
Conservatively estimated, after 1966 census, at over one million, 
of whom three-quarters were from the Irish Republic, Kevin O'Connor,
The Irish in Britain (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1974), p. 152.
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For accounts of the politics of this development see Paddy 
Devlin, The Fall of the Northern Ireland Executive, (Northern Ireland: 
by the author, 39 Greenane, Shaw's road, Belfast 11, 1975), pp. 40-51; 
(hereafter cited as Devlin, The Fall of the Northern Ireland Executive) 
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Northern Ireland, and law enforcement assumed more significance than 
the two remaining items.
After four days of negotiations, a long and detailed communique
was produced which proposed that a Council of Ireland would be
established, and that the Republic of Ireland would recognise the
constitutional position of Northern Ireland and would take action
143
against fugitive offenders. In effect the second and third items
were the price to be paid by the Republic for the first,  which provided
for a two tier structure with both executive and harmonising functions
in such areas as agriculture, electricity, tourism and transport, but
144
also with some competence in human rights and policing.
Of these the solemn declaration 'that there could be no change
in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of
145
Northern Ireland desired a change in that status' was a significant 
departure from previous Irish Government policies. But it was 
accompanied by an advance, from previous and passive British Government 
attitudes towards unity, to one in which it now promised to 'support' 
the wish of any future majority in the North to 'become part of a 
united Ireland.1*4^
As between the parties present at Sunningdale the agreement 
was notable on two levels. First, it reflected, as had recent 
developments, the influence and personality of the British Prime 
Minister, Heath. By one account
Heath was the iron chairman — occupying the rooms which 
commanded the central well where the lobbying was done, 
closing the bar to remove distraction during the final
143
Northern Ireland: Agreed Communique issued following the 
conference between the Irish and British Governments and the parties 
involved in the Northern Ireland Executive (designate) on 6th, 7th, 8th 
and 9th December 1973, Government Documentation (N .I .  4) (Dublin: 
Government Information Services, n . d . ) ;  and House of Commons, Official 
Report, vol. 866, 10 December 1973, cols. 37-41.
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all-night sitting. His aim was to compel a 
settlement, not to represent British interest.147
And it should be noted that every reason existed for him to so 'compel 
a settlement'. Quite apart from British impatience and Irish pressure 
for one to be effected, the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 
required that, unless a power-sharing Executive was in operation by
148
March 1974, the Assembly was to be dissolved and direct rule resumed.
Second, this 'most ambitious attempt to date to place the issue
149
of Irish unity on a less controversial footing',  particularly the
section(s) relating to the Council of Ireland, was marked by what Kyle
150
described as 'an agreeable whiff of ambiguity'. Indeed, in this 
regard, the Sunningdale Communique of 9 December 1973 presents an 
interesting comparison with the Anglo-Irish treaty of 6 December 1921. 
Patrick 0 ' Farrell wrote of the earlier settlement
The Treaty was, in fact, all things to all men. Those 
who supported it in the Dail debates did so because they 
contended that it recognised the substance of Ireland's 
national independence: those who opposed it in the House 
of Commons did so for the same reason. Those who 
supported the Treaty in the Commons contended that its 
qualifications . . .  were quite sufficient to keep Ireland 
subject to all necessary British control — which were 
precisely the grounds on which its Dail opponents rejected 
it. Or to put it with blunt simplicity: the anti-Treaty 
republicans fought the Irish Civil War because they held 
the same interpretation of the Treaty as did the British 
government.151
John Whale and Chris Ryder, 'Ulster 1969-1978: A Decade of 
Despair', Sunday Times, 18 June 1978, p. 16. Heath's account about 
the nature of his control over proceedings at Sunningdale differs 
somewhat with regard to emphasis. House of Commons, Official Report, 
vol. 874, 4 June 1974, cols. 1072-3.
148
Devlin, The Fall of the Northern Ireland Executive, p. 42; and 
MacAllister, SDLP, p. 129.
149
Keatinge, Issues of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 121.
1 ^0
Kyle, 'Sunningdale and after' ,  p. 441.
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Relations 1534-1970 (London: Batsford, 1971), pp. 294-5.
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It is here contended that, with due allowance being made for the 
differences in substantive intent between the Treaty and the Communique, 
and for a tolerable level of shared objectives between the SDLP and the 
Irish Government on the one hand, and between the Unionists and the 
British Government on the other, O'Farrell 's description was generally 
applicable to 1973, as MacAllister confirmed:
The scope and detail of the Sunningdale Agreement were 
such that both Unionists and SDLP could return to their 
supporters and justifiably claim that they had achieved 
a compromise especially favourable to their own side.
The SDLP could claim that they had achieved a strong 
Council of Ireland and rather than devalue the idea of 
reunification they had helped to create the institution 
that could bring it about. The Unionists could similarly 
maintain that the Council v/as merely a body fostering 
mutual aid and in return for accepting this they had 
extracted from the Republic a 'de jure' recognition of 
the province's constitutional Status plus action to bring 
fugitive offenders to j u s t i c e . 1 5 2
Thus ultimately he concurred with Michael Farrell:
. . .  the success of the Agreement depended on neither side 
listening to what their allies were saying about i t . 153
And ultimately of course, that asked too much of inattentiveness. 
Those who were opposed to the Agreement had interpreted it with some 
perception, as the Unionist M.P. for Amargh, John McClusker, indicated 
in his reply to the reproach that he and his fellow candidates had, 
during the February 1974 General Election campaign, frightened their 
electors with the prospect of a united Ireland 'tomorrow'.
I told them that it was more subtle than that [putting 
Ulster into a united Ireland tomorrow! and that it was 
more likely to put their children into a United Ireland 
in 25 or 30 years time. I said that the Sunningdale 
agreement v/as designed not to kick us out of the United 
Kingdom but to change our attitudes, to swing our gaze 
slowly towards Dublin and by slow process to change the
15?
MacAllister, S D L P p. 132.
153
Michael Farrell, Northern Ireland: The Grange State (London: 
Pluto, 1976), p. 311; and as cited in MacAllister, SDLP, p. 132.
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attitude of the Loyalist people so that one day they 
might believe the myth of Irish unity which so 
bedevils many people in Northern Ireland. I said 
that the Sunningdale agreement was an insidious way 
of bringing our people eventually to agreeing that 
it was a solution.154
Ironically, the achievement of the agreement at Sunningdale 
heralded a decrease in the British sense of engagement in Ireland.
In a sense Heath destroyed his own achievements: he had been the 
first Prime Minister since Lloyd George to pay serious attention to 
Northern Ireland, but in response to a miners' strike he called a 
General Election for February 1974. He was voted out of office, to be 
replaced by Harold Wilson's third Labour Government. In a United 
Kingdom context, Sunningdale was never an issue; in Northern Ireland 
it inevitably was. Candidates opposed to it won eleven out of the 
twelve Northern Irish seats. There existed, therefore, an arguably 
moral basis upon which disgruntled Protestants could oppose the 
power-sharing Executive. They did so with a weapon not used 
previously in Northern Ireland — a general strike.
This action, mounted in May 1974 by an amalgam of hardline
'loyalist' (extreme Unionists) groups called the Ulster Workers’
Council (UWC) became 'one of the pivotal events in Irish History in
155
the 20th Century'. Moreover, it has with considerable accuracy
156
been described as the 'strike which broke the British in Ulster'.
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 874, 4 June 1974, 
col. 1108. Also cited in Keatinge, Issues of Irish Foreign Policy3 
p. 121; and Kyle, 'Sunningdale and after' ,  p. 443.
Donal Barrington, 'After Sunningdale?', Administration (Dublin), 
24, (Summer 1976): 241, (hereafter cited as Barrington, 'After 
Sunningdale?' ) .
Sub-title of Robert Fisk's book: i .e .  The Point of No Return: 
The Strike Which Broke the British in Ulsters (London: Andre Deutsch,
1975), (hereafter cited as Fisk, The Point of No Return). As 
considerable use will be made of this work in the succeeding pages of 
this chapter, it is relevant to note that both of the other two 
principal secondary sources used cite it approvingly. Barrington 
('After Sunningdale?', p. 240) , with obvious approbation, refers to it 
as a 'remarkable book', and MacAllister (SDLPs p. 143), describes it 
as 'an authoritative account'.
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Initially, there appeared no compelling reason for this to 
have been the case. In April Prime Minister Harold Wilson had 
journeyed to Belfast to meet with the Executive's Chief 
Minister, Brian Faulkner, to assure him that the Labour Government 
stood by the Sunningdale Agreement and to state his revised position 
on meetings with groups such as the Provisional IRA.
What I want to make clear is . . .  the utter 
determination of Her Majesty's Government that 
violence will not succeed. To use the phrase which 
has now been interwoven into all discussions about 
Northern Ireland, the men of violence are not 
going to bomb their way to the conference table.
Nor must they be allowed to bomb Northern Ireland 
into the abyss. The work of the security forces 
to counter violence, from whatever quarter will 
continue. There will be no let-up.157
At this press conference he gave a warning of the consequences 
of failure to those who would obstruct the working of the Executive.
In this event, he said,
. . .  there would be little hope that we could once 
again reconstruct a fresh political i n i t i a t i v e . 1^8
Taxed by journalists on that comment he enlarged upon it as follows
You would have to introduce direct rule, or maybe 
some other variation of direct rule, but no one 
believes direct rule is a way forward. Direct rule 
in political terms is a dead end . . .  It would need 
legislation - it would be temporary, with no light 
at the end of the tunnel. 159
Within the space of six weeks this comment was seen to be a prophecy.
On 15 May 1974, following the decision of the Assembly to support the 
Sunningdale Agreement, the UWC began their strike which resulted in the 
collapse of the Executive on 28 May.
Times> 19 April 1974, p. 1.
ibid.
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This Agreement, which represented the culmination of over four
years of diplomatic and political endeavour, and which the two
sovereign parties to it intended registering at the United Nations,
collapsed mainly for reasons which had nothing to do with Anglo-
Irish relations. The UWC strike was only a single, immediate cause
of this effect of which there were a further ten proximate causes.
Six of these belong outside the scope of this work and are mentioned
only in passing. They included, first,  the fact that the situation
in Northern Ireland was in competition with several 'other crises' for
i fin
the British Government's attention in 1974. Second,there were
tensions-within the Executive, which served to weaken it, regarding 
the SDLP's concern with policing and the continuance of internment.
The third and fourth were consequences of the British General Election 
of 28 February 1974 — because it 'left the country effectively without 
a government, and thus provided an opportunity, which the Northern 
Irish dissidents could not resist, to sabotage the Sunningdale 
Agreements', and because it provided these elements with a 
'democratic' basis for their activities.
A fifth resided with the IRA, as Fisk noted
With some vision, Liam Cosgrave, the Republic's Prime 
Minister, blamed the Provisional IRA for the downfall 
of the executive, thus questioning whether the UWC 
could ever have been created without the watershed of 
violence which had preceded i t . 163
According to Harold Wilson these other crises were: (1) the 
British economy; (2) re-negotiation of Britain's membership of the 
European Economic Community; (3) problems of relations with Chile and 
South Africa; (4) conflict and crisis in Cyprus; and (5) dangers of 
hostilities with Turkey — see Harold Wilson, Final Term: The Labour 
Government, 1974-1976 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, and Michael 
Joseph, 1979), pp. 16 and 19-20.
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Finally, the sixth of these non-Anglo-Irish reasons, and one
perhaps more commonly perceived in Dublin than elsewhere, was found
in Northern Ireland Secretary Merlyn Rees' vacillation and his
164
reluctance to stand up to the Army. This accorded with the general 
theme of Fisk's book, as summarised by Barrington, that
. . .  the Government was uneasy and felt it could not 
rely on the Army; the Army distrusted the RUC while 
the BBC gave the striker extraordinary publicity 
and felt entitled to remain neutral as between the 
Government and a strike which everyone knew to be 
illegal and which was, in Westminster terms, seditious. 65
But, the essentially domestic nature of this cause notwithstanding, it
became an issue in Anglo-Irish relations. In part this resulted from
what Fisk terms, the Dublin Cabinet's 'fundamentally nationalist
interpretation of events' which was, in turn, derived from a lack of
166
reliable first-hand information reaching it from Belfast.
Nevertheless, the Irish Cabinet was not inhibited from making its
position known — unofficially by telephone and officially through the
British Ambassador - although it could not assume other than a passive
stance for fear of exacerbating an already critical situation in the 
168
North. Thus, privately, the British Government were still left in 
no doubt as to the nature of Irish views.
The Taoiseach and other members of the Cabinet saw 
Sir John Galsworthy,169 the British Ambassador in 
Dublin, and told him that Britain was largely responsible 
for the crisis in Belfast. They had become incensed not 
so much by the developing strike but by the way in which 
Britain, after harrying the Irish Cabinet for stricter 
measures to overcome terrorism, was now failing to 
maintain order in the six counties of the North . . .
164
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viewed from Dublin, the British lack of action 
smacked of that old spectral insurrection at the 
Curragh . . .
There was, therefore, little apparent awareness in Dublin that the 
Irish Government may have, by commission or omission, been in some 
way, if not principally, responsible for the failure of Sunningdale. 
Yet in this regard there were four reasons which supported such a 
conclusion.
In the first instance Cosgrave is reported to have insisted
that the loyalists — of the like of the Rev. Ian Paisley and
Mr William Craig — be excluded from Sunningdale on the grounds that
their presence would be disruptive.*7 * Somewhat disingenuously, this
was finessed by the recently appointed Northern Ireland Secretary,
172
Francis Pym, who claimed that since the loyalists would not join
the Executive, they could not attend Sunningdale. Although Cosgrave's
fears may well have been realised — the loyalists had obstructed the
173
Assembly's legislative functions - it was also true that they were,
to paraphrase the Constitutional Proposals, 'the elected
174
representatives of Northern Ireland opinion',  and entitled to be
175
there as much as (say) Faulkner or Fitt. Indeed the British 
Government recognised this and eventually issued an invitation to the 
loyalist parties to attend Sunningdale. However, as MacAllister 
observes, the method of issuing the invitation - while Paisley v/as
Fisk, The Point of No Return, pp. 186-7. Cosgrave has subsequently 
denied Fisk's claim (Interview with the writer, Dublin, 17 September 
1979), but Fisk remains adamant that, at the inter-government official 
level, at least, his account is accurate (Interview with the writer, 
Dublin, 19 September 1979).
*7* Fisk, The Point of No Return, p. 43.
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speaking at the dispatch box - ensured its refusal.*76 Thus the 
Sunningdale conference v/as conducted in the absence of those parties 
in Northern Ireland whose presence may have helped to allay 
suspicions that the meeting was essentially a betrayal of traditional 
Unionist interests.*'77
The second area of responsibility is more one of a joint failure. 
With regard to the Republic of Ireland it concerned a reluctance to 
modify certain domestic political and constitutional arrangements, as 
argued by Barrington.
For Sunningdale to have succeeded, it was necessary 
to convince the overwhelming mass of the people, 
both North and South, that it represented a new 
departure in the history of the people of the island.
This required some overt symbolical political act 
from the people of the South to show their 
determination to create new institutions and a new 
system of government in Ireland. . . .  To do that, 
nothing less than a new Constitution, approved by 
the people in a Referendum, was required in the 
Republic.178
And, of course, a similar claim may be made with regard to the North.
Another fundamental mistake made at Sunningdale was 
to assume that decisions as important to people as 
those taken there could safely be taken by Governments 
. . .  without express popular endorsement.I'9
In the Republic this failure lead to a situation in which 'Government
and Opposition appeared to be manoeuvering for position, each prepared
to take credit for Sunningdale if it succeeded, but fearful of the risks
180
involved in consulting the people',  while in the North it meant 
that
*76 MacAllister, SDLP3 p. 131.
*77 Barrington, 'After Sunningdale?', p. 237
*7^ ibid . ,  pp. 235-6.
179
i/y ibid . ,  p. 237.
180 ibid. , p. 236.
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. . .  an opportunity to educate the people of Northern 
Ireland and of all Ireland about the implications of 
the Sunningdale Agreement was missed. As a result . . .  
it was possible for the Leaders of the Loyalist 
Coalition to suggest that Sunningdale was something 
which the British Government was attempting, with the 
connivance of Dublin, to impose upon the people of 
Northern Ireland.181
The third and fourth reasons which may be adduced for the
failure of Sunningdale arose out of the terms of the Agreement itself.
Given the resistance to the timing of a Council of Ireland, but the
Agreement's provisions to establish one, it may be logically concluded
that Cosgrave had fought hard for it. If he was not then to damage
Faulkner's credibility (beyond that which Faulkner had himself effected
by his Executive activities) it was essential that the Irish Government
182
fulfil ,  'in the letter and spirit ' ,  the obligations contracted at 
183
Sunningdale. But its inability to satisfy the expectations
engendered concerning law enforcement, and the recognition of the status
of Northern Ireland, not only undermined the Agreement, but also
184
contributed to rifts within the Executive.
A recurring and dominant aspect of Britain's relations with the 
Republic of Ireland throughout the periods under review to date had 
been its frequent requests for close co-operation in the matter of 
apprehending and prosecuting those defined as 'fugitive offenders'.
ibid . ,  p. 237.
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Phrase taken from Faulkner's amendment in support of the 
Agreement, before the Assembly on 14 May 1974.
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Curiously, some years later, Cosgrave offered the opinion that 
Sunningdale failed not because it attempted 'too much', but because it 
was either 'too early or too late'.  Interview with Mr Liam Cosgrave, 
T .D . ,  8 June 1978. His assessment is a contrast to that of his 
successor (as Leader of Fine Gael), Dr Garret Fitzgerald, who wrote that, 
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The problem, however, v/as that the Irish Constitution contained no 
provision for extradition if the offence in question was political. 
Hence, there was a need to resolve
. . .  how most effectively, from a legal point of view, 
to bring to trial persons alleged to have committed 
crimes of violence, however motivated, in any part 
of Ireland irrespective of the part of Ireland in 
which they are located.185
To this end an eight-man Law Enforcement Commission was established 
consisting of British, Northern Irish, and Republic of Ireland 
representatives. In essence they were required to solve a problem 
concerning a 'limited, though very dangerous, class of offender',  who, 
if apprehended in one jurisdiction in Ireland for offences alleged 
to have been committed in the other, could claim that the offences for 
which it was sought to charge them were political offences, or 
connected with political offences.*^6
The Report was published on the afternoon of Thursday 23 May
1974, by which time the strike had almost run its course. Mainly
because of the Republic of Ireland's opposition to extradition, the
Commission recommended the setting-up of extra-territorial courts to
try fugitive offenders. Despite the Irish Government's acceptance of
187
this main recommendation it found no favour with the British
188
Government, which had hoped that Dublin would support extradition.
185
Law Enforcement Commission Report To The Minister For Justice Of 
Ireland And The Secretary Of State For Northern Ireland, PrI . 3832 
(Dublin: The Stationery Office [1974]0, p. 9, (hereafter cited as
Law Enforcement Commission Report).
186
ibid . ,  other fugitive accused persons were covered by existing 
extradition legislation.
^  Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 272, 23 May 1974, col. 2140.
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Fisk, Point of No Return, p. 186. By Cosgrave's account, this 
v/as a disappointment entirely of the British Government's own making. 
According to him, the British were never encouraged to think that an 
agreement on extradition would be forthcoming; further, that they used 
this issue periodically to berate the Irish Government even though 
they fully understood the difficulties which the latter faced 
( Interview with the writer, Dublin, 17 September 1979).
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But there were, as Barrington outlined, sound political objections 
in Dublin to what London was asking.
The RUC and the British Army [werel being charged by 
the Government of the Republic before an International 
Court with the torture of political prisoners. Since 
then, there [had] been major reforms in the RUC, and 
vast improvements in the quality of British 
administration in Northern Ireland. These [were] not 
. . .  sufficient either to attract the support of the 
minority population in Northern Ireland, or to make it 
politically possible for any Government in the South 
to sanction the automatic extradition of Irish citizens 
from South to North.189
Moreover, as Cosgrave indicated to Galsworthy (and possibly Wilson) on
23 May, the British Government's failure to act decisively against the
190
UWC made the Law Enforcement Commission's Report irrelevant.
There was, however, an element of misleading self-justification 
in the Taoiseach's assessment inasmuch as it implied that the British 
Government's inactivity against the UWC was sufficient cause not to
support extradition. Given that the Report was completed well before
191 . . .
the strike took place, it cannot be accepted that British inaction in
May could have in any way influenced the Commission's deliberations, nor
can it be accepted that the Report in any way indicated or presaged
more than an incremental advance in understanding between the Republic
and both Northern Ireland and Britain on the issue of security.
The matter of the Republic's recognition of the position of 
Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom fared even worse than that 
of law enforcement. This v/as, initially, a direct result of the 
territorial claim contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. 
In the absence of a referendum, the leader of Aontacht Eireann, Kevin 
Boland, brought suit to challenge the legality of the declaration made 
by Cosgrave at Sunningdale. Although the Irish Government successfully
Barrington, 'After Sunningdale', p. 249.
190
Fisk, The Point of No Return3 pp. 186-7.
1Q1
The Report, on p. 67, is dated '25th April 1974';  the strike 
began on 15 May 1974.
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defended its actions, the Court's verdict was of little satisfaction 
to those parties interested in the full implementation of the 
Agreement. The Irish Government had argued that the declaration at 
Sunningdale
. . .  did not acknowledge that a portion of Ireland, 
therein described as "Northern Ireland", is part 
of the United Kingdom . . . 1 92
And the Supreme Court found that the Sunningdale declarations
were clearly distinct and in no sense an agreement on fact or
193
principle'.  Cosgrave's recourse to the device that the Republic 
recognised the de facto position of Northern Ireland within the 
United Kingdom was, therefore, not an acceptable substitution.
As MacAllister noted,
. . .  he [Cosgrave] appeared to put one interpretation 
on the declaration when addressing Unionists and 
another when faced with 1 i t i gat i on.194
Under the weight of all these burdens, then, Sunningdale, or rather 
the most tangible expression of its hopes — the Executive — collapsed 
on 28 May 1974.
It is difficult, however, to attribute a significant portion of 
the blame for this to any alleged failures of Anglo-Irish relations 
or, for the matter of that, to any alleged faults of commission or 
omission by the Irish Government. The latter judgment is, of course, 
contrary to that of Barrington's, who concluded that 'a major portion
195
of the blame for the failure of Sunningdale must rest with the South'' 
(emphasis added).
The Sunningdale Agreement did not fail because the loyalist 
groups were not represented at the Conference. Granted, they should
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have been there, but then it is difficult to imagine that such a 
document as the Sunningdale Agreement would have resulted, in 
anything like the same form as did result, if they had been present. 
Moreover, it cannot be accepted that Cosgrave's insistence on their 
absence was other than a fortuitous coincidence of view with that of 
the British Government. Furthermore, Pym's later invitation to 
Paisley not only indicated the limits of the Taoiseach's influence 
in the matter, but the British Government's lack of enthusiasm for 
their presence. Is not the logical conclusion to be drawn that 
Heath, in his determination to achieve a settlement, was ill-disposed 
towards including in any negotiations those who might justifiably be 
described as 'part of the problem' rather than 'part of the solution?' 
And even had the historic Agreement been reached in their presence, 
would they not still have conducted their subsequent opposition to 
it accordingly?
Similarly, it is difficult to accept that Sunningdale would have
attracted wider support in Northern Ireland if the Republic was to
have adopted a new Constitution. Although Paisley, in the course of
an interview with the Irish Times and RTE in late 1971, suggested
that such steps as Barrington outlined previously might cause
Northern Protestants to look more favourably upon the Republic and a
196
united Ireland, this line of thinking appears not to have been
adopted’ by Loyalists or mainstream Unionists in subsequent years.
Indeed, if Fisk was correct, such measures were unlikely to impinge
upon the political calculations of the Loyalists. As he noted, even
the Irish Government's declaration that 'there could be no change in
the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of
Northern Ireland desired a change in that status' v/as 'largely
197
forgotten' by them.
Finally, with the benefit which seven years remove affords, and 
a further view to the influence of the Law Enforcement Commission's 
Report upon the overall progress of the strike, Cosgrave's assessment
196
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that it was irrelevant must be allowed as accurate. The causes of
Sunningdale's failure which may be located within the realm of
Anglo-Irish relations were not decisive. For example none, either
contemporaneously or in the intervening years, has assumed the
significance in this regard which is attributed to the failure of
the British Army to act against the UWC in the first forty-eight
198
hours of the strike.
In MacAl1 i ster' s treatment of these factors he did not claim
that Sunningdale failed because of them — rather that two of them
(extradition and recognition) were among four causes of 'stress'
199
and 'tension' in the Executive. Thus, while his conclusion that 
they 'harmed the Republic's credibility' ^  is consistent with the 
arguments presented in the foregoing pages, Barrington's conclusion 
that a 'major portion of the blame . . .  must rest with the South' 
is not. Moreover, Barrington's judgment was internally inconsistent 
with his own argument: it assumed that the 'no surrender' - 'not 
an inch' cast of mind in Northern Ireland was amenable, in the 
short-term, to modification by developments in Dublin and London. 
Clearly they were not.
Where Barrington may have offered an insight into the Anglo- 
Irish components of the failure of Sunningdale was in his assessment 
of the assumptions which many in the Republic of Ireland held 
following Britain's 1972 initiatives:
[A] disastrous mistake made by Dublin politicians 
and political journalists was the suggestion made 
in the days before and after Sunningdale that the 
two Sovereign Governments in London and Dublin 
would sort out the Ulster situation. The Ulster 
Workers' Strike was to expose this kind of political 
arrogance for what it was.201
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Surprisingly, Britain was not included in the above. Yet 
there was no evidence that would suggest that Britain was any less 
'arrogant' than the Republic in its appreciation of what could be 
achieved in Northern Ireland. Indeed, Heath's dominant role at 
Sunningdale was probably the most blatant example of this failing (if 
failing it was) in the entire history of the Executive. It is argued 
here, therefore, that Barrington's accusation of 'political arrogance' 
could have been levelled equally against Britain as it was against 
Ireland. And there would have been justice in this. The decisions 
relating to Sunningdale were, very largely, Britain's and the 
Republic's; the immediate consequences, very largely, we’re Northern 
Ireland's.
In their joint enterprise there was more than a suggestion of
an attempt, to paraphrase T.P. O'Connor's famous phrase of ninety
years before, to govern one state through the popular — indeed, the
202
vulgar — conceptions of another. Historically, this was a common 
enough charge against Britain's rule in Ireland; in 1972-74, it was 
a peculiar irony that the Republic of Ireland should have transgressed 
in such a way against the North.
While, this was a considerable mote on the Republic's claim to 
respect the 'other tradition',  and one that raised uneasy questions 
about just how the North was and might be regarded by the Government 
in Dublin, among the factors which brought down the Executive it was 
of a low order. It might even be more precise to conclude that Anglo- 
Irish relations (and contemporary politics) in the Republic proved 
irrelevant to the outcomes of May 1974. In the period which preceded 
that time, probably the most productive with regard to the Ulster 
Question, they had proved sufficient only to establish the means by 
which a settlement might have been approached, but less than equal to 
the task of sustaining them.
202
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There is here a distinction to be drawn between the achievements 
in and of Anglo-Irish relations which preceded the UWC strike, and 
the outcomes of that action. In the conclusion expressed above, 
then, there is no attempt to diminish the former, but rather to 
provide a reminder of what their limits were in the face of that habit 
in Irish history for certain influences and accidents to have their 
way. Thus the remarkable change in British attitudes on such matters 
as the Irish Dimension, Council of Ireland, and Irish unity are to be 
set against the dominance of British factors — in some cases 
irrelevant British factors (e.g. the miners' strike) — which allowed 
the situation in Northern Ireland to take the course it did in 1974.
While one is aware that the manufacturing of historical analogues
from disparate sets of material is an analytically debauching exercise,
there seems to be a correspondence between events in Ireland in 1914
and events in Northern Ireland in 1974. In the former it was a case
of the British Government being served warning, by way of the Curragh
mutiny, that the British Army could not be relied upon to enforce Home
Rule in Ulster; in the latter, a mutiny was absent but the lack of
confidence that the military would move against the UWC strikers was
203
certainly reported in the most authoritative account of the period. 
Similarly, in 1914, the outbreak of World War I and Britain's 
involvement therein effected the postponement of Home Rule (for the 
twenty-six counties), and in 1974 the British General Elections 
brought into train many of the conditions which contributed to the 
fall of the Executive. In both cases the Irish Question at issue was 
irrelevant and unrelated to the major intervening variable, the war 
and the election, respectively.
It would, however, be a gross pessimism to conclude that Anglo- 
Irish relations (and politics in the Republic) were, by their very 
nature, flawed with respect to the situation in Northern Ireland in 
1972-74. Again, what has to be borne in mind is that the British 
Government was able to establish the parameters within which
i.e. Fisk, The Point of No Return.
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international diplomacy and third-party domestic politics were 
likely to be effective. The fact that the British Government did not 
take any concerted action against the UWC strike in its early hours 
was a clear illustration of this. In terms of a general and 
historical principle, it was a demonstration of London's marked 
reluctance to confront Loyalist (or Unionist) intransigence.
Of course it was possible that, even had London acted contrary 
to this principle, the end result could have proven that the might 
of Westminster was insufficient to rule the Six Counties. According 
to a leading Ulster historian, Anthony Stewart, the patterns of 
behaviour which worked in the Province were unlikely to be changed 
or broken by the type of developments which this chapter examined:
Neither pressure from London, nor pressure from Dublin, 
can alter them. They are impervious to propaganda and 
to hostile criticism; since both must in the end come 
to terms with the reality of their existence. Nor will 
they be changed in essence by the economic, social and 
intellectual pressures of the contemporary world, as so 
many imagine. To say this is not to aver that the 
economic and constitutional situation of Northern Ireland 
will not change, or that its society will not change; it 
is, of course, changing continually, but it changes in 
accord with intrinsic laws, and not at the dictate of the 
makers of instant blueprints. The function of wise con­
stitutions and just reforms is to help humanity to 
achieve a future that is better than the past, but if 
they are not to have the opposite effect they must take 
account of the grain, not cut against i t . 204
Yet, to accept Stewart's assessment, with its heavy reliance on 
precedent and extrapolation, or to interpret the material in this 
chapter in a manner consistent with it, would not, to this writer, be 
appropriate. Two reasons dictate an alternate judgment. The first 
is that neither precedent nor extrapolation are themselves wholly 
appropriate. The former comes close to a resignation of the will that 
insures against all risk, and to a self-fulfilling guarantee that the
204
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failures of yesterday absolve those in the present from even making 
an attempt. Similarly, extrapolation is repellent not only because 
it conceals passivity with the illusion of movement, but also because, 
essentially, it seeks no more than to apply new co-efficients to old 
and discredited 'solutions'.
The second reason is that as a result of the failure of the 
British Government to exercise its jurisdiction — particularly with 
regard to the Loyalists — discussions of the relevance of Anglo-Irish 
relations, or of the irresistibility of patterns of behaviour in the 
North, are truncated. They terminate on a note of despair because the 
course of action with which they are concerned were pursued without a 
willingness to accept their consequences..
This abdication of (British) political will, therefore, confuses 
the image of Anglo-Irish relations in 1972-74: it lacks a continuity 
of relief against which it could be judged with more certainty. Thus, 
to conclude that Anglo-Irish relations were irrelevant to the outcomes 
of May 1974 is only to affirm that the Ulster Question is, in certain 
circumstances, an English question, and that judgments of a more final 
character are in this instance subordinate to that fact.
Stewart might have been absolutely correct when he wrote that 
Northern Ireland will change only 'in accord with its intrinsic laws',  
but in the absence of the British Government's testing of those laws, 
his statement tended towards an hypothesis. He did not exhaust the 
possibilities of such action. Which dictates, in logic at least, 
that the conclusion expressed in the paragraph above is more easily 
supported. That the question of Ulster should have been seen once 
more to devolve upon the British Government in the first instance was 
not a new or startling phenomenon. What was startling was the fact 
that, after so much effort and hope had been invested in an 'Irish' 
solution on both sides of St George's Channel, it should somehow 
inexorably return to a point close to which the parties began their 
negotiations. In all,  an elaborate and melancholy tribute to the 
verity of scripture:
All the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not 
full;  unto the place from whence the rivers come,
thither they return a g a i n . 205
205
Ecclesiastes, I,  7. The relevance of this passage was first 
suggested by Stewart, who also cites it , but in connection with his 
own conclusions (The Narrow Grounds p. 185).
Na r r a t i v e , June 1974 - June 1977
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The fall of the Northern Ireland Executive signalled both the 
failure of the British Government1s effort to devise a solution 
for Northern Ireland and a return to Direct Rule. The experience 
also encouraged 'loyalist' intransigence and fueled exasperation in 
London. Instead of offering further alternatives, the British 
Government proposed only a forum — a Constitutional Convention — 
through which the Northern Irish should design their own alternative.
The July 1974 White Paper containing this proposal did, however, 
endorse power-sharing and the 'Irish Dimension’ again. It also 
reserved to Westminster the power to decide whether the recommendations 
of the convention would be adopted. * The proposals themselves were 
subsequently enacted as part of the Northern Ireland Act 1974.
In specific terms this Act provided for a Constitutional Convention 
of 78 members to be elected on a. multi-member basis from the 12 
(Westminster) parliamentary constituencies by the single transferable 
vote system of proportional representation
. . .  to consider what provision for the government of 
Northern Ireland is likely to command the most wide­
spread acceptance among the community there.
The Act also provided that the Convention should have an independent 
chairman and that it should produce a report (or reports) on its 
conclusions to the Secretary of State who would in turn lay it before 
Parliament.
In preparation for the May 1975 Convention election, the majority 
of Unionists re-united themselves as the United Ulster Unionist 
Council (UUUC). Aiming to win the maximum number of seats under the 
complex proportional representation system of balloting, they were 
able to negotiate among themselves the number and identity of candidates 
they would endorse in each constituency. Their campaign manifesto 
called for, inter alia, a twenty-one seat representation at Westminster
The Northern Irelcxnd Constitution, Cmnd. 5675 (London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1974).
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(on a par with Scotland and Wales), rejection of any 'artificial 
device' for giving any group more power than it won in elections, a 
government formed by the leader of a majority in the House, the 
return of security responsibilities to Stormont, and no imposed 
association with the Irish Republic. Faulkner remained outside this 
arrangement to form a new Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (UPNI), 
with little hope of success, to represent an intermediate alternative 
to Protestants.
Through a Provisional Sinn Fein (the political arm of the Provisional 
IRA) election boycott, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 
was the dominant competitor for Catholic votes. Its platform stressed 
economic issues, and called for a strong Northern Ireland Assembly, 
an Executive in which both parts of the community would be full 
participants, and the recognition and acceptance of both an Irish 
dimension and a British dimension in Northern Ireland's affairs.
The UUUC strategy proved to be greatly successful: its candidates 
won a solid 47 seat bloc of the 78 Convention seats. The SDLP won 
17, the Alliance won 8, Faulkner's UPNI won 5, and the Northern 
Ireland Labour Party took one. Those whose -campaign manifesto placed 
them within negotiating distance of each other had, therefore, only
31 seats between them. With a solid majority of the seats and a 
platform that was uncompromisingly specific on the main issues, UUUC 
members had neither a need nor a desire to compromise. The Convention 
failed accordingly.
Despite wide areas of agreement between the SDLP and the UUUC
(on such matters as the re-establishment of a devolved administration,
greater participation by representatives of the minority community, and
the introduction of a Bill of Rights), the Constitutional Convention
failed because of the fundamental differences which were evident in
their respective election manifestos. In effect it was only the
formal and legitimate rejection of the Sunningdale Agreement which
2
had been achieved by other means the year before.
See Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention: Report, together 
with the Proceedings of the Convention and other Appendices (London: 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1975).
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The British Government's reaction to this impasse was to extend 
the deadline for the Convention report until May 1976. This 
similarly3 and inevitably failed to achieve anything and the 
Convention was dissolved in March 1976 when it became clear that 
there was no prospect of agreement between the parties. Its 
conclusions took the. form of a majority report which was unacceptable 
to Westminster in terms of the Northern Ireland Act of 1974y and 
minority reports with terms which were equally unacceptable to the 
UUUC.
After the final dissolution of the Consitutional Convention the
British Government made no further formal attempts at a settlement
in Northern Ireland. As a result of its experience it concluded
that 'a period of constitutional stability was needed in which the
3
Province's economic and security problems could be tackled. ' Direct 
Rule was therefore3 renewed in July 19763 and annually thereafter.
In the absence of initiatives from London the period July 1976- 
June 1977 was one without any major focus3 although there were 
developments which appeared to offer some hope of amelioration in 
Northern Ireland. Foremost among these was the Peace Movements 
founded in August 1976 by two women, Betty Williams and Mairead 
Corrigan. It was a. mass movement which crossed sectarian divisionss 
as evidenced by the tens of thousands it attracted to demonstrations 
in both Protestant and Catholic areas. As might be expected in the 
circumstances it suffered from the very attributes which made it so 
appealing: it proposed no specific programme other than the 
repudiation of violence practiced by the extremists of both sides and 
a broadly expressed Christian concern for all. Yet it so tapped the 
well-springs of such a great number of people in Northern Ireland 
that the established political organisations, in varying degrees and for 
m e  reason or another3 regarded it suspiciously. For all that the Peace 
Movement emerged as a spontaneous and genuine reaction to eight years 
of 'troubles ' and the best hope that some sort of consensus was 
possible in the future. '
Northern Ireland, Central Office of Information Pamphlet 135,
2nd ed. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979), pp. 19-20.
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Similarly, the failure of the May 1977 strike called by the 
Reverend Iccn Paisley's United Unionist Action Council (UUAC) 
provided further grounds for supposing that Ulster's extremists 
would not always have their way. Whereas in 1974 the Ulster 
Workers' Council strike had brought down the Executive, the 
UUAC's attempt to restore Stormont along its pre-1972 lines accomplished 
nothing. Worker support was lower, and British reaction swifter and 
more decisive than before. Not only was the strike broken but, for 
the time being, Paisley and the paramilitary groups which supported 
him were discredited.
On the other side of the paramilitary divide there was also 
evidence that the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) was becoming 
somewhat more isolated from the great majority of Catholic opinion. 
Externally, the flow of funds, north from the Republic and east from 
the United States appeared to indicate a falling away of support. 
Furthermore, in the Republic legislation was enacted in 1976 which 
contained the most stringent measures to combat the activities of 
terrorist groups hoping to use the 26 Counties as a base.
But hope was also to be seen in other areas as well. By 1976, 
further progress had been made on the reforms demanded in 1968-69.
The Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 made discrimination 
unlawful on grounds of religious belief or political opinion in both 
public and private sectors, thereby removing some of the reservations 
which were attendant on earlier measures which allowed discriminatory 
practices by firms in their non-government work.
Such welcome omens, however, were tempered by contra-indications — 
mainly in the security field — that Northern Ireland was far from 
returning to normality. By virtually every index of terrorist activity, 
1976 was a more violent year than 1975: the number of deaths rose; 
the high rate of sectarian killings continued — both despite the fact 
that seizures of explosives by the security forces almost doubled, as 
did charges made against members of the IRA. 4 Nevertheless, the
See Appendix III.
intensification of activities by the security forces did appear to
contribute to the reduction of terrorist activity in 1977 which was
5
to be, on a comparative basis, t)le ’best’ year since 1970.
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In the wake of the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) strike certain 
lessons appeared to suggest themselves in relation to the future 
government of Northern Ireland as seen from London and Dublin perspectives. 
The first was the clear disjunction between the preponderance of political 
and miltiary capabilities which Britain possessed vis-a-vis Northern 
Ireland, and its intentions to use them as an instrument of political 
will to achieve its objectives. As Donal Barrington described it
The British Government has the power but not the will 
to rule in Northern Ireland. For it, the game is not 
worth the candle.i
In contrast, the Government of the Republic of Ireland,had neither
the power nor the will to attempt to incorporate Northern Ireland
2
into the Republic against the wishes of the Northern majority. This 
had been a persistent and frequently stated element of Irish Government 
policy since September 1969.
From these two lessons two conclusions may be drawn as regards 
Britain and the Republic of Ireland. Of the former
... the only real power which the British Government has 
in Northern Ireland is the power to get out. More 
correctly, no new political initiative is open to it 
unless, it spells out the terms on which it is prepared 
to stay, and the situation which would cause it to go, and, 
in the latter case, what transitional arrangements, if 
any, it would be prepared to make.3
And of the latter
Donal Barrington, 'After Sunningdale?', Administration (Dublin)
24 (Summer 1976): 242, (hereafter cited as Barrington, 'After 
Sunningdale?').
ibid.', pp. 243-4.
3 ibid., p. 242.
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... the immediate interest of the Government of the 
Republic is for peace in the North with justice for the 
majority and the minority.4
The British Government, while apparently aware of its remaining 
options, understandably -  in view of its immeasurably greater 
responsibilities —  chose not to admit them, explicitly at least. But 
inferentially it was clear that for Britain, the sense of disengage­
ment from Ireland which had marked the last two years of the Heath 
premiership, was in the ascendant. An early indication of tin's 
attitude was found in the publication of a discussion paper on the 
financial arrangements between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
It appeared to be an extension of Prime Minister Harold Wilson's
g
'spongers' speech, made during the strike, a reminder of the 
province's financial' debt to Britain. As Fisk noted:
It took the loyalist and nationalist politicians only a 
few hours to realize that the London Government was, in 
effect, telling them that Ulster's departure from the 
United Kingdom would not be too deeply r e g r e t t e d .7 
[emphasis added].
ibid., p. 244.
5
Northern Ireland Office, Northern Ireland Discussion Paper:
Finance and the Economy (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1974). 
g
On 25 May, Wilson had incensed the population of Northern Ireland, 
Protestant and Catholic, with a speech over the BBC which included the 
following passage:
British taxpayers have seen the taxes they have poured out, 
almost without regard to cost ... going into Northern 
Ireland. They see property destroyed by evil violence and 
are asked to pick up the bill for rebuilding it. Yet 
people who benefit from all this now viciously defy 
Westminister, purporting to act as though they were an 
elected government; people who spend their lives sponging 
on Westminister and British democracy and then systematically 
assault democratic methods. Who do these people think they 
are?
As cited in Robert Fisk, The Point of No Return: The Strike which 
broke the British in Ulster (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975), p. 183, 
(hereafter cited as Fisk, The Point of No Return).
Fisk, The Point of No Return, p. 230.
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Further indications of an attitude of disengagement in the immediate 
aftermath of the strike were found in the tone of the second discussion
o
paper on the proposed Constitutional Convention, and in the
manoeuvres of the Northern Ireland Secretary, Merlyn Rees, to create
9
a violence-free environment in which this body could deliberate.
In Anglo-Irish relations during this period, however, neither 
party was prepared to admit that the Sunningdale Agreement had been 
completely vitiated. On the contrary, the National Coalition of 
Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave continued to proclaim its force.
We must go forward from here. The principles of partnership 
and co-operation with democratically elected representatives 
in this island ... remain as true and genuine a basis for 
progress as they have ever been.10
Yet his refusal, the day following this statement, to hold a referendum
on the Agreement, suggested that the limits of hope for further
progress were hardly expansive.** Not only was there no attempt made
to amend the articles of the Constitution which gave so much offence
to the Unionists, but even a lesser measure designed to placate
Protestant fears failed miserably. After the fall of the Executive,
and in response to complex pressures in the Republic, the Irish
Government introduced a Bill legalising the sale of contraceptives.
Without informing any of his Cabinet of his intention, Cosgrave voted
against the Bill, which was defeated. In conjunction both developments
constituted an unhelpful and inauspicious beginning to the Irish
Government's declared intention 'to reassure [the Northern majority]
that the Sunningdale package was a bona fide package, that it was full
12
of good intentions and that they were meant'.
Northern Ireland Office, Northern Ireland Discussion Paper 2: 
Constitution Convention: Procedure (London: Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1974).
^ see pp. 167-8.
Dail Eireann, Parliamentary Debates, Official Report3 vol. 273,
28 May 1974, col. 101, (hereafter cited as bail Eireann, Official Report).
11 ibid., 29 May 1974, cols. 151-2.
12
Minister for Justice, Mr Patrick Cooney, ibid., 26 June 1974, 
col. 1597.
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When this statement by the Minister for Justice, Patrick Cooney,
is placed in the context of earlier post-strike official statements,
it becomes evident that it was more of an 'adieu' to a once fond idea
than a declaration of intent. On 14 June Cosgrave, on behalf of the
Irish people, disavowed any desire of 'unity or close association
13
with a people so deeply imbued with violence and its effect'. In
the lengthy debate on Northern Ireland a fortnight later it was
patently obvious that the Irish Cabinet realised, even accepted, the
truth inherent in the many previous (and unpopular) warnings given
by the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien, i.e.
that Protestant working class hostility towards anything which they
construed as enforced Irish unity was a fact of life for the present
14
and foreseeable future.
There was, therefore, an attempt by the Taoiseach to focus 
attention upon those who were perceived to have caused previous 
policies to founder.
The political leaders of these islands have devoted 
considerable time and energy to the formulation of 
policies for securing peace with justice in Northern 
Ireland. In the past it was to a large extent on the 
initiatives of the British and Irish Governments that such 
formulations were devised. I think that it is to the 
Northern political leaders that we should now look for the 
next steps in this process.15
Furthermore this attitude denoted a general passivity, which persisted 
throughout the National Coalition's remaining period in office, towards 
both the immediate and long-term goals which had been the concern of 
contemporary Anglo-Irish relations.
Irish Timer,, 14 June 1974, as cited in Ian McAllister, The Northern 
Ireland Social Democratic and Labour Party: Political Opposition in a 
Divided Society (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977), p. 150, 
(hereafter cited as McAllister, SDLP) ,
14
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 273, 26 June 1974, 
cols. 1571-1712 (entire debate). Dr Cruise O'Brien's speech is located 
between cols. 1626-37.
15 ibid., col. 158.1.
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Within this approach the Irish Government effectively renounced 
its pretensions to be the 'second guarantor' of the Northern Catholic 
community, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated.
It would be very satisfying, no doubt, for us down here 
to have the will to do things but it would not help 
anyone in Northern Ireland for us to speak in those 
terms, to mislead people who might not differentiate 
between will and power and who might read into speeches 
of that kind an expectation that they can be protected 
in certain circumstances if certain things happen.16
A more significant casualty of this period was the Irish Dimension. 
Despite explicit assurance in the White Paper, The Northern Ireland 
Constitution, that 'any political arrangements must recognise and 
provide for this special relationship',*7 it was not again to assume 
the importance it had held between October 1972 and the fall of the 
Executive in May 1974. In the British Government deliberations which 
followed closely upon the resumption of direct rule it is clear that 
this once central aspect of Anglo-Irish relations was to be set aside 
in the interest of creating conditions more conducive to political
IP
dialogue in the North. Within the space of eighteen months its 
relegation was rendered almost complete by Rees's announcement that:
The Government do not consider it necessary or appropriate 
to create an institutional framework such as a Council of 
Ireland for relations with the Republic. Arrangements for 
co-operation should evolve positively and naturally as and 
when the need for them arises and is generally recognized 
and acceDted.
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Garret Fizgerald, ibid., col.1699.
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, The Northern Ireland 
Constitution, Cmnd. 5675 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1974), p. 16 (hereafter cited as The Northern Ireland Constitution).-
Ip
See, for example, the Northern Ireland Secretary's speeches as 
follows: Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, 
vol. 874, 3 June 1974, cols. 878-8; vol. 878, 4 July 1974, cols. 610-13; 
and ibid., cols. 1162-70, (hereafter cited as House of Commons, Official
Report).
19
House of Commons, Official Report3 vol. 903, 12 January 1976,
col. 56.
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However, this process of attrition undergone by the Irish
Dimension as a British priority v/as complemented by its corresponding
abandonment in the policies of the Republic. Indeed, it may be more
accurate to regard the priority accorded it in British policy as
reflecting London's willing acquiescence in initiatives taken by the
Irish Government to minimise areas of its Northern Ireland policy to
which Unionists were objecting. To this end the Irish Government,
according to a confidential policy document prepared by Conor Cruise
O'Brien, developed a strategy by which it would do 'everything in [its]
power' to prevent a Loyalist majority emerging in the forthcoming
20
Constitutional Convention. Further, it was the Irish Government's
view that 'a relatively low profile' (as opposed to a 'noisy threatening
posture') was 'that best calculated to allow the emergence of a non-
21
Loyalist Protestant vote'. The factor which decided the Irish
Government in favour of this strategy was the anxiety felt regarding
a scenario which included military activity by the Loyalists, a
resultant withdrawal of British forces, and the 'virtually certain'
22
prospect of an all-Ireland civil war which would follow.
More positively, these sacrifices in Irish Government policy were
23 24
directed towards 'the most useful thing', the 'all important thing'
—  the reconstruction of power-sharing. In support of this objective
the Irish Government repeatedly sought and obtained reassurances from
20
Irish Times, 25 September 1974, p. 1.
2 1  • i • j 
ibid.
22
ibid. A very similar scenario, labelled the 'malignant model' 
of alternative futures was described nearly two years earlier in 
Conor Cruise O'Brien, States of Ireland, (London: Hutchinson, 1972), 
pp. 299-303.
23 -., -.
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 273, 26 June 1974, col. 1633.
24
Report of an interview with the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, 
Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien, on Radio Telefis Eireann's (RTE) radio 
programme 'This Week' of 30 June 1974, Irish Times, 1 July 1974.
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p r
the British Government that power-sharing was the pre-condition /
26
pre-requisite for future developments in the North. It was no doubt 
heartened by such affirmations as Rees's in the House of Commons on
27 June 1974:
Power-sharing is not dead.' It is the one thing which 
has stayed on since the fall of the Executive.27
Thus the Taoiseach stated to Dail Eireann on 24 October 1974 that the
British and Irish Governments had agreed that power-sharing (and the
28
Irish Dimension) were 'non-negotiable' principles. Ostensibly, 
therefore, there existed an (albeit reduced) identity of interests 
in Anglo-Irish relations.
Yet this was not in fact the case. Indeed, the frequent
reassurances on power-sharing given by the British Government, between
29
the fall of the Executive and May 1977, can in large part be traced
to a well-founded sense of nervousness on behalf of the Irish
Government that London's support for it had been, or was about to be, 
30
eroded. At issue were differing sets of assumptions concerning the 
emphasis which should be accorded to a concept which was tainted with 
the failure of the Sunningdale package. They may be accurately gauged 
from the following two passages concerning the respective policies. 
Keatinge notes that
25
'Northern Ireland: Statement by Dr Garret Fitzgerald, T.D., Leader 
of the Opposition in Dail Eireann, 12 October, 1977', Garret Fitzgerald, 
The Role of Fine Gael (a booklet appearing without publications details) 
p. 20, (hereafter cited as Fitzgerald, 'Statement on Northern Ireland,
12 October 1977'.
26 ibid. , p. 22.
27
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 875, 27 June 1974, col. 1704.
28
'Taoiseach's address at Opening of Dail', Ireland today: Bulletin 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, No. 856, 18 November 1974, p.3, 
(hereafter cited as Ireland today).
29
The last meeting between Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Garret 
Fitzgerald, and Northern Ireland Secretary, Mr Roy Mason. The National 
Coalition was defeated in the June General Election, by Fianna Fail.
30
Fitzgerald, 'Statement on Northern Ireland, 12 October 1977', pp.20-1. 
Doubts about British intentions regarding power-sharing were evidently 
shared by the SDLP who 'sought political undertakings directly from the 
Prime Minister'. McAllister, SDLP, pp. 150-51.
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the coalition government's aim was to discreetly 
encourage a return to power-sharing ... [emphasis 
added] ,31
while Fisk, writing of the British perspective, observes
the phrase 'power-sharing' was none too discreetly 
forgotten ... [emphasis added].32
Moreover, in the pursuit of its objective the Irish Government was
faced with a dilemma. Either it assumed a forceful role vis-a-vis
power-sharing and thereby risked its acceptability to the Unionists,
or it maintained its recently adopted low profile and relied upon the
questionable enthusiasm of the British Government for the measure. In
practice a combination of both methods was attempted —  with less than
wholly satisfying results. The Irish Government appear to have insisted,
within the confidentiality of major Anglo-Irish negotiations, that
33
power-sharing be affirmed as an operating principle, while the
British Government obliged by its pronouncements but effectively did
34
little else to promote it.
Power-sharing, or rather, a lack of confidence in British 
intentions regarding power-sharing was, however, only one of four 
factors which undermined Anglo-Irish relations throughout the remaining 
period of office of the National Coalition. Primarily, the doubts 
concerning this principle may be viewed as extending from the overriding 
Irish uncertainty concerning the British policies in Northern Ireland.
As Keith Kyle later commented
... the worst shock for the Irish Government was the 
revelation of what they interpreted as British 
irresolution in the face of a fundamental challenge to
Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations: Issues of Irish 
Foreign Policy (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1978), p. 122, 
(hereafter cited as Keatinge, Issues of Irish Foreign Policy).
ip
Fisk, The Point of No Return3 p. 230.
33
Fitzgerald, 'Statement on Northern Ireland', p. 21.
34
See also pp. 204-10 concerning the alleged Unionist-Labour Party 
'pact'and its bearing on power-sharing.
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Britain's authority, particularly in the vital first 
days [of the UWC strike]. From then on they felt 
themselves out of touch with British motives, consulted 
in a formal way but not taken into confidence.35
Moreover Anglo-Irish relations in this third period confirmed Harold
Wilson's April 1974 prophecy that if the Executive failed then 'there
would be little hope that we could once again reconstruct a fresh
36
political initiative1. Thus, drift served to compound uncertainty 
throughout the following three years —  through the succession of 
James Callaghan as Prime Minister, to the return of Fianna Fail as 
Government in the Republic.
The remaining three factors —  a readiness on the part of the 
British Government to negotiate with the Provisional IRA, the 
susceptibi1ity of the Labour Government (after 1976) to Unionist 
pressure at Westminster, and disputes concerning transnational security 
matters may be regarded as issues with more limited implications than 
the first. Indeed, it is suggested that these factors achieved the 
prominence they did, directly as a result of the absence in Anglo-Irish 
relations of imaginative measures such as had characterised the 
preceding period.
It is emphasised that the above four classifications are not
37
exhaustive: others, such as internment, the use of CR gas by
38 39 40
security forces in the North, sectarian murders, and espionage,
35
Keith Kyle, 'Sunningdale and after: Britain, Ireland, and Ulster', 
The World Today, 31 (November 1975): 448.
or
Press conference, Belfast, 18 April 1974, Times, 14 April 1974, p .1,
37
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 275, 7 November 1974, 
cols. 1315-18; vol. 277, 5 February 1975, cols. 1711-15; and vol. 281, 
5 June 1975, cols. 1841-3.
38
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 277, 8 February 1975, 
cols. 1699-1701.
39
Dail Eireann, Official R e p o r t vol. 283, 9 July 1975, cols. 1124-7.
40
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 275, 7 November 1974,
cols. 1315-16; and vol. 285, 19 November 1975, cols. 1554-6.
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all contributed to the deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations between 
mid-1974 and mid-1977, but by no means to the same extent as those 
which are given a more detailed consideration.
As on previous occasions, the British Government's decision to
meet with the Provisional IRA coincided with efforts in both Britain
and Ireland to create conditions inimical to the latter's support.
In both countries the respective governments accepted the recommendations
of the Law Enforcement Commission and proceeded with legislation to
41
establish extra-territorial courts. In the case of Britain contact 
with the Provisional IRA also followed closely upon virtuous 
denunciations by the Northern Ireland Secretary of the political 
morality of acceding to such a course of action. On 3 June 1974 
Merlyn Rees had explained to the House of Commons
This group [the UWC] is a non-elected body of men 
that sought to subvert the expressed wish and 
authority to this Parliament through unconstitutional 
and undemocratic means involving widespread 
intimidation ...
In the same way as I refused to be bombed to the 
conference table by the Provisionals, so I have been 
adamant that a sectarian strike by so-called Loyalists 
and backed by para-military forces would not force me 
to such a conference table.42
Nevertheless, in December 1974, with the foreknowledge and
something more than the tacit approval of the Northern Ireland Office
43
(NIO), a group of Protestant clergymen met with Provisional IRA
44
leaders at Smyth's Village Hotel, Feakle, Co. Clare. This resulted
41
The Legislation came into effect on 1 June 1976.
42
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 874, 3 June 1974. col. 880.
43
McAllister, SDLP, pp. 148-9, claimed that it was 'with at least the 
tacit approval of the NIO', and a report subsequent to the publication of 
this work indicates that the 'men of God had the Government's confidence'
—  John Whale and Chris Ryder, 'Ulster 1968-1978: A Decade of Despair', 
Sunday Times, 18 June 1978, p. 17, (hereafter cited as Whale and Ryder,
'Decade of Despair').
44
Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of Despair', p. 17; and Conor O'Clery,
'Provisionals got a commitment to withdraw', Irish Times, 9 June 1978. 
(O'Clery's article is an interview with the Rev. William Arlow, the man 
responsible for arranging this and a later meeting between British 
Officials and Provisional Sinn Fein; hereafter the article will be cited 
as O'Clery, Arlow interview, Irish Times, 9 June 1978).
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in a ceasefire by the Provisionals which lasted from 22 December 1974
to 16 January 1975. Within a few weeks of this meeting, on 19 January
1975, representatives of Provisional Sinn Fein —  only notionally
distinct from the Provisional IRA —  met with British Government
representatives including James Allan, a Foreign and Commonwealth
45
Office diplomat seconded to the NIO. Once again the outcome was a 
ceasefire, which began on 10 February.
Rees's reversal of his previous policy on this matter owed much 
to his hope for a stable environment in which the forthcoming 
Constitutional Convention could operate. By his account he
... sought to get away from the daily catalogue 
of violence and open the door to a new situation in 
which discussions and political activity could take 
place in a constructive and peaceful atmosphere.46
He was, therefore, disposed to respond to reductions in the level of 
violence by the IRA. As he admitted in the Commons
the actions of the security forces ... would be related 
to the level of any activity which might occur.47
Furthermore he promised that, in the event of 'a genuine and sustained
43
cessation of violence', he would 'gradually release all detainees'.
Rees, it might be noted, eschewed the term 'ceasefire'.
Last year there was a ceasefire. I did not 
describe it as a ceasefire. ,Jhose were the words 
used by the Provisional I R A . 49
45
Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of Despair', p.15; and O'Clery, Arlow 
interview, Irish Times, 9 June 1978.
46
House of Commons, Official Report, vol.885, 5 February 1975, col.1384,
47
House of Commons, Official Report, vol.884, 14 February, 
cols.201-02, as cited as McAllister, SDLP, p.149.
48
House of Commons, Official Report, vol.885, 5 February 1975, col.1384,
49
House of Commons, Official Report, vol.913, 14 June 1976, col.48.
In fact they were words used by more than the Provisional IRA: in May 
1975, a British Government agency, the Central Office of Information, 
described the cessation of violence that occurred as a 'ceasefire'
[Northern Ireland, (London: Central Office of Information, 1975), p.6], 
while in 1979, Sir Harold Wilson went so far as to term it a 'definitive
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Moreover he went so far as to deny that the meetings with Provisional 
Sinn Fein were negotiations.
There have never been negotiations with anyone, but, ... 
it is valuable to explain Government policy, and my 
advisers believe that benefit is to be gained from doing 
so.ou
Rees's attempt to evade the use of expressions alluded to by 
semantic juxtaposition is to be understood in terms of the opprobrium 
which contacts with the Provisionals had earned William Whitelaw in
1972. But such an understanding in no way serves to authenticate his 
claim that the meetings, in early 1975 anyway, were called so that the 
IRA might become better acquainted with the British policies. On the 
contrary, there are grounds for concluding that, at these meetings 
which were 'never ... negotiations', it was the IRA that convinced the 
British representatives of its intentions to conduct a massive 
terrorist campaign on the mainland, and obtained in return for not doing 
so, several advantages which included a promise by the British to 
withdraw from Northern Ireland.
If this was the case, then obviously the Northern Ireland
Secretary allowed himself somewhat elastic limits, beyond the release
of detainees, in which to respond to the IRA's 'sustained cessation of
violence'. It is useful, therefore, to consider the evidence relating
to the outcomes of these meetings, and in some instance, the
reliability of those who provided it. In particular, considerable
reliability must be placed on the veracity of the Rev. William Arlow,
51
a Church of Ireland clergyman, and then Assistant Secretary to the
cease-fire' [Harold Wilson, Final Term: The Labour Government, 1974-1976 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979), p. 129.]
c;n
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 912, 27 May 1976, col. 611. 
In 1974 the Irish Minister for Justice, Mr Cooney, attempted a similar 
semantic evasion when questioned about his meeting with members of the 
Ulster Defence Association. On that occasion the point at issue was 
whether the meeting constituted 'talks' rather than a 'casual 
conversation'. Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 276, 3 December 
1974, cols. 643-5.
51
Denomination given by Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of Despair', p. 15. 
Fisk, The Point of No Return, p. 247, wrongly states Arlow is a 
Methodist.
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respected for his integrity and courage and is, by one description,
52
a man of 'transparent trustworthiness'. In confirmation of part
of his testimony there is no record of disagreement with it from any
53
of the six clergymen who accompanied him to Feakle.
54
That the meeting at 'Laneside' on 19 January 1975 was more
than a policy-advising session was borne out by events both before
and after it. On being apprised by the IRA of its intentions to
direct a bombing offensive upon the London underground, and of its
demands to prevent this, Arlow and his colleagues reported .to the
NIO. Broadly, the demands were for reduced military activity
(including an end to detention) and an increased opportunity for the
Provisionals to press their views, both in negotiation with the
55
authorities and in local politics. Within a week Arlow had
journeyed to London with a further Provo message and returned to Dublin
56
with the. British response. On 20 December 1974 a Provisional IRA
57
truce was announced with effect from two days on.
Following the 19 January meeting the ceasefire, which had been 
suspended three days earlier, was invoked once again. And once again 
the circumstantial evidence is heavily supportive of a conclusion that 
negotiations took place, as follows:
Irish Council of Churches. He is, throughout Ireland, widely
52
Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of Despair', p. 15.
53
They included the Secretary of the Irish Council of Churches, the 
Rev. Ralph Baxter; the Church of Ireland Bishop of Connor, Bishop 
Butler; and two clergymen from England. Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of 
Despair', p. 17; and O'Clery, Arlow Interview, Irish Times, 9 June 1978.
54
A secluded house, at Craigavad, near the southern shore of Belfast 
Lough.
55
Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of Despair', p. 17.
56
ibid. It is claimed that 'Arlow and his men' went to
London, but there is no mention of who, if any, accompanied him to 
Dublin with the response.
57
ibid. As a side point, Marian and Dolours Price, convicted
of bombing offences in Britain, were shifted to more comfortable quarters 
at Durham, and late in the extended ceasefire of 1975, were transferred 
to Armagh.
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1. Detainees were progressively released, and detention 
itself ended at the end of the year despite the failure of the 
ceasefire and the succeeding period of violence.
2. Large scale Army searches in Catholic areas were abandoned 
and military checkpoints on the edges of these areas were 
withdrawn. (They were replaced with the advent of renewed sectarian 
violence.)
3. Specified Provisional leaders were given immunity from 
arrest.
4. Street level negotiations were conducted between British 
officers and local Provisional commanders.
5. 'Incident Centres' were established from where Provisional
Sinn Fein appointees could report breaches of the ceasefire and
58
conduct political activity.
Within a complete enterprise that was regarded as anathema by the
Irish Government, the most damaging single item to Anglo-Irish
relations was the decision to establish, with British Government funding,
a total of seven incident centres. In an approach to the British
Ambassador in Dublin the Irish Government advised that such centres
were 'unacceptable' to it on the grounds that they gave political
credibility to the IRA at the expense of Catholic-elected representatives
59
in Northern Ireland.
Exclusive of these tangible developments, the most disturbing
feature, to the Irish Government, of British contacts with the IRA was
the reports of an undertaking to withdraw from Northern Ireland.
According to Irish Times correspondent, Conor O'Clery, after the first
'Lanesi d e 1 meeting,
officials at Stormont began to lace their after dinner 
conversations and political tete-a-tetes with predictions 
of a pul 1 out.60
58 .... , r
lbid. , p. 15.
59
Times, 24 February 1975.
^ O'Clery, Arlow Interview, Irish Times, 9 June 1978.
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The condition upon which this depended, it was suggested, was the
failure of the Constitutional Convention: if and when it did so, the
61
British would commence their withdrawal.
Among those who believed that the Provisional IRA had received 
a British commitment to withdraw was one of their more widely-known 
leaders, Dave O'Connell (Daithi 0'Connaill), who claimed that
The overall feature of that truce was a statement by the 
British Government that it was committed to disengage 
from Ireland, but it could not say so publicly.62
More substantially, it appears that the Government in Dublin were also 
convinced that the Provos genuinely believed they had received such a 
commitment. And the Rev. William Arlow was in no doubt that they 
had. In an interview over RTE on 25 May 1975 he claimed
... the British government have given a firm commitment 
to the Provisional IRA that they will withdraw the army 
from Northern Ireland. This would be under circumstances 
such as if the present Constitutional Convention fails to 
produce an agreed structure of government for the
province.64
Over three years later he was 'absolutely certain' that the British
undertaking, constituted not just a prediction of disengagement but an
65
actual commitment to withdraw.
Not unexpectedly, the Northern Ireland Secretary denied 
Arlow's allegations in a brief but firm statement.
There is no truth in the statement made by the Rev.
William Arlow concerning an alleged agreement about 
the withdrawal of British troops.66
McAllister, SDLP, p. 149.
As cited in Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of Despair', p. 15. 
ibid.
Belfast Telegraph, 26 May 1975, as cited in McAllister, SDLP, p.149. 
O'Clery, Arlow Interview, Irish Times, 9 June 1978.
Times, 26 May 1974, p. 1.
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The British Government, however, itself appeared to substantiate 
Arlow1s claim by two genuine acts of disengagement. The first concerned 
economic withdrawal. According to the one report, the Aircraft and 
Shipbuilding Industries Bill of 1975, a major measure of nationalisation 
and refinancing, was drafted so as to exclude the Belfast shipyard of 
Harland and Wolff and, thereby, to present a 'meaningful sign' of 
withdrawal to the Provisional leadership. A similar exclusion applied 
to the aircraft manufacturing concern of Short Brothers and Harland.67
The second act of disengagement was mi 1itary/strategic. In this 
period five Government bases were closed in Northern Ireland —  an air
traffic control centre, an FCO radio station, two RAF establishments,
68
and a Royal Navy depot. If these indications were not the British 
consideration for a Provisional IRA ceasefire, then as empirical 
evidence they surely support a conclusion of some form of British 
disengagement at a time when it was extremely dangerous for them to 
be seen as such.
It could, of course, be suggested that the British Government was 
pursuing a sustained policy of official ambiguity, and through this, 
hoped to both delude the Provisionals into keeping 'the gun on the 
shelf', and encourage the intransigents within the Convention to reach 
an accommodation with the moderates. But this is imputing a particularly 
dangerous and Machiavellian character to British policy-makers that they 
otherwise did not display between 1968 and 1979 —  and for good reasons. 
Deluding the Provisionals would have had the most violent of reper­
cussions when they had realised it, and interestingly, they have never 
claimed in the six years since the ceasefire that they were so taken in. 
And if it was to encourage the Loyalists, who were an overwhelmingly 
majority in the Convention, to reach a settlement with parties such as 
the SDLP, then against all reasonable expectations, the failure of the 
'imposed' (to Loyalists) Sunningdale Agreement would need to have passed 
from the active memories of all concerned..
67
Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of Despair', p. 15.
68 . . . .l bid.
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Nevertheless, the paucity of irrefutable evidence requires that 
the claims of a British commitment to withdraw from Northern Ireland 
be advanced with caution. This is not the place in which to enter into 
a more detailed analysis either as to what exactly what was transacted 
between the Provisional IRA and officials of the NIO, or of the 
controversy which the Rev. Arlow's claims attracted. Because of the 
focus of this thesis it must suffice to note that the Irish Government 
was clearly disturbed by the persistence with which British Ministers 
admitted the IRA to negotiations, as was later indicated in the Dail 
by Garret Fitzgerald, the Minister for Foreign Affairs throughout this 
period.
On the IRA side, the idea that their methods might secure 
sympathy or support from elected politicians, or that 
elected politicians might be brought to the conference 
table at the point of a gun, has received no support in 
the Republic since the events of May 1970. Since that 
time the various IRAs have had no grounds for any illusion 
as to the willingness of any Government here to deal with 
them or tolerate them.
Unfortunately this was not true of the U.K. Government.
A Conservative Northern Ireland Secretary met IRA 
Spokesmen personally and conceded to them special treatment 
in prison akin to that of prisoners of war —  thereby 
deluding them into thinking that persistence with their 
campaign would bring that Government to the conference 
table with them, and his successor authorised his officials 
to enter into discussions with political representatives of 
Provisional IRA, not easily distinguishable from members 
of that organization. These actions have probably prolonged 
violence in Northern Ireland by a number of years.69
Thus, also from an Irish perspective, the British Government, had 
undermined a basic principle upon which a power-sharing devolved 
government should be established, i.e. 'the defeat of violence, by 
convincing the IRA that it cannot win'.7^ Furthermore the advantages 
to the Convention which Rees had hoped to create by a stable environment 
were negated. In Northern Ireland the controversy which the withdrawal 
allegations attracted did nothing for the spirit in which it was 
conducted, while in the Republic, there was understandably no improvement
Fitzgerald, 'Statement on Northern Ireland, 12 October 1977', p.19.
Garret Fitzgerlad, 'Five Years of British Muddle', Sunday Times>
18 December 1977.
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Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of Despair', p. 15.
68 .. . .ibid.
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upon Cosgrave's pessimistic prediction that 'little likelihood' 
existed of a constructive outcome.7*
The Irish Government, moreover, took steps which left London in
no doubt as to its views on the 'accommodation' which had been reached
with the Provisional IRA. In July 1975, Dave O'Connell,
reportedly their Chief-of-Staff was arrested in the Republic; a month
later the Taoiseach broke his silence on Northern Ireland to demand
72
'effective action' to end sectarian violence there. However, despite
these reminders of Irish irritation, it took some time for the British
Government to respond favourably —  and it did so then less out of
accession to the former's demands and more as a consequence of events
in Ireland. Although the end of the ceasefire was never officially
declared, August 1975 may be held as its termination. That month
saw the commencement of a period of sectarian assassinations which
eventually led, in the following November, to the closure of the
incident centres. Even so, meetings between the Provisionals and
British officials persisted intermittently until July 1976 and the
assassination outside Dublin of the British Ambassador to Ireland
73
(Mr Christopher Ewart-Biggs) and a woman official of the NIO.
The third factor undermining Anglo-Irish relations between June 
1974 and June 1977 —  the susceptibility of the Labour Government at 
Westminister to extreme Unionist pressure —  was at first sight the 
least necessary of all the disturbances to which they were subject.
For instance, there was in Dublin an understanding that the circumstances 
of the British Government were not propitious for the development of an 
'initiative' on Northern Ireland, as evidenced by the following 
passage from a speech by the (former) Minister for Foreign Affairs:
No doubt a British Government with a threatened 
parliamentary majority facing grave domestic and 
political problems in Great Britain, finds it difficult 
to give the kind of single-minded attention to
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 275, 5 November 1974, 
cols. 928-9.
72
Financial Timer,, 18 December 1975.
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Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of Despair', p. 15.
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Northern Ireland that was given in 1969 and again 
in 1972/73 ..J 4
Additionally, and on the British side, James Callaghan's 
succession of Harold Wilson as Prime Minister on 5 April 1976 brought 
with it an incidental advantage. From as early as 1973 he had an 
obvious affinity and respect for Fitzgerald. In the memoirs of his 
period as Home Secretary (1967-1970) Callaghan noted his 'close 
sympathy'76 for the then opposition T.D. (Irish Member of Parliament) —  
which remained undiminished, indeed increased, in the ensuing years.
In March 1977 he told a National Press Club gathering in Washington, 
D.C.,
I do not wish to cut across anything that Garret 
Fitzgerald will say ... I believe he is coming to address 
you next Friday. Well let me give you a free trailer to 
Garret Fitzgerald, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for 
the Republic of Eire. You will hear a witty, erudite 
speaker, a man of very deep conviction and of very great 
knowledge ... I don't want to cut across anything that 
Garret is going to say ...76
But ironically, it may have been the ideas that Callaghan's 
memoirs contained which dimmed the prospects of closer Anglo-Irish
relations in this period. A House Divided, in company with Harold
77 78
Wilson, The Labour Government and Richard Crossman's Diaries,
'Northern Ireland: From a speech by Dr Garret Fitzgerald, T.D. , 
Leader of Fine Gael, in Moylough, Co. Galway, 27 September, 1977',
Garret Fitzgerald, The Role of Fine Gael (a booklet appearing without 
publication details), p. 16, (hereafter cited as Fitzgerald, 'Moylough 
Speech').
75
James Callaghan, A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland 
(London: Collins, 1973), p. 152, (hereafter cited as Callaghan, A House
Divided) .
7 6
As cited in London Press Service, Verbatim Service 064/77,
'Extracts From Questions After Premier's Washington Press Club 
Statement' (also referred to as National Press Club Washington), pp. 6-7. 
Whether this admiration was reciprocated by Fitzgerald is open to 
speculation: there are no similar references to Callaghan in his 
publications or other published repositories of his views.
Harold Wilson, The Labour Government} 1964-70: A Personal Record3 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1974).
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Richard Crossman, The Diaries of A Cabinet Ministers 3 vols. 1:2 
(London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathon Cape, 1975 and 1976 resp.);
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revealed the disquieting shallowness of the Labour Government's
79
appreciation of the Northern Ireland problem —  in particular a 
pervasive British failure to develop policies which accurately
reflected strongly-held perceptions, or to implement fully those
80
policies which were developed.
It may also have been Callaghan's misfortune that A House Divided
was published when he was in Opposition, enjoying a widely-held but
undeserved reputation as a 'success' in Northern Ireland, and not
81
concerned with even 'shadowing' that portfolio. Thus the 'greening'
82
of the future Prime Minister —  i.e. his hope for eventual Irish unity
—  must have been an embarrassment to him upon assuming the leadership
of a party whose tenure of the treasury benches was in large part
dependent upon a small minority who were unalterably opposed to this
prospect. (Nor could Harold Wilson's comfortable advocacy of Irish
83
unity, in Opposition, have been a legacy Callaghan received with any 
great gratitude).
His Northern Ireland Secretary was, therefore, obliged to engage 
in some peculiar conceptual inconsistencies. The first principle on 
which Rees argued was contained in the July 1974 White Paper, which 
stated
2 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977).
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Oddly, the Irish Government regarded some of the leading officials 
who served these politicians in very good light. According to Mr Sean 
Donlon, an assistant Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the 
reports submitted to London by seconded F.C.O. diplomats Oliver Wright 
and Howard Smith, were 'first class', (Interview, Dublin, 7 June 1978). 
According to one report, a similar respect was voiced for a later F.C.O. 
appointment at the NIO, Frank Cooper, (Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of 
Despair1, p. 15).
80
The same shallowness imputed to the Labour Minister named above 
is also found in the memoirs of a former Conservative Home Secretary.
See Reginald Maudling, Memoirs (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978), 
p. 28; p. 157; and pp. 178-88.
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Harold Wilson took over this role in December 1971.
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Callaghan, A House Divided, pp. 182-7.
See Chapter 1, p. 72.
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Any pattern of government must be acceptable to the 
people of the United Kingdom as a whole and to 
Parliament at Westminister. Citizenship confers not 
only rights and privileges but also obi igations.84-
Second, the House of Commons was the supreme legislative body of the 
United Kingdom, it was up to that body 'to reach final decisions'. 
'That', said Rees, 'is what being part of the United Kingdom is all 
about'.^
Both, however, were aspirations rather than operating principles.
Insofar as the first was concerned, there was not in 1974, nor has there
been since, any suggestion that the British Government would refer
Northern Ireland matters to the United Kingdom electorate. And with
some justification. In every major survey conducted in Britain since
86
1974 a majority opinion has been expressed in favour of withdrawal.
As Sir John Peck, the British Ambassador to Ireland (1970-1973) 
remarked of an earlier similar claim to that of Rees's
87
this [was] an elegant charade which fooled nobody.
Nevertheless, with regard to the second Rees was somewhat more
able to demonstrate the operability of the principle. On 3 February
1976 the Constitutional Convention was ordered to reconvene because
the United Kingdom Government did not view its Report as 'commanding
88
sufficiently widespread acceptance throughout the community'. It was 
required, thereupon, to further deliberate and, hopefully, agree on a 
system of government which 'provided for a form of partnership and
The Northern Ireland Constitution, p. 16, and cited by Rees, House 
of Commons, Official Report, vol. 903, 12 January 1976, col. 54.
^  ibid., col. 54.
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According to a study published in 1978, from June 1974 to February 
1977, 'British opinion has been consistent and clear: in each of seven 
surveys a majority, averaging 57 per cent, has favoured a phased with­
drawal of troops' (Richard Rose, Ian McAllister, and Peter Mair, Is
There A Concurring Majority About Northern Ireland3 Studies in Public 
Policy, No. 22 (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 
University of Strathclyde, 1978), p. 27.
87
John Peck, Dublin from Downing Street (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 
1978), p. 135.
ibid. , col. 54.
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participation'. Yet the limits within which this prerogative 
would be exercised were abundantly clear. The collapse of the 
Northern Ireland Executive was eloquent testimony to the contingent 
rather than the absolute primacy of Westminster which the Loyalists 
operate under, and which the Labour Government passively encouraged 
by its lack of effective action against the UWC. In appreciating, 
but in no way justifying, the ferae majeure of their position Rees 
concluded that
a united Ireland [was] not in the gift of this 
Pariiament.90
To this point it may reasonably be assumed that the Irish 
Government extended its understanding of the factors which determined 
the diminishing efforts by the British Government to break the stalemate 
in Northern Ireland. Thereafter, for the clearest of reasons, this 
could not be assumed. At issue was a measure —  on increase in the 
Province's representation at Westminster —  which if introduced or 
encouraged by the British Government, could only be interpreted as 
antithetical to Irish unity. In this it was obvious that the imperatives 
of maintaining government office were foremost, although the full extent 
of what v/as involved did not become apparent in the period now under
review.91
But it was apparent that the Labour Government, in the latter
half of 1976, had found it necessary to reverse its position on the
representative question. On 18 March 1976, the Northern Ireland
Secretary came under strong pressure from the Conservative Opposition
during Question Time in the House of Commons to increase the number of
Northern Ireland seats. Rees in reply insisted that, 'even to talk about
extra representation is to fly in the face of history' and, therefore,
92
that such a change would not be feasible.
89
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 906, 5 March 1976, col. 1716.
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House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 903, 12 January 1976, col. 51. 
See Chapter 4, pp. 204-10.
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House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 907, 18 March 1976,
cols. 1518-19.
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Throughout the remainder of 1976 the Labour Government remained 
non-committal on increased representation until the approach of a 
devolution debate. At that point, Mr Michael Foot, the leader of the 
House of Commons, proposed that
progress should be made on the question of 
representation from Northern Ireland.
Furthermore he repeated to the House part of a speech made by the
93
Northern Ireland Secretary, Mr Roy Mason, the previous week, in
which he said that a constitutional settlement would open the way for
94
the change in the 'present under-representation'.
95
His denial that this was in the nature of a 'commitment' did 
not allay fears in Dublin that the British Government was fundamentally 
uncertain of its own intentions. Thus the Irish Foreign Minister 
noted later
the ... private discussions between Unionist/Loyalist 
M.P.s at Westminster ... and some members of the present, 
British Government ... may have helped to delude Unionist 
opinion as to the attitude of the present British
Government.96
and
a prolonged failure to give full attention to the problem, 
leading to a feeling amongst both sections of the 
community in Northern Ireland that the buck is being 
passed exclusively to them, despite the obvious difficulty 
that they face in arriving at a solution unaided, and 
without any clear concept of the intentions of the 
sovereign power.97
The National Coalition of which Fitzgerald was a Minister passed
93
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Mason succeeded Rees as Northern Ireland Secretary in September 1976,
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 921, 30 November 1976, 
col. 825.
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ibid., col. 826
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P.
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Fitzgerald, 'Statement on Northern Ireland, 12 October 1977', 
p  20.
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from office in June 1977 without the sought-after clarification of 
British intentions —  indeed they were no clearer nearly two years 
beyond then when the British Labour Government was defeated —  but not 
before a re-emerging concern with security matters was restored to its 
former prominence, and with it, the fourth unsettling influence upon 
Anglo-Irish relations.
As with the previous factor, there appeared little good reason
for security considerations to provide such a substantial cause for
misunderstanding and tension. Certainly the irritation caused by the
methods and practice of Border road closures continued to be an
98
irritant, as did the steadily mounting toll of cross-Border incursions
99
by the British Army, but of these only a small number constituted 
what Fitzgerald described as 'of a particular serious character 
involving assaults on members of our security forces or threats 
against them'. ^
Yet it is deserving of comment that these infringements, whether 
unintentional or (deliberate, failed to prompt a 'troops out' demand 
by the Irish Government. On the contrary it appeared to be an almost 
whole-hearted supporter of the British Army's presence in the North.
In the Northern Ireland debate of 26 June 1974 the Taoiseach was 
adamant that its presence was essential in the province to ensure the 
protection of the Catholic community:
y o ' *
See for example, Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 274, 9 July 
1974, cols. 513-14; vol. 275, 30 October 1974, cols. 547-8; ibid.,
7 November 1974, col. 1312; vol. 279, 10 April 1975, cols. 1497-8; 
vol. 280, 6 May 1975, cols. 1127-8; and vol. 285, 6 November 1975, 
cols. 1093-4.
99
In the period 1 January 1973 to 12 May 1976, 304 incursions by the 
British Army were registered by the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs. 
261 of these incidents were taken up with the British, who expressed 
regret for 144; 19 (on 13 May 1976) were still under discussion, and 
on 117 there was disagreement as to the facts. By Irish Government 
estimates there were 22 Irish Army incursions into Northern Ireland in 
the same period. Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 290, 13 May 1976, 
cols. 1323-3.
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 275, 5 November 1974, 
cols. 929-30. For a brief account of three such incidents see Dail 
Eireann, Official Report, vol. 271, 14 March 1974, cols. 272-5; and 
Times, 15 August 1974.
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Some people say that the British Government should 
be asked now to make a declaration of their intent to 
withdraw at some time in the future to be determined 
by parties in Ireland, or to withdraw their troops to 
barracks as a first step in a phased withdrawal.
Suggestions of this kind ignore reality —  for example, 
the reality of the exposed position of the minority in 
many parts of the North and the absence of any Northern 
Ireland security force acceptable to the whole community 
there.101
On this at least there grew to be a close agreement —  if there was not 
102
one already. After the failure of the first phases of the
Constitutional Convention, Rees, in Janaury 1976, denounced withdrawal
as a 'short-sighted ... but above all ... an irresponsible policy'
for the havoc its implementation would wreck, not only in Northern
103
Ireland but also the Republic and mainland Britain.
In any event the Republic's endorsement of a British military 
presence was a natural consequence of its 'low profile' on Northern 
Ireland, which was further amplified by the Minister for Defence. On 
the occasion of an interview in September 1975, Mr Patrick Donegan 
disclaimed any foreseeable situation, specifically the 'doomsday' 
scenario, in which the Irish Army would receive orders to cross the 
Border in aid of the minority community. In Donegan's reckoning the
104
Army was 'here to see that our citizens go to bed and sleep safely'.
In a positive sense also the Irish Republic's response on security
matters during the period of office of the National Coalition
reflected a general Anglo-Irish accord. Although many of the measures
undertaken by the Irish Government fell short of the joint British
105
Army/Irish Army patrols sought by Roy Mason in July 1974, there were,
101
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 273, 26 June 1974, cols. 1579-80.
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i.e. Depending on the substance to the allegations of withdrawal 
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House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 903, 12 January 1976, col.51.
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Irish Press, 11 September 1975, p. 1.
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House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 876, 2 July 1974, col. 195 
(Mr Mason was then Secretary of State for Defence.)
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nevertheless, substantial efforts made in relation to the overall 
resources of the Republic. In the space of the five years since the 
'troubles' had begun in earnest (i.e. between 1969 and 1974), the 
Defence Budget was tripled —  to over £ 40 million. Recruitment to 
the Army and Garda Siochana (Police) were also substantially increased:
in the former from 8,252 in 1969 to 11,602 in 1 9 7 4 , and in the
latter from approximately 6,400 in 1969 to approximately 8,300 in 1974.
After explosions in Dublin and Monaghan on 17 May 1974 had claimed 28
lives the Irish Government recalled the more than 300 troops it had
serving with the United Nations force in Cyprus and supplemented this
/ /
measure with a limited call-up of the Forsai Cosanta Aitula —  the Irish
109
Army Local Defence Forces. In the Dail the Taoiseach made a plea to 
school-leavers to 'consider the desirability of a period of service in 
the Army' so that the security forces might be well provided with 
manpower to combat the terrorist threat to the country.**^ The strength 
of the Army was then (June 1974) at its highest peace-time level since 
the Civil War half a century earlier, while that of the Garda
111
Siochana was at its highest level since the foundation of the State.
Of a combined military-police strength of 19,000,nearly 3,000 were on
112
security duties in the Border areas. Measured simply in financial 
terms, the violence in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1974 was 
estimated to have cost the Republic £40 million in financing the
106
Comparison was made between the respective Appropriation Accounts of 
the Defence Vote for 1969-70 and 1974. Photo-copies of same were supplied 
by the Department of Defence, Dublin, but not with any full title reference,
^  Letter to the writer from the Department of Defence, Dublin,
16 October 1980.
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Conor Brady, 'The Changing of the Gardai', Irish Times, 24 September 
1979, p. 10. Unfortunately no reply was received by the writer to his 
written inquiry of 25 July 1980, addressed to the Commissioner, Garda 
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Account. The police figures are, therefore, the result of interpolating 
figures as of 1973 and 1977 used by Brady. .
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London Sunday Times, 19 May 1974.
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 273, 26 June 1974, col. 1580.
*** Speech by the Minister for Justice, Mr Cooney, ibid., col. 1604.
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It was a response which was well received in London, as was 
indicated by the Prime Minister in the course of a Northern Ireland 
security debate in 1976, by which time the levels referred to in the 
foregoing had all maintained their steady increase.
I pay tribute to the co-operation we are receiving 
from the Government of the Republic of Ireland ...
There is no doubt that the Government of the 
Republic are as determined as are this Government 
to stamp out cross-border banditry and murder. There 
is now close and valuable co-operation between the 
RUC and the Irish police.!^
By exclusion it was clear that the British Government was still
not appreciably closer to its objective of Army-to-Army co-operation,
115
a point which Wilson admitted later in the debate. However, it 
was not this shortcoming in Anglo-Irish relations which caused them 
to be further strained in 1976/1977, although both of the two causes 
of this process may be partly attributed to the frustration which a 
lack of bilateral military co-operation engendered.
The first concerned the consequences of incursions into the
Republic of Ireland by two units of the British Army Special Air
Service (SAS) on 5/6 May 1976. Depsite a request from the British
Under-Secretary for the Army, Mr Robert Brown, that the Irish
1 1
Government take a 'constructive view' of the incident, the eight men 
concerned were tried in the Special Criminal Court in Dublin (which 
normally saw alleged IRA defendants before it) in March 1977. The 
charges they faced were:, possessing arms and ammunition without a
113
expansion of the security forces alone.
ibid., col. 1574. In 1974 the Irish budget was approximately 
£ 1,500 mi 11 ion.
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ibid., col. 33. See also House of Commons, Official Reports vol.903,
22 January 1976, cols. 1515-18, for confirmation by Rees that cross- 
Border police co-operation v/as 'close', and in some areas 'excellent', 
but that bilateral Army co-operation was unlikely.
i i r
Irish Times, 8 May 1976, p. 1.
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licence, and possessing weapons with intent to endanger life —  
the latter of which carried a twenty-year maximum prison sentence.* 7 
Perhaps fortunately for the whole spectrum of Anglo-Irish relations, 
the SAS personnel were acquitted of this second charge, but found
U p
guilty and fined £100 each on the other.
In the context of the hundreds of incursions by British Army
units into the Republic from Northern Ireland, the question arises as
to why these particular instances were subject to the full force of
Irish law. And, incidentally, why it was that two British patrols
which crossed into the Republic only the following day (7 May) were
escorted back to the Border without further action being taken by
119
the Irish authorities.
The answer is to be found, generally, in the context of what 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs described as
the firmest assurances [from the British Government! 
that their activities would be confined to the other 
side of the Border and that their method of operation 
would be in accordance with the law in Northern 
Ireland.120
and the conflicting fact that, by the date of this statement, over
121
300 incursions had been reported. It is also to be found in the
122
suspicion with which the SAS are regarded in Ireland, which arose
123
from its justified reputation as an elite and unorthodox regiment.
** Sunday Times3 6 March 1977.
118 Guardian, 9 March 1977.
119
Irish Times3 8 May 1976, p. 1.
120
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 290, 13 May 1976, col. 1328.
121 ibid., cols. 1325-6.
122
See for example, Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 271, 27 March
1973, cols. 903-07; and vol. 287, 21 January 1976, col. 3.
123
The SAS's unorthodoxy was testified to at the Dublin trial by Major 
Brian Baty who was commander of the SAS in South Armagh at the time the 
incursions occurred. He admitted that although his men operated under 
the same rules and instructions as other army units, they used 'slightly 
different methods'. Guardian, 9 March 1977.
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official circles in Dublin that the SAS had deliberately infringed
124
the Republic's territory with an intent to operate therein.
The effect of this particular incident upon Anglo-Irish relations
is difficult to assess. While it was Fizgerald's opinon during the
early controversy that it caused, that it would not significantly affect
125
Anglo-Irish relations or co-operation against terrorism, the long
delay between the incursion and the trial must surely have compounded
the substantive issue with irritation. On the one hand the delay,
126
and the imposed silence, may have led both parties to regard the 
incident as appropriately deserving of no further comment; and on 
the other it may be that the feelings to which it gave rise were 
sublimated and transferred, to be expressed on a later occasion.
Indeed, and with no more than a modest claim in its favour, this 
conclusion may be inferred from the behaviour of both states on the 
subject of extradition, which overtook Border incidents as the principal 
focus of Anglo-Irish relations in early 1977.
This second security-related cause of poor Anglo-Irish relations 
was the result of the Irish Government's refusal, in November 1976, to 
vote in favour of the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism, and consequent upon that, its refusal to sign the Convention.*^7 
This Convention covered proposed co-operative measures against terrorism 
to be taken by the eighteen member countries of the Council of Europe,
And finally, the answer is to be found in the clear belief in
124
See the report in the Irish Times, 8 May 1976, p. 1 of Dr Garret 
Fitzgerald's interview onthe BBC programme 'Newsday'' also confirmed 
Mr Sean Donlon, Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs 
(Interview, Dublin, 7 June 1978). But there was a measure of light 
relief: from August 1976 soldiers in Northern Ireland were required 
to carry a 'green card' advising them what to do it they strayed across 
the Border. This was in addition to a yellow card (instructions on when 
to open fire), a red card (instructions on when they could fire plastic 
bullets during riots), and a blue card (detailing powers of arrest under 
Northern Ireland's emergency laws). Sunday Times, 6 March 1977.
125
Report of an interview of Dr Garret Fitzgerald on the BBC programme 
'Newsday' of 7 May 1976, Irish Times, 8 May 1976, p. 1.
126
i.e. neither British nor Irish Government spokesmen commented 
during the period that the matter was ’sub judiee’.
Irish Timess 13 November 1976.
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and in refusing to vote in favour of it, Ireland was a minority of 
128
one.
The Irish decision neither to vote in favour of the Convention
nor to sign it was explained in identical terms as its refusal, in the
129
Law Enforcement Commission's Report, to agree to the extradition
of a particular class of fugitive offender, i.e. those who could
130
claim that there was a political motive for their crimes. The 
impediment to Irish accession was, therefore, Article 29 of the Irish 
Constitution of 1937, which states
Ireland accepts the generally recognized principles 
of international law as its rule of conduct in its 
relations with other states.131
According to the legal adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs 
in this matter, Mr Mahon Hayes, the Irish Government therefore
[had] no alternative but to refuse because the 
generally recognized principles of international law 
do not allow a country to extradite someone wanted by 
another country for a political crime. For us the 
matter is closed uni ess these should change in the 
next five or ten years.132
What the Irish Government was prepared to agree to was also
consistent with its stand on the Law Enforcement Commission: it
sponsored a clause whereby a suspected terrorist could be tried in his
country of origin rather than be extradited, but this failed at an 
133
early stage. Furthermore there were indications from the Irish 
Government that they were prepared to sign the parallel EEC anti­
terrorism convention, proposed for later in 1977, precisely because 
it accommodated the principle of 'aut dedere aut judicare' —
128
ibid., Ireland did not, however, vote against the Convention; it 
abstained.
see Chapter 2, pp. 139-41.
130
Report of an interview by the Times with Mr Mahon Hayes, legal 
adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs, on 25 January 1977, Times,
26 January 1977.
131 .... 
ibid.
132 ibid.
133 ibid.
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Government, for there persisted in some official circles a belief that
135
the Republic of Ireland was a 'haven' for terrorists. Moreover, 
even among those in the British Government who might be thought to 
have understood, if not sympathised with, the policies of extradition 
in Ireland, there was an attempt to belabour this issue as though it 
was, substantively, a central concern of Anglo-Irish relations and 
the affairs of the Council of Europe. Thus in the wake of Ireland's 
abstention at Strasbourg, the Northern Ireland Secretary voiced his 
hope that it would yet reconsider its position and join Britain in 
signing and ratifying the Convention.
In doing we shall take a major step forward in the 
capture of terrorists within Northern Ireland. Those 
that have fled to the South will have no political
argument for remaining. 6
Callaghan, the Prime Minister, was even more forceful: he assured
a questioner in the Commons
Everyone needs to ratify it. It is Britain's desire 
that they [the Republic of Ireland] should do so, 
and we shall place the maximum possible pressure on 
them to do so within the limits of our power.137
It was at this point that the feelings accruing to other issues in 
relation to Northern Ireland appear to have surfaced. Mason, in the 
course of informing the House of the outcome of his visit to Dublin on
134
extradite or try'.
Neither measure was regarded as sufficient by the British
Financial Times, 12 February 1977.
135
A belief which Scotland Yard fostered and repeatedly asserted. Times,
18 February 1977; and Financial Times, 24 February 1977. The latter 
reports that the briefing given to crime correspondents, by senior 
Metropolitan Police officers, after the Balcombe Street (hostage) trial 
suggested that 30 badly wanted terrorists were.hiding in the 'haven' 
of the Republic.
136
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 923, 13 January 1977, 
col. 1626.
137
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 925, 10 February 1977,
col. 1655.
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24 January 1977, expressed a brief but angry opinion on Ireland's 
case, then before the European Court of Human Rights, concerning
allegations against Britain of ill-treatment and torture of
. . 138
internees.
The more that they are pursued [the allegations! in the 
European Court the more that they serve only the cause 
of the Provisional IRA. Some years ago we recognised 
that we had been guilty of ill-treatment and that 14 
prisoners had been ill-treated. We admitted that and 
have now paid compensation. I thought that was a first- 
class example of a mature democracy. Only the 
Provisional IRA can benefit as a result of pursuing
this c a s e . 139
In the context of developments in the Republic of Ireland such out­
bursts appeared to be insensitive and unjustified. Insensitive because, 
in 1976, the Irish Government had, at the cost of a constitutional 
crisis, passed three major pieces of anti-terrorist legislation which 
bestowed upon the security forces extraordinary powers of search, arrest 
and detention with regard to certain offences related to the security 
of the State. They were: the Criminal Law Act; the Emergency Powers 
Act; and the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act.*4^ The first mentioned, 
the Criminal Law Act 1976, provided for maximum penalties for certain 
offences, in particular those under the Offences against the State Act 
1959, to be increased. This Act also created certain new offences in 
respect of incitement to join unlawful organisations, of aiding, 
facilitating or arranging escapes from lawful custody and of giving 
false information. The Garda Siochana were also given increased powers
of search while members of the Defence Forces were given powers of
141
arrest and search when acting under certain specified conditions.
See Chapter 9.
l
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 925, 10 February 1977, 
cols. 1635-6. Mason v/as misleading. Britain had carefully agreed only 
not to contest the torture and ill-treatment findings.. It did not admit 
them.
140
R.F.V. Hevston, 'The Legal Control of Terrorism in the Irish 
Republic', a paper presented at the World Congress on Philosophy of Law 
and Social Philosophy (Paper Mo. 95), Sydney-Canberra, 14-21 August 1977, 
pp. 7-8.
ibid. , p. 7.
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The Emergency Powers Act 1976 gave increased powers to the
Garda in respect of the arrest, custody, and questioning of persons
suspected of certain offences. The third measure, the Criminal Law
142
(Jurisdiction) Act 1976, was the Irish counterpart to the British
legislation which resulted from the recommendation of the Law Enforcement
Commission to establish extra-territorial courts. Of significance to
Anglo-Irish relations was that the second and third of these measures
were regarded by the President of Ireland, Cearbhall O'Dalaigh, a
143
noted legal authority, as possibly unconstitutional. While the
first mentioned, the Criminal Law Bill 1976, was signed on 25 September
of the same year, the remaining two were referred by him to the
144
Supreme Court for a decision as to their constitutionality. In turn,
these also received the Presidential assent but O'Dalaigh1s initial
decision was bitterly criticised by the Minister of Defence, which
event, in the absence of a satisfactory apology from either him or
145
the Government, resulted in the former's immediate resignation.
Hence, in early 1977, there was, in addition to the further
controversy which would have resulted from any attempt by the Irish
Government to amend the Constitution in favour of British demands for
extradition, a residue of sensitivity from the recent attempts by the
Head of State to ensure that legislation already passed was
constitutional. Furthermore it is doubtful whether these circumstances,
146
and those of the 'inter-state case' would have allowed the
An Act entirely distinct from the Criminal Law Act 1976.
143
Cearbhall O'Dalaigh's legal (and cultural) accomplishments were 
outstanding. In 1946, at the age of 35 he was appointed Attorney 
General —  the youngest in the history of the State. He held this position 
from then until 1948, and again between 1951 and 1953 —  at which time he 
was appointed Chief Justice. In 1972 he became a judge at the European 
Court of Justice. (Ireland Today: Bulletin of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, No. 927, 15 April 1978).
In the case of the Criminal Law Act and the Emergency Powers Act, 
advice was first sought by the President from the Council of State, an 
advisory body to the President.
145
On 18 October 1976, at the opening of an Army cookhouse at Columb 
Barracks, Mullingar, Patrick Donegan, a Minister with a justified 
reputation for 'foot-in-the-mouth' statements, described the President 
as 'a thundering disgrace'.
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See Chapter 9.
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Government to call the required referendum with any degree of
confidence that it would yield a favourable result. This consideration
had two aspects. The first was the effect that an unfavourable
(negative) vote would have had upon the majority in Northern Ireland,
147
and their attitude towards political progress. The second related 
to the approaching General Election in Ireland and the risk that the 
question of extradition might be removed from the realm of inter­
national politics, and further distorted by reducing it to one of 
several issues in a domestic election campaign.
That Callaghan and Mason were unjustified in their respective 
criticisms of the Irish Government is a conclusion which appears to be 
supported by reference to the available evidence on convicted 
terrorists and fugitive offenders. In October 1975 there were 
approximately 2,000 persons in custody in Northern Ireland for terrorist 
or terrorist-related offences. At the same time there were less than
150 such persons in custody in the Republic and only 49 extradition
140
warrants to hand from the RUC, which suggests that the problem of 
fugitive offenders was not then a major contributing factor to the 
general problem of politically motivated violence. Moreover, as of 
January 1977, no attempt had been made by the British authorities to 
use the legislation that enabled an Irish court to try those charged 
with terrorist offences involvinq violence and which were committed in
140
the United Kingdom. This reinforced the view of the Irish Government 
that British complaints about the use of the Republic as a safe haven by 
the IRA were exaggerated, which Fitzgerald confirmed.
147
Cosgrave was not particularly impressed by the Unionists' attitude 
towards constitutional change in the Republic. It was his experience, 
based on the successful 1972 move to delete the provisions establishing 
the special position of the Catholic Church, that they adopted a 'just- 
as-well' attitude which did not bode well for future initiatives. 
(Interview with Liam Cosgrave, T.D., Dublin, 8 June 1978).
148
Source: Irish Government Security briefing.
149
Times, 26 January 1977.
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Despite repeated allegations that there are people 
in the Republic against whom evidence exists in 
: respect of offences committed [since 1974], we are
still awaiting the submissions of such evidence on 
which to charge any such people ...
All my efforts when Minister for Foreign Affairs to 
secure either co-operation in prosecuting such 
people, or an admission that there was no one in the 
Republic against whom such evidence existed, failed.150
Finally there were indications that the principles adhered to by
the Irish Government in refusing to sign the European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism were accepted as valid by a- number of the
Council of Europe nations. Expressing its own point of view, France
stated that it would not ratify the Convention until its EEC counterpart
151
was ready, and issued a declaration that 'any person persecuted on
account of his action for the cause of liberty has the right of 
152
asylum'. Norway and Italy reserved the right to use Article 13,
which enables signatories to refuse extradition in respect of
153
political offences, or offences connected with political offences. 
Portugal stressed that it would not extradite anyone for solely
154
political motives, or to a country were capital punishment existed.
Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands
also reserved to themselves the right to decide whether or not to
155
extradite their own nationals, irrespective of the offence. Thus the
150
Guardian Weekly, 1 April 1979, p. 4, Letter to same by Garret 
Fi tzgerald.
151
Irish Times, 28 January 1977, p. 13.
152
'No Haven For Terrorists', Speech given by the Taoiseach, Mr Jack 
Lynch, T.D., at a meeting of the Fianna Fail Party Committee on Northern 
Ireland in Leinster House on Thursday, 27 April, 1978. Statements and 
Speeches 5/78: Bulletin of the Department of Foreign Affairs, (hereafter 
cited as Lynch Speech, 'No Haven For Terrorists'). Substance of 
Taoiseach's remarks regarding nations entering reservations was confirmed 
in the Irish Times, 28 January 1977, p. 13. Malta also joined Ireland 
in refusing to sign the Convention but its reasons for doing so were not 
disciosed.
154
Irish Times, 28 January 1977, p. 13.
155
Lynch Speech, 'No Haven For Terrorists'. In an attempt to obtain 
the sources of these claims the writer made three written requests of 
Mr Lynch between 27 June 1979 and 30 June 1980. Unfortunately, although
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Republic of Ireland's action notwithstanding, the cumulative effect 
of these several reservations was, for practical purposes, to diminish 
much of the proclaimed force of the Convention.
In Dublin the response to British criticism was, therefore,
156
angry (and well supported by the Pariiamentary Opposition).
Following a Cabinet meeting on 11 February 1977 a curt one sentence 
rebuttal was issued saying
The determination of the Irish Government to deal with ^  
terrorism is well known and needs no further elaboration.
In sum, Anglo-Irish relations with regard to Northern Ireland 
were, in the spring and summer of 1977, in a noticeable state of 
disrepair. That they should have reached this point primarily as a 
result of the flux in British attitudes was not remarkable. Indeed, 
it was proof only that the processes at work in the period 1973-1977 
were, cumulatively, a significant illustration of one of the 
fundamental truths of Britain's relationship with Ireland —  what 
Oliver MacDonagh expressed in the context of earlier events as
158
essentially a 'readiness to put off intractable political problems' 
in favour of policies which cannot ameliorate the underlying nature 
of the conflict.
The pattern of this characteristic has, in fact, three components. 
The more prominent is that of intervention, exemplified by such actions
Mr Lynch's office advised on two occasions that he would attend to the 
matter, no reply was forthcoming as of April 1981. Similarly a written 
request to Dr Denny Driscol 1 , Senior Lecturer in Law at University 
College Galway, who was reportedly engaged in a study of the 
extradition issue also drew no reply. Other attempts to obtain the 
necessary information through law journals also proved unsuccessful.
156
The significance of remarks made by the Fianna Fail spokesman on 
foreign affairs, Mr Michael 0'Kennedy, is discussed later in the next 
chapter —  as part of a broader discussion of Anglo-Irish relations in 
early 1978, by which time he was Minister for the portfolio.
157
Guardian, 12 February 1977.
158
Oliver MacDonagh, Ireland: The Union and its Aftermath (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 164. It is helpful if this observation 
is read in conjunction with MacDonagh's as yet unpublished 'The Grooves 
of Change', i.e. Lecture III of the Australian National University's 
Lecture of 1977 on the theme 'Ireland and England: Past and Present',
193
as the initial deployment of the British Army in 1969, the prorogation 
of Stormont, and the forcefulness behind the Sunningdale talks. The 
second and more usual component, however, is an accustomed stance of 
standing above or outside of the arena occupied by the competing 
factions. This was London's modus operandi in the period 1968-71, 
as it was during the UWC strike, and in the period following the 
Constitutional Convention. Indeed, that whole enterprise could be 
regarded as an exercise typical of British superintendence of Ireland. 
And finally there is that singular form of intervention, most vividly 
illustrated by the introduction of internment without trial in 1971, 
which is a resort to an emphasis on security concerns. Under this 
rubric the political reform which was the object of what might be 
called comprehensive intervention is deferred, and the otherwise 
corresponding 'observer status' of the British Government excused.
The combined effect of these three components was twofold.
Protestant intransigence was increased and encouraged with the
experience that Britain had not the will to enforce its writ over the
long term, or would enforce it selectively, while among the Catholics
the result was to further alienate the community and undermine its
responsible representatives. Thus, irrespective of intentions in
London the course of action undertaken by Britain was seen by Catholics
in the North and by the Government in Dublin as in MacDonagh's
description: 'inevitably both partisan and destructive in Irish 
,159
terms.
It was, therefore, relatively easy to account for the state of 
disrepair in Anglo-Irish relations in mid-1977. With an eye to 
predictions of greater accord between Britain and Ireland which 
accompanied the election of the Fine Gael —  dominated National 
Coalition in 1973, this situation held so little apparent irony. For 
it had been brought about by misunderstandings and disputes over 
precisely those issues on which it had been mutually thought that
pp. 21-4, (hereafter cited as MacDonagh, 'The Grooves of Change'). This 
paper, a copy of which is held by the writer, includes not only substantial 
portions of the section from which the above question was extracted, but 
also its further amplification by way of contemporary examples.
1
MacDonagh, 'The Grooves of Change', p. 24.
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understanding, if not agreement, existed. The predictions, however, 
placed too high a discount on London's caprice and Dublin's ability 
to accommodate it. Hence they were fulfilled only in the short term, 
to founder along with the initiatives in Northern Ireland, thereby 
illustrating yet again that accord in Anglo-Irish relations was 
determined by progress in the North-rather than determinative of such 
progress.
If the record of Anglo-Irish relations between June 1974 and 
June 1977 was instructive of any further principle then it was so 
of the potential for limited issues to assume the importance of core 
issues in the absence of progress on the latter. And as a corollary 
it might be noted that the malaise in Anglo-Irish relations concerning 
Northern Ireland both influenced, and was influenced by, disagreements 
in otherwise discrete and unrelated issue-areas whose advent coincided 
with the foregoing. This was evident in the Rockall dispute, a 
blanket term used to cover a growing number of conflicting offshore 
zone claims extending from the uninhabited islet to Ireland's north­
west, as far as the Western Approaches to the south-east. ^  The 
argument grew in intensity in early February 1977, following a 
Whitehall decision to grant British Petroleum a drilling licence in 
two blocks off Scotland which Ireland had contested since 1974.* *
By one account this was seen in Dublin as a somewhat high-handed 
action and, again, an insensitive one for the challenge it represented
to Irish hopes for economic development by an already oil-rich trading
162
partner whose dominant economic position was resented.
There was, however, a promising development which suggested that 
this was appreciated in London and that steps should be taken to 
redress the situation. Less than three weeks after the BP decision, 
and reportedly at the urging of the Foreign Office, the British 
Department of Engergy announced that it accepted that the whole question 
should go to inLernational arbitration. In doing so it reversed its
Financial Times, 24 February 1977.
Guardian, 12 February 1977.
Financial Times, 24 February 1977.
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previous opposition to this remedy, and adopted the policy which the
163
Irish Government had advocated for almost a year.
This concession to Irish sensitivities was timely, generous, and
necessary. But it did not, for it could not, go any great distance
in bridging the gap between British and Irish understandings of the
issues at hand. Apart from the consultations with the Provisional
IRA —  which were discontinued in July 1976 —  the general uncertainty
as to British intentions in Northern Ireland, the susceptibility of
the Labour Government to Unionist pressure, and the security-related
disputes all remained as agents —  in effect vagrant influences —  which
164
could bedevil Anglo-Irish relations beyond 17 June 1977 when a 
Fianna Fail Government was returned with the largest majority in the 
history of the State.
Fianna Fail's victory followed close upon the general strike in 
Northern Ireland, called in May 1977, by the United Ulster Action 
Committee. This attempt in support of a multiplicity of Loyalist demands, 
although based on the UWC forerunner, was a failure, and in terms of 
this work, irrelevant. It simply did not become an issue in Anglo- 
Irish relations.
Na r r a t i v e , Ju n e 1977 - Se p t e m b e r  1979
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The division of Anglo-Irish relations between 1968 and 1979 
into a fourth period (to cover June 1977-September 1979) has little, 
indeed almost nothing,. to do with events in Northern Ireland. Where 
each of the preceding periods was punctuated, with tolerable precision, 
by developments in the Province, this period offered nothing to an 
observer which suggested that it should receive particular attention. 
Coincid.enta.lly, the preceding periods were not only chronological 
successions of time, but also, in terms of the developments contained 
therein and the consequences for Northern Ireland, of descending 
significance. It was as though nine years of frequently intense 
political activity had left most of the actors enervated.
This was most noticeable in the attitude of the British Government, 
which waited until the end of 1977 before it undertook anything 
approaching an initiative. And then only exploratory talks were held 
between the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and four of the 
main political parties on a possible interim form of devolved government 
in the Province. But as might be expected of a system in which all of the 
components had reverted to states of low-energy, inertia was dominant.
The talks failed.
Notwithstanding that, the period is deserving of attention in its 
own right for developments which took place outside of Northern Ireland. 
In June 1977 the National Coalition of Fine Gael and Labour, which 
had been the Government in the Republic since 1973, was voted from 
office and Fianna Fail returned. In so far as Anglo-Irish relations 
were concerned, this held the potential for placing them on a somewhat 
different footing than had existed under the previous leadership of 
Taoiseach. Liam Cosgrave and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Garret 
Fitzgerald.
Fianna Fail were, for the third time •led by Jack Lynch, but it 
was more than his persona (although that, too, was to have its effect) 
which provoked the apprehension that Anglo-Irish relations could be 
headed for new and even turbulent times. This was due to the inclusion 
in his Cabinet of Charles Haughey and Jim Gibbons — whose involvement 
in the affairs which, culminated in the Arms Trial of 1970 was noted
198
earlier, and whose likely influence on Northern matters, it was 
presumed by many, would be uncompromising rather than conciliatory.
There was, moreover, a' more recent justification for this view than 
events which were seven years the past. Less than two years before, 
in October 1975, Fianna Fail had released a policy document on 
Northern Ireland which was widely taken to be representative of the 
Party's hard-line republican interests rather than of the more moderate 
policies favoured by the Taoiseach. The situation therefore was similar 
to that which existed in 1969, except that Lynch was now in an even more 
unassailable position than before: he had led the Party, in opposition 
and government for over a decade, and under him Fianna Fail had been 
awarded the most decisive election victory of any party in the 
history of the State. It was to be expected, then, that the overall 
tenor of Anglo-Irish relations would be decided in no small part by 
Lynch’s ability to integrate the expressed wishes of his party within 
his own inimical style of diplomacy.
Yet in Britain, too, there were influences which were to have 
even more effect upon outcomes, or more correctly the lack of outcomes, 
in Northern Ireland. The Labour Government leadership which was assumed 
by James Callaghan in 1976 was not in a position of strength in 
Parliament. After July 1977 it became increasingly obvious that certain 
understandings had been, and would be, reached at Westminster which 
would preclude any major initiative in Northern Ireland in the short 
term.
In these circumstances the conditions existed for frustration on 
central issues to be expressed on those of no great or lasting moment» 
with the result that the latter tended to become exaggerated and 
dominant. The cycle of diplomatic bickering may, however, be 
considered complete, for the purposes of this work, with the return of 
a Conservative Government in Britain in May 1979. It was not so much 
that it did anything immediately to disturb the situation in Northern 
Ireland, but it did bring to office views that were bound to break with 
the patterns established during the Labour Government’s period, even if 
they were not to become apparent for some time beyond 1979.
CHAPTER FOUR
A n g l o - I r i s h  Re l a t i o n s , J u n e  1977-May 1979
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The early ramifications of Fianna Fail's election victory in
1977 induced their own unsettling influences into Anglo-Irish 
relations, to compound those of a British origin. In the first 
instance the new Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, included in his Cabinet a 
number of Ministers whose appointment, if not quite provoking the 
intense feelings claimed by Conor Cruise O'Brien, v/as at least curious 
in terms of recent Irish political history.
I don't know how anyone with a clear recollection of 
the Arms Trial period can look at a picture of 
Fianna Fail's new front bench without a sense of 
revulsion. There is Mr Gibbons who swore that Mr 
Mr Haughey's sworn testimony was untrue. There is 
Mr Haughey, who swore that Mr Gibbons's sworn 
testimony was untrue. There is Mr Lynch who dismissed 
Mr Haughey, put him on trial, and said he was not 
satisfied with the verdict that acquitted him. And 
look again at Mr Haughey who once publicly indicated 
that resignation was the 'honourable course' for the 
leader at whose hands he has now accepted reappointment
The fact that Mr Haughey, for example, was both able and well
regarded by a section of Fianna Fail and had therefore to be included
in the Cabinet (as Minister of Health), that the 1977 election had been
fought on issues other than Northern Ireland, and that the Taoiseach
2
had given an undertaking not to ease-up on the IRA, was not 
necessarily reassuring. Principally this was because Fianna Fail had 
published a major policy document in October 1975 which reportedly 
represented the party's hard-line Republican interests. It opened 
with a statement which left no doubt as to the priority accorded the 
Ulster Question.
A central aim of Fianna Fail policy is to secure, by 
peaceful means, the unity and independence of Ireland 
as a democratic Republic, [emphasis added]
Conor Cruise O'Brien, Herod: Reflections on Political Violence 
(London: Hutchinson, 1978), p. 140.
2
Irish Independent, 25 June 1977.
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Inter alia it also called upon Britain to 'encourage the unity of 
Ireland by agreement', and to declare a 'commitment to implement an
3
ordered withdrawal from her involvement in the Six Counties'.
According to Lynch, it did not, as some reports claimed, call for a
'declaration by the British Government of its intention to withdraw
4 5
from the North', or for a 'declaration of a commitment to withdraw'.
Indeed, according to two of his much later statements, as party 
leader and Taoiseach respectively, there was no question of 
requesting Britain to implement a speedy withdrawal, or even to set 
a date for a withdrawal, because of the dangerous effect this would
g
heve within Northern Ireland. As Taoiseach he claimed —  somewhat 
unconvincingly in view of the foregoing and the currency of the term 
'Lynchspeak'7 —  that Fianna Fail had made it clear, in its October 1975 
statement, that it was urging that the British Government might declare 
its interest in the ultimate unification of Ireland and that it might
g
take some specific steps in that direction.
g
The key to understanding these 'theological' distinctions between 
reported or presumed intentions, and actual intentions v/as to be found, 
as in Fianna Fail's previous period of office, in the interaction 
betv/een the personality of the Taoiseach and some of the more forceful 
members of the Party. From two accounts by three leading Dublin
'Statement by Fianna Fail on Northern Ireland', a two page document 
published by Fianna Fail Research and Support Services, Leinster House, 
Dublin, undated, but released on 29 October 1975.
4
For example, the Irish Times3 30 October 1975, p. 1.
5
Irish Times, 7 July 1977, p. 1.
r
Report of an interview on the RTE programme 'This Week' of 15 May 
1977, in the Times, 16 May 1977; and in a press conference, reported 
in the Irish Times3 16 June 1978.
7 See Vincent Browne, 'the Artful Ambiguities of Jack Lynch', Magill, 
October 1977, pp. 8-10, (hereafter cited as Brov/ne, 'The Artful 
Ambiguities of Jack Lynch').
o
Report of Lynch's first major press conference as Taoiseach,
Irish Times3 7 July 1977, pp. 1 and 6. 
g
Description used by Mr David Barrie, a junior member of the British 
Embassy staff in Dublin, in 1978.
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political journalists —  one in October 1975*^ and the other in October
1977** —  the October 1975 policy statement was forced upon a reluctant
Lynch by a majority of Fianna Fail members who favoured a return by
the Party to its traditional line. But after leading Fianna Fail to a
massive election victory, Lynch's subsequent 'artful ambiguities'
were held to reflect his attempts to evolve the 1975 policy away from
its embarrassing commitment to seek a British withdrawal, however that
12
phrase was qualified, and towards North-South economic co-operation.
As in 1969, however, these accounts which explained Lynch's 
statements in terms of strong Republican pressure were not altogether 
sufficient. Once more, they did not explain why it was that Lynch, 
to all appearances a calm and deliberative person not given to making 
'off-the-cuff' remarks, persisted in his particular style of pronounce­
ments long after the alleged reasons for doing so initially had 
passed. As was argued earlier, a more complete and satisfactory 
explanation would appear to be that 'Lynchspeak' was the result of a 
personal preference for a relatively passive style of leadership, and 
hence speaking style, being rendered negative and imprecise by what
amounted to a lack of confidence in the face of pressure from his
13
parliamentary colleagues. Within a relatively short time it was 
clear that the idiosyncracies so generated were to be important, as 
was demonstrated by the first post-election Anglo-Irish summit in 
London on 28 September 1977.
In the first instance some doubt exists as to what emphasis, if
any, the Taoiseach placed upon the 'central aim' of Fianna Fail's policy.
Reportedly, at this meeting requested by the Taoiseach immediately
following the election, he 'failed even to draw attention' to the unity
14
plank. Lynch later disagreed with this account, or rather appeared 
to disagree with it.
Dick Walsh and Denis Coghlan, 'F.F. demands British intent to 
withdraw', Irish Times, 30 October 1975, pp. 1 and 5.
** Vincent Browne, 'The Artful Ambiguities of Jack Lynch', pp. 8-9.
ibid., p. 9.
13
See Chapter 1, pp. 42-6.
14
Financial Times, 12 January 1978.
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... I told Mr Callaghan about our long-term ambitions 
and ah, I told him these would remain our long-term 
ambitions, that is, the ultimate unity of all the Irish 
people.15
Clearly the two reports were not fundamentally opposed: in the 
course of a day-long conference it would have been possible for 
Lynch to have done all that he claimed he did without really drawing 
attention to the goal of unity. But even if his report is accepted 
as the more reliable, the inference could still be taken that unity 
received less than the strong representation which might be expected 
of a 'central aim'. This question, however, cannot be decided with 
any greater certainty at the present time with the evidence currently 
available.
But a second example admits less doubt as to the ability of Lynch 
to create doubts on matters previously thought to be well understood.
At the September summit the Fianna Fail policy on British withdrawal, 
as expressed by the Taoiseach, bore little resemblance to that 
enunciated in 1975. Following the meeting he told RTE radio that 
the time had not yet come to call on Britain to declare its intention 
of withdrawing from Northern Ireland at some future date. He continued:
That can come in time. But we shall have to judge 
the climate, the circumstances in which such a 
request will be made ... I do not know when that 
day will come. But in the meantime there is no point 
in arousing expectations that what we are asking for 
can be achieved. This is a question of political and 
ordinary judgement as to when we can move forward to 
that position. I am not saying that position obtains 
at the present time.16
In the context of these modifications to the tough requirements 
of Fianna Fail's policy in 1975, his decision to also accept British 
proposals towards an interim political settlement suggested a 
conciliatory, and even a concessionary, attitude on behalf of the Irish
Text of Taoiseach's radio interview on RTE news programme 'This 
Week' , 8 January 1978, Irish Times, 11 January 1978.
Financial Times3 12 January 1978.
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Government.*7 Yet even in this third area there were inconsistencies. 
On two major and related issues —  the further integration of Northern 
Ireland into the United Kingdom and power-sharing —  Lynch claimed 
that British and Irish views were in accord when the evidence existed 
of a divergent tendency in both.
The Taoiseach's position on further integration at least was 
unequivocal: in the run-up to the election he had rejected it even 
if the minority community in Northern Ireland should feel that a
18
solution to the province's problems lay in this course of action.
Thus, his subsequent decision to support British proposals for
locally-elected bodies was interesting because the Northern Ireland
Secretary claimed that the minority community rejected them on the
19
grounds that they were integrationist measures. Nevertheless, Lynch
felt free to pass on, ex parte, the British assurance that there was
20
'not a scintilla of a move towards integration' intended.
Indications of a pact, or understanding between certain Ulster
Unionists and the Labour Government, and the establishment of the
Speaker's Conference 'to consider and make recommendations on the
number of Parliamentary Constituencies that there should be in
Northern Ireland' were reduced by him to mere 'appearances' or 'rumours
21
of integration. Yet, on a closer examination they were more than 
this.
ibid., and see also 'Northern Ireland: The text of a Communique 
following the meeting between the Taoiseach, Mr Jack Lynch, T.D., and 
the Rt. Hon. James Callaghan, M.P., in London, 28 September 1977', 
Government Documentation (JL1), (Dublin: Government Information 
Services, n.d.), (hereafter cited as Communique, 28 September 1977; 
and Lynch Statement, 12 October 1977).
18
Report of Lynch's interview on the RTE programme 'This Week' of
15 May 1977, in the Irish Times, 16 May 1977.
19
20
'Northern Ireland: Statement by the Taoiseach, Mr Jack Lynch 
T.D. to Dail Eireann, October 12th, 1977, following a meeting with the 
British Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. James Callaghan, M.P.', Government 
Documentation (J L1), (Dublin: Government Information Services).
21 -k-wl bid.
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 929, 24 November 1977, 
c o l s . 1728-9.
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The first suggestion of an 'understanding' between the Ulster 
Unionists and the Labour Government arose as a result of a division 
forced by the Scottish Nationalists at Westminster on 4 July 1977, 
on a motion to reduce the Prime Minister's salary —  in effect a 
motion of no confidence in the Government. Whereas previously the 
six Unionist MPs had split their voting strength, between abstention 
and voting with the Opposition, they on this occasion abstained as 
a bloc. According to their leader, Mr James Molyneaux,
The Government has moved on administrative devolution 
and representation, and we, unlike other Opposition 
parties, have no vested interest in a general election.22
The following day Molyneaux was more explicit as to what the
Unionists' abstention signified. At his weekly press conference in
the House of Commons he confirmed that the six MPs had agreed to a
pariiamentary pact with the Government by which they would not vote
to bring it down, in return for progress on administrative devolution
for Northern Ireland and an increase in the number of Northern Ireland
23
seats at Westminster. He also indicated that, should the Government
require positive support from the Unionists to remain in office, the
24
price would be raised.
And so it proved to be. Throughout the succeeding nine months the
Unionists exercised their prerogative of opposing the Government as
they saw fit, but by means short of effecting its downfall. Thus,
when in May 1978, they were aggrieved at the handling of local
government and education matters by the Northern Ireland Office (NIO),
they expressed their displeasure in terms of support for a measure to
reduce the basic rate of income tax by one penny and so inflicted an
25
embarrassing defeat on the Government. Yet, at the same time, they 
made it plain that their action did not signify an irrevocable change 
of heart, as one of the leading Unionist spokesmen, Enoch Powell, 
explained:
Irish T i m e s 6 July 1977, p. 1.
Irish Timess 7 July 1977. 
ibid.
Irish Times3 10 May 1978.
22
23
24
25
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We in the Unionist Party will have to wait and see 
whether there is any kissing afterwards.
If the Government now insisted on a Commons vote of 
confidence, it seems likely that some of those who 
voted against them tonight would not then do so.26
Nevertheless, that defeat was a portent of the determination of the
Unionists to use their bargaining position to maximum advantage and
of the Government's inability to rely on the acquiescence of that
group in the event of the Lib-Lab pact breaking down. At the end of
March 1979, when this condition v/as fulfilled, the increased, but to
Callaghan, unacceptable price predicted by Molyneaux v/as held to
include the sacking of Roy Mason from the Northern Ireland Secretary-
27
ship. And it is significant that the Labour Government fell in 
default of Unionist support.
There has, however, been no explicit confirmation by the British 
Government that a pact existed, but one normally reliable commentator 
on Northern Ireland reports of such an admission:
[Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives]
Tip O'Neill's visit to Ireland last month seems to 
reinforce this much more critical [of Britain] line, 
though here it should be said that his remarks about 
Northern Ireland being used as a political football appear 
to have stemmed from his meeting with Jim Callaghan 
during the election campaign. A source close to O'Neill 
told me that Callaghan had admitted to the Speaker 
(presumably as one seasoned wheeler dealer to another) 
that he had done a deal with the Ulster Unionist bloc 
at Westminster to keep his government in power without 
referring it to the Parliamentary Labour Party, and that 
this had shocked the other visiting congressmen sufficient 
for O'Neill to refer to it obliquely in his Dublin speech.28
But he added
Melbourne Age, 29 March 1979.
28
Mary Holland, 'Kennedy's New Irish Policy', New Statesmen, 11 May 
1979, p. 679. On the face of it, O'Neill's breach of what must have 
been a confidence was difficult to understand unless reference is made 
to its forerunners. It appears that, earlier in 1979, the Speaker had 
raised the matter of a Callaghan-Unionist deal during a meeting with the 
then British Ambassador (and son-in-law of the Prime Minister) Mr Peter 
Jay. Jay denied this vigorously; moreover, claimed that the suggestion 
was a 'personal affront'. Consequently, when O'Neill was told by
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Furthermore, the reduced priority and emphasis accorded power-
sharing lent credence to the claims made by both Molyneaux and
O'Neill. Specifically, if the Unionist MPs were able to dictate the
boundaries within which the Labour Government was able to operate in
Northern Ireland, then it would be logical to expect that this
objective be reduced in priority, or even abandoned, and such appears
to have been the case. In response to questions at the press
conference of 6 July 1977, and at which he gave details of the
Unionist-Labour pact, Molyneaux said he was convinced that the
Government was moving away from its 'rigid attitude' to power-sharing
in any future Northern Ireland administration, and further, that the
NIO was 'moving into a more realistic situation' about setting up a
29
structure to deal with local government problems.
These statements were not lost on the SDLP leader, Gerry Fitt, 
who, only days before the September Anglo-Irish summit, called upon 
Callaghan to personally reaffirm that ' power-sharing' —  the choice of
words was deliberate -  remained a British Government objective in
30
Northern Ireland.
It was surprising to note, therefore, that the communique
released after the 28 September summit did not mention the term 
31
'power-sharing'. Rather, it confined itself to stating that 'the 
British Government's policy was to work towards a devolved system of
Government in which all sections of the Community could participate on
32
a fair basis' (emphasis added) —  a formula which was open to 
interpretations other than those which previously had been associated 
with power-sharing. That Lynch gave ex parte assurances from
Callaghan personally of the existence of just such an arrangement, he 
was incensed, and in this atmosphere one of his aids released the 
information although almost certainly not at O'Neill's direction. 
[Interview; and David McKittrick, 'Horsemen of the Irish Apocalypse', 
Irish Times3 6 September 1979, p.10.]
Irish Times, 7 July 1977.
30
Irish Times} 21 September 1977, pp. 1 and 4.
31
Communique, 28 September 1977; and Lynch Statements 12 October 1977.
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Callaghan that power-sharing was a necessary pre-requisite for the
33
return of a system of devolved government in Northern Ireland in
no way altered the fact that the September communique constituted
a departure from the firm and unambiguous language which had
characterised British and Irish statements on the subject over the
34
preceding five years."
Among the several explanations which could be offered for this 
development the most satisfactory appears to stem jointly from both 
Callaghan's need not to alienate the Ulster Unionists at Westminster, 
and Lynch's understanding of this and his evident desire to evolve 
his Government's Northern Ireland policy away from the embarrassment 
of Fianna Fail's 1975 position. The equivocal language of the 
communique would be consistent with this explanation, although Lynch's 
acquiescence in it would depend upon his being able to claim that it 
continued to represent the substance of previous statements on power- 
sharing. (It also assumes that a British withdrawal was a 
'negotiable' item in the Irish Government's Northern Ireland policy 
whereas power-sharing was not). Indeed it is possible to regard his 
claims to this effect as being in the nature of a challenge to the 
British Government to deny that it had strayed from the power-sharing 
1 ine.
Any other approach than this requires either the imputation of 
an intent to deceive,to either (or both) Callaghan and Lynch, or that 
in an excess of enthusiasm to abandon the 1975 position, Lynch
unguardedly sacrificed elements of power-sharing along with the
35
withdrawal demands. There is, however, little evidence in support of
See, for example, the report of his press conference following the
28 September summit, Irish Times, 29 September 1977, pp. 1 and 11; 
Communique, 28 September 1977; ccnd Lynch Statement, 12 October 1977; 
and his adjournment debate speech in Dail Eireann on 28 June 1976, as 
reported in the Irish Times, 29 June 1978, p. 4.
34
A point well made by the Leader of the Fine Gael Opposition in 
Dail Eireann in his 'Statement on Northern Irealnd, 12 October 1977', 
pp. 20-2.
35
Three Inquiries by the writer were addressed to Mr Lynch in an 
attempt to ascertain why it was that the September 1977 Anglo-Irish 
communique was worded in the manner described above. Despite two replies 
that Mr Lynch would be forthcoming with an answer, nothing had been 
received by the writer as of April 1981.
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these possibilities, but there was evidence to justify the 
apprehension felt in Dublin and Northern Ireland that the September 
communique signified a further reduction in the priority to be 
accorded power-sharing.
By early 1978 the transition was virtually complete as the 
Northern Ireland Secretary's avoidance of the term during Question 
Time indicated:
... I have never used the expression 'power-sharing':
I have always insisted that it should be a case of 
partnership and participation in the administration of 
Northern Ireland. The House will remember that my 
predecessor, more than 15 months ago, had also dropped 
the use of that emotive term.
It is right to inform the House that the term 'power- 
sharing' tends to be taken in Northern Ireland as 
meaning the system laid down in the 1973 Act. The
Government are in no way committed to this system or, 
indeed, to any other system.36 [emphasis added]
If that was the case Mason's answer comprised a rather belated
obituary for an ideal which his predecessor, Merlyn Rees, had
maintained in June 1974, was 'the one thing which has stayed on since
37
the fall of the Executive' and which had never been officially
repudiated by the British Government. This oversight notwithstanding,
38
the transition was, without question, complete by mid-1978. Despite
39
Lynch's continuing claims to the contrary, and, perhaps surprisingly,
3fi
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 941, 12 January 1978, 
col. 1834.
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 875, 27 June 1974, 
col. 1704.
38
In the following months Mason frequently took the opportunity to 
repeat his 12 January message. See also: 'Text Of A Speech By The 
Secretary Of State For Northern Ireland, Rt. Hon. Roy Mason MP, To The 
Doncaster Constituency Labour Party, At The King George V Hotel —  7.30 pm 
Friday, 3 February 1978' (Supplied by the British Embassy, Dublin).
39
Lynch, adjournment debate speech, 28 June 1978, as reported in the 
Irish Times, 29 June 1978, p.-4.
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apparent public support for power-sharing in Northern Ireland,
Mason's moving of the extension of direct rule on 30 June 1978
contained no reference to the term —  even in the passages which
outlined the criteria for a locally elected administration as a
41
forerunner of full legislative devolution.
The immediate effect of Lynch's attitude throughout these
developments, until early 1978, was to encourage the British Government
to believe that a modus vivendi had been established, at least with
regard to short-term objectives such as the need for an interim
42
settlement. This persisted despite indications throughout November 
and December that Lynch's patience with British inactivity in Northern 
Ireland was almost exhausted.
In mid-November he told a group of Fleet Street leader writers 
that if the administrative devolution talks failed —  and he clearly
expected that they would —  then the Dublin Government would have
43
recourse to its official policy. By late December Lynch was saying, 
with reference to the idea that Ireland should drop its constitutional
40
40
Three separate polls conducted between 1976 and 1978 revealed 
considerable support for power-sharing. In February 1976 a survey 
conducted for the London Weekend television programme, 'Weekend World', 
reported a 62% majority in favour of some form of power-sharing (Irish 
Times, 9 February 1976). The following month a National Opinion Polls 
survey, commissioned jointly by the BBC and the Belfast Telegraphy 
reported an even wider support for power-sharing, with a favourable 
reply from 70% of the respondents. (Irish Times, 20 March 1976).
Finally, in February 1978, an Opinion Research Centre poll conducted 
for the Ulster Television programme 'Counterpoint', found a 63% majority 
in favour of power-sharing. (Irish Times, 10 February 1978). The 
significance of these findings is beyond the scope of this thesis but 
two further points are of interest: in the first poll 42% of respondents 
also supported the anti-power-sharing advocate, the Rev. Ian Paisley; 
and none of these polls revealed the same level of support for power- 
sharing that was reported during the term of the Northern Ireland 
Executive, i.e. 74%.
41
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 952, 30 June 1970, 
cols. 1703-16.
42
Financial Times, 12 January 1978.
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claims to the Six Counties, that an Irish Constitution acceptable 
to the Unionists could only be considered when
elected representatives of North and South get around 
a table to discuss the future of the country, following 
an indication by the British Government of its interest 
in moving forward by encouraging the unity of Ireland 
by consent and on the basis of agreed structures.44
Nevertheless, it appears that British officials continued to
believe that Lynch's September silence on key issues in Northern Ireland
45
signified his complaisant support. It is otherwise difficult to
account for the surprise and consternation which greeted the Taoiseach's
comments made during the course of a lengthy interview over RTE Radio
46
on Sunday, 8 January 1978.
Apart from the timing of the Lynch interview, which the British 
found particularly distressing (see below), exception was also taken 
to
(i) his assertions on the subject of power-sharing: i.e. that 
Callaghan had assured him that 'there would be no devolved govern­
ment without power-sharing.'
(ii) his references to possible British Government 'disengagement 
from involvement in Irish affairs' and its replacement by an 
'interest in the unification of Ireland'. At one point he 
described the provisions contained in the Ireland Act 1949 as a 
'negative guarantee' and later as 'a steel wall against which 
intransigent unionists can put their back'; and
Report of an interview with the Taoiseach by Geraldine Kennedy, 
Irish Times3 29 December 1977, p. 10.
45
Financial Times3 12 January 1978, carries a report in support of 
this interpretation, including an unattributed statement by a British 
official. The Times, of 8 February 1978 carries a similar report by its 
Northern Ireland correspondent, Christopher Walker.
46
The full text of the broadcast interview was reported in the 
Irish Times, 11 January 1978, (hereafter cited as Lynch Interview,
RTE, 8 January 1978).
L
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(iii) his cautious and modified reply to a question about 
a possible amnesty for Provisional IRA prisoners in the 
Republic.47 (see pp. 215-16).
The objection as to the overall timing of the interview related
to the talks on administrative devolution which Mason and NIO
officials began with political leaders in the North on 6 December 1977.
As a result of what was regarded as Lynch's interference, the
administration at Stormont Castle postponed indefinitely the round of
48
talks which was then imminent. They in any case had little Ghoice
but to do so as three parties -  the Official Unionists, the Democratic
Unionists, and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) —  had
49
withdrawn, although for different reasons. The impression given
by the British Government was that the responsibility for this
debacle lay with Lynch's statements which were, according to Mason,
in breach of the summit 'understanding' established in September.
The Northern Ireland Secretary was, therefore, 'surprised and
50
disappointed by the unhelpful comments' of the Taoiseach, who in turn,
completed the mirror image of incomprehension by finding Mason's
51
reaction 'surprising and unexpected'.
Given that Lynch had already started to make such obvious 
references to reunification, it was understandable that the Irish 
Government's first reaction to the attention his broadcast drew was 
that it contained 'nothing new'. Hence the burden of his statement two 
days later; in fact he could have claimed that such references as the
M-n
Irish Times, 10 January 1978.
49
ibid., and Financial Times, 12 January 1978.
50
Northern Ireland Office, Press Notice: 'Text of a Statement issued 
by the R. Hon. Roy Mason M.P., Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
(Monday 9 Janaury 1978), N 10/1/3, 10 January 1978'.
51
'Statement by the Taoiseach, Mr J. Lynch, T.D.: Interview on 
RTE, Sunday 8th January 1978'. (Issued by the Government Information 
Services, Dublin, 10 January 1978, hereafter cited as Lynch Statement,
10 January 1978).
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'steel wall' of the British guarantee owed much to the inspiration
52
of the Northern Ireland Secretary. Apart from the vexed question
of a possible amnesty for Provisional IRA prisoners in the Republic,
this was true, for in the kaleidoscope of Irish and Anglo-Irish
politics the Taoiseach had in the past already said the things he
repeated during the interview. The point was that Lynch on this
occasion had chosen to say them while the talks on administrative
devolution in the North were still in progress. For a man whose skill
in verbal obfuscation was renowned, he had clearly chosen his time
to be unequivocal, particularly since it provided the Unionists with
a justification for withdrawing from talks to which, reportedly,
53
Lynch had given some impetus.
The key to understanding this imbroglio was that Lynch believed
that the adminstrative devolution initiative had broken down, while
in Belfast the NIO maintained that it had not, and moreover that some
chance existed of salvaging it. Thus Mason, during Question Time in
the House of Commons on 12 Janaury 1978, was careful not to preclude
the resumption of talks with Northern Ireland's four main parties once
54
the furore had subsided.
Lynch's certainty on this matter was well-publicised and widely
shared. Apart from his statement to the Fleet Street leader-writers
he had, only the day before his controversial interview, taken the
time to inform the visiting United States Secretary of State, Cyrus
55
Vance, of the talk's lack of success. In this opinion he received
Speaking at a lunch in Belfast for leaders of social and welfare 
organisations on 19 December 1977, Mason stated that the Border could 
not be forever regarded as 'a sort of Berlin wall dividing hostile 
peoples'. (Irish Times, 20 December 1977). It is thought that this 
was also intended to encourage the SDLP —  who were on the point of 
withdrawing from the administrative devolution talks —  to remain. See 
John Healy's column 'Sounding Off', Irish Times, 14 January 1978.
53
Irish Times, 14 January 1978.
54
House Commons, Official Report, vol. 941, 12 January 1978, 
cols. 1834-40.
55
See the report of an interview by Vincent Browne of Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Michael 0'Kennedy in (the Dublin) Sunday Independent, 
29 January 1978 (hereafter cited as 0'Kennedy Interview, Sunday 
Independent, 29 January 1978).
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wide-ranging support from disparate and usually opposing groups.
Airey Neave, the Conservative Party spokesman on Northern Ireland, 
placed the bipartisan approach to the province at Westminster under 
some strain by describing the talks as 'waffle', adding that it was
56
the correct description of circular conversations that led nowhere.
The SDLP's lack of regard for the talks had been indicated at an
early date —  it sent a deputation comprising only two members to
the exploratory discussions in December in what many took to be a
57
studied insult towards the whole enterprise. Similarly Harry West, 
leader of the Official Unionists, expressed himself as bitterly 
disappointed with the results of his party's contacts with the NIO 
with the comment that 'I do not honestly believe there is any base 
in the talks'.^
Inferentially, both the Home Secretary and the British Prime
Minister appeared to exhibit signs of frustration with the lack of
progress being made, even if they were not in full agreement with
those forementioned. Mason's 'Berlin Wall' speech on 19 December
59
provided one example, and Callaghan's address from the steps of
Stormont Castle two days later, in which he demonstrated only his
mastery of the obvious political facts of Northern Ireland, being
60
another.
From these manifestations it seems likely that the talks had 
become, in the absence of a common level of understanding between the 
parties, a purely cosmetic operation. In these terms, Lynch's inter­
vention appears not so much decisive as premature, and lacking in 
tactical acumen insofar as the Unionists were concerned. That the talks
56
Times, 8 December 1977.
57
Irish Times, 19 December 1977, pp. 1 and 5.
58
Times, 8 December 1977.
59
See p. 213, note 59.
60
During a five-hour visit to Belfast, Callaghan claimed that
Provisional IRA morale was 'on the wane'; that the people of Northern 
Ireland must 'give their full-hearted consent' to finding a political 
solution which could only be suggested, but not imposed from Westminster 
(Irish Times, 22 December 1977, pp. 1 and 13).
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never resumed, even after the dust of the interview had long 
settled, upheld the claim that the deadlock between the Northern 
political parties, which existed before, during and after this period, 
was the deciding factor throughout.
The Taoiseach's remarks on a possible amnesty for Provisional
IRA prisoners in the Republic are, however, deserving of further
consideration, because they were illustrative of Dublin's changed
attitude towards Northern Ireland in the face of the political stalemate
there. As was noted previously, Lynch's remarks on a possible amnesty
were both cautious and modified, yet it must be assumed that his
decision to answer the question in the way he did was deliberate,
61
which the following excerpt confirms.
Interviewer (Mike Burns of RTE):
Taoiseach, there are a number of Provisionals in 
jails in the Republic. If the Provisionals cease the 
violence, if peace did come, would you give an amnesty 
to those Provisional IRA prisoners in the Republic's 
jails?
Taoi seach:
That will remain to be seen. In most cases these 
people broke the ordinary law of the land and naturally 
enough if peace came, if there was a cease-fire, we'd 
look at the situation again. I can't say in advance what 
the Government would do. It's a matter for the collective 
responsibility of the Government. But again we're talking 
on the basis of a hypothesis but if there was a termination 
of violence and if it appeared that it was unlikely to 
start again naturally the Government would give careful 
consideration to some form of amnesty or some form of 
mitigation of sentences.62
One, perhaps inconsequential indicator supports the view that the 
Taoiseach may have been unwell on the day of his interview: if the 
transcript carried by the Irish Times is correct, then he showed, it 
should be emphasised, an uncharacteristic inattention to historic details. 
Twice he referred to Fianna Fail's 1974 policy statement when, in fact 
it v/as not promulgated until 1975. He also had some trouble matching 
dates and Acts of signal importance in Anglo-Irish relations. Thus, he 
referred to the '1920 Ireland Act', when presumably he meant the Govern­
ment of Ireland Act 1920; 'the 1945 Ireland Act', which does not exist; 
and the 'Attlee Act whichever year it was' —  by which he, almost certainly 
meant the Ireland Act 1949.
Lynch Interview, RTE, 8 January 1978.
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Even so, such sentiments were contrary to the spirit of previous 
Irish Government positions on the British Government's concessions 
to the Provisional IRA, as well as recent British statements that no
c o
amnesty would be provided for convicted terrorists.
Unfortunately a clear understanding of Lynch's motives v/as
complicated by his subsequent statements on amnesty. Given the
speed and the terms in which he retreated from his 8 January
position the question arose as to why he introduced the issue in the
64
first place. On the one hand, his statement of 10 January, and
65
his further clarifications during an interview with Thames Television 
created the impression that he was extremely anxious to increase the 
distance from his original statement on every occasion; on the other, 
if the original reference to amnesty was intended as an (arguable) 
inducement to the Provisionals, he clearly lacked the courage to see 
it through the opprobrium, domestic and external, which it generated.
As regards amnesty, therefore, it must be concluded that Lynch 
had overreached himself. But more importantly his flirtation with 
it was to be seen as a consequence of the perceived failure of the 
low-posture-conciliatory policies which were adopted by the National 
Coalition Government following the fall of the Northern Ireland 
Executive, and by the Fianna Fail Government during its first few months 
in power in 1977. Indeed, from a reading of both the Lynch interview 
and the subsequent amplification by the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
r r
Michael 0'Kennedy, it was evident that the Irish Government in 1978 
were convinced that the only way forward was to persuade the British 
Government first, to stop its buttressing of the Unionists and, second, 
to declare its support for the eventual goal of a united Ireland.
See for example Mason's statement on amnesty in House of Commons, 
Official Report} vol. 940, 8 December 1977, col. 1687.
64
Lynch Statement, 10 January 1978.
65
For a report of these see the Irish Timess 15 March 1978.
66
0'Kennedy Interview, Sunday Independent3 29 January 1978.
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As a strategy it failed: the British Government was simply no 
more forthcoming as a result of Irish assertiveness than it was of 
Irish quiescence. Instead, on 12 Janaury 1978, in the House of 
Commons, Mason accepted Lynch's statement of 10 January as removing 
'most of the ambiguity about amnesty'.^7 From the parliamentary 
record it appears that, ten minutes into Question Time, the controversy
which had consumed Anglo-Irish relations for the previous week was
68 n •+- aover. Or so it seemed.
The reality was that neither Britain nor Ireland was deterred 
from their mutually uncomplementary diplomatic practices of inactivity 
and assertiveness, respectively. In the prevailing circumstances 
this had two consequences: the first was to reduce, or even nullify 
the opportunity for political dialogue, while the second was to 
encourage the further intrusion into Anglo-Irish relations of surrogate 
issues for those of the future of Northern Ireland. Thus were the 
components of Anglo-Irish relations determined and thus they were 
composed —  in the form of tv/o cycles —  throughout the remainder of the 
period up to, and beyond, the Conservative Party's victory in the 
British General Election of May 1979.
The first of these cycles which plainly exhibited the tendencies
referred to in the foregoing, may be located in February 1978 with
renewed criticism by Mason of Lynch's interview comments. These
'external utterances' he told the House of Commons during Northern
Ireland Question Time, had caused parties in the North to 'stand back'
69
from their round of talks on a future administration. Although he 
did not refer to it, the recent statement by Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Michael 0'Kennedy, that his Government no longer supported the 
Sunningdale Declaration on the status of Northern Ireland, must have 
contributed to the tenor of the Secretary's remarks.7^ Thereafter, a
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 941, 12 Janaury 1978, 
col. 1832.
^  ibid., see cols. 1831-40.
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House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 943, 9 February 1978, 
col. 1652.
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reversal in the confidence in British security measures in the North 
and a further 'offensive' by the Taoiseach completed the movement 
towards deterioration in this cycle.
Ironically, the former arose from the indicators which, throughout
1977, tended to show an improving security situation. In terms of
civilian and military casualties, shooting incidents, explosions, and
the number of persons charged with serious security-type offences, the
statistics were a marked improvement on 1 9 7 6 . Moreover, it took
place at a time when any security anxieties which the British Government
may have felt about the return to power of Fianna Fail (the amnesty
issue excepted) were not in evidence. In the House of Commons, the
Northern Ireland Secretary acknowledged that since the advent of the new
Government in the Republic there had been no lessening in cross-border
co-operation; indeed he cited the co-operation of the Garda Siochana
72
in a recent incident at Forkill, Co. Armagh. Nevertheless, whether
the numerical indicators were sufficient to justify Mason's end-of-year
statements that 'there [could] be no doubt that the tide [had] turned
against the terrorist'; that 'the return to normality [had] begun';
73
and that 'the message for 1978 is one of real hope', must always have
been open to question. Although he had conceded during the course of
the debate in the House of Commons on the Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Order some six months earlier, that such figures were to
74
be 'used with care', he was obviously distressed when the caveat v/as 
necessarily applied to himself.
See House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 943, 1 February 1978, 
cols. 236-242. For other indicators of the improved secretary situation 
see Mark O'Neill, 'Finding the "Right Policy" in Ulster', an Observer 
Foreign News Service release, No. 36999, of 23 February 1978.
ibid. , col. 1644.
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London Press Service, Verbatim Service, Review of the Year in 
Ulster: Statement by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,
Mr Roy Mason, issued at Stormont Castle on 29 December 1977.. (Verbatim 
Service 270/77, 29 December 1977), hereafter cited as Mason Statement,
29 December 1977.
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House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 934, 30 June 1977,
col . 634.
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The occasion requiring this was the gutting (by a Provisional
IRA fire-bomb) of the La Mon House restaurant at Comber, Co. Down, on
17 February 1978. In terms of the 12 deaths and 30 injured, this
incident was one of the worst since the violence erupted in 1969. Not
only did it constitute a serious challenge to the optimism which had
accompanied British security statements over the previous six months,
it both undermined Mason's attempt to convince United States interests
75
that Northern Ireland offered a worthy investment potential, and 
provided a somewhat macabre overture to Lynch's Presidential address 
to the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis the following night. According to figures 
quoted by the Taoiseach to his audience, only two per cent of violence 
in the North emanated from the southern side of the Border.
In its context and timing it was a statement which could hardly
have been more unfortunate. Despite the Taoiseach's condemnation of
7 6
the bombing as a 'barbarous act' Mason determined to implicate the
Republic in what he may have seen as the incipient collapse of the
security achievements already referred to. (His position, undoubtedly,
was not improved by the Provisional IRA's claim that they v/ere also
responsible for the downing of a helicopter on 17 February at Jonesboro,
Co. Armagh, which killed the Commanding Officer of the Royal
Greenjackets). He dismissed Lynch's claim saying that he disagreed
'absolutely and fundamentally' with the 'paltry figure' of two per
cent, and then attempted to reactivate the extradition issue by giving
notice of his intention to bring pressure to bear on the Republic to
ratify the European Convention on Terrorism.77 And in an attempt to
justify the latter retrospectively, the Northern Ireland Secretary
further implied that the IRA members responsible for the La Mon bombing
78
had probably sought refuge in the Republic.
See Mason Statement, 29 December 1977.
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Dublin Sunday I n d e p e n d e n t 19 February 1978, p. 4.
House of Commons, Official Report3 vol. 944, 20 February 1978, 
cols. 1012-17.
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House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 945, 6 March 1978, col. 997.
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For Anglo-Irish relations, the difficulty with both of Mason's 
lines of argument v/as that at no stage did he provide the evidence 
which may have made his Government's case convincing. On the first
—  that of challenging Lynch's figure —  he was at a particular dis­
advantage: the Irish Government claimed, and went to some lengths 
to substantiate, that the Taoiseach's remarks were a repetition of 
British statistics. Subsequently an official Irish Government spokes­
man not only repeated the statement made at the Ard Fheis, but 
described the means by which the figures were relayed to Dublin.
Mr. Mason's assertions about the number of terrorist 
incidents allegedly originating in the Republic are 
totally contrary to the known figures based on statistics 
provided by the British themselves.
Under a procedure instituted early in 1975 the British 
submit to the Irish authorities a weekly list of terrorist 
incidents which they allege have their origins in the 
Republic.
On the basis of these British lists, 28 incidents were 
alleged to have originated in the South last year. That 
was 1.06% of all incidents in the North. This compared 
with a figure of 82 for 1975, which was 2.1% of the 
terrorist incidents North of the Border.79
As regards the second line of argument —  rather, the assertion
that the La Mon bombers were sheltering in the Republic —  the Irish
Government was able to claim that 'not a shred of evidence' had been
80
offered in substantiation. By inference, this response also disposed
of the (British) qualifications applied to the tv/o per cent estimate
used by the Taoiseach. According to the Northern Ireland Secretary,
this figure applied only to a very narrow definition of incidents —
shots across the Border or terrorists captured or injured —  but not to
81
the 'use of the Border for terrorist activities in the north'. It 
v/as a point which made perfect sense, if only it had not, like Lynch's 
initial statement at the Ard Fheis, been preceded by, or placed in
220
Irish Times, 21 February 1978.
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Irish Times, 7 March 1978, p. 1.
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House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 945, 6 March 1978,
col. 1000.
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company v/ith events or ripostes which tended to divert the mind by 
stimulating the spleen.
Since Callaghan and Lynch had reported their satisfaction with 
security matters in their September communique; since Mason had 
acknowledged on at least two occasions subsequent to the La Mon bombing
82
that there had been no lessening in cross-Border security co-operation,
and since the legal machinery existed in the Republic, under the
Criminal Law Jurisdiction Act and other legislation, for the consideration
and bringing of charges where evidence warranted them, Mason's attempts
to allocate a measure of responsibility to the Republic, by association
or innuendo, were unacceptable in Dublin. In the light of the
83
Secretary's characteristic cockiness, they appeared at best an
arrogation of self-righteousness, or worse, a display of opportunism
which could only hinder good relations between Britain and Ireland.
As the Taoiseach chose to comment on them, 'we regard Mr Mason's ...
J 84
speech as buck-passing by a man in deep political trouble.'
In the ensuing period, an element of distrust crept once more
into Anglo-Irish relations. The extent to which it operated and was
reinforced became apparent during the trial at Belfast City Commission
of five men charged with the murder of Captain Robert Nairac, a British
under-cover soldier who v/as murdered in the Republic. After nearly
five hours of legal confusion and argument, the proceedings had to be
adjourned because authorities in Dublin refused to release vital
exhibits which, they claimed, would be needed at some unspecified date
85
for the appeal of a man convicted in the Republic on a similar charge.
See, for example, House of Commons, Official Report3 vol. 943,
9 February 1978, col. 1644; and House of Commons, Official Report3 
vol. 944, 20 February 1978, col. 1010.
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This term is used advisedly. In virtually every interview with 
British and Irish observers, comment v/as passed on Mason's attitudes in 
this term. One observer of the Northern Ireland scene, Christopher 
Walker, noted that in the Catholic enclaves of the Province this 
characteristic of Mason earned him the title '5ft 3 in John Wayne' ('The 
American Threat to Ulster', Spectator3 3 February 1979, p. 11).
84
Times, 8 March 1978, p. 3.
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Thus the opportunity to test the possibilities of Anglo-Irish legal 
co-operation resulting from joint laws introduced in June 1976 and, 
thereby, to allay British reservations concerning the practicality of 
the arrangements so provided, was foregone.
In its stead Lynch continued to press the Irish Government's more 
forceful line, and with more positive results than might have been 
forecast given the preceding events. Interviewed on Thames Television's 
programme 'This Week', the Taoiseach said of the British presence
I honestly don't believe there can be permanent 
peace in Ireland because there will be, in future 
generations, people who will be prepared to take up 
arms, even though they will not have the support of 
the majority of the people to take up arms in such a
situation.86
Moreover, it was of significance that, on this occasion, the Irish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the precaution of informing the heads of
all diplomatic missions in Dublin of the Taoiseach's proposed statements
87
for that evening. In a further move taken at the same time the Irish 
Government dismissed two claims made by the Northern Ireland Office, 
as to lists of actions originating in the Republic. In the first 
instance it denied ever having received the document in question (one 
purportedly delivered in December 1977), while the contents of the other 
were reduced to
... speculations, vague assumptions and unfounded 
deductions without a shred of evidence to support any 
of it.88
Given the emphatic tone of these denials it was obvious that the 
tolerance of differences in Anglo-Irish relations was at a particularly 
low level. Diplomatic debate in any meaningful sense appeared to have 
receded —  to be almost completely usurped by a confrontation between 
assertiveness and bluster. In the Republic the Government's attitudes 
were doubtless encouraged by the support lent by Fine Gael during this
As reported in the Irish Times, 10 March 1978, p. 1. 
Irish Times3 11 March 1978, p. 1.
Irish Times, 10 March 1978, p. 1.
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period. Revelations concerning British attempted coercion during the
89
period of the National Coalition, followed by Fine Gael's support of
90
an eventual withdrawal and its leader, Garret Fitzgerald's criticism
of Mason's recent security statements as 'unprincipled and less than
91
honest' provided an indication of the extent to which Lynch's 
initiative was both drawing upon, and successfully operating within 
popular public opinion in the Republic. And since something less than 
a bi-partisan approach towards the North existed between Fianna Fail 
and Fine Gael, it was clear that the burden would be chiefly upon 
Britain for retrieving the poor Anglo-Irish relations which had resulted 
over the first three months of 1978.
In an attempt to ease the situation, Mason denied three times in
the Mouse of Commons that relations between the RUC and Garda Siochana
were anything but good, and even went so far as to say that co-operation
92
from the Irish Army had improved in recent months. Further
manifestations of this conciliatory mood were found in his reluctance
93
both to respond to questions critical of the Taoiseach, and to dismiss
A British threat made by the then Foreign Secretary, Mr Tony 
Crosland, that if Ireland did not support the UK stand on fisheries 
policy, it would have an 'adverse effect' on Anglo-Irish relations, was 
disclosed by the Fine Gael Leader, Dr Garret Fitzgerald in Dail Eireann 
on 15 February 1978 (Dublin Irish Independent, 16 February 1978, p.l). 
Two days earlier he had stated that, although Northern Ireland was 
never mentioned, it was generally understood that Anglo-Irish relations 
with regard to this issue would be particularly prejudiced. (Interview 
with Dr Fitzgerald, Dublin, 14 February 1978.)
90
In announcing a major review of its policy on Northern Ireland, 
the party emphasised its aim to enable the Irish people 'to govern them­
selves without any involvement by Great Britain'. (Irish Times, 17 
February 1978, p. 1).
91 /
Report of a speech delivered in Roscommon on 10 March 1978 (Irish
Times, 11 March 1978, p. 1). See also his rebuttal of various security-
related assertions by British Ministers in April 1978, in the course of
an interview on the RTE radio programme 'This Week' of 30 April 1978
(Irish Times, 1 May 1978, pp. 1 and 6.)
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House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 945, 9 March 1978, 
cols. 1593-1600. Four days later Mason was quick to praise the Garda 
Siochana for their quick response to two cross-Border shooting incidents 
(Irish Times, 14 March 1978).
ibid., col s. 1585-6.
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out of hand, as he had done in the same place three days earlier, the
94
two per cent figure cited by Lynch.
There were two other hopeful notes amid the tedium of proceedings
prior to this time. The first concerned the decision by Westminster
to provide for a system of proportional representation in Northern
95
Ireland for elections to the European Parliament. Contrary to some
96
claims, the Irish Government's influence upon this decision had been,
according to Garret Fitzgerald, to suggest not the system of election
but the number of seats to be contested. In negotiations which covered
a wide range of European representational matters it was also agreed
97
that the Republic would make no claim as to its role in the matter.
The other source of consolation was the discreet silence maintained
by the British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, prior to his meeting
with the Taoiseach at the EEC summit in Copenhagen in April 1978. In
98
the event, this apparently amicable meeting, produced two immediate
and tangible results: a decison that the Irish Minister for Foreign
Affairs and the Northern Ireland Secretary should meet for discussions
99
on political, economic and security matters as soon as possible, and 
an expressed desire to 'look forward' rather than dwell on past 
recriminations.*^ Acting on this the Irish Government suggested a date
94
95
ibid., col. 1601.
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 943, 2 February 1978, 
cols. 723-871.
96
e.g. Those made by the leader of the Unionist MPs at Westminster,
Mr James Molyneaux, as reported in the Irish Times, 9 January 1978; 
and Conor O'Clery, 'Westminster Notebook', Irish Times, 11 February 
1978.
97
Interview with Dr Garret Fitzgerald, Leader Fine Gael Party, Dublin,
14 February 1978. Fitzgerald, however dispensed with this proviso in 
an address to the Atlanta (Atlantic?) Commission on Foreign Policy, in 
which he disclosed the Irish Government's role. (Irish Times, 16 June 
1978).
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For these reasons it was curious that the Northern Ireland
Secretary should, only a few days later, express the view that it was
unnecessary for him to meet with the Irish Minister for Foreign
Affairs, thereby initiating the second cycle in Anglo-Irish relations
102
in 1978-1979. This disturbance to the reassuring atmosphere 
created by the Copenhagen meeting had its origins in the aftermath to 
Lynch's 8 January interview but v/as supplemented by Mason's inter­
mittent attempts to belabour security and related issues in bilateral 
contacts with the Irish Government.
Almost immediately after the RTE interview. Mason had sought a
meeting with 0'Kennedy but agreement could not be reached on either
the agenda or the venue. The former sought to hold it in Belfast, with
an emphasis on security matters. To this end he also sought to have
present the Chief Constable of the RUC, Sir Kenneth Newman, and the
Irish Minister for Justice, Mr Gerry Collins. None of this held any
attraction for Kennedy: the trip North could be made to appear, even
if it was not intended by Mason, as a 'summons'; besides, the
practice of rotating the venue for Anglo-Irish meetings made Dublin
103
the logical choice, and the Irish Government's view was that the
agenda should embrace political developments, economic co-operation,
104
and security in equal measure. Eventually, hov/ever, agreement v/as 
reached as to the date and venue —  Dublin on 23 March 1978 —  but the 
disagreements regarding the agenda persisted until a few days prior 
to the proposed meeting. They v/ere then rendered academic, as that 
date was found to coincide with the State funeral of the former 
President, Cearbahall 0 Dalaigh. Accordingly the meeting v/as postponed.
Thus Mason's opinion and general tone in the Commons on 13 April
early in May for the proposed Mason-0'Kennedy talks.
Irish Times} 14 April 1978, p. 1.
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House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 947, 13 April 1978, 
cols. 1641-5.
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Since September 1977, Lynch had been to London once, and 0'Kennedy 
twice. Neither Callaghan nor Mason had visited Dublin in that period.
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was contrary to Dublin's interpretation of what had been decided upon 
in Copenhagen. On this occasion however, Mason's reluctance to meet 
with 0'Kennedy was expressed at the same time as his criticism of 
parties in the Republic who publicly explored the themes of a united 
Ireland, and the suggestion that the Republic was under pressure from 
other European countries to sign the Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrori sm. *
The Secretary's stance and views, therefore, were inconsistent 
with those of his Prime Minister. Where Callaghan and Lynch had 
agreed on an early meeting, Mason claimed that his previous arrangements
—  which were known at the time of the Copenhagen decision —  were now 
redundant because of that meeting. In other words, what Mason had 
required exclusively to be discussed at length in the company of his 
security adviser had now, in his reckoning, been satisfactorily 
disposed of in the course of a 50-minute, far-ranging but incidental 
discussion in Copenhagen.
On the theme of the Convention —  in effect extradition —  Mason 
joined two weeks later by a junior Minister at the Home Office,
Dr Shirley Summerskill and, somewhat el 1iptically, by the Prime
M i n i s t e r . A c c o r d i n g  to Summerskill, who was speaking in the debate 
on the Prevention of Terrorism Bill which would enable Britain to 
ratify the Convention, the British Government had
provided for the application of some of the Bill's 
provisions to the Republic of Ireland, even if the 
Republic is not party to the Convention, in case the 
Republic were willing to participate in an agreement 
outside the Convention but on similar lines.
She continued:
Discussions are at present taking place in the EEC 
about the possibility of concluding such an agreement 
between the Republic and the rest of the Nine. 107
105
House of Commons. OfficialI Report3 vol. 947, 13 April 1978, 
cols. 1642-4.
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As a result of these assertions, the Irish Government issued an 
official statement that
There is no pressure and it [is] wrong to suggest that 
discussions are taking place between the other member 
States and the Republic. The discussions that are taking 
place are between all nine member-states.108
A more comprehensive reply was made the following day in what stands
as the Irish Government's firmest denunciation of British attitudes 
109
on this subject. At a meeting of the Fianna Fail Party Committee 
on Northern Ireland the Taoiseach cited both international, and 
particularly British evidence**^ in support of his Government's 
position to emphasise that the Republic was 'no haven for terrorists'.***
Although in June, he was to refer to the attempts by the British
Government to show the Republic in an unfavourable international light
on the extradition issue as 'deplorable', and to question the motives
112
for which they v/ere made, further debate or reaction v/as precluded
by an agreement to proceed v/ith the ministerial discussions proposed at
113
Copenhagen. On 5 May 1978 these took place in Dublin between Mason
1 OR
Irish Times, 27 April 1978, p. 1.
109
'No Haven for Terrorists: Speech given by The Taoiseach,
Mr J. Lynch, TD, at a meeting of the Fianna Fail Party Committee on 
Northern Ireland in Leinster House on Thursday, 27 April 1978',
Statements and Speeches 5/78: Bulletin of the department of Foreign 
Affairs, (hereafter cited as Lynch, 'No Haven For Terrorists').
In particular part of a speech of a former British Solicitor-General, 
Sir Dingle Foot, and Britain's position on the 'Hi-jacking' Convention 
and in the discussion at the European Council of July 1976, on the 
taking of hostages. Also noted v/as Britain's failure to avail itself 
of the provisions of such acts as the Offences against the Person Act, 
1861, and the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act, 1976.
*** Lynch, 'No Haven For Terrorists'.
112
See the Report of Lynch's adjournment debate speech on 28 June 1978 
in the Irish Times, 29 June 1978, p. 4.
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The public debate continued in Ireland, however, and at some 
lenqth, particularly in the columns of the Irish Times, during May and 
June 1978,
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and 0'Kennedy, with additional contributions from the Minister for
State at the Foreign Office, Frank Judd; the Irish Ministers for
Justice, Collins, and Economic Planning and Development, Dr Martin
O'Donoghue; and the Minister for State at the Department of Foreign
114
Affairs, David Andrews. Superficially these meetings, and the
joint communique which followed them, were satisfactory to the 
purposes of reconciliation, indeed almost unctuously in this regard, 
as Mason's comments illustrated:
I am always pleased to come to Dublin. It's a 
beautiful city. Grand weather. Amiable ministerial 
colleagues. We have reached a remarkably high level 
of understanding.
If this was so, then why had there been the need for a meeting in
the first place? The communique, after all, had only registered an
agreement to differ on fundamental attitudes, but 'complete accord' on
the need for short-term political activity in the North. Similarly,
cordiality was recorded on security matters and imminent progress
11
forecast in cross-Border economic development. In short, little of 
substance was agreed that had not already been agreed. Moreover, 
given the failure of Mason's previous initiative in Northern Ireland, 
the expectation at this time of a United Kingdom General Election**7 
and. therefore, a concomitant expectation that no strenuous British 
attempt could be expected in the province before the year's end, there 
was cause for some misgivings for the immediate future of Anglo-Irish 
relations.
For some time these may have appeared unfounded. The record shows 
that Mason returned to London 'completely aware' that the security 
forces in the Republic were 100 per cent committed to defeating
Irish Timess 5 May 1978, p. 1.
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As reported in the Irish Times, 6 May 1978, p. 1.
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For the text of the communique, see the Irish Times, 6 May 1978,
p. 6.
117
'Expectation' is the operative term. Callaghan eventually decided 
not to go to the country in the autumn, as most British observers 
anticipated he would, but to attempt to remain in office for a full term.
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terrorism, and that subsequently, he demonstrated an increased
119
resolve against Unionist demands. Indeed, it is possible to regard 
the Dublin discussions of May 1978 as the final, ameliorating exchange 
in the two cycles Anglo-Irish relations were subject to in 1978.
Hereafter, despite the fact that Northern Ireland receded as 
far as British interests v/ere concerned, the Irish Minister for 
Foreign Affairs began to speak of 'greater hope' with regard to 
Northern Ireland, as in his 1978 address to the United Nations:
118
This year, I am pleased to be able to bring this Assembly 
a message of greater hope about Northern Ireland. It is 
true that it is violence generally which makes headlines 
in the world press. But it is important to look behind 
the headlines to the fact that, in Northern Ireland, 
violence is now clearly seen as futile, and that it is 
rejected and repudiated by all except a tiny minority.
There are signs of new thinking on the part of those 
concerned v/ith this problem —  within Northern Ireland 
as a whole, and in the United Kingdom —  with which on 
this difficult subject my Government has regular and close 
consultation. The new thinking and the hope, to which I 
referred, derive in part from progress and new developments 
in Ireland. Today the Republic has one of the fastest 
growing economies in Western Europe. The problem of 
inflation and unemployment are being brought under control.
Now that both parts of the island are within the 
European Economic Community we have become more conscious 
than ever of the extent to which the problems and 
opportunities we face are similar in both parts of the 
island. There is a new mood which recognises that on many 
questions we have common interests which are best pursued 
in common. My Government would like to ensure that there 
is a clear awareness abroad of this new mood and of the 
new possibilities in Ireland.120
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ibid., col. 1389. The following day, in the course of a luncheon
speech in Derry he had correspondingly bad news for those of an anti- 
Unionist persuasion, i.e. he would not seek to impose a constitutional 
settlement upon the province. (Irish Times3 13 May 1978.)
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'Address to the 33rd General Assembly of the United Nations by 
■the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Michael 0'Kennedy TD, on 28 
September 1978', Statements and Speeches 7/78 : Bulletin of the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
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Additionally, the Unionists were to be encouraged towards these 'new
possibilities' by 'plain speaking' between 'both the main Irish
Traditions' in the confident hope that the differences between them
121
would be overcome.
If anything, in 1979 the Minister's optimism was even more 
expansive. In an article which appeared in the New York Times on 
St. Patrick's Day his remarks included the following passage:
Some new developments in Ireland encourage the hope that 
the day of reconciliation is near. The fastest growing 
economy in Western Europe —  with 7 per cent growth in 
1978 —  is that of the Republic, and this trend has had 
a significant effect on public opinion in Northern 
Ireland.
Common interests between North and South are moreover 
becoming more apparent because of joint membership of 
the European Community and when later this year,
Ireland takes over from France the Chairmanship of the 
European Community, Dublin's international standing 
will not go unnoticed in Belfast.122
Yet against all this emollient talk it was clear that nothing
had changed which would alter the basic character of the diplomacy
between Britain and Ireland for the remainder of the period under
review. 0'Kennedy, moreover, had succumbed to the temptation,
previously noted in Mason's pronouncements in late 1977, of associating
progress (in this case towards a united Ireland) with a diminution of 
123
IRA activity. By his own admission the 'new thinking' which he 
found in British attitudes was not based on any tangible expressions by
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'Text of an address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Michael 
0'Kennedy TD, to the World Affairs Council, Los Angeles on Friday,
6 October 1978', Statements and Speeches 8/78 : Bulletin of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, (hereafter cited as Statements and Speeches 
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From a reprint of the New York Times article entitled 'The Situation 
in Northern Ireland' , Ireland Today : Bulletin of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, No. 948, 15 April 1979, p. 6.
123
Mason, in this respect was incorrigible. By mid 1978 he was again 
proclaiming that the 'improving trend is clear ... Gradually normality 
is returning'. (House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 952, 30 June 
1978, cols. 1705-06).
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British political leaders. Rather it rested on a 'renewal of interest'
in solutions to the Irish Question which could be found in the British
media, and on unspecified 'evidence of re-thinking on the part of some
124
Unionist leaders.'
Notwithstanding these qualifications to his optimism there were 
two other surprising elements in his appraisal of the Northern 
situation in September-October 1978. The first was his investment of 
hope in the rather Marxist assumption that an increase in (principally) 
economic benefits would extinguish the other, Unionist tradition whose 
strength and place the Irish Government simultaneously claimed to 
respect. And the second was that he appeared not to take caution in 
these remarks from the increasing likelihood that the Conservative 
Party, with a respectable record of pro-Unionism under Margaret 
Thatcher, was going to be the Government.
While it was possible to dismiss some Tory statements in opposition
125
as 'kite-flying' or lunatic fringe in origin, it was difficult to
read into the majority of those made by Spokesmen, etc., as other than
a positive hardening of a disposition against the immediate and long-term
objectives of the Irish Government. In the period after Thatcher took
over the Party leadership, only William van Straubenzee's notice to the
Unionists that they could not expect a return to old-style Stormont rule
under a Conservative Government was in any way supportive of 0'Kennedy's
126
view. All the other indications were that the trend in Tory 
thinking, or at least of those who were known to be close political allies
Statements and Speeches 8/78.
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In 1976 Marcus Kimball, Tory MP for Gainsborough, asked for an 
investigation into the possibility of creating a colourful new Colony 
'like Hong Kong' in a sparsely-populated area such as the Ards Peninsula, 
and allow into it unlimited numbers of British passport holders who would 
not have the right of entry to the rest of the United Kingdom. (House of 
Commons, Official Report, vol. 916, Part 1., 27 July 1976, col. 969).
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At the annual conference of the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland in
1978, van Straubenzee, vice-chairman of the Northern Ireland Committee of 
Conservative MPs, delivered the message that 'If the calculation is that a 
minority Conservative Government will trade a return to an old-age type 
Stormont Government for remaining in office, then the calculation is a 
false one'. Some doubt existed, however, as to whether this was an 
'official' statement on behalf of the Conservative Party. (Irish Times,
12 September 1978, and Times, 27 September 1978).
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of Thatcher, was away from the innovations of the Heath-Whitel aw
era —  the Irish Dimension, power-sharing, and the weakening of the
Union. In this they differed from the Labour Party, with whom they
shared a (generally) bi-partisan approach on Northern Ireland, only in
the lack of equivocation with which they expressed their opposition
to these formerly hallowed concepts. In fact the whole mood of the
Conservatives Northern Ireland pronouncements in the period of the
Thatcher ascendancy may be seen as complementing a repudiation of all
127
that was attempted under Heath.
This was particularly noticeable in the appointment of the
principal spokesman on Northern Ireland, Airey Neave. Despite his
colourful name, obvious personal courage and adventurous wartime
128
career he was, as a politician, colourless and promoted for loyalty
rather than drive. After assuming the spokesmanship on Northern Ireland
129
he claimed to want good relations with the Republic but his 
subsequent statements were not calculated to serve this purpose.
Neave, for example, claimed early on not to know exactly what
130
was meant by the Irish Dimension —  and if he ever found out it was 
obvious that he was never disposed favourably towards it. In his 
lexicon Irish unity v/as something rational Unionists would never
contemplate: on the contrary it v/as a state of affairs into which they
131 132
would need to be 'beguiled' or even 'seduced'. If Neave's
127
Apart from the evidence for this claim to be cited in the following 
pages, it was made abundantly clear during interviews —  at the 
Conservative Party Research Office in London (August 2, 1978), and with 
John Biggs-Davison, Conservative MP for Epping Forest, and then junior 
spokesman on Northern Ireland. (House of Commons, 2 August 1978).
128
After being imprisoned in occupied Europe during World War II, he 
became famous for two escapes from Colditz Castle, the top security 
fortress in Silesia.
129
Interview on RTE Radio, 23 February 1975, as reported in the Irish 
Times, 24 February 1975.
130 .... 
ibid.
131
Report of a luncheon address organised by the Official Unionist 
Party in Belfast on 7 April 1978, in the Irish Times3 8 April 1978, 
p. 1, (hereafter cited as OUP Address, 7 April 1978).
132
Report of an address to the Maldon Industrial Council, at the House 
of Commons on 25 May 1978, in the Irish Times, 26 May 1978, (hereafter 
cited as Maldon Industrial Council Address, 25 May 1978).
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statements on this aspect of the Northern Ireland Question had one 
overriding theme it v/as that
we [the Conservative Party] stand four-square 
for the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.133
With equal force he dismissed power-sharing on the grounds that it
would need to be an imposed measure and, therefore, fiercely resisted
134
by the Protestant majority.
According to Neave, what was realistic was an increase in the
135
Northern Ireland representation at Westminster, a regional council
136
with restored local government powers, and 'decisive emergency 
action' which included a resumption of internment, house-to-house
searches of the Catholic areas, and a full scale anti-guerrilla warfare
137 .
campaign by the Army. On related issues he was no less mischievous
in his pronouncments —  claiming, in one instance, but somewhat out of
138
phase with Mason, that the La Mon bombers were 'now in the Republic'.
As with the Secretary's earlier (6 March) allegation to this effect,
Neave produced no evidence whatever, either to the House of Commons in
139
which he made this charqe, or to the Irish Government, but appeared
140
to content himself with its repetition.
133 .... 
ibid.
134 .... 
ibid.
135 OUP Address, 7 April 1978.
See Airey Neave, 'Bridging the Ulster Gap', Guardian, 3 May 1978; 
and a report of an interview with Neave on the BBC Radio's 'Inside 
Politics' programme of 30 May 1978, in the Irish Times3 31 May 1978.
I 07
Report of a speech at Abingdon (i.e. his Westminster constituency), 
on 26 May 1977, in the Times> 27 May 1977).
1 38
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 952, 30 June 1978, col. 1717.
139
ibid., cols. 1716-23 cover all of Neave's speech.
* ^ Neave made this assertion on several occasions, but as of 7 June 
1978 no information had been received by the Irish authorities (Interview, 
Dept, of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 1978). Further, since this date, there 
is no public record of any such evidence having been forwarded.
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Naturally, Neave as Conservative spokesman, was reflecting the 
views of his party and of its higher leadership. Accordingly, his
views were the repetition and amplification of those of Mrs Thatcher,
141
wno was just as uncompromising on such matters as power-sharing 
and the Union. As she told a meeting of businessmen in Belfast:
We shall not consider any plans for the political 
future of this part of the United Kingdom which could 
result in the weakening of the Union.1^2
It was no surprise, therefore, that the meeting at which this
affirmation was delivered should have been organised by the Official
143
Unionist Party (OUP), or that the full text of which it was part,
144
was circulated by the Party's publicity department. It was, after 
all, an expression of sentiment quintessentially Unionist —  notwith­
standing, that to remain absolutely true to the word of Thatcher's 
undertaking, the Conservatives would be obliged to repeal certain 
provisions of the Ireland Act 1949!
However, given that the same party which had facilitated Thatcher
during her visit had also refused to meet her spokesman the previous
145
year, it was clear that Conservative-Umonist relations had undergone
a marked reconciliation in 1978. Indeed this was confirmed by the OUP
leader at Westminster, James Molyneaux, who in view of the shadow-
Cabinet approval he assumed Thatcher's statements to have, spoke of a
possible 'working relationship' between his Party and a Conservative
146
Government. In his reckoning, the Unionists were closer to the
Tories than to Labour and had come closer since Thatcher had taken over 
147
the leadership. It would, however, have been alarmist to infer from
141
Mrs Thatcher, at her first meeting with the Taoiseach, is reported 
to have told him that she believed power-sharing was no longer a possible 
objective (Guardian3 30 September 1977).
142
As reported in the Irish Times3 20 June 1978.
143 .... 
ibid.
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'Northern Notebook', Irish Times, 24 June 1978, p. 5.
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Report by David McKittrick to accompany OUP Address, 7 April 1978, 
Irish Times3 8 April 1978, p. 1.
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Irish Times3 22 June 1978.
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the foregoing that the possible need for parliamentary support had
necessitated the reforging of the Tory-Unionist alliance. Although
Thatcher had clearly played the 'Orange Card' during her visit to
Belfast, she appeared not to be too anxious to repeat the tactic,
or with the same enthusiasm anyway. At the Conservative Party
conference in October 1978 her emphasis was on the consequences of
withdrawal rather than any positive steps her Party would take in
government. By then, also, her references to the future of the Union
were couched in the familiar terms of the Attleean guarantee enshrined
in the Ireland Act of 1949. Interestingly, as Conservative leader,
she was following an almost parallel development in her attitudes to
Northern Ireland as the man she had displaced, Edward Heath: initial
disinterest in the issues, followed by an uncompromising affirmation
of the Union, which was then overtaken, in effect compromised, by a
willingness to contemplate a weakening of the union. Yet in all
there was sufficient ambiguity in Conservative behaviour in Opposition
for the Unionists to be anxious, and yet such a clear rejection of
the terms in which Britain and Ireland had discussed the political
future of Northern Ireland over the previous seven years, that
148
0'Kennedy should surely have taken instruction from it.
To an extent this brief discussion of the Conservative's 
Opposition role in Anglo-Irish relations is redundant. Any impact 
Airey Neave might have had upon their course, as a Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland, cannot be considered in other than 
hypothetical terms: he was murdered in his car leaving the House of 
Commons car park on 30 March 1979. But his death cannot alter the 
fact that his views were of considerable significance to Anglo-Irish 
relations during his life, and that they were a necessary element of 
contemporary assessments of the future course of these relations. 
Similarly, the fact that the Conservatives became the Government in no 
way diminishes the relevance of their Opposition statements, except
Thatcher's possible election as Prime Minister was not the most 
daunting of prospects however. When the question was put to a senior 
Irish Government official as to how he viewed having to negotiate with 
her or Neave, he replied, 'nothing could be worse than dealing with 
Reginald Maulding'. (Interview, Dublin, 1978).
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inasmuch as Opposition statements in general may be discounted as 
reflecting less than the full constraints of government.
Anglo-Irish relations, however, were blighted not by the 
Conservatives' statements in opposition, although these did not help 
matters, and really not by the surrogate issues which the Labour 
Government raised, although these also played their part in creating 
tensions. Fundamentally, Anglo-Irish relations developed, or rather 
settled, into their cyclical patterns of disturbance and quasi-harmony 
for the same reasons that had led to this state of affairs in the 
previous period —  because Northern Ireland had virtually become 'any 
other business' on the British Government's agenda.
For this reason Anglo-Irish relations ceased to include, in any
meaningful sense, a dialogue on the future of the Province. Overall
on this matter they became more a series of 'silences punctuated
149
with insincerities'. Silences, on the British side, because they 
had not the heart, nor perhaps the imagination, to construct new ideas; 
and insincerities, on both sides, because on the available evidence it 
is difficult to accept that the assurances given were really believed 
by those who gave them.
The period June 1977 —  May 1979, therefore, was notable only in
negative terms, being as one scholar put it, 'the years the locust 
150
ate'. Indeed, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that this 
period reduced to just so much wasted time in terms of the situation in 
Northern Ireland. It lacked the topicality of the civil rights 
demonstrations, the outrage of Bloody Sunday, the hope of Sunningdale, 
or even the poor theatre of the Constitutional Convention.
In these two years, the policy-makers of Whitehall became 
paralysed by the knowledge that what happens on the Andersontown Road, 
the Falls, or the Shankill is more important than what is decided at 
Westminster, in Great George Street, or at Stormont Castle. In Dublin
149
The description only is taken from journalist John Whale's forecast 
of the 1977 Cal1aqhan-Lynch summit (London Sunday Times3 25 September 
1977.)
Coral Bell, 'Tribes That Lost Their Heads', Melbourne Age3
4 September 1979, p. 9.
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this was never a welcome truth, more so under a Fianna Fail Government 
than the National Coalition. It resulted, therefore, in a waiting 
triumvirate: the Irish Government waiting for a British initiative; 
the British Government waiting for the Protestants and Catholics 
to come to their respective senses; and the Protestants and Catholics 
waiting to see what would happen next from the British Government.
As with most extended periods of waiting, this one also became 
an experience in tedium for all concerned with both the domestic 
and international politics of the Ulster Question. As was noted 
earlier, it lacks a focus, a climax, or even an anti-climax. Nothing 
seemed to command the sort of effort or attention that could have 
produced any of these. This period —  this chapter —  ends with the 
return of the Conservatives to government only for one reason: the 
patterns of behaviour between Britain and Ireland immediately before, 
and after this event, deviated little from those already established, 
and they indicated that it may yet be some time before the moulds are 
broken.
C H A P T E R
T h e  Un i t e d
f i v e
Na t i o n s
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Unlike many issues in contemporary international politics
involving disputed territory, the Ulster Question had not been placed
before the United Nations prior to 1969. Although self abnegation on
behalf of the Irish Government was sometimes cited for this state
1
of affairs, the principal and overriding reason, as explained by the 
Irish Minister for External Affairs at the time the current decade of 
'troubles' began, Mr Frank Aiken, was pragmatic:
... for the good reason that none of our Governments 
was convinced that during its period of office the 
adoption of a United Nations resolution would contribute 
to the restoration of Irish unity.2
The events in Northern Ireland in late 1968-early 1969, however, 
rendered these conditions temporarily inoperative —  a likelihood 
anticipated by the British Government. Although Aiken had 'briefed' 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, in April 1969,
4
on the situation in Northern Ireland, 'it was not until three days after 
the first British troops had been deployed 'in aid of the civil power' 
that a concerted Irish initiative was attempted. On 17 August 1969, 
Cornelius Cremin, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN,
Dr Patrick Hillery, Minister for External Affairs (appointed July 1969), 
makes a claim on these lines by citing the consensus of Dail Eireann in 
July 1946, when a debate took place on whether Ireland should seek 
admission to the UN, that 'it would be wrong to look to the Organization 
for national advantage only ...' However he also cites the more 
compelling reason offered by Aiken (above). [United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) Official Records,1768th Plenary Meeting, 26 September 
1969, para 64.]
2
Dail Eireann, Parliamentary Debates^Official Report, vol. 240, 29 April 
1969, col. 6, (hereafter cited as Dail Eireann, Official Report).
3
James Callaghan, A House divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland 
(London: Collins, 1973), p. 28, (hereafter cited as Callaghan, A House
Divided),
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 241, 22 October 1969, col. 1474.
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requested, by virtue of Article 35 of the Charter, 'an urgent meeting 
of the Security Council in connexion with the situation in the Six
g
Counties of Northern Ireland.'
5
In his letter, Cremin referred to a statement by the Taoiseach of
13 August,7 according to which the events set off by a parade in the 
city of Derry on 12 August had made it evident
that the Belfast Government was no longer in control of 
the situation, that the Royal Ulster Constabulary v/as no 
longer acceptable as an impartial police force, and that the 
employment of British troops would not be acceptable and 
would not be likely to restore peaceful conditions, and 
certainly not in the long term. In these circumstances, the 
Irish Government requested the British Government to apply 
immediately to the United Nations for the urgent despatch of 
a peace-keeping force to the Six Counties of Northern 
Ireland. The British Government rejected that request. 
Subsequently my Government proposed that there should be a 
joint peace-keeping force in the area composed of members 
of British and Irish Defence Forces. This proposal was 
likewise rejected by the British G o v e r n m e n t .8
Cremin also expressed the hope that his delegation might be 
permitted to be heard at all stages of the discussion by the Security
g
Council of his Government's request.
Article 35 provides that any Member of the United Nations may bring 
any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction 
or give rise to a dispute to the attention of the Security Council or 
of the General Assembly.
£
'Letter Dated 17 August 1969 From the Permanent Representative of 
Ireland Addressed To The President Of The Security Council', United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), document S/9394, 17 August 1969, 
(hereafter cited as S/9394).
7 i.e., Lynch's 'we cannot stand [idly] by' address over Radio Telefis 
Eireann on 13 August 1969, in The Taoiseach, John Lynch, T.D. Speeches
and Statements on Irish Unity, Northern Ireland, and Anglo Irish 
Relations, August 1969 -October 1971 (Dublin: Government Information 
Bureau, 1971), pp. 1-3.
8 S/9394.
i bid.
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It v/as a move made only under the pressure of events, when 
the Irish Government, after fifty years of irredentist 
talk, had to give the appearance of doing something.
Moreover, as he pointed out, there v/ere three further observations 
which v/ere to be made of this drama over the month-long period in which 
it attracted interest at the UN.
Thus Patrick Keatinge noted of the Irish initiative:
It v/as a move in which the diplomatic courtesies were more 
than preserved ... Dr Hillery's tone in the Security Council 
was almost apologetic. The amount of pressure it exerted 
on the British Government is debatable; indeed its primary 
purpose may have been to placate domestic opinionll ...
But, above all, it was not typical of Ireland's role in 
international institutions ...
(Although Keatinge's observations were directed towards the Security 
Council proceedings, they may, without distortion, be taken to apply 
with equal force to the sequel which occurred in the General Committee 
of the General Assembly.)
The first is particularly interesting although a reservation may
be entered concerning Keatinge's description of Hillery's tone as
'apologetic'. From the Minister's speech during a debate in Dail
Eireann later in 1969, it appears true that Ireland v/as concerned that
13
its approach to the UN was 'reasonable and not at all disruptive'.
And it is difficult to escape taking the inference from his statement 
that Ireland had 'no desire to bring Britain unnecessarily before the
Patrick Keatinge, 'Irish Foreign Policy', Collected Conference Papers 
on Ireland, Britain, and Europe (London: University of London Institute 
of Commonwealth Studies, 1971) p. 64 (hereafter cited as Keatinge, 'Irish 
Foreign Pol icy').
** Keatinge observes, in this regard, that the Security Council 
proceedings v/ere broadcast direct on the national radio network, a 'not 
usual occurrence', ibid., p. 71, note 23. (Confirmation of the importance, 
if not the primacy of domestic considerations was provided in an interview 
with a senior official of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs in June 
1978).
^  ibid., p. 64.
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 241, 22 October 1969, col. 1483.
242
or vulgar about raising the issue of Northern Ireland at the UN. But
15
in these respects only did Hillery's tone approach the apologetic. 
Certainly his statement to the Security Council may, in retrospect, 
appear restrained in tone (but not apologetic) if compared with his 
utterances at the UN following Bloody Sunday, but these were made after 
the publication of Keatinge's paper.
Nevertheless, the central observation remains true, that the 
diplomatic courtesies were more than preserved, or as Andrew Boyd 
phrased it
... Hillery got together with [Lord] Caradon for a quiet 
talk in which he and the British representative evidently 
found that, while their positions could hardly be 
reconciled, they could trust each other to play their 
parts in the Council with dignity and what may be termed 
style.
The 'dignity and ... style' of these proceedings, was, however, 
not always guaranteed. Indeed the treatment accorded by the British 
Government to the first two Irish approaches to it as regards a peace­
keeping force was lacking in either quality. The initial request that 
Britain should seek a UN force was subject to such an extraordinarily 
quick rebuttal that Lynch later claimed it was rejected even before it
was formally put.*7 The second request -  this time for a joint
18
British-Irish peace-keeping force, on 15 August -  was similarly refused
bar of world opinion',*^ that there was something faintly distasteful
14 ibid., col. 1475.
15
Hillery's statement to the Security Council is found in UNSC, 
Official Records, 1503rd Meeting, 20 August 1969, paras. 22-43.
16
Andrew Boyd, Fifteen Men on a. Powder Keg: A History of the U.N. 
Security Council (London: Methuen, 1971) pp. 326-7, (hereafter cited 
as Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg).
*7 On 13 August, Mr Kevin Rushe, an official of the Irish Embassy in 
London, presented to Lord Chalfont an aide memoire about the request to 
Britain to seek a UN peace-keeping force. An aide memoire differs from 
a formal Note in that it requires no reply, but one was forthcoming, 
within a mere four hours, asserting the essentially domestic (UK) nature 
of the issue at hand. (Irish Times, 14 August 1969, pp. 1 & 4).
18
Made jointly to Lord Chalfont of the Foreign Office and Lord
Stonham of the Home Office. (Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 241, 
22 October 1969, col. 1475.
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developments in Anglo-Irish relations which could have determined an
19
almost complete breakdown in diplomacy.
Essentially, the Security Council proceedings of 20 August 1969 
were concerned with the competence of that body to inscribe the 
'situation ... in Northern Ireland' upon its agenda; it was concerned, 
therefore, with the force of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter 
which states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state 
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII. [emphasis added]
Accordingly, Lord Caradon, representing the United Kingdom, invoked a 
'principle which is of the greatest consequence to the United Nations, 
and indeed to every Member State'. Furthermore, he spoke of the most 
serious consequences 'for the United Nations and for all of us' if 
this principle were breached and if 'this necessary safeguard were 
no longer accepted and respected and effective'. Thus, in his view, 
the inscription of the item on the agenda '... would undermine the
20
agreed basis in international law on which the United Nations rests'.
In pursuing this line of argument, Caradon disclaimed any 
intention to challenge the substance of the Irish letter to the 
President of the Security Council, but only to reassert the principle 
involved. And this, of course, precluded UN intervention. In 
Caradon's estimation
Northern Ireland is and has long been an integral part 
of the United Kingdom. Events in Northern Ireland are 
accordingly an internal matter for the United Kingdom 
Government. It is within the competence of the Government
But it was significant that both were made in the context of
For an account of these developments see Chapter 1, 'Anglo-Irish 
Relations, 1968-1972, pp. 34-5.
20
UNSC, Official Records, 1503rd Meeting, 20 August 1969, para 1.
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of the United Kingdom to restore and maintain order.
That we are doing. A United Nations force is unnecessary 
and inappropriate. It is unnecessary because my Government 
is already taking action. It is inappropriate because 
United Nations intervention 
violation of Article 2(7) of
The raising of the lack of competence of the Security Council 
based on the domestic jurisdiction clause was, and remains a very 
common occurrence and the United Kinqdom statement was in line with
22
similar objections made by the governments concerned in other cases. 
Caradon, however, exaggerated the force of Article 2(7), as in his 
reference to the Irish Government's invocation of Article 35 of the 
Charter.
In any event, Article 2(7) is clearly overriding.
Neither Article 35 nor any other article can possibly 
be regarded as prevailing over the specific provisions 
of Article 2(7).23
In doing so he appeared not to recognise that Article 2(7) itself 
expressly provides that the principle on which it is based 'shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.' 
Moreover, from a procedural point of view, when a matter is brought 
before the Security Council under Article 35, and the Council is 
considering its inclusion in the agenda, it is not known whether the 
matter will be disposed of under Chapter VI (pacific settlement of 
disputes) or whether action under Chapter VII (action with respect to 
threats to the peace, etc.) will be envisaged. Thus Egon Schwelb 
concluded that Caradon's claim regarding the precedence to be accorded 
the respective Articles was 'unwarranted' because
ibid., para 7.
22
For a brief reference to such cases see Egon Schwelb, 'Northern 
Ireland and the United Nations', (under the head 'Shorter Articles, 
Comments and Notes') International and Comparative Law Quarterly 19 
(July 1970), p. 484, (hereafter cited as Schwelb, 'Northern Ireland and 
the Uni ted Nations').
UNSC, Official Records, 1503rd Meeting, 20 August 1969, para 9.
It might be noted that throughout these proceedings, Lord Caradon 
repeatedly referred to the letter to the president of the Security 
Council from the Irish 'Foreign Minister', when in fact it v/as as a result 
of a letter from the Permanent Representative that the above debate took 
pi ace.
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If it were held that Article 2(7) overrides Article 35 
at the stage of the adoption of the agenda, the whole of 
Chapter VII would become inoperative in cases of claims 
of domestic jurisdiction.24
The presentation of the Irish reply to the United Kingdom's
arguments is deserving of comment as much for its substance as for the
fact that it were heard at all by the Security Council. Generally
speaking, it was the practice of the Security Council not to permit the
participation in procedural debates of States not represented on the
Council and to limit their right to speak to matters of substance. The
adoption of the agenda is considered to be a procedural question. For
this reason the representative of Finland, Max Jakobson, who professed
to have doubts about the right of the UN to intervene in the Northern
Ireland Question, expressed nevertheless his concern about the
possibility that, in the event of the agenda not being adopted, the
Security Council would dispose of the matter without hearing the
representative of the Member State which had raised it. He therefore
proposed, successfully and without objection from Caradon, that the
Security Council listen to a statement from the Irish Minister for
External Affairs which 'would in no way prejudge' the question of
competence raised by the former, nor 'constitute a precedent for 
25
future procedure.'
Hillery's statement, which Caradon later described as 'careful 
and restrained', consisted of an argument in two parts, the first 
legal, the second substantive. As regards the first, he stated 
that Article 2(7) had in fact not always been applied in the clear-cut, 
rigid manner which the United Kingdom representative had implied. He 
recalled, for instance, that the General Assembly was accustomed, and 
rightly so in the view of the delegation of Ireland, to discussing year 
after year the question of apartheid in South Africa. He also pointed 
out that in 1964 the permanent representative of the United Kingdom had 
suggested that the Security Council should deal with the tension 
existing between the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus, a sovereign
Schwelb, 'Northern Ireland and the United Nations', pp. 484-5.
UNSC, Official Recordss 1503rd Meeting, 20 August 1969, paras 15-17.
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State and Member of the United Nations. In doing so Hillery 
recognised that in 1964 the United Kingdom representative had invoked 
the fact that the United Kingdom was a guarantor under the Treaty of 
1960, but could not see how the delegation of that State could reconcile 
the stand taken by it, to the effect that the internal tensions in 
Cyprus were a proper matter for dicussion by the Security Council,
with its rejection of any competence of the Security Council in the
27
matter of Northern Ireland.
On matters of substance, Hillery made four main points. The first
was that the situation in Northern Ireland was 'grave and could
become aggravated to a degree which would create a major problem ... in
28
relations between Great Britain and Ireland.' In the closing 
paragraph of his statement this was further portrayed as an anxiety
to find through the United Nations a means of defusing 
the tensions which prevail in the North of Ireland and 
obviating the risk of those tensions mounting, spreading 
beyond the area itself and leading to friction between 
two neighbouring Member States.29
The intention here was obvious: it was an attempt to justify Security 
Council consideration of Northern Ireland in terms of Article 35 of the 
Charter.
Secondly, Hillery repeated a claim, found in the Taoiseach's
13 August broadcast (and repeated in Cremin's letter of 17 August)
that Ireland's recourse to the Security Council was necessary because
it had exhausted the remedies available through its bilateral
relations with the United Kinqdom, and consequently feared for the future
30
of the minority community.
26
Letter of the United Kingdom representative of 15 February 1964, 
document S/5543, UNSC, Official Records, (Supplement for January-March 
1964), pp. 66-7.
UNSC, Official Records, 1503rd Meeting, 20 August 1969, paras 24-28.
28 •, • i on
ibid., para 29.
29
ibid., para 43.
^  ibid., paras 31-32.
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The third was yet another claim: that the minority in Northern 
Ireland v/as denied basic civil rights in voting, v/as discriminated 
against in employment and housing, and was denied the rights of equal 
access to the fundamentals of a dignified life and citizenship. The 
Government in Northern Ireland was, moreover, 'lukewarm' in its commit­
ment to reforms and by allowing the provocative parade in Derry had 
aggravated the situation and sparked the ensuing conflagration.
Hillery concluded from this that an impartial peace-keeping force
was required, and that the persistent denial of civil rights to a large
part of the population of the Six Counties was sufficient in itself
to justify the Security Council's consideration of his Government's
31
request. In support of this proposition, he quoted a statement made 
only the year before, during the general debate of the General Assembly, 
by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs (Michael Stewart), to the effect that
Article 56 of the Charter makes it clear that no country 
can say that the human rights of its citizens are an 
exclusively domestic matter. A country that denies its 
citizens the basic human rights is by virtue’of Article 
56 in breach of an international o b i i g a t i o n . 32
Finally, Hillery raised the whole validity of the partition 
of Ireland:
Although we in Ireland have lived for some time with the 
reality of British control of the North of our country, we 
do not in any way concede to them the right to exercise 
jurisdiction there.33
The claim of the Irish nation to control the totality of 
Ireland has been asserted over centuries by successive 
generations of Irish men and women, and it is one which 
no spokesman for the Irish nation could ever renounce.34
ibid., paras 32 and 41.
32
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Official Records3 document 
A/PV. 1693 (Provisional), 1693rd Meeting, 14 October 1968, p. 42.
UNSC, Official Records, 1503rd Meeting, 20 August 1969, para 25.
^  ibid., para 26.
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Ireland was divided as a result of an Act of the British 
Parliament in 1920, an Act in favour of which not one 
Irish vote, either North or South, was cast and I might 
say incidentally, an Act which explicitly contemplated 
the reunion of Ireland.35
As regards the last two points, the Minister for External Affairs 
presented what may be termed a 'two-bite' approach to the Security 
Council. Thus, on the one hand Hillery alleged violation of human 
rights in Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom, and on the 
other, he challenged the proposition —  more, the 'reality' —  that 
Northern Ireland was a part of the United Kingdom. He nevertheless 
realised the implications of the latter for the proceedings before the 
Security Council as in his recognition that
... certain members of the Council may pause before they 
agree to inscribe the item, inasmuch as by doing so they 
might feel that they would seem to be taking sides on a 
territorial issue.3b
As was expected. Lord Caradon,in his reply, made no concessions
which were likely to alter the pre-ordained outcome of the meeting.
Notwithstanding that he departed from his declared intention of focusing
only on the procedural question, by discoursing briefly on aspects of
the partition of Ireland, he offered a three-part rebuttal of the Irish
Representative's arguments. These included the obvious fact that,
whatever the Government of the Republic of Ireland claimed to be the
theoretical position of Northern Ireland, it recognised the fact of
partition. Furthermore, and to preclude external intervention, he gave
notice of his Government's determination to pursue the necessary reforms
in Northern Ireland 'relentlessly'. And, quite validly, in the light of
contemporary circumstances, he added that the civil rights movement in
the North was directed 'not to the transfer of Northern Ireland from
37
the United Kingdom but to internal reforms'.
ibid . , para 33. 
i b i d ., para 40. 
i b i d ., paras 4 8 - 6 1 .
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In the normal course of events the Security Council, having
heard the relevant Statements, would have proceeded to vote on the
adoption of the provisional agenda. Lord Caradon, however, concluded
his reply with reference to a suggestion made in the course of
consultations which had taken place that day concerning an adjournment.
On this prospect he stated that if such a course of action were to be
adopted, he would not complain, provided that there was 'a clear
understanding that the wish of the Council [was] not to accept and
38
proceed with the item proposed.'
To this end, the Zambian representative, Lishomwa Sheba Muuka,
formally proposed that the Council should simply adjourn, sine die,
without a decision being taken on the question. As Muuka had proposed
this motion in accordance with rule 33, paragraph 2, of the rules of
procedure, the Zambian motion v/as required to be adopted without debate,
39
which it v/as, unanimously. Since that date the Security Council 
has not returned to the Northern Ireland situation.
A short time after this adjournment, Ireland made one more effort
to bring the Northern Ireland situation before the United Nations. On
5 September 1969 Cremin requested the inclusion in the agenda of the
twenty-fourth regular session of the General Assembly and item
40
entitled, 'The Situation in the North of Ireland'. Generally, the 
arguments adduced in the Permanent Representative's Explanatory 
Memorandum which accompanied his letter were a reiteration of those 
made in the proceedings of the Security Council, both regarding the 
alleged violation of human rights in Northern Ireland and the partition 
of Ireland.
There v/ere, however, some differences of emphasis. As Schwelb 
observed, the human rights aspect was somewhat more stressed in this
ibid. , para 65.
^  ibid., para 70.
40
'Request for the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of 
the twenty-fourth Assembly: The Situation in the North of Ireland', 
Letter dated 5 September 1969 from the Representative of Ireland to the 
United Nations addressed to the Security General, UNGA, document A/7651,
5 September 1969, (hereafter cited as A/7651).
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competences of the Security Council and of the General Assembly.
And it was probably in recognition of these that the provision of a
peace-keeping force was not mentioned. Significantly, the title of the
proposed General Assembly agenda item was 'The Situation in the North
of Ireland', while the request addressed to the Security Council had
referred to 'the situation in the Six Counties of Northern Ireland3
which may be taken as an indication of the increasing tendency of the
Irish Government to portray partition as being 'the root cause of the
42
demonstrations and unrest in the North ...'
According to the Explanatory Memorandum the reunification of
Ireland, by peaceful means, gave the only hope for the evolution of
balanced political and social relations between all sections of the
Irish people. Accordingly, Cremin's letter invoked, as had his
earlier one to the Security Council, Article 35 of the Charter. But
also cited in support of the request on this occasion were a number
of the Human Rights provisions of the Charter (Articles 1(3), 13, and
55), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 60 of the
43
Charter, and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
44
Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960. In regard to this last- 
mentioned Declaration, particular attention was paid to its paragraph
6 which states that
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption 
of the national unity and the territorial integrity of 
a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations.45
Thus, like Spain before it on the question of Gibraltar, Ireland invoked 
the 1960 Resolution in support of a claim to be protected against
second request —  a development he attributed to the different
41
Schwelb, 'Northern Ireland and the United Nations', p. 488.
42 A/7651, p. 4.
43
Article 60 relates to the responsibi1ity of the General Assembly
in economic, social, and human rights matters.
44 A/7651, pp. 4-5.
45
General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV), 14 December 1960.
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Procedurally, the case for any such request was required to be 
made before the General Committee (or Steering Committee or Bureau), 
which is the organ specified to make recommendations to the General 
Assembly as regards the inclusion or rejection of items for the
A A 47Agenda.
At the subsequent meeting of the General Committee, the Irish
Minister for External Affairs attempted a different approach in
regard to the competence of the General Assembly to discuss the item.
He referred to the comment of the United States representative during
the Assembly's 832nd Plenary Meeting, that in the years since the
establishment of the United Nations, certain principles and rules
had emerged concerning the application of Article 2(7) of the Charter
and it had become established, for example, that inscription and the
discussion of an agenda item did not constitute intervention which
48
lay essentially within domestic jurisdiction. Thus, according to
Hillery, Article 2(7) had to be read in the light of Articles 55 and
56 under which all Member States had pledged to promote 'universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
49
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
Naturally this proposition was once more challenged by Lord 
Caradon for the United Kingdom, and just as extensively as before. He 
argued that
di smemberment.
For a brief reference to the role of this Resolution regarding 
Gibraltar see Schwelb, 'Northern Ireland and the United Nations', 
pp. 488-9.
47
The General Committee consists of the President of the Assembly, 
its 17 Vice-Presidents, and the Chairmen of the seven Main Committees. 
(Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, UN document A/520/Rev 9, 
rules 38 and 40).
48
The statement referred to was made by Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Representative of the United States, in connection with the question 
of Tibet. (UNGA, Official Records, 832nd Plenary Meeting, 20 October 
1959, para 83).
49
UNGA, General Committee, Official Records> 189th Meeting, 17 
September 1969, para 5.
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It was surely the duty of Member States not to flout 
the principle of domestic jurisdiction but to support 
it ... To do away with the protection contained in 
Article 2(7) would be to bring internal disputes into 
the United Nations, and no Member State could long 
remain immune to the consequences of such a breach of
the Charter.50
Yet it was evident from the qualification which immediately 
followed that the British were reconciled to accepting that some 
discussion at the UN of at least part of the multi-faceted- situation 
in Northern Ireland was inevitable.
If the question raised by the Irish delegation referred 
solely to human rights, there would be no need for a 
separate item as it could be dealt with by existing 
machinery or brought up under existing agenda items. 1
Presumably Caradon was implying that the United Kingdom would be
unable to prevent a General Assembly discussion on Northern Ireland
should one arise in the course of a consideration of agenda items
already accepted. In this case, however, he qualified his qualifications
with the claim that the Irish proposal 'raised issues far wider than
human rights, ... which were incontrovertibly within the domestic
52
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.' He therefore appealed to 
Hillery 'in the general interests of the people of Northern Ireland,'
to rise 'above the spirit of dispute', and withdraw his Government's
. 53 
request.
Hillery, faced with the difficult choice of either acceding to a 
request based on a flattering appeal to his country's contributions 
to the UN, or risking an unpredictable outcome in the event of a vote, 
did neither. And that v/as not surprising given the precedent of the
ibid., para 45.
51
ibid., para 46. Of this Schwelb wrote, 'Lord Caradon apparently 
referred to a series of human rights items the inclusion of which the 
General Committee had already decided to recommend, such as the "question 
of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms ... in all 
countries".' ('Northern Ireland and the United Nations', p. 489, note 25).
ibid., para 47 .
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Security Council proceedings and the consultations which took place
outside these. He opted instead to 'reflect further' on the
consequences that withdrawing the Irish request would have upon the
54
introduction of reforms in the North.
Thereupon, after receiving the briefest of cautions against
haste in making a decision on the Irish proposal by the Representative
55
of Chile, Jose Pinera, the Committee accepted an adjournment motion
56
by E.O. Ogbu of Nigeria. Mo action in the matter was subsequently 
taken by the delegation of Ireland or by the General Committee, and 
the item has never appeared on the agenda of the General Assembly.
Clearly, 'the diplomatic courtesies were more than preserved'.
And it was indicative of the overall tenor of these proceedings
that the US Representative on the General Committee, William B. Buffum,
was permitted to escape from what he termed 'a very unhappy dilemma' by
57
not being required to take a stand on the inscription issue.
Only the clumsy, and for Ireland, embarrassing support for its
proposals registered by the Representatives of the Soviet Union,
58
A.V. Zakharov in the Security Council and Y.A. Malik in the General
59
Assembly, could qualify the above verdict but not to any marked 
extent. From their statements the USSR (publicly) subscribed to the 
view that it was the United Kingdom Government's policy to maintain 
inequality in Northern Ireland, and to permit the right to form a 
government to only the Protestant community —  a view which certainly 
exceeded the formulation of the Irish Government, and probably many a
59
UNGA, General Committee, Official Records3 180th Meeting, 17 
September 1969, paras 48 and 52.
ibid., para 53. 
ibid., para 50. 
ibid., para 56. 
ibid., para 49.
UNSC, Official Records, 1503rd Meeting, 20 August 1969, paras 44-46,
northern republican! Even then Lord Caradon felt sufficiently
F\ 1
moved to note the former's 'unusual restraint'. In analytical terms, 
however, the record of proceedings was less than clear. Was it the 
'solemn farce' or 'charade' its detractors claim, or was it more 
properly characterised by Boyd, who saw it as an admirable illustration 
of
the way in which an apparently empty exchange of words 
in the [Security] Council, leading to no formally 
identifiable agreement or action, can sometimes help to 
stabilise a dangerous situation —  if the trick is 
worked neatly, by people who understand how to operate 
the UN mechanism without letting it get out of hand?
[question mark added].
The answer must lie in the extent to which the UN proceedings induced 
the United Kingdom Government to introduce reform measures in Northern 
Ireland. In effect this is to test Keatinge's 1971 claim that the 
amount of pressure they exerted upon Britain was debatable and that 
their primary purpose may have been to placate domestic opinion.
Quite obviously, the Irish appeal to the United Nation's based 
on the situation in the Six Counties constituting a source of 
international friction, or a threat to international peace and security, 
failed miserably. While the statements of the various parties admitted 
that there v/as 'situation' it was apparent to all that
254
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The two statements were very similar but Zakharov's was the more 
tendentious. In the General Committee, Malik's contained slight 
alterations which suggested that the Soviets had realised some, if not 
all, of their previous overstatements.
^  UNSC, Official Records, 1503rd Meeting, 20 August 1969, para 62. 
Caradon found Malik's statement, on the other hand, to contain 'two 
calumnies' to which the British Representative objected, and which he 
attempted to dispose of. (UNGA, General Committee, Official Records, 
180th Meeting, 17 September 1969, para 51). The reason for allowing 
Zakharov to make his statement without challenge but to challenge 
Malik's probably lies in Caradon's declared intention of speaking only 
to the principle in the Security Council, which he fulfilled, whereas he 
departed from this in the General Committee.
Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg, p. 329.
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... there [was] no valid threat to the peace ..., for 
neither the possibility of a British-Irish war nor the 
belief that Catholics in Europe and throughout the 
world [felt] 'threatened' bv the tragic events in the 
North [was] very realiStic.
And it was probably not realistic to the Irish Government either.
Despite the internal developments which led to the Arms Trial, the 
mobilisation of the army reserves and the deployment of Irish Defence 
Forces in Border areas (all of which v/ere discussed in Chapter One), 
its lack of emphasis upon Article 35 —  related matters was such as to 
question whether Dublin raised them only pro forma, so as to be heard 
before the UN.
As regards human rights, no UN member disputed the facts prevailing 
in Northern Ireland. There v/as, correspondingly, little doubt 
expressed at the time that the United Kingdom Government would take 
positive and urgent action to remedy the situation.
Although Ireland may have prejudiced a UN discussion of human 
rights by its determination to link them alv/ays with the wider issue 
of partition, it is arguable whether this was a significant forfeiture.
On the contrary, the Taoiseach felt free to claim that Hillery's 
odysseys to New York v/ere a 'success', for by these, and 
the efforts of the expanded Government information service
the facts of the ... Six County situation [v/ere] 
better known than ever before, not alone to the member 
Governments of the United Nations but to the world at
large.64
Moreover, given the United Kingdom Government's proclaimed 
determination, there was probably little to be gained from a UN 
consideration of human rights since, at best, the international body 
v/ould recommend that Britain do what was already its stated policy. And 
Caradon, in the course of his statements, had given what amounted to 
British assurances on the restoration of human rights in Northern Ireland
Roger Hull, The Irish Triangle: Conflict in Northern Irelands 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 254, (hereafter cited 
as Hull, The Irish Triangle) .
64
Dail Eireann, Official Report3 vol. 241, 22 October 1969,
cols. 1404-5.
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before an international audience of the highest standing. The 
resulting responsibility was recognised by the Home Secretary who 
wrote
We had no doubt that we [the United Kingdom] would 
be able to argue successfully that this was a domestic 
matter. But that argument in itself, especially with the 
eyes of the v/orld upon us, meant that we would have to 
show that the Government at Westminster was effectively 
able to intervene, control the situation and introduce 
policies that would remove the causes of the revolt.65
Thus, there was an admission, if not of 'pressure' from the
Republic of Ireland, then of an additional responsibility imposed by
developments at the UN as a direct result of action by that state.
It was, however, no more than that. From this it followed that it
was barely tenable to claim a causal relationship between Irish
'pressure' and the particular efforts, referred to in Chapter One,
made by the United Kingdom Government to define the problems of
Northern Ireland and arrive at appropriate policies. Furthermore the
available records by prominent British Cabinet members at the time
6 6
simply do not support this proposition either. Collectively, these 
accounts demonstrate that there existed sufficient motivation, without
external influences, to ensure that initiatives, such as produced the
67 68 69
Cameron Report, Hunt Report, Scarman Report, and
65
Callaghan, A House Divided, pp. 28 and 93.
66
See ibid.; Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-70: A 
Personal Record (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1974); and Richard 
Crossman, The Diaries of Cabinet Minister, 3 vols. 1 : 2  (London: Hamish 
Hamilton and Jonathon Cape, 1975 and 1976 resp.); 3 (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1977).
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Government of Northern Ireland, Disturbances in Northern Ireland: 
Report of the Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland, 
Cmd.532 (Belfast: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, September 1969), also 
known as the Cameron Report, after its Chairman, Lord Cameron. Also 
referred to in the Narrative to Chapter One.
68
Government of Northern Ireland, Report of The Advisory Committee on 
Police in Northern Ireland, Cmd.535 (Belfast: Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, October 1969), also knov/n as the Hunt Report, after its Chairman 
Baron Hunt.
69
The short reference for a Tribunal of Inquiry under the Chairmanship 
of Sir Leslie Scarman, established 27 August 1969, to inquire into
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established joint Stormont-Whitehal1 working parties,7 *^ were taken. 
Hence Keatinge's claim is upheld: international pressure was more 
than incidental but less than decisive in terms of affecting 
outcomes in Northern Ireland.
The question as to whether the UN initiatives succeeded in
placating domestic opinion in the Republic, or even whether they were
intended to, is beyond the particular concern of this thesis. However,
it is worthy of comment that, even in 1978, the precise motives for
Ireland's action at the UN in 1969 were still unclear. According to
a senior member of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the need for
Ireland to take its case to the UN was determined by factors already
considered, but also by an understanding of the Northern Ireland
situation in terms consistent with the Irish Government's arrogation
of the role of 'second guarantor' of the minority community.7 * Thus
it sought to use its constitutional position as, for want of a more
appropriate term, the moral government of the Six Counties, in such a
way that the Catholics would be reassured, and without conceding, by
72
default, the initiative to the IRA.
The historian T. Desmond Williams does not accept these reasons 
unconditionally. In his view there was, neither then' nor since, an 
indication as to how well thought out the Irish moves had been, nor 
how far the full and possible consequences of a UN peace-keeping force 
had been envisaged, nor whether the Government's action had been a 
response to those 'hot days of August' or as a device to defuse a 
dangerous situation.7^
Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland between March and 
August 1969.
7^ Callaghan, A House Divided, pp. 94-5.
See Chapter 2 , 'Anglo-Irish Relations, 1968-1972', p. 41.
72
Interview, Dublin, June 1978. Note: The interviewee did not use 
the term 'second guarantor' in relation to the matters discussed, but it 
is suggested that the actions taken were entirely consistent with this 
rol e .
73
Report of a Thomas Davis lecture on Irish foreign policy since the 
Second World War, delivered on 9 April 1978, in the Irish Times, 10 
April 1978.
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Having concluded this, the question might be raised, again v/ith 
regard to international pressure, as to whether it v/as necessary or 
desirable for the United Kingdom to defend its position on the 
question of domestic jurisdiction in the somewhat immoderate terms 
that it did. This is not to deny that any government would use 
Article 2(7) in the circumstances which the United Kingdom was placed 
in -  indeed Article 2(7) v/as written into the Charter for just such 
purposes —  but it is to question the need to justify its use in such 
extreme terms. Thus, was it appropriate to speak of the 'overriding 
importance' of this principle, to speak of the undermining of the 
agreed basis in international law on which the UN rests, to view an 
accession to the Irish request as a threat to the sovereignty of Member 
States and to denounce 'such a breach of the Charter' as a danger to 
which no Member State could long remain immune.
As Schwelb observed:
It [was] hardly in accordance v/ith the status of the United 
Kingdom in international affairs to appeal in a human 
rights context to the solidarity, as it were, of member 
States in protecting themselves against 'the most serious 
consequences' which would follow if 'the principle of 
domestic jurisdiction', fundamental for all, v/ere breached 
and eroded. Nor [was] it desirable for the United Kingdom 
to lend its prestige and authority to an excessively wide 
interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction clause. It 
might also be doubted whether it [was] good policy for the 
United Kingdom to use the type of defence which [had] become 
so familiar as the almost instinctive reaction of States 
whose record and reputation is entirely different from that 
of the United Kingdom.74
And to this overreaction by the United Kingdom there v/as also the
suggestion of confusion in presenting its case for not having the
Northern Ireland situation inscribed upon the agendas of the Security
Council and the General Assembly, respectively. It might be argued, for
instance, that it was not necessary to have recourse to Article 2(7)
because there v/ere convincing grounds for objecting to the inclusion
of an agenda item which was directed aqainst the territorial integrity
75
of a Member State. Moreover, it could be argued that the
Schwelb, 'Northern Ireland and the United Nations', p. 491.
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invocation of Article 2(7) in this context did not strengthen the 
case against the inscription of such an item because the (Irish) claim 
for the change of an international boundary cannot be classified as a 
matter which is within the domestic jurisdiction of either Britain or 
Ireland
In sum there were grounds for suggesting that the United Kingdom, 
an experienced and competent ac.tor in the UN, was unsettled by the 
situation in August and September 1969. The only recorded intimations 
to date which lend a measure of support to this were Callaghan's and 
these, it must be admitted, concerned only his assertion that there 
were nations represented in the UN with whom there was always a latent 
sympathy for any other nation with a grievance against the United 
Kingdom. 7 From such scattered and not entirely convincing indications 
it may be unwarranted to draw the conclusion that the United Kingdom was 
subject to international pressure in its institutional behaviour, but it 
is, nevertheless, worthy of note that its behaviour v/as at least 
uncharacteristic on those occasions.
If the attitude displayed by the United Kingdom has had any lasting
effect upon the international treatment accorded the Northern situation
since then, it is that Ireland was discouraged by the tenacity with
which the Article 2(7) position was adhered to. This is a judgment
inferred from the record, but it is to the point that Dublin has not
again mounted a challenge to it. Furthermore this decision to forego
UN initiatives has been maintained since 1969 despite the obvious
dissatisfaction of the Irish Government v/ith the pace of reform in
Northern Ireland, a factor which then v/as held to be a major consideration
78
in any contemplated referral of the issue.
British attitudes alone, however, have not determined this exercise
ibid. See also Hull, The Irish Triangle, pp. 237-55, for a summary 
of the arguments challenging the absolute primacy of Article 2(7), and 
particularly p. 254 for a further opinion that the UN was 'not estopped 
by Article 2(7) or by British actions to ameliorate the situation from 
exercising its competence short of dictatorial interference.'
Callaghan, A House Divided3 pp. 28 and 53.
Dail Eireann, Official Report3 vol. 241, 22 October 1969, col. 1481.
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in self-abnegation: the realistic appraisal of Ireland's inability
either to influence the Security Council or to rely upon a favourable
outcome of a vote in that body or the General Committee, expressed by
79
Hillery in 1969, has remained and also ensured this. And the
unwillingness of governments, friendly to both Britain and Ireland,
to appear to take one side or the other has required that the latter
reserve its international appeals for only the most serious of
developments in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the only other occasion
on which this prerogative appeared to have been exercised was
following Bloody Sunday, when Hillery embarked on a tour of North
America and Western Europe to publicise the Northern situation and
denounce British policies there, and with results quite predictable
80
from a reference to the precedents of 1969. Sympathy for the Irish 
viewpoint and concern for the suffering in the North were always in 
evidence, but such sentiments presaged nothing, or almost nothing, in 
the way of a sustained international campaign to influence Britain's 
policies in the province.
Consequently, the events in New York of August-September 1969 have 
served to emphasise the uniqueness of the Irish initiatives, or to 
confirm in a positive sense, Keatinge's fourth observation that they were 
'not typical' of Ireland's role in international institutions. The two 
appeals, to the Security Council and the General Assembly, remain the 
first and last time in which the Northern Ireland question appeared to 
be about to assume a central position in international affairs.
Moreover they underline the curious ambivalence with which Britain and 
Ireland have tended to regard this question and which has been one of 
the constant characteristics of Anglo-Irish relations throughout not 
just the period under review, but since the beginning of partition.
Thus the British Governments have normally maintained that Northern 
Ireland was an integral part of the United Kingdom, but have on occasions
ibid., and cols. 1477-9.
80
The decision by the Irish Government to pursue its allegations of 
torture against the British Government at the European Commission (and 
Court) of Human Rights is not regarded in the same light as the appeals 
to the UN, for the reasons that the former was more obviously 'inter­
national' and 'political', whereas the latter v/as 'regional' and 'judicial'.
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not hesitated to absolve themselves from the responsibility which
this entails, and have frequently gone so far to proclaim that the
Northern Ireland problem is one that can only be solved by the Irish
themselves. Similarly, successive Irish Governments have adopted a
'Britain first' strategy —  based on the fact that since partition was
established by an Act of the British Parliament and Government, it can
be terminated in like manner —  but have, as occasion demanded, denied
81
the United Kingdom's claim of domestic jurisdiction.
In accordance with the experience outlined and the expectations
so engendered, the pattern in the intervening years since 1969 has, very
largely, been determined by both British and Irish inactivity and has,
therefore, conformed to the pattern noted by Aiken of the period between
1955 and 1969 —  that Northern Ireland was raised at the UN only when it
82
appeared 'relevant and useful to do so'. Thus British interest in 
UN intervention has been voiced on only two occasions —  inconsequentially
and certainly not by Government —  by a Westminister group of Peers and
83
Commons members in 1971, and, four years later, by a pariiamentary
84
member of the (Labour) Troops Out Movement.
On the Irish side, only the introduction of internment without 
trial in August 1971 and the events of B1 oody Sunday in January 1972 have 
caused the Government to seek assistance from the UN. In neither case 
was the approach along the lines of 1969. Indeed, it was significant 
that Ireland's response at the UN to internment was almost negligible, 
notwithstanding the fact that Dublin had, for some time prior to its 
introduction, been dissatisfied with a situation in the North which had 
steadily deteriorated through late 1970 and 1971. Apart from an approach 
by the Taoiseach to the British Prime Minister, in September 1971, for 
a UN Observer Group along the Border, so as to reduce the 'threat to
See John F. O'Connor, 'Disturbances in Northern Ireland - a n  
International Problem and an International Solution', International 
Relations 3 (November 1971) : 968.
p p  ^
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 240, 29 April 1969, col. 6.
83
Irish Times, 5 May 1971.
Irish Times, 26 February 1975.
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central concern of Hillery's General Debate speech of 7 October 1971.
87
On that occasion it v/arranted only three quite brief references, with
the result that an observer might have justifiably inferred from the
address as a whole that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was more
interested on rebutting the earlier contrivance of the British Foreign
Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, to present the conflict in Northern
88
Ireland as principally a 'religious confrontation'.
Following this it took the shock of Bloody Sunday, when thirteen 
Catholics were killed during a civil rights demonstration by soldiers 
of the Parachute Regiment, to prompt a further appeal to the UN. Or 
was it an appeal? When Hillery arrived in New York on his international 
mission to obtain support for Ireland's policies neither of the forums 
of the General Assembly was available to him. The former was not in
89
session, while the latter was meeting, but in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia! 
Perhaps it v/as as well, for the Minister's statements could in no way 
have drawn from the United Kingdom representatives the compliments 
('careful and restrained') which Lord Caradon bestowed in 1969.
According to Hillery, Britain's policy in Northern Ireland had
90
been changed 'by stealth' so that the British Army had become 'an
91 92
instrument of coercion, comprising forces of repression'. Moreover
85
international peace1 caused by the 'troubles', internment was not the
85
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'Press Conference Given By Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 
United Nations, 2nd February, 1972', Statements and Speeches 1/72} 
(Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland), p. 2, (hereafter cited as 
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ibid., p . 1.
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ibid., p . 8.
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the Irish in a way which threatened international peace and security.
94
The British Government had, therefore, 'gone mad', even 'crazy', and
95
its policies (not surprisingly) were 'lunatic'.
In these circumstances it might reasonably be expected that no less 
a request would be forthcoming from the Irish Government than was made 
to the Security Council in August 1969. And with additional cause.
Not only had the Irish Ambassador to the Court of St James been recalled 
following the events, but the mood within the Republic had taken on a 
decidedly Anglophobic hue, of which one of the more extreme
96
manifestations had been the burning of the British Embassy in Dublin.
On the contrary, however, it v/as not Hillery's purpose in New
York to propose that the UN consider the Northern Ireland situation.
After meeting v/ith an Under-Secretary-General, Chakravarty Narasimhan,
he claimed to have established for himself, 'the limitation of this
Organization' and that it would be of no use, to either Ireland or the
UN, to seek an action which could be blocked by the British Government's
97
invocation of Article 2(7). Rather, it was apparent that the Irish
Government's intentions encompassed no more than to impress the
international community with the urgency of the situation and to call
upon its 'active goodwill and cooperation ... in accordance with the
98
purposes and principles of the Charter'. In the course of the press 
conference this hoped-for role of other governments was mentioned no 
less than eight times by the Minister for Foreign affairs.
The effectiveness of this response, in UN terms alone, was
this policy had evolved so as to include deliberate provocation of
93
ibid., pp. 6 and 10.
94
ibid., p. 5; as he told the conference, ... we have given them 
advice, we have told them what should be done ... only God can give 
them sense now'.
^  ibid., p. 4.
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difficult to judge. Although Stormont was prorogued a short time
afterwards, this event v/as also to be seen in the context of an
increasing likelihood that the British Government would need to assume
a more direct role in Northern Ireland, and of the Irish Government's
wider efforts, including the remainder of Hillery's European and North
American tour, to bring international pressure to bear on Britain.
Nevertheless these particular UN endeavours did at least involve the
Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, to a greater extent than his
99
predecessor, U Thant. Whilst in Addis Ababa he had, as a result of 
a suggestion by Hillery, indicated to the British Government his 
willingness to involve the UN in measures designed to alleviate the 
situation in Northern Ireland, provided both Britain and Ireland were 
in agreement on them. On tv/o subsequent occasions, in July 1972 
and January 1973, he reiterated this offer of assistance, even 
proposing on the former, to send Lester Pearson and Earl Warren to
102
mediate the conflict and assist in arranging a political settlement.
None of the three offers v/ere taken up.
Two consequences have proceeded from these generally frustrating 
experiences for Ireland at the UN on the matter of Northern Ireland. The 
first v/as that, with the exceptions of 1969, 1971, and 1972 (discussed 
above), the treatment accorded the issue has taken the form of ritual 
exchanges of viewpoint between the Representatives of Ireland and the 
United Kingdom respectively, and usually in the General Debate of the 
General Assembly. Given the view of the latter, that it v/as not properly
There are reports that U Thant, after resigning from the position 
of Secretary-General, disclosed an offer, made during his period of 
office, of the good services of the UN v/ith regard to Northern Ireland, 
but further evidence than that cited below has not been discovered by 
the writer. Furthermore, in reply to questions in Dail Eireann on this, 
Hillery was not prepared to comment on what he regarded as confidential 
discussions, although it appeared from what he did say that U Thant spoke 
to both the British and Irish Governments respectively. (Dail Eireann, 
Official R e p o r t vol. 262, 27 June 1972, cols. 8-9.
* ^ Times, 8 February 1972, p. 2.
Financial Times, 10 January 1973.
102
Richard Ned Lebow, 'Ireland', Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow 
and John G. Stoessinger, eds., Divided Nations in a Divided World (New 
York: David McKay, 1974), p. 249.
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an issue which should be aired at the UN, it has received markedly
more attention from the former. For the most part these addresses have
consisted of a reiteration of the concerns each has had for Northern
Ireland, so that in 1973, the hope of the proposed Northern Ireland
103
Executive was prominent in Garret Fitzgerald's, as was tne message of 
'greater hope' in Michael 0'Kennedy's in 1 9 7 8 . * ^  And in this regard 
it was also interesting that even in 1969, 1971 and 1972, the General 
Debate speeches by the Representatives of Ireland and the United 
Kingdom were virtually devoid of the antagonism which could reasonably 
have been expected to follow upon the more traumatic events in Northern
Ireland. These facets aside, the record since 1969 has, overall, been
i ki 105 unremarkable.
The second consequence was that the possibility and prospect of
UN intervention has retained an official but somewhat limited appeal in
Ireland. Following the third rejection of Waldheim's offers, the
Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, dismissed any possible role for the organisation
in a restatement of the 'British first' strategy (noted earlier),
in which he claimed that the Irish people did not believe that the
problem was a matter for the UN but rather a matter that should be
10fi
solved by negotiations between Westminister and Dublin. Although 
Fianna Fail were turned out of Government the month after, the 
National Coalition (Fine Gael - Labour) v/ere no more enthusiastic about 
the UN than had been its predecessors. Perhaps in partial reflection of 
the experience and opinions of Conor Cruise O'Brien, a Cabinet member
103
UNGA, Provisional Verbatim Record, 2125th Meeting, 24 September 
1973, p. 46.
104
'Address to the 33rd General Assembly of the United Nations by the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Michael 0'Kennedy TD, on 28 September 
1978', Statements and Speeches 7/78 : Bulletin of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, (hereafter cited as 0'Kennedy UN Address, 28 September 
1978)'.
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1975, however, provided an outrageous but highly incidental occasion 
Uganda's Idi Amin took the opportunity, presented to him by his UN 
appearance, to compare his own country's 'measures to restore ... 
cultural values and establish justice' with Britain's 'blackmail' and
'decadence' in Northern Ireland. (UNGA, Provisional Verbatim Record, 
2370th Meeting, 1 October 1975, p. 67.
1
Daily Telegraph, 10 January 1973.
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any suggestion that the British Army should be replaced by a UN
108
Observer Group on the grounds that this was not 'in the interests
109
of the minority in the North'.
When Fianna Fail returned to Government in 1977 there was a 
suggestion that Irish faith in the efficacy of the UN had been renewed. 
During its period in Opposition in the mid-1970s it had formulated a 
new, more assertive policy in Northern Ireland, in which v/as included 
a proposal to seek support for the achievement of its objectives by 
'political and diplomatic endeavour at the United Nations',**^ and 
further,to obtain the good offices of that body towards developing a 
British initiative. Although it has, in office, continued to seek 
the UN's benediction for its policies, and the UN's forums for the 
expression of its concerns, it could not be said to have kept v/ith the 
electorate on either of the above pledges. Apart from a thinly 
disguised request at the UN in 1977 for friendly persuasion to be
(1973-77) and former UN Representative in the Congo, ^  it eschewed
His controversial views on the UN Operation in the Congo are con­
tained in his To Katanga and Back (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1966). 
Additionally, he viewed assumptions that a UN force could control the 
North in the event of a peremptory withdrawal by the British Army, as 
'untenable'. (Report of a memorandum on the Coalition's policy on 
Northern Ireland, presented to the Administrative Council of the Irish 
Labour Party, Irish Times> 25 September 1974).
1D8
Surprisingly, in view^of Lynch's January 1973 statement, this 
was proposed by a Fianna Fail spokesman on Northern Ireland, Ruairi 
Brugha (Daily Telegraph, 27 August 1975). However, it may have been 
an early indication of the change, which v/as to become evident in 
October 1975 (see Chapter 4, pp. 200-02), to a more assertive policy on 
Northern Ireland by that party.
109
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 277, 5 February 1975, col. 1716. 
According to one report, however, the Coalition had, some time prior to 
this statement, been involved in consultations with the Secretary General, 
i.e. in 'the most informal, personal, and hypothetical way', over an 
eighteen-month period in 1973-74. (Times, 7 June 1974).
^  Fianna Fail Research and Support Services, 'Statement by Fianna 
Fail on Northern Ireland'.
Report of Jack Lynch's address to the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis in the
London Sunday Times, 20 February 1977.
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exerted upon the British Government; there are no indications that 
the UN's support, however defined, or its offices, have been requested 
in terms of the policy statements previously mentioned.
From an Irish perspective, the most likely reason for this was 
that the Party's leader at the time these policies were formulated (and 
later, Taoiseach), was less than convinced of their likely success. 
Indeed, he prefaced his pledge to seek the good offices of the UN with 
the following statement:
International statesmen have intervened in Rhodesia and 
the Middle East —  I do not say with conspicuous success 
so far —  but at least some effort is better than n o n e . H ^
This, of course, raises the question as to why the UN should be 
mentioned at all in Fianna Fail's policy if such a pessimistic view 
was held of the likely outcome. The answer appears to lie in the natural 
tendency of opposition parties to present an alternative to the 
government, which was in this case not interested in UN intervention, and 
in the apparently strong Republican feeling among an influential group of 
Lynch's pariiamentary colleagues that it v/as necessary to bring inter­
national pressure from several sources to bear upon Britain as regards
114
the Ulster Question.
But the failure of the Irish Government after 1977 to implement 
its pre-election pledges was also to be seen in the wider context of 
the place that the Ulster Question holds among the states of Western 
Europe and North America. This is considered in several of the 
following chapters, but it will suffice at this point only to note that 
it was not generally an issue which they were prepared to involve them­
selves in. The same national attitudes which held sway in 1969 —  of a 
reluctance to take sides in a dispute between two states, Britain and
112
112
'Text of the Speech delivered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr Michael 0'Kennedy, TD, to the 32nd Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly on Wednesday, 5 October, 1977', Statements and Speeches 
2/77 : Bulletin of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
113
Report of Jack Lynch's address to the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis in the
London Sunday Timess 20 February 1977.
See Chapter 4, pp.201-02; Chapter 8, pp.318-21; and
Chapter 11, pp.495-6.
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Ireland, with which they had friendly relations —  was a caution against 
any attempt to internationalise the issue. Thus the UN may be 
regarded as the first litmus test of the international political (and 
strategic) significance of the conflict, or more precisely, of the 
limits within which it was an international issue at all.
*
T h e  U l s t e r  Q u e s t i o n  a n d  t h e  Co u n t r i e s  o f
C H A P T E R  SIX
W e s t e r n  Eu r o p e
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Frequently throughout the period under review a whole range of 
politicians, scholars and commentators —  British, Irish and European —  
have seemingly accepted as an article of faith and also encouraged their 
audiences to believe, or to accept, that Ireland was part of that loosely 
defined entity, Western Europe.* Whatever reservations may have been held 
about the substance of their assertion (and these will be considered in 
this and later chapters), they were at least formally correct. Ireland, 
for example, was a founder member of the Council of Europe and, since
1 January 1973, a member of an enlarged European Economic Community (EEC). 
Nevertheless, they have remained assertions which in the light of Irish 
history and the concept of the Nation State which they embody, could be 
accepted only with considerable misgivings by anyone concerned with the 
Ulster Question. The reason for this was well captured in the words of 
a French writer, Jean Blanchard: 'L'Irlande est une ile derriere une 
ile'.2
Blanchard, of course, was referring to more than Ireland's geographical 
location west of Britain. He was noting the historical fact that 
British influence and Britain's experiences tended to isolate Ireland 
from continental Europe, with the further consequence that Ireland could 
not properly be regarded as a European nation. In terms of a participatory 
interest by the countries of Western Europe in the Ulster Question this has 
been reciprocal. The troubles in the North of Ireland have simply not
For the purpose of the following discussion Western Europe will be 
defined as comprising: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and the Vatican. It is conceded that the last-named is barely a state, 
much less a nation, as these entities are generally understood within the 
discipline of International Relations. However, the writer has included 
it in this chapter because it both facilitates analysis and because any 
injury it does to either the discipline or the Vatican is, in the terms of 
this thesis, minimal.
2
Jean Blanchard, Le Droit Ecclesiastique Contemporain d'Irlande (Paris: 
n.p., 1958), p.11. as cited in Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of 
Ireland (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p.46.
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achieved a central or even an abiding position of any interest in the 
international politics of these countries. And this occurred despite 
attempts by the Irish Government, particularly following the 
introduction of internment in August 1971 and Bloody Sunday in January 
1972, to ‘Europeanise1 the conflict in Northern Ireland. In short, the 
'diplomacy of protest' which v/as the Irish Government's response to these 
events, failed to engage the governments of Western Europe in any 
sustained or systematic programme towards action in Northern Ireland.
A different interpretation, however, was presented by the Taoiseach, 
Jack Lynch, who, following his Minister for Foreign Affairs' February 
1972 tour of North America and Western Europe, concluded that there 
existed a considerable measure of international support for the Irish 
Government's objectives:
The attempt to reimpose traditional Unionism whose vision 
is narrow and self-defeating, will certainly end in total 
failure. I have no doubt about this. The political 
leadership of the non-Unionist community in the North have 
no doubt about it. Indeed, no objective observer —  even 
though he might be British-European, American, or otherwise, 
doubts that this cannot happen either. It would be fair to 
say, in fact, that the published comments of most journalists, 
and the private views expressed to me and to the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs by most political leaders in other 
countries, are insistent that the policy of return to monopoly 
Unionist Government is now impossible.4
It should be noted that the Taoiseach was not here claiming more than a 
sympathy of views, nor could he be, for Stormont had yet to be prorogued 
and the indications given 'by most political leaders in other countries' 
were best summed up in the sibylline phraseology of the French Foreign 
Minister, Maurice Schumann:
We [ the French Government] would not dream of interfering 
in the internal affairs of a friendly and allied country. 
Hov/ever, when such a painful difference separates a friendly 
and allied country from another with whom we have such close
See Chapter 1 , 'Anglo-Irish Relations, 1968-1972', pp. 68-85.
4
Dail Eireann, Pariiamentary Debates, Official Reports vol. 258,
3 February 1972, col. 914 (hereafter cited as Dail Eireann, Official
Report),
links, and when they are both about to join the EEC, we 
have the duty to listen with attention and sympathy, a 
sympathy that should be translated into words and into 
facts. .5
How France was going to translate its sympathy into words and deeds 
without interfering in internal British affairs was not explained by 
Schumann. But an indication of what probably lay behind his statement 
was given by Patrick Hillery at a press conference on 8 February. The 
Irish Foreign Minister appeared to go out of his way to emphasise that 
he was fully aware of the fact that no government could tell any 
other what to do about its internal problems. According to Hillery the 
purpose of the discussions he had had in various countries —  all friendly 
to Britain —  was to inform them of the Irish point of view in the hope 
that they might be able to persuade Britain to examine a political 
solution of the Irish problem. Moreover, he realised that if Britain
refused to take any advice from others his efforts would have been to no
•i 6 aval 1.
Elsewhere in Europe the diplomatic response was no greater than it 
had been in France. In the Vatican, Pope Paul VI expressed his sorrowJ  
although some time after Hillery's audience with him, he felt sufficiently 
moved by events to refer to 'the deplorable delays or even ... continuous
disregard' of the problems in Northern Ireland which were contributing to
8 * 
the violence. It was the nearest any head of government in Western
Europe came to an overt criticism of the British Government.
At the time (early 1972) it was difficult to tell whether these 
developments, or rather the lack thereof, signified that Hillery's efforts 
were to no avail. Stormont was prorogued but this was not necessarily as 
a result of external pressure upon the British Government. Indeed this 
appears to have been recognised in Dublin. A senior official of the
27 2
Times, 9 February 1972, p. 2.
^ Financial Times, 9 February 1972.
Telegram to Cardinal Conway, Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of All 
Ireland, as cited in the Daily Telegraph, 1 February 1972.
8
Letter to Cardinal Conway, as cited in the Times, 18 March 1972.
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Department of Foreign Affairs claimed only that the 'prorogation door 
was bound to open' and that the international initiative taken by the
Irish Government ensured that this happened sooner rather than later.
Non-government reaction to the events of late 1971-early 1972 were, 
on the other hand, more pronounced; Bloody Sunday touched off a spark 
of activism among a host of disparate organisations throughout Western 
Europe, though it has to be said that these would probably have occurred 
without the efforts of the Irish Government to bring its views before 
a wider audience. In general these consisted of locally (i.e. non-Irish) 
organised demonstrations, marches, and even a small number of explosions 
directed against property that was identified as British, sometimes 
wrongly.*^
Thus, by March 1972 a pattern was established which was to be 
repeated throughout the remainder of the period under review. Governmental 
response in Western Europe with but one principal exception —  the Vatican, 
which has maintained a constant interest but low profile regarding 
Northern Ireland —  has been determined very largely by the inhibitions 
expressed by Schumann. And almost all non-governmental responses with 
the notable exception of efforts by various organisations in the 
Netherlands, may be cynically but accurately categorised as no more than 
'the politics of the last atrocity'.** By this expression is meant the 
transient interest which was shown only as a result of particularly 
traumatic events in Northern Ireland and which subsided in the period 
between such events. (It might be noted at this point that this was not 
a phenomenon peculiar to Western Europe: in later years it became almost 
a truism that American interest in Northern Ireland was directly related
9
9
Interview, Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 1978.
For example, in Bonn, West Germany, a home-made explosive charge 
blew out the windows of an antiques shop, Italian-owned in spite of its 
name, British Trade. (Times, 4 February 1972).
An expression used by Erskine Homes, Chairman of the Northern Ireland 
Labour Party, in reproaching Conor Cruise O'Brien for his willingness to 
respond to the prevailing mood of his own community to the point of losing 
sight of the legitimate reactions of the other. See Conor Cruise O'Brien, 
States of Ireland (St. Alban, Herts: Granada/Panther, 1974), p. 265.
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to the frequency or magnitude of what were euphemistically termed
1 spectaculars1). From 1972 onwards, therefore, it was remarkable 
if the representative of any Western European government said anything 
publicly about Northern Ireland. It was truly an area in which, 
figuratively, statesmen feared to tread.
Only two dared speak of Irish uni ty and they, interestingly, were heads
of State who fused temporal position with spiritual leadership: Pope
12 13
Paul VI, and Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus.
Of the two, Makarios1 was the less equivocal statement; the Pope's
left some room for doubt as to whether he meant political union or
14
harmony. Whatever his intention, the Pontiff was at least demonstrating 
the abiding interest which he and his sucessors took in the conflict in 
Northern Ireland.
As early as August 1969 he was reported to be 'gravely concerned'
about the civil strife in the province and to be following it 'with
15
extremely close attention'. At the same time he expressed his 
sadness —  in effect his criticism of the Stormont Government —  at the 
'bitter riots and harsh repression' which were then regular features 
of life in the North.
Similarly, the violence which followed the introduction of internment 
was seen as being 'greatly aggravated [by] the adoption o f ... exceptional 
security measures'.*7 But in a later, authorised statement a Vatican 
press spokesman explained that the Pope's attitude was that 'history 
teaches that attempts to redress injustice by force and terrorism cause 
more, and increasingly grave, injustice'. Thus the Vatican sought both
Times, 17 September 1973.
13
Irish Times, 25 February 1974.
14
According to one report, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office strove 
to persuade inquirers that the Pope, who spoke in Italian, used the word 
'unione', which could be taken to mean harmony —  and not an unambiguous 
word like 'unificazione' which signified political union. (Times, 18 
September 1973).
15
Sunday Telegraph, 17 August 1969.
1 r
New York Times, 18 August 1969.
17
International Herald Tribune, 30 August 1971.
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a non-violent solution to the 'grave historic, political and social
1 8
problems of Northern Ireland', and to reject any suggestion that the 
Vatican v/as in any way condoning violence perpetrated by Catholics.
With the passage of time, however, the Pope came to a position
supportive of British policies in Northern Ireland. Although his
Easter messages, proclaimed from the balcony of St. Peter's, v/ere
usually couched in such general terms that even the most devout Roman
Catholics were tempted to take them as read, his 1973 pronouncement was
a significant departure. In that year he inserted a sentence which
could only be construed as expressing specific approval of the British
19
Government's White Paper's proposals for Northern Ireland.
Later still, in 1977, it was reported that Prime Minister, James
Callaghan, had received papal approval for the British Government's
20
policies in N o r t h e r n  Ireland. Apparently this was based on Callaghan's
declared intention of 'working towards a power-sharing solution'—  which
immediately rendered questionable any benediction the Pope may have
bestowed upon them. As was discussed in Chapter 4, the British
Government's commitment to 'power-sharing' in this period was a matter
2 1
about which the gravest doubts could be held.
In other instances the Pope has appeared as an actor only in the
imaginings of those who thought his intervention would somehow succeed
where that of others had failed, or at some remove. As unlikely as it may
have sounded his name was suggested as an intermediary to set up the 1974
22
talks between Provisional Sinn Fein and British Government officials.
New York Times, 20 December 1971.
1 Q
Times, 23 April 1973.
20
Times, 24 September 1977, p. 3.
See Chapter 4, pp. 204-10.
22
John Whale and Cris Ryder, 'What Did We Promise the Provos?', Sunday 
Times3 18 June 1978, p. 17. The Pope was not the only unlikely candidate: 
according to this report Lady Falkender, Harold Wilson's political 
secretary, was suggested —  not surprisingly, by herself!
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But in 1978, Archbishop Tomas 0 Fiaich, Primate of All Ireland, acted
on a recommendation of the Vatican's representative in Ireland,
Archbishop Gaetano Alibrandi, to intervene in the matter of prisoners
23
being held in the 'H' Block at the Maze Prison in Northern Ireland.
Whether the Vatican approved of the manner in which this intervention 
was carried out is another matter, but what its record indicates is that, 
of the states of Western (Continental) Europe, it alone has maintained 
the nearest to what may be termed an active interest in Northern Ireland. 
Such a judgment is, of course relative; the descending order of interest 
recorded by those which follow, in this regard, after the Vatican, has 
but two entries: the Netherlands and Sweden.
The Government of the Netherlands stands alone in having attempted
an intervention with the purpose of achieving an accommodation between
the factions in Northern Ireland. In early 1975 the three parties to the
United Ulster Unionist Coalition (UUUC), the Social Democratic and Labour
Party (SDLP), the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (UPNI), the Alliance,
and the Northern Ireland Labour Party were invited to visit Holland for a
24
study tour to be totally financed by the Dutch Government. The purpose of
this visit, to be conducted under the auspices of the Netherlands
25
Institute for Education and Democracy, was to allow the Assembly parties 
in Northern Ireland to examine the system of coalition and accommodation 
which the Dutch had evolved in response to their own long history of 
religious differences.
Apart from what appeared to be a genuine attempt to contribute 
constructively to the beginnings of a solution, the Dutch initiative was 
also interesting from another perspective. In a green paper published
Donal Foley, 'The Saturday Column', Irish Times, 23 September 1978,
See also, pp. 345, of Chapter 9 for a brief mention of O'Fiach's 
intervention.
24
Irish Times3 22 February 1975, p. 1.
25
According to the Irish Times of 27 February 1975, the invitation was 
extended through this institute. However, according to a later report the 
visit itself became the responsibi1ity of 'de Haaf', a joint Catholic- 
Protestant organisation, which was funded 70 per cent by the Dutch 
Government. (Conor O'Clery, 'When Irish Eyes v/ere Opened', a Special Report 
on the Netherlands, Irish Times3 1 July 1976), (hereafter cited as O'Clery, 
Irish Times} Special Report, 1 July 1976).
277
around this time, the Netherlands was one of three areas specifically
selected by the British Government as an example of how opposing groups
27
had been accommodated. However it was and remains a matter of pure 
speculation as to whether the invitation which ensued wasa result of 
British-Dutch diplomacy. In any event many of the hoped-for benefits 
of the visit were reduced when the most intransigent parties in the 
Assembly, the UUUC, declined the invitation while the others accepted
26
Sweden's 'contribution', on the other hand, was both passive, and
from a British perspective at least, negative. In the main it consisted
of accepting deserters from the British Army and granting them 'residence
29
on humanitarian grounds'. What was to be noted was that the Swedish
authorities eschewed the word 'asylum', with its precise legalistic
implications —  among which would have been an implicit accusation of
30
dictatorial oppression against Britain. The number of deserters
involved was not great: by July 1973 five had been granted residence
in the terms described above and another five had filed an application
31
for similar treatment.
Clearly, British soldiers were not the first deserters to be granted 
refuge in Sweden. About 400 American deserters were allowed in during the 
period of the war in Viet Nam, but a certain marked difference was 
apparent between them and the British. The latter joined the Army 
voluntarily, whereas the former had been conscripted; they could not, 
therefore, claim to have been taken against their will. However, the 
argument was advanced that the only way for a British serviceman to obtain
26
The other two were Belgium and Switzerland.
27
Northern Ireland Office, Northern Ireland, discussion Paper 3, 
Government of Northern Ireland: A Society Divided (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1975) p. 43.
28
Irish Times, 22 February 1975, p. 1.
29
Roland Huntford, 'Why Sweden Gives Sanctuary to Deserters', The 
Observer Foreign News Service, No. 29951, 28 April 1972 (hereafter cited 
as Observer, Foreign News Service, 28 April 1972).
30 .... 
ibid.
31
Rosalind Morris, 'British Soldiers Getting a Guide for Deserters', 
The Observer Foreign News Service, No. 31241, 3 July 1973.
of working class Britons, to whom the deserters were acknowledged to
32
belong. Consequently, it was possible to allow that their continued
membership of the Army was determined by coercion and hence, that they
33
were entitled to 'residence on humanitarian grounds'.
According to Huntford's report, the Swedes seemed to have been
persuaded in their decisions by two arguments. The first was the moral
objection of employing the Army to maintain peace in Northern Ireland,
and the second was the prospect of going into action, which was
34
apparently considered a valid ground for desertion. They may also have 
been swayed to make a gesture by two other considerations which had little 
or nothing to do with morality or the trauma of a military engagement.
The first of these was the force of domestic radical opinion, of
35
some importance to the then ruling Social Democratic Party, and within
which a certain romanticisation of the IRA was noticeable. According to
another report filed by Huntford, Swedish radio and television not only
paid Northern Ireland considerable attention, but also devoted most of
the air time allocated to a presentation of the IRA viewpoint. Thus they
recorded exclusive interviews with members of the illegal paramilitary
force, described its members as 'resistance men' or 'freedom fighters',
36
and placed them in the best possible Swedish light.
The second consideration was the likelihood that its decisions would 
be favourably received in (say) the Eastern bloc. By granting what was in 
reality a form of quasi-political asylum to British deserters, Sweden 
could justifiably claim that its acceptance of Americans had been less of
278
a discharge was to buy himself out, and that this was beyond the means
32
Observer, Foreign News Service, 28 April 1972.
33 .. .. 
ibid.
34
ibid. It should be noted in this regard that West Germans, for 
example, who sought refuge in Sweden to escape military service because 
they objected to it in principle were not allowed to stay.
35 ibid.
36
ibid., and the Observer, 5 March 1972. According to the second 
report, support for the IRA in Sweden was also accompanied by the 
suppression of opinion critical of their activities.
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a special case and more of a precedent, thereby reinforcing its 
neutrality by demonstrating a certain impartiality in the definition of 
those fleeing from persecution.
As an issue between Britain and Sweden, the acceptance of deserters
assumed no great proportions. The most which was said of it was that it
37
caused a minor irritation in their relations. And it follows that even
less did it enter into Irish-Swedish relations. Indeed, the only comment
available in Dublin as to the general interest shown by the Scandinavian
countries (at an official level) in Northern Ireland, was that no
38
readily apparent reason existed for it.
When it is considered that, after these brief instances the record 
shows little more than that Walter Scheel, President of the Federal
Republic of Germany, praised the Irish Government's 'moderation' on
39
Northern Ireland, and that Prince John, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, made
a brief but surprising reference to the conflict in the course of a State
ion 
,41
40
dinner speech, it is difficult to accept without equivocati Lynch's
claim that 'European leaders are not afraid of the problems.
Undoubtedly for different reasons, the record of non-State actor 
involvement in Northern Ireland, after 1972, was equally lacking in
42
substance. Apart from denunciatory exercises by various intellectuals,
Observer Foreign News Service, 28 April 1972.
Interview, Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 1978. 
Irish Timesy 8 February 1977.
40
In pleading for peace in Northern Ireland the Grand Duke drew a 
parallel between his country's centuries-1ong struggle for independence 
with that of Ireland. (Irish Times} 22 September 1978, p. 8).
41
Irish Times, 9 September 1972, p. 9.
42
In 1975 Jean-Paul Sartre, the French existentialist philosopher, 
announced the establishment of an 'international commission for the study 
of oppression in Ireland'. Associated with him in this venture were 
Vladimir Dedijer, vice-president of the so-called 'Russell tribunal' and 
Noam Chomsky, the American linguist. (Daily Telegraph3 7 April 1975). 
This was Sartre's second foray into the Northern Ireland sitaution: in
1970, in company with writers Simone de Beauvoir and Michel Lefris, and 
numerous lesser luminaries, he had presented a petition to the British
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an attempt to raise the issue of human rights at the Commission of the
43
European Communities, efforts by Swedish pacifist groups to persuade
44
British in Northern Ireland to desert, and infrequent indications of
45
trade union interest in various aspects of the situation, only the
activities centred in the Netherlands were deserving of more extended
4- 46 comment.
The Dutch initiatives comprised two markedly different types of non­
governmental activity. While both must be regarded as 'political' in the 
widest sense of the word, the first —  an intially secret attempt to provide 
mediation was more so. It consisted of a seemingly innocent seminar
47
convened in Bergen/Binnen (Holland) by the Dutch Council of Churches,
and at which the official topic for discussion was 'Co-operative Housing
48
Schemes'. Although it was not a government undertaking, it was fully
(42 cont'd.) Embassy in Paris which condemned 'the Fascist methods —  
which in no way [fell] short of those of the Greek colonels —  employed by 
the Northern Ireland Government.' (Guardian, 27 October 1970).
43
Two Italian deputies in 1972 asked what action the Commission 
intended to take in view of the obvious violations of human rights they 
asserted were occurring in Northern Ireland. (Irish Times, 17 February 
1972).
44
Times, 20 June 1973.
45
Following the UWC strike a joint meeting of British and Italian 
communists pledged their support for the struggle in Northern Ireland 
(Morning Star, 1 July 1974), and in 1977 the European Trade Union 
Confederation offerred a similar pledge (Morning Star, 14 January 1977). 
Perhaps of more significance thouqh, was the declined offer made by union 
leaders in Holland and Germany, during the UWC strike, to the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions, to place embargoes on goods exported to Northern 
Ireland and to 'black' goods leaving it. (Robert Fisk, The Point of No 
Return: The Strike which broke the British in Ulster (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1975), p. 238.
46
Norway is perhaps deserving of a mention at this point although, in 
the context of international politics, it has no more than a tenuous 
connection to Northern Ireland. Its inclusion here rests on the fact 
that in October 1977, two founders of the Peace People Movement, Mai read 
Corrigan and Betty Williams were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1976 
[Times, 24 October 1977, p. 16).
47
Guardtan, 28 November 1975. Another report claims that it was 
arranged through the European Conference of Churches by the Protestant 
mediator, the Rev. William Arlow [Times, 29 November 1975).
48
Sue Masterman, 'Dutch Try to Mediate Ulster Terror', The Observer, 
Foreign News Service, No. 34242, 1 December 1975 (hereafter cited as 
Observer, Foreign News Service, 1 December 1975).
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subsidised by the Dutch Ministry of Culture. Among the thirty or so
delegates who attended were such notable authorities on Catholic-
Protestant co-operation as Andy Tyrie and David Payne of the Ulster
Defence Association (UDA), and Seamus Loughran, Northern Organiser of
50
Provisional Sinn Fein. As was suspected from their presence, the 
seminar was a well-intentioned cover for a meeting between some of the 
leaders of rival paramilitary organisations which included the Provisional 
IRA, the Ulster Volunteer Force and, of course, the UDA.
Whether it achieved anything was open to question. Because of the 
publicity which it attracted —  the element of secrecy was poorly
51
maintained —  it broke up in confusion after four days of discussions. 
Nevertheless, the fact that they took place at all was in itself 
significant, for one of the tragedies of Northern Ireland has been that 
the two communities, and by extension the extremists within them, have 
seldom, if ever, been given the opportunity to meet in an environment 
untainted by hostility and tension.
It was out of the need to ameliorate this condition that the second
initiative drew its inspiration. The 'HulpNoord Ierland' foundation
52
(HuNI) undertook a programme, between 1972 and 1976, whereby over 2,000
children from strife-torn areas were given 'inteqrated' community
53
holidays in Holland. As with the other Dutch measures discussed
previously, the motivation for this action appeared to be provided by the
Times, 29 November 1975.
Observer, Foreign News Service, 1 December 1975. 
ibid.
52
A Utrecht-based umbrella group which included the Catholic 
organisation Pax Christi, the Dutch Protestant League of Churches,
'Churches and Fugitives' (affiliated to the Dutch Council of Churches), 
and Lions, Round Table, and Dutch Rotary Clubs.
O'Clery, Irish Times, Special Report, 1 July 1976. Note 1: A 
similar joint programme v/as commenced in 1972 by the Netherlands Society 
for Religious Freedom and Terres des Hommes (Times, 7 August 1972), but it 
is not clear how, if at all, 'HulpNoord Ierland's' programme related to it, 
Note 2: A total of 5,000 children was claimed in the Irish Times, 18 
August 1976, and the Times, 18 August 1976.
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natural and spontaneous sympathy which the Dutch felt for another 
community sorely afflicted by what they saw as a religious conflict.
The impetus to aid Northern Ireland children, therefore, had come 
naturally from churchmen in Holland, historically linked with Northern 
Ireland through William of Orange —  better remembered perhaps in Belfast 
than in Amsterdam for his contribution to the North's divisions.
But neither the motivation nor the impetus were sufficient to allow 
the enterprise to escape criticism in Northern Ireland. The fault
appeared to lie with what some observers noted as the colonial attitude
55
of HuNI itself. It was accused by some of its detractors of paying 
too little attention to local advice, and by others of having no lasting 
effect on the children who were meant to be its beneficiaries. According 
to this latter objection there was more to be said for the children 
meeting their ghetto counterparts for holidays inside Northern Ireland, 
and getting them to experience peace in their own country rather than in 
unrelated surroundings.^
In response to these criticisms the objectives of the foundation
were redefined but to no great effect. In August 1976 further extensive
projects were abandoned following a reported disagreement among the joint
57
Dutch-Northern Irish organisers. According to the foundation's 
chairman, Cornelius Van Bockel , the fault lay with the 'Irish churches',
which, he claimed, wanted complete control over the spending of the funds
58
raised in Holland. And there v/as also the suggestion that the 
foundation's campaign organiser, Onno De Haan, was too left in his
59
political complexion for the comfort of Northern Ireland churchmen. 
Although the parties concerned, including Van Bockel and De Haan, then
59
ibid. De Haan's official title, according to HuNI, was Executive 
Di rector.
ibid.
ibid.
ibid.
Irish Times, 18 August 1976. 
Times, 18 August 1976.
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tried to resolve matters at a meeting in Belfast in September 1976,
during which they discussed recent media reports, the tone of the
resulting press statement only served to confirm that the underlying
grounds for discontent remained substantially untouched. The statement,
signed by both of the above on behalf of the HuNI Executive and Board
made no mention of the abandoned projects, nor of the political
complexion of De Haan, and went so far as to state that 'any suggestions
that the Irish Churches had attempted to seek control of [HuNI's ]
activities [i.e. the very suggestion that Van Bockel was reported to
60
have made ] ... v/ere entirely without foundation.'
However, the activities of HuNI did continue but at what level it
is difficult to say since the organisation itself eschews publicity in
the belief that it hinders, rather than assists, in the work of inter-
61
community reconciliation. The measure of this belief may be that it 
was not until 1980 that the writer became aware that HuNI was also running 
'encounters, etc.,' for local leaders and community groups from the
m -t-u 62North.
Ironically, this information came to the fore only as a result of 
further criticism of the organisation's activities. In April 1980,
26 community workers in Northern Ireland put their names to a declaration 
of support for HuNI in response to their understanding that it was about
r n
to consider disbanding its operations. This action may not have had the 
desired effect: in August 1980,. the Secretary of HuNI advised that:
It is hard to say if our work will continue in the coming 
periods ... because both policy and finances are subject 
to further investigation and discussion.64
Stichting 'Hu1p Noord-Ierland', News Release, 20 September 1976.
r 1
Letter from Onno De Haan, Executive Director, HuNI, to the writer,
30 July 1980 (hereafter cited as De Haan letter, 30 July 1980). As of 
this date De Haan claimed that 7,000 teen-agers and 1,500 adults had been 
involved in the various programmes.
r p
Community and Youth Service Association (CYSA), statement in support 
of HUNI, dated April 1980 (hereafter cited as CYSA statement, April 1980); 
and De Haan letter, 30 July 1980.
Letter from Jo. C. Van Loveren, Secretary, HUNI, to the writer, 3 
August 1980.
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As of November 1980, no further information was to hand as to what 
these reviews had produced by way of decisions or recommendations. 
Nevertheless, even if they were to lead to the end of HuNI's involvement, 
they should not detract from the fact that the Dutch organisation had, 
for over a decade, provided one of the more impressive examples of 
concerned Christianity to have been associated with the conflict.
Perhaps in this light it was to be expected that Western European 
involvement in Northern Ireland should have been minimal. Although it 
was little referred to by heads of government, Britain's dismal record 
in Ireland must have been at least vaguely familiar to them all and, 
thereby a strong caution. Any assessment of the role of the non-state 
actors must be tempered by what could be reasonably expected of them.
With the Dutch examples excepted, almost none of them could claim that 
the issues in Northern Ireland were even a principal concern. Within 
their respective frames of reference it was surely expecting too much of 
them to practise more than the 'politics of the last atrocity'.
But then it was not really from the countries of Western Europe, or 
from its non-state actors, that the region derived its significance in 
relation to Northern Ireland. That quality arose from the institutional 
arrangements and international agreements which the countries of Western 
Europe have erected and which, more properly, are discussed in the 
following four chapters. Thus, they are concerned with the treatment 
accorded the Ulster Question within such entities as the Council of 
Europe and the European Economic Community (including the European 
Monetary System), and its relationship to the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
C H A P T E R  SEVEN
The Ul s t e r  Qu e s t io n  and the  Co u n c il  of Europe
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Following the frustrated attempts by the Irish Government to
internationalise the Northern Ireland situation at the United Nations
in 1969, it began to focus more on the international political
institutions of Western Europe as a likely alternative forum. At the
Council of Europe in Strasbourg the first indications of this were
found in the action of the Irish delegation following the introduction
of internment in August 1971. It promoted a motion for the establishment
of a representative group to be appointed by the Political Affairs and
Legal Affairs Committee of the Consultative Assembly to study the
situation in Northern Ireland and recommend appropriate legal and
administrative provisions that would guarantee the involvement of the
northern minority in all decision making and administrative processes.*
This motion was then referred to the Political Affairs Committee for a
report and the Legal Affairs Committee for an opinion —  developments
which, according to the Taoiseach, were ‘evidence of the serious concern
2
of European countries with developments in Northern Ireland'.
Thereupon, it took some four years for this 'concern', in the form 
of an Order adopted by the Standing Committee on behalf of the Assembly,
3
to achieve a more tangible expression. During this period, in which 
investigatory sub-committees undertook their tasks in accordance with
Dail Eireann, Parliamentary Debates, Official^Report3 Vol. 256,
20 October 1971, col. 18 (hereafter cited as Dail Eireann, Official 
Report). Exactly when the Irish delegation took the above action was 
not specified by the Taoiseach in his speech.
2 ibid.
3
Order No. 319 of 16 December 1971. By this order, the Political 
Affairs Committee and the Legal Affairs Committee were instructed:- 
'i. to appoint Sub-Committees on Northern Ireland, on the understanding 
that the two sub-committees shall meet jointly, ...
ii. to study any problems, relating to the situation in Northern Ireland 
which may be referred to them by the abovementioned sub-committees'. 
[Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Report on the situation
in Northern Ireland and the activities of the Sub-Committees on Northern 
Ireland> Document 3696, 28 November 1975, para. 4 (hereafter cited as 
Document 3696). ]
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the Order, the Council of Europe's role in events in Northern Ireland 
was minimal although not necessarily passive. In January 1972 it 
provided an occasion for a bitter exchange between British and Irish 
delegates to the Consultative Assembly on the matter of IRA activities
4
and British policies and, also in 1972, one of its committees, 
established to hear complaints of discrimination on religious or 
political grounds from Northern Ireland citizens, welcomed the
5
prorogation of Stormont and the assumption of Direct Rule by Westminster. 
But perhaps of a wider, and in the long term, greater significance, the 
European Parliament held a debate on 13 November 1974, on a 'development 
programme for areas adjoining the border between the United Kingdom and 
Ireland'. ®
The Report which was eventually presented to the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe on 28 November 1975 was notable in 
two ways. First, if affirmed that
just as there is an 'Irish dimension' ... there is 
a 'European dimension' to the problems of Northern 7 
Ireland which can be seen on three different levels.
These levels, or aspects,of the European dimension extended from, in the 
first instance, British and Irish membership of the Council of Europe, 
an organisation which was established, inter alia, to guarantee the 
principles of democracy and respect for human rights. It was thus 
regarded as inconsistent if that organisation did not consider the
g
problem of Northern Ireland as a common European concern. From this 
responsibility the second level was determined according to which the 
Council of Europe had an interest in matters concerning legislation and
Timor,, 21 January 1972; and Irish Timess 21 January 1972, pp. 1 
and 13.
5
Times, 11 April 1972. It is not clear from this report whether the 
committee in question was one of those established by Order No. 319 or a 
different committee, 
g
Document 3696, para. 9. 
ibid., para. 6.
g
ibid. , para. 7.
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the administrative and judicial practices obtaining in Northern 
9
Ireland. And finally, a European aspect arose from the common 
membership of Britain and Ireland in the European Communities which 
imposed upon them (and, indeed, provided the opportunity for) 'an even 
higher degree of obligation to co-operate than is the case between 
sovereign states in general'.*^
The second distinguishing feature of the report was to be found in
the quality of understanding which the Rapporteur, Piet Dankert,** brought
to its compilation. In this he was undoubtedly assisted by the
opportunities to discuss the issues presented by twenty-two meetings of
the sub-committees and their visits to Belfast, Dublin, and London. Yet
it is still deserving of comment that so many of the important facets of
the situation were appreciated by one whose involvement was, in historical
12
terms, brief, and at some remove. The Report's conclusions, therefore,
were consistent with Dankert's understanding of political realities and
possibilities in Northern Ireland. It came down unequivocally in favour
of 'strong coalition government', in which power would be shared between
the Protestant majority and the Roman Catholic minority, and which should
develop 'technical, social and economic' co-operation between North and
13
South. After being unanimously approved by the Political Affairs 
Committee it proceeded to the full Parliamentary Assembly for debate on
29 January 1976.
This occasion was in effect a debate in two parts —  relating, in the 
first instance, to the Report in General and in the second to the draft
ibid., para. 8.
ibid., para. 9. The Report .was here quoting from: Report of a 
committee to consider, in the context of civil liberties and human rights 
measures to deal with terrorism in Northern Ireland, Cmnd. 5847 (London:
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, January 1975), para. 10.
1 1
A Dutch socialist parliamentarian.
12
Perhaps the best testimonial to Dankert's report was that only one of 
the speakers in the January 1976 debate on Document 3696, the British 
Conservative MP, Julian Critchley, failed to extend his congratulations to 
him for a difficult task well completed. Critchley's references to the role 
undertaken by the Council of Europe could be best described as patronising.
^  Document 3696, para. 81.
resolution which had been proposed in the Report, and the four
15
amendments thereto. Neither part was the cause of any great moment
so far as the Council of Europe and Ireland was concerned. The first,
which lasted little more than two hours, attracted contributions from
16
only four speakers from outside Britain and Ireland; the second, which 
occupied the Assembly for even less time, attracted none.*7
Perhaps that was not unusual. Although the immediate outcome (a
resolution, see below) was to a degree more decisive than the
adjournments which had taken place at the United Nations, it was clear
that the principal antagonists were well aware of the limitations of any
'Europeanisation' of the Northern Ireland situation. Thus, as with the
ritual exchanges which ensued between United Kingdom and Irish
representatives at the UN after 1969, the Council of Europe debate in 1976
was conducted without rancour and as if it was a microcosm of prevailing
views among parliamentarians from each side of the Irish Sea. It would,
however, be misleading to equate the forums, for their respective natures
are quite different. In particular allowances must be made for the fact
that party-political considerations can sometimes come to the fore as a
18
result of the mixed composition of national delegations. Nevertheless, 
it was generally true that, as with the annual exchanges in New York, 
those in Strasbourg in 1976 essentially reflected a two-fold purpose:
289
14
ibid., paras. 1-11.
15
The text of the amendments, and the debate upon these and the draft 
resolution may be found in: Council of Europe, Pariiamentary Assembly, 
Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (Third Part), 26-30 January 1976, Official 
Report of Debates, Vol. Ill, Sittings 19-25, pp. 991-9 (hereafter cited as 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Official Report of Debates).
16
Andrianopolis of Greece, Dankert, van Ooijen of the Netherlands, and, 
briefly, Vedovato of Italy, Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee.
At the request of the President, Dankert occasionally represented 
the views of the Committee but it could not be said that he participated 
in the debate. .
18
As in the speech of Padhraic Faulkner, of the Irish delegation, who 
sung the praises of Fianna Fail. (Council of Europe, Pariiamentary 
Assembly, Official Report of Debates, pp. 981-4).
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the constructive presentation of broadly agreed national objectives and, 
for the edification of the international audience, the correction of 
'misunderstandings' attributed to the presentations of the other party 
involved.
In its final form, therefore, the resolution adopted by the Assembly
19
was of a type which could well have followed upon an Anglo-Irish summit.
In its condemnation of violence, its exhortations to the people of 
Northern Ireland to find a democratic accommodation, and in its recognition 
of the spirit of Anglo-Irish reconciliation evident at Sunningdale,it 
differed in no substantial way from anything which had previously emerged 
as a result of bilateral discussions between Britain and Ireland. Once 
again, that was probably not unusual. Affirming that there existed a 
'European dimension' to the problem of Northern Ireland was never meant 
to convey the impression that it was a European problem. More positively, 
nothing had changed during the period in which the Council of Europe had 
seized itself of the situation which could have altered the obvious fact 
that it was an issue to which Britain and Ireland held pre-emptive 
international rights.
If the Council's approach was in any way open to question, it was so
in this last regard, but only slightly. While giving due weight to the
role of political forces inside Northern Ireland, the resolution
implicitly supported the concept (but not by name) of the 'Irish
dimension' which was by then in tatters insofar as the British Government
and, more importantly, the Northern Unionists were concerned. Indeed,
it was by then even de-emphasised as a matter of policy by the Irish
20
Government. Thus, there existed the possibility that the interest 
of the Council of Europe would be that much less acceptable to those it 
intended to help. However, the resolution adopted was less than what 
was nearly carried. An amendment explicitly mentioning the 'Irish 
dimension' as an essential element in any permanent settlement was
Pariiamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Twenty-Seventh 
Ordinary Session, Resolution 612 (1976) on the situation in Northern 
Ireland (hereafter cited as Pvesolution 612 (1976)).
See Chapter 3, p. 162.
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passed, only to be superseded by a further amendment in which the
(Sunningdale) spirit of reconciliation was recognised without
2 1
reference to the 'Irish dimension'.
Given the relative lack of acclaim or criticism the Report and the 
resolution received at the time (and since), and given the success of the 
further amendment (noted above), it is extremely doubtful whether the 
aforementioned 'blemish' held any significance. The Constitutional 
Convention, towards which the low profile of the Irish Government was 
principally directed, had reported back some two months before the 
Council of Europe debate. And it was abundantly clear from the 
Convention's proceedings that resolutions adopted in Strasbourg, or for 
that matter in Westminster, were of little ‘consequence to Unionists who 
perceived tneir majority position as a mandate for intransigence.
Any further discussion of the impact of the Council of Europe's 
interest in Northern Ireland between 1971 and 1976 must be foreshortened 
at this point for two reasons. After 1976 The British Government was 
unable to sustain an initiative in Northern Ireland and this obviously 
rendered any Council of Europe activity inappropriate, if not meaningless, 
in the short term. Furthermore, under the terms of reference established 
both in December 1 9 7 1 , ^  and January 1976 (Resolution 6 1 2 ) , ^  the sub­
committees and the Political Affairs Committee, respectively, had no 
greater charge than a study brief prescribed as their future course of 
action. It follows that the Parliamentary Assembly's involvement has been 
similarly curtailed. Despite the final paragraph of the resolution, which
instructed the above committees, 'as a matter of urgency' ... to 'follow
24
the development of the situation in Northern Ireland', and despite
The draft resolution contained no reference to the 'Irish dimension'. 
Most likely it was excluded as a result of Dankert's view that it was 
necessary for this to be de-emphasised if progress was to be made in the 
North (Document 3696, para. 48). Two Irish delegates, Crowley and 
Faulkner, then successfully moved an amendment which specifically mentioned 
it in the terms above. But this was then superseded by another Irish- 
sponsored amendment —  this time by Collins. Interestingly, all three were 
Fianna Fail TD's.
Order No. 319, 16 December 1971, (ii).
Resolution 612 (1976), para. 13.
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the European Parliament on matters indirectly related to the
25
conflict, the Council has not again returned in any major sense 
to the 1 troubles1.
occasional heated outbursts between British and Irish delegates to
e.g. During Question Time on 14 June 1978, alleged cross-border 
smuggling provided the cue for a bout of Anglo-Irish verbal fisticuffs, 
some of the points in which were a repetition of those made by British 
and Irish Ministers responsible for security (Irish Times, 15 June 
1978).
C H A P T E R  E I G H T
T h e  U l s t e r  Q u e s t i o n  a n d  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t y
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Ireland's entry into the European Community (EC)* in 1973 was
subject to considerable and prolonged debate, particularly in the period
leading up to the referendum on Irish membership in May 1972. Most of
it, according to Patrick Keatinge, was poorly based in conceptual terms
as regards what membership would entail, but nevertheless concerned with
2
the consequences of membership for national sovereignty and neutrality. 
Although some members of the Government had, in the most general terms, 
implied that the EEC would be the institutional framework in which Irish 
unity would be achieved, this was seen more as 'an association of ideas
3
with some electoral appeal than as evidence of policy on the North'.
In the main, the possible effect of membership on partition was not the
4
issue upon which the referendum was decided. However it was inevitable 
that the consequences of membership would include a broadening of 
perspectives from which to view the Ulster Question, and an increase in 
the external influences upon possible answers to it. These may be 
regarded as extensions of the two principal reasons which Taoiseach Jack 
Lynch adduced for the overwhelming approval given by the Irish electorate 
for the move into Europe.
Strictly speaking, the European Community (EC) refers to the 
common political structure established to make economic decisions for the 
European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community (EEC), 
and the European Atomic Energy Community. However, with the passage of 
time, and as the EEC developed into something more than an economic 
community, it became quite common practice to use EEC and EC inter­
changeably —  the Taoiseach's message described in note 5 is a good 
example. In this thesis, therefore, both terms will also be used inter­
changeably —  so as to preserve the terminology of the documents and 
statements referred to.
2 . .
Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations: Issues of Irzsh Forezgn
Policy (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1978), pp. 77-8 
(hereafter cited as Keatinge, Issues of Irish Foreign Policy).
3
Patrick Keatinge, 'Irish Foreign Policy', Collected Conference 
Papers on Ireland3 Britains and Europe (London: University of London, 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1971), p. 61.
T.W. Moody, The Ulster Questions 1603-1973 (Dublin: Mercier, 1974), 
p. 90.
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a strong desire on the part of the Irish people 
to play their part in the development of a new 
Europe.
And the second:
the conviction which had been growing fo-r some 
time, that in modern circumstances Ireland could 
best promote her own interests and simultaneously 
make a worthwhile contribution in international 
relations, as a member of a larger European entity, 
firmly based on democratic principles.5
Both of the above held implications for Anglo-Irish relations 
in general and Irish unity in particular. As Queen's University,
Belfast, political scientist E. Moxon Browne noted:
One of the main attractions of Community membership 
for Ireland was the chance of freeing herself from 
an essentially unequal trade relationship with the 
United Kingdom.
The Community provides Ireland with a new fulcrum 
on which to exert leverage against her more powerful 
neighbour .6
But it would be misleading to accept this as implying that Ireland saw 
EC membership solely, or even predominantly in terms of an opportunity 
to improve its position vis-a-vis the United Kingdom as an adversary. 
Indeed there were indications that both parties looked forward to their 
membership of the EC as facilitating an easier working relationship.
To an extent Browne acknowledged this himself when he observed that, 
within the Community, issues between the tv/o countries could be raised 
without some of the 'acrimony and claustrophobia' which had characterised 
them previously.7 However, during his period as Vice-President of the 
Commission of the European Communities, Patrick Hillery presented a
The first was:
'Ireland's Membership of the EEC 1973/1979: Message from An 
Taoiseach, Mr. J. Lynch TD', Ireland Today: Bulletin of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs, No. 935, 1 July 1979.
E. Moxon Browne, 'Ireland in the EEC', The World Today, 31 (October
1975): 431 (hereafter cited as E. Moxon Browne, 'Ireland in the EEC').
7 ibid.
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fuller and more positive assessment of this development when he wrote 
that it
was, perhaps, paradoxically reinforced by mutual 
recognition that the process concerned was one which 
would give Ireland a more independent position in 
the world.8
In 1978 this was given further confirmation by the British Ambassador 
to Ireland, Robin Haydon, who claimed that membership of the EC had been 
good and healthy for Anglo-Irish relations, giving them 'a new and wider 
g
perspective1.
Insofar as Irish unity was a consideration in applying for member­
ship, the Taoiseach, in 1972, was quite definite as to what could be 
expected.
Apart from any political contribution which it may 
make, EEC membership will also mean the economic 
unification of our island.10 [emphasis added]
His then Minister for Foreign Affairs was even more optimistic: 
according to one report, Brian Lenihan claimed that Irish cross-Border 
co-operation within the EEC would evolve into a 'United Ireland'.
In view of the Taoiseach's reluctance to make such a claim it is unclear 
whether this statement was a result of incorrect reporting or an 
insufficient understanding of the issues involved by a recently appointed
Patrick Hillery, 'Ireland and Britain in the European Community', 
text of the third Sean Lemass Memorial Lecture, delivered at the 
University of Exeter, 1 March 1976, Administration 24 (Spring 1976), p.8. 
g
Luncheon Address to the Association of European Journalists, Dublin, 
19 July 1978, as reported in the Irish Times3 20 July 1978.
'Address by the Taoiseach, Mr. John Lynch, at a luncheon given by 
the Anglo-American Press Association in Paris on Wednesday, 18th October, 
1972', Statements and Speeches3 5/72 (Department of Foreign Affairs of 
Ireland), p. 5.
1 1
Interview of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Brian Lenihan, by Olivia 
O'Leary on the Radio Eireann programme. 'This Week of 31 December 1972', 
as reported in the Irish Times3 1 January 1973.
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Minister. In any case, the view which prevailed within Fianna Fail 
more closely reflected the Lynch statement than any other.
Interestingly, a compromise between these two views, perhaps
leaning slightly more towards Lynch's, was taken by Garret Fitzgerald,
a leading Fine Gael spokesman and later Minister for Foreign Affairs
in the National Coalition. (Fitzgerald, it should be noted, is the
son of Northern Presbyterian mother and a Southern Catholic father. He
is widely respected, North and South, for his conciliatory views on the
matter of Irish unity which have found expression in a number of well
publicised speeches and pamphlets, and in one book.) According to him,
the EEC could not solve the problem of Northern Ireland; it was not to
be seen 'as a panacea', but it was, nevertheless, 'likely to prove
helpful to the cause of a peaceful reunion of the Irish people, rather
13
than otherwise'.
The bases for Fitzgerald's cautious optimism were derived from what
he saw as the increasingly 'anachronistic character' of the whole
partition issue within a modern, European context, and the particular EEC
14
influences he expected would work upon it. Not the least among the 
factors guiding his arguments was a wholehearted commitment to economic 
determinism —  as was evident in his reply to an Irish Times reporter in 
1978.
In the long-term, economic interests determine the 
actions of States and, while at the moment other 
interests will be uppermost in Northern Ireland minds, 
these economic considerations will determine things.15
12
Lenihan had then only recently succeeded Patrick Hillery who had been 
appointed to Brussels when Irish membership of the EEC was effected on 
1 Janaury 1973. The former's tenure in office v/as short due to his 
Party's failure in the General Election of February that year. He was, 
however, re-appointed to the position in the Cabinet selected by Charles 
Haughey in December 1979.
13
Garret Fitzgerald, Towards A New Ireland (Dublin: Torc/Gill and 
Macmillan, 1973), p. 113 (hereafter cited as Garret Fitzgerald, Towards
A New Ireland).
14 ibid., pp. 102-13.
15
Irish Times, 30 May 1978, p. 1. Possibly, the belief noted above
reflects Fitzgerald's somewhat late academic interest in the discipline 
of Economics. In 1946 he graduated from University College, Dublin, with 
first class honours (and first place) in both History and French. In 1969, 
however, he supplemented this with a Ph.D. in Economics from the same 
university.
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Thus, while Fitzgerald allowed that such factors as the decreasing
importance of 'cultural differences based on religion, ... the growth
of a more liberal Catholicism and of ecumenism in the Republic ...
16
[and] further education' would contribute towards an atmosphere in 
Northern Ireland which would be better disposed towards Irish unity, 
it was clear that he saw such a change of attitude being worked 
primarily as a result of financial benefits. As he put it:
[The] economic rationale for Partition wi11 not 
exist within the EEC.17
Objections to this view, arising from the Northern Unionists'
identification of themselves as being separate at both an individual
18
and a political unit level, would be overcome, according to Fitzgerald,
19
by an 'objective assessment' on their part that their economic well­
being would be better served within a Federal (united) Ireland. Even 
the repugnance for anything resembling Dublin control of Northern 
Ireland through this arrangement was robbed of much of its potency by 
Fitzgerald's argument that, since so much of the sovereignty historically 
exercised by Dublin and Stormont would have passed to Brussels anyway, 
there could be little objection to a partnership between them over what
• j 20reman n e d .
Of Fitzgerald's writings, this much must be said: they were 
eloquent and comprise some of the most persuasive arguments in favour of 
eventual Irish unity by agreement between the two traditions. If they 
admit any weakness, other than that they are couched optimistically, it
Garret Fitzgerald, Towards A New Irelands pp. 103-4. 
ibid., p. 105.
^  ibid. , pp. 104-5.
19 ’
This expression is found in a later repository of Fitzgerald's 
thoughts on Irish unity, i.e. Fine Gael, Ireland —  Our Future Together 
(Dublin: Fine Gael Press and Information Services, 1979), p. 18 
(hereafter cited as Fine Gael, Ireland -  Our Future Together). Although 
this booklet appears under the name of the Fine Gael Party, it is clear 
from the Preface written by Fitzgerald, and from numerous statements 
made by him before and since, that it reflects not only an official 
Party viewpoint but also his personal ideas.
20
Garret Fitzgerald, Towards A New Ireland, pp. 108-9.
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is the rather obvious one that, if the trends and influences were in
fact to lead to a situation where the Unionists could contemplate Irish
unity with equanimity, the concomitant need would then surely exist,
in the North and the Republic, to ask 'why?'. With so many sovereign
powers of the nation state vested in Brussels, or at least shared with
Community organs so as to make distinctions between reserved and
shared powers extremely difficult to delineate, and with the expected
emergence of a European identity, would not the attempt to reunite
Ireland be not only unnecessary but also reactionary? And perhaps one
further criticism could be made of Fitzgerald's formulations, at least
from the point of view of the Northern Unionists. Although his
background and record would contradict it, there was, in the reliance
placed upon the efficacy of economic incentives, something of the
familiar contempt that the loyalty of the Unionists was to the half-
crown rather than the Crown. Moreover, in view of major policy statements
in this same vein throughout 1978 and 1979 by Fitzgerald's successor at
2 1
Iveagh House, Michael 0'Kennedy, the view may have been fostered, or 
reinforced in the North, that the EEC was just another means which the 
Catholic Republic of Ireland would seek to use against 'the other 
tradition' while disingenuously claiming to respect it. This is not so 
much a claim as a suggestion, but the fact that the two Unionists 
elected to the European Parliament from Northern Ireland in 1979, Ian 
Paisley and John Taylor, could fairly be described as 'hard-line' gave 
some idea of the regard in which the Community was then held.
If the views of Lynch, followed by Fitzgerald and Lenihan, 
are regarded as being in an ascending order of expectations of Irish 
unity consequent upon EEC membership, then the views of Dublin Senior 
Counsel and Fianna Fail adviser, Donal Barrington, would be placed above 
all three previously mentioned. In the context of direct elections to the 
European Parliament the thrust of his argument was that the nation
state, and hence the 'Sovereign Irish Republic', was 'already becoming
22
irrelevant'. The emerging identity for Ireland as a state, he
See Chapter 4, 'Anglo-Irish Relations, 1977-1979', pp.229-31. 
(Iveagh House is the building on St. Stephen's Green in which is located 
the Department of Foreign Affairs.)
22
Donal Barrington, 'After Sunningdale?', Administration, 24 (Summer
1976); pp. 255-6.
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suggested, lay in a 'European Federation', and the destiny of the
23
Irish in an emerging 'Republic of the European Peoples'. As was 
befitting one of Ireland's leading legal counsels, he quoted an 
eminent English judge as to the effect of the Treaty of Rome on the 
English legal system, suggesting that the words applied equally to all 
spheres of Irish life.
The Treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows 
into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot 
be held back-24
Barrington, however, disagreed with Fitzgerald and Lenihan as to
the kind, rather than the degree, of expectations which would follow
from EEC membership. He held that it would be wrong to think that the
European movement must bring about the political unity of Ireland;
'to say that', he claimed, 'is like saying that Germany joined the EEC
25
in the hope of 'getting back' Alsace-Lorraine. To a considerable 
extent this position reflected Barrington's abdication —  virtually to 
the point that he was an advocate of despair —  of ever finding a 
'solution' to the problems of Northern Ireland within an Irish context. 
An indication of this was provided by his statement that
Europe may seem a vast and frightening place. But 
it may turn out to be much safer than an Ireland 
in which we have all turned in on each other, seduced 
by the false but easy comfort of an ancient hate.26
It was all a long way from what had originally been the hopes of
former Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, when Irish membership of the EEC was
first considered. According to a letter by Lemass's daughter, Peggie
Lemass O'Brien, published in the correspondence columns of the Irish
Times, her father saw in the EEC 'the strongest single instrument which
27
could help persuade the British to withdraw from Ireland'. After the
23
24
25
26 
27
ibid. , p. 256.
ibid. (the name of the eminent English judge is not cited.) 
ibid.
ibid., p. 257.
Irish Times, 5 January 1978. This correspondence arose from two 
reviews of Kevin Boland's book Up Dev! -  by Paddy Hart, TD, and journalist 
John Healy. Both claimed that Sean Lemass changed the direction of Fianna 
Fail and that he abandoned the idea of Irish unity. Peggie Lemass O'Brien 
thereupon felt compelled to write in reply, and to 'set the record right 
for once and for all'.
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first British application for membership had been vetoed by France 
Lemass evidently saw this view enhanced if Ireland should obtain 
membership ahead of Britain. To this end, his daughter declared, and
In an effort to copper-fasten that idea he paid a 
visit to the leaders of the six EEC countries and 
told them that when we [i.e. Ireland] came to 
conduct our negotiations we would insist that, if 
at some later date Britain's application was accepted, 
the Six would have to ensure the departure of British 
troops from Irish soil before we could accept 
partnership with her in the EEC.
Both Adenauer and de Gaulle promised enthusiastic 
support for this stance as did the other leaders of 
the Six.28
In the event, neither Lemass's reported insistence on a British 
withdrawal from Northern Ireland, nor the 'enthusiastic support' of 
Adenauer and de Gaulle for this measure, were put to the test. All 
had departed public life before the Irish negotiations took place and 
their respective successors gave no indication of adhering to their views. 
Furthermore, the fact that Ireland sought membership of an enlarged 
Community virtually in tandem with Britain, invalidated the premises 
upon which Lemass's hopes were based.
Notwithstanding those developments, unforeseen in the time of 
Lemass, all of the formulations referred to with perhaps the exception 
of the economic unity forecast by Lynch, appear unreal given the 
continuing social and political climate of Northern Ireland. While it 
is probably a requirement of a settlement in the province that no one is 
entitled to be pessimistic, there is nevertheless an odd logic to the 
notion that, somehow or other, quite undefined (although Fitzgerald's 
writings may be an exception to this condition), common membership of 
the EEC must lead inexorably to Irish unity, or alternatively, its 
irrelevance. As Brian Garrett, Secretary of the Northern Ireland 
Council of the European movement has observed of the former proposition:
ibid. As various other statements made on this subject in January 
1978 complicated, but did not contradict Mrs O'Brien's assertions, it 
was useful to refer to John Mulcahy's column, 'The Last Word', in Hibernias
20 January 1978, p. 40, for an account which clarified matters.
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It is a sort of Irish political version of the 
Indian rope trick —  perhaps better described as 
the Brussels trick. Like most tricks it will 
require an extraordinary deftness and sleight of
hand.29
And of the latter, concerning the irrelevance, or even the diminution 
of the importance of Irish unity, even greater reservations may be held. 
Indeed, in the discussion which follows, the proposition that nationalism 
is irrelevant within the EEC will be confronted with the contrary view —  
that it may well be that it is the EEC which is irrelevant to the deep 
divisions of Ireland. To explain and justify this statement it is 
necessary to briefly digress upon attitudes which have emerged since the 
beginning of the period.
In 1976 Conor Cruise O'Brien, Minister for Posts and Telegraphs in 
the Irish Government, addressed the students of University College, 
Dublin, on a text from Yeats's poem 'September 1913':
Romantic Ireland's dead and gone,
It's with O'Leary in the grave.
The burden of O'Brien's speech then, as of numerous essays, articles and 
books both before and since, was that Romantic Ireland was not dead and 
gone. And that was to be regretted. According to O'Brien, Ireland 
would not be at peace until the ideology of Romantic Ireland —  with its 
reverence for men of blood and violence, its English demonology, and its 
vision of history as a sequence of glorious but failed revolutions —  
was abandoned.^
O'Brien, therefore, urged the Irish to postpone indefinitely the 
question of England's departure from the North. In the words of 
Denis Donoghue, he urged them to
Irish Times3 9 October 1978, report of a conference on the theme 
'Irish Political Evolution in the European Context', organised by the 
Irish Association for Cultural, Economic and Social Relations.
30
As reported in Denis Donoghue, 'Drums Under the Window', review of 
The Damnable Question by George Dangerfield (and Mother Ireland by Edna 
O'Brien), in The New York Review, 14 October 1976, p. 12 (hereafter cited 
as Donoghue, 'Drums Under the Window').
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... attend to the chore of making daily life more 
equable, more tolerant ... to live by bread alone.31
Now, of course, it is something of an understatement to say that the 
views of Conor Cruise O'Brien are considerably removed from those of 
the Irish Government. But in 1976 his address could not so easily be 
dismissed: he was both a central figure in the Cabinet of the National 
Coalition, and, arguably, the most prominent member of it in articulating 
its philosophy as regards the asp.iration of national unity. Thus 
Donoghue observed at the time:
Dr. O'Brien's speech embodies the policy of his 
government, and of many people who do not support 
the government in any other respect. 'They have gone 
about the world like wind', Yeats wrote of the fame 
of Ireland's revolutionary heroes, but in Ireland 
today it is increasingly common to say that this wind 
brought good to nobody.32
It is when O'Brien's views are placed alongside those of his 
then colleague, Fitzgerald (and Barrington for that matter), that the 
grounds for reservations become defined. O'Brien, obviously, was 
disgusted by the consequences of a myth and admonished the Irish to
live, in Donoghue's paraphrase, in 'a clean air, humanist and secular,
33
without complaint or nostalgia'. In a different vein Fitzgerald 
offered a new, safe symbol in the ostensible unity embodied in the EEC. 
Yet this, too, in the context of Irish history was essentially a negative 
proposal. Whereas O'Brien appeared almost to disown the past and to 
advocate a future devoid of myths, Fitzgerald sought more to replace —  in 
effect to degrade —  the myth of nationalism with another which not only 
had yet to be held as sacred, but given the richness and potency of the 
old myth, was unlikely to be held as such.
Specifically expressed, the first reservation concerning these 
approaches to Irish history and to EEC membership, arises from the 
attempts to persuade the Irish people that their particular lot lay with
31
32
33
ibid. 
ibid. 
ibid.
the social democracies of Western Europe —  those whom Anthony Cronin 
described as
[having] forgotten not only ancient dreams and 
delusions but much else as well in favour of 
contentment with the material convenience and 
prosperities of what is called the ‘free world'.34
According to Cronin, in the interests of this sort of persuasion 
a view of Irish history was presented which attempted to 'tranquil 1ise' 
the more brutal aspects of the British exploitation of Ireland, to 
portray as a 'mere shibboleth' the 'vital necessity' of national unity, 
and which ignored the profound differences in the matter of natural 
historical development between Ireland and the countries it was proposed
that it join and e m u late.^ Ireland, it should be noted,was, apart from 
being a fractured country, not an ex-Imperial industrialised power like 
Belgium, Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands. Moreover, as to 
the minimum conditions necessary for national development, certain forms 
of economic and social attainment, and freedom from exploitation, it was 
far from being in the position of the Scandinavian countries it was 
principally asked to look upon as models.
Cronin, thereby, argued from a position contemptuous of 
Fitzgerald's views and diametrically opposed to Barrington's arid O'Brien' 
Fundamentally, it was an extension of the importance which he vested in 
the nation.
It may be that some of us delude ourselves about the 
nation, but let us be clear about this. The importance 
of the nation as a matrix of human expression, endeavour 
and association can hardly be exaggerated. It is impossible 
to conceive of Shakespeare as other than an Englishman; or, 
for the matter of that, of James Joyce as other than a 
product of Ireland. Without England the one could not have 
happened; nor without Ireland, the other.36
Anthony Cronin, 'The Nationalism that never was: 1916 and the 
Cultural Decline', an edited transcript of a lecture given in 1976 at 
Liberty Hall, Dublin, titled 'The Relevance of 1916', published in 
Hibernia3 2 July 1976, pp. 16-17 (hereafter cited as Cronin, 'The 
Nationalism That Never Was').
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It was an awareness of the past which was perhaps best 
encapsulated by Frank O'Connor's conclusion to his analysis of Irish 
literature, The Backward Look.
I am not sure that any country can afford to discard 
what I have called 'the backward look', but we in 
Ireland can afford it less than any other because 
without it we have nothing and are nothing, and we 
must not cease to remember Yeats' final words:
Cast your mind on other days 
That we in coning days may be 
Still the indomitable Irishry . ^ 7
If Cronin's basic contention is accepted, and it seems reasonable 
that it should be, then the full significance of Ireland's move into 
Europe becomes apparent. Put quite simply, Ireland entered the EEC 
without having completed its nationalist revolution. As events since 
Partition have confirmed, neither state in the island of Ireland has 
successfully or properly subsumed its dreams of nationality into its 
respective state structures. Indeed, it appears that in the Republic, 
among certain writers and politicians, the components of nationality 
were progressively modified and abandoned.
What replaced them was a concept of Man merely as an economic 
actor who, deprived of a national identity because the Irish nation 
remained divorced in the form of two Irish states, was disposed to assume 
an international identity. This gives rise to the second reservation, 
which derives from the fact that the EEC was never a matrix of human 
expression and association, but basically a political notion (Europe) 
given economic functions. Hence the view of Man envisaged by 
Barrington and Fitzgerald in relation to this entity is necessarily 
impoverished and, as it concerns his nature, boring and bleak as 
wel 1.
As a consequence, from a cultural and social, but particularly 
a political perspective, the incomplete bonds which have at least allowed 
the development of a limited sense of community in Ireland to this time
Frank O'Connor, The Backward Look (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 230.
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will be placed under stress by progress towards an assumed 
internationalism. In the context of the EEC this is both inappropriate 
and misdirected for that organisation will not in the forseeable future 
be able to replace them with the relevant Euro-identities nor, because 
of its nature, even facilitate the development of what currently passes 
for an Irish identity. The significance of this may well be that 
Ireland will be in that position described by Cronin —
... open to exploitation by larger forces which we
are not even in the position of the old state ...
to resist.38
In that event the opportunity to develop a sense of nationhood in 
Ireland, North and South, will have become a casualty to a faceless 
and perhaps even an inhuman bureaucracy.
These ideas, however, have yet to be realised. The period in 
which the two states of Ireland have been part of the EEC is as yet 
too short for them to be regarded as applicable or otherwise. In any 
case, they were not presented by their protagonists as immutable laws, 
but rather as hopes or fears. But their consideration was required 
nonetheless. For Barrington, the Dublin Senior Counsel, this was 
determined by the position of influence he was held to enjoy vis-a-vis 
the Fianna Fail leadership —  under Lynch at least —  although it is 
conceded that this may have suffered with Haughey's succession. Cronin's 
case rested not on his association with any political party, but on the 
fact that he is an articulate and widely read intel1ectual,and like 
Barrington, presented an argument which demanded a closer examination.
The views of leading politicians were at once more compelling in 
this regard, even if they were not in every case as well presented, and 
even if, as was the case with Lynch and O'Brien, they could not at the 
time of writing (early 1981) still be regarded as central figures in 
political life. As statements of exhortation and expectation as to how 
a centuries-old dispute might be resolved they simply could not be 
overlooked. Moreover, all the views discussed were representative of the 
range of hopes and fears which obtained (and still obtain) with respect 
to Ireland's unknown European future.
Cronin, 'The Nationalism That Never Was', p. 17.
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To date (January 1981) the record of Irish membership of the 
European Community has provided few indications that would tend to 
support the more optimistic formulations discussed in the foregoing. 
However, given that the record is based on only a seven-year period 
this is not surprising, but it is surely of interest to note that 
progress towards an even lesser objective than political unity, has been 
sufficiently troubled to question just exactly what progress should be 
expected realistically within (say) the next decade or two.
In the period before Irish membership of the EEC a brief but
promising attempt was made to establish some form of economic
co-operation between the Republic and Northern Ireland. Towards what
Lynch (as Taoiseach) termed 'a new kind of Irish society ... equally
agreeable to North and South', he, in early 1971, offered to make
available to the Stormont the collected experience and knowledge of the
Irish Government 'at any times and on any subject' relating to the
39
development of all Ireland in the EEC. This offer was accepted in 
principle by Brian Faulkner, the new Northern Ireland Prime Minister, 
and talks at 'senior official level' were initiated. In April of 1971, 
Lynch referred to this development as an
expression of what can be called political confidence 
that the North is now capable of setting its face on a 
different kind of future for all its people ...40
Later that year, in August, he extended his original offer by proposing 
a joint economic council and suggesting that
... giving representatives both North and South the 
opportunity of working together in a formal way would 
expand the scope of their functions and further bring 
about efforts to reconcile views North and So u th .41
'Presidential Address to the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis, 20th February,
1971, The Taoiseach, John Lynch, T.D., Statements and Speeches on Irish 
Unitys Northern Ireland, Anglo-Irish Relations> August 1969 —  October 
1971 (Dublin: Government Information Bureau, 1971), p. 47 and pp. 44-5 
(hereafter cited as Lynch, Statements and Speeches).
40 . .
ibid., p. 53, Speech at the Speakers' Club, Cork, 30 April 1971.
41
ibid., p. 69, Statement in Dail Eireann, 6 August 1971.
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which had marked North-South initiatives in the Lemass period and which
42
then had seemed to hold so much hope. While subsequent events —  such
as the introduction of internment and the prorogation of the Stormont
Government —  had the effect of rendering this offer inoperable, a
stimulus towards broadly similar objectives was provided by the decision
of the EEC Commission to designate the entire island of Ireland as a
43
single region in the planning of regional policy.
In this the Commission reflected the widespread accord which v/as to
be found in both British and Irish Government statements (particularly
during the period of the 1972-73 initiative) and in Anglo-Irish
44
communiques since then. In the debate on the Green Paper of 1972, the 
Northern Ireland Secretary, William Whitelaw, noted that
in the context of the European Economic Community, there 
is a clear opportunity for developing co-operation on 
economic and social issues which could bring considerable 
benefits to the people in both the North and the South
of Ireland. ^
It was, therefore, a recourse to the strategy of functional co-operation
Keatinge, Issues of Irish Foreign P o l i c y p. 118.
43
Two attempts to inquire further into the North-South politics of 
this period as they related to Lynch's offers proved unsuccessful. The 
former Department of Foreign Affairs senior civil servant, Eamon Gallagher, 
declined to offer any information on the grounds that, as Director-General 
for Fisheries in the Commission of European Communities, he had 'no access 
to official sources of information' of the time (letter to the writer,
6 May 1980). More promising replies were received from Jack Lynch, both 
as Taoiseach and as TD on his retirement, who agreed to provide written 
answers to questions submitted by letter (letters to the writer from the 
Private Secretary to the Taoiseach, dated 'August 1979'; and his Personal 
Secretary, 31 March 1980, respectively). However, as of June 1981, 
despite a further written request on 30 June 1980, no reply had been 
recei ved.
44
Northern Ireland Office, The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper 
for Discussion (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972).
45
Pariiamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report, 
Vol. 846, 13 November 1972, Col. 46, (hereafter cited as House of Commons, 
Official Report). The hope evident in the above statement was also found 
in the British Government White Paper of March 1973 [Northern Ireland 
Constitutional Proposals (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
March 1973), pp. 5-6.1
I
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Even in Europe a cautious endorsement of this hope was expressed 
in the Report adopted by the Council of Europe in 1976:
The unexpected pro-marketeer majority that came out of 
Northern Ireland at the EEC referendum can perhaps be 
taken as an encouraging omen. For once forgetting 
party directives, the new, cross-barrier majority that 
materialised at the polls shows that the people of 
Northern Ireland are not entirely hostile to accepting 
a wider dimension and to co-operation with other 
neighbouring European countries. 1°
But it would be misleading to draw from such indications any more
hopeful conclusions. In the referendum on the EEC in Northern Ireland,
49 per cent voted against entry and the sentiment expressed was not lost
on political leaders in the province, who continued to tread very
warily whenever the prospect of cross-Border co-operation was raised.
Thus in 1976,serious reservations about the EEC's cross-Border regional
development study were made by a delegation of Official Ulster Unionists
on a fact-finding mission in Brussels. Foremost among its membership
were Harry West and John Taylor, both of whom stressed that the study
should be proceeded with only after exhausting the possible uses of
regional aid within the two separate states in Ireland, and then only
after consultation with the Northern Ireland people and their
47
representatives.
From subsequent statements it was clear that this caution extended
even to those who were regarded as enthusiastic supporters of Northern
Ireland's (strictly speaking, the United Kingdom's) membership of the
EEC. Both Roy Bradford (chairman) and Brian Garrett (secretary) of
the Northern Ireland Council of the European Movement have respectively
held that it was not only 'unhelpful' to the aims of the EEC to regard it
as a vehicle for Irish unity, but have also implied that it was anti-
48
thetical to its true aims. The awareness of these views also accounted
Pariiamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Report on the 
situation in Northern Ireland and the activities of the Sub-Committees on 
Northern Ireland3 Document 3696, 28 November 1975, para. 82.
47
Irish Times3 11 June 1976.
48
Irish Times3 9 October 1978; report of a conference on the theme 
'Irish Political Evolution in the European Context', organised by the 
Irish Association for Cultural and Social Relations.
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the matter of cross-Border co-operation discussed in 1978, when his
49
Government was particularly vulnerable to Unionist pressure.
Nevertheless, the Irish (National Coalition) Government, with less
to lose than Mason in 1978, were not so easily intimidated by Northern
attitudes. As early as 1974 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Garret
Fitzgerald, had promoted the regional fund interests of both the
Republic and Northern Ireland at a meeting of the EEC's Council of
50
Ministers. Yet in time he, too, appeared to modify his enthusiasm 
and to appreciate more keenly the limits to which the interest of his 
Government was acceptable in the European affairs of Northern Ireland.
In reply to a question in Dail Eireann in 1976, John Kelly, his 
Parliamentary Secretary, stated that because of British sovereignty 
over the province it was 'not ... appropriate' for the Irish Government 
to make representations to the EEC on its behalf for special loans and 
grant assistance. To do so, he claimed, would be to
invite a rebuttal from the Community in the first 
place, a complaint from the other [British] Government 
concerned in the second and would probably cause a 
great deal of resentment among the population of the 
area, ... in the third place.51
In the place of such efforts, Kelly suggested only the possibility of
52
joint approaches being made with a view to cross-Border projects. But
given that Fitzgerald has since acknowledged the unwillingness of
Unionists to publicly recognise the advantages which might accrue to
53
Northern Ireland from political association with the Republic, and 
that in describing the political situation in the six counties over the
for the reluctance of Northern Ireland Secretary, Roy Mason, to have
49
Irish Times} 15 March 1978, p. 1; 22 March 1978, p. 1; and 14 
April 1978, p. 1.
50
Irish Times3 26 November 1974, p. 7»
51
Dail Eireann, Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Vol. 290,
28 April 1976, Col. 207.
52 .. .. 
ibid.
53
Fine Gael, Ireland —  Our Future T o g e t h e r p. 18.
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last six years, the term 'stalemate' has so readily come to mind, it is 
difficult to foresee how and where substantial development may take 
place on a cross-Border theme.
Admittedly two somewhat ambiguous reports were produced towards
the end of the period which could possible temper this judgment. The
first, produced in 1977 under the aegis of the Governments of the United
Kingdom and of Ireland and the Commission of the European Communities,
was the result of the first specific attempt at a cross-Border study
54
since Partition. And that fact alone should have given some idea of
the historical difficulties which had beset this type of initiative.*
However, almost with a disregard for that caution, it was contended
by David Andrews, Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs,
that the report, which pointed to a similarity of problems across the
Border region and the involvement of local administrators to solve them,
was evidence of 'vision and goodwill' and a 'general commitment to cross-
55
Border co-operation'. But this view was illusory. It derived its 
optimism from documents which were no more than EEC-financed studies, or 
their like (such as the aforementioned UK-Ireland-EC report of 1977) and 
was excessively dependent on the enthusiasm generated for cross-Border 
co-operation in Dublin and among the local groups who stood to benefit.
Perhaps in numerous other settings Andrews' formulation would have 
been a logical deduction, but in Northern Ireland, with its record of 
opposition to the EEC, and in the wider context of the British 
Government's reluctance to pursue cross-Border developments because of 
this, a conservative, and hence pessimistic judgment appears more 
justifiable. Subsequent events have added strength to this conclusion.
See: Cross-Border Communications Study for the Londonderry and 
Donegal Area, Vol. 1, Summary Report, prepared for the Governments of 
the United Kingdom and Ireland and the Commission of the European 
Communities, by: Peat, Marwick, Mitchel1 and Co. (London), and Stokes 
Kennedy, Crowley & Co. (Dublin), October 1977.
55
'Speech by Mr. David Andrews, T.D., Minister of State at the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, at the Ardara Comhairle Ceanntair Annual 
Dinner Dance in the Nesbitt Arms Hotel, Ardara, Co. Donegal.' (Text 
issued by the Government Information Services, Dublin, on behalf of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, 3 February 1978).
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The wording of the joint communique issued after the Mason- 
0'Kennedy talks in Dublin on 5 May 1978 must rate as a model study 
in the politics of procrastination. The part dealing with cross-Border 
co-operation read:
The Ministers announced that there would be an early 
application for EEC funds with a view to starting a 
study of the Erne catchment area. The study was a 
major proposal contained in the report56 and followed 
an initiative by local authorities on both sides of 
the Border. Consultants would be employed to assess 
and report on the development potential of the Erne 
catchment area with references to the development of 
tourism amenities in matters such as accommodation, 
access and marketing and the development of land 
resources through actual drainage.57 [emphases added]
While, in other circumstances the wording of this statement could 
have been interpreted as a declaration of intention to act speedily, 
it has not been so regarded here because of the context in which it 
occurs.
If each of the sections italicised is analysed in terms of the 
likely speed with which action could be expected, the results are hardly 
promising. At best, there are at least four stages at which the study 
could be delayed, and even then, it would be concerned only with 
potential, rather than actual areas of co-operation. Thus while 
0'Kennedy may have won his Government's battle to include cross-Border 
matters in the controversial meeting, he may also have signalled their 
demise, for the terms of the communique commit neither Government to a 
firm course of action. There is not even a commitment to a study: 
while the funds may be applied for and set aside, the date of any further 
action (including the date of application for that matter) was not 
specified. This significance of these omissions was not lost on the 
political commentator, John Healy, who, in characteristic fashion, 
provided the following obituary of the whole study enterprise:
i.e., the report of a Steering Group set up, following the 
September 1977 meeting between Callaghan and Lynch. See Reports on
Economic Co-operation (also titled Reports on Anglo-Irish Economic 
Co-operation) issued June 1978, and obtained from the Office of the 
Taoiseach, p. 33 (hereafter cited as Reports On Economic Co-operation).
Text of the joint communique, as published in the Irish Times3
6 May 1978, p. 6.
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... it bids fair to be 1990 before it gets back to 
the politicians and the decision makers in Parliaments 
where it must be Green-Papered and White-Papered and, 
if things are getting sticky funds-wise in Dublin and 
London, you can always depend on a Minister for Finance 
announcing that he was decided —  and this is really the 
bit that buries it —  to do a cost-benefit analysis on 
the proposed Erne catchment area scheme ...
By that time Roy Mason will be where the chickens 
won'tfind him, the Dublin altar boys^8 will be writing 
their memoirs, the Erne will remain undisturbed ...
He had, thereby, highlighted two principal characteristics of
international functionalism which must condition any assessment of
North-South relations based on cross-Border co-operation. The first,
as Keatinge pointed out, is that progress in this type of endeavour,
6 0
'is by its nature slow'. The second, as Inis Claude observed in a 
more general context, is that such activity is
at least in the short run, more dependent upon the 
political weather than determinative of the political 
weather.61
The value of functional co-operation is not, therefore, the question 
so much as it is the willingness of all parties to exploit the 
opportunities for it within a reasonable time frame. And even then, as 
the second report illustrated in a North-South context, the results lend 
themselves to a number of interpretations.
58
A term applied by Healy to some of the younger and more prominent 
members of the Irish Government. In particular he used it to describe 
Michael 0'Kennedy, then Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Lynch 
Government.
1
CQ
John Healy's column 'Sounding Off', Irish Times, 8 May 1978, p. 11.
His prediction of 1990 was not the exaggeration it may have appeared.
For just one section of the Bal1inamore/Ballyconnel1 Canal it was 
estimated that 'about 3 y e a r s ' will be required before a scheme of works 
with estimated costs could be produced. (Reports on Economic Co-operation, 
pp. 30-1, and 40.) It is conceded, however, that this could equally 
happen in a national enterprise, but this would not alter the effect 
that the time for such could have on the eventual project.
60
Keatinge, Issues of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 124.
'‘ Inis Claude, Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of 
International Organization, 4th e d . (New York: Random House, 1971), 
p. 407. Also cited in Keatinge, Issues of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 124.
The second report was the one referred to in the 6 May communique.
It was not so much a development in itself but a collection, in great 
detail and perhaps with some unnecessary padding, of communiques, 
minutes and reports on the series of exchanges which followed the 
September 1977 meeting between Callaghan and Lynch. On first perusal 
it was a prosaic, not to say boring, document; indeed the most 
enthusiastic section was that where Her Majesty's Customs and Excise
62
and the Irish Revenue Commissioners indulged in mutual congratulation.
Yet the list showed thirty-three existing contacts, ranging from 
North-South trade promotion through off-shore oil, drainage, fire 
services, education (almost nil) to statistics, Geological Survey, and 
the Public Record Office. Obviously, this record included a considerable 
number of little publicised contacts, but overall, their effectiveness 
was not then apparent nor has it been since. Certainly, it was open to 
the interpretation that even the mundane trading of information which it 
chronicled was at least helpful to both sides, even on the basis of a 
mere comparing of notes among professionals. And it may yet advance the 
cause of better living for people on both sides of the Border and that 
also would be a welcome move.
However, the very extent of the contacts listed provides a cause 
for reflection, and emphasises the ambiguity which obtains to so many 
developments in Ireland. Put simply, the evidence of extensive 
co-operation was capable of supporting both an optimistic and a 
pessimistic construction on the hopes of cross-Border co-operation.
On the one hand it could be argued that examples of such wide ranging 
co-operation suggested a decrease in North-South antipathies, while on 
the other, it was equally valid to suggest that they implied nothing of 
the sort —  other than that they existed concomitantly despite these 
feelings. In support of the latter it was also pertinent that a great many 
such contacts existed before the current outbreak of the 'troubles', and 
these appear not to have been an effective restraint over the past ten or 
twelve years.
314
Reports on Economic Co-operationpp. 19-21.
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Furthermore, in seven of the past twelve years, these tensions 
were maintained coterminously with a dramatic improvement in the 
Republic's prosperity as a result of its EEC membership. Indeed, the 
economic progress made by the Republic has matched the enthusiasm with 
which its entry was supported by the electorate, and gives some 
credibility to Donoghue's cynical assessment that the Irish are in the 
EEC 'only for the m o n e y ' . ^
With just under a quarter of its working population on the land,
the Republic's prosperity has received a remarkable boost as a result of
the Community's agricultural policies. Between 1970 and the end of 1977,
beef exports were quadrupled and dairy products increased by 40 per cent.
Total agricultural exports in the same period rose from £197 million to
64
over £700 million. Ihe main reason for this was that the EEC set a 
guaranteed price for farm products, irrespective of the volume of 
production. Produce not sold was put into 'intervention' —  i.e., stored. 
The Irish farmer, thereupon, hit a bonanza; in contrast to non-EEC 
times, however much he produced he was guaranteed an economic price.
The farmer in Northern Ireland was less fortunate for two reasons.
First, the United Kingdom is a net importer of food, and second,
extending from this, the British agricultural policy, dictated by London,
favoured the consumer and not the producer. For the period under review,
British farmers did not receive the full European price. Yet, because
of political pressure from the North, the British Government felt
compelled to redress the balance between the farmers there and those in the
Republic. This of course proved a costly exercise (£50 million in 1977)
and one which also generated resentment in the rest of the British farming
65
community which was not so treated. In turn, this had the effect of 
making the subsidy of Northern Ireland farmers politically unpopular at 
Westminster, and called into question how long it could be continued. To 
complete the cycle, this then raised an uncertainty with the Northern
63
Donoghue, 'Drums Under the Window', p. 12.
^  Mark O'Neill, 'Europe Link Helps to Close Irish Wealth Gap', The 
Observer Foreign News Service, No. 36978, 17 February 1978.
65 -u-Aibid.
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farmers as to whether Westminster could be relied upon to maintain 
their standard of living.
The prosperity of the Republic's agricultural sector has also led 
to spin-offs in other areas. In 1977 the country had the highest growth 
rate in the EEC, which no doubt contributed to Lynch's confidence to 
announce tax cuts and improved social security benefits in his 1978
rr
budget. Industrially too, the EEC benefited the Republic —  allowing it
*
to retain its fifteen-year tax holiday on exports as an enticement to new 
firms, an incentive which no other EEC member country offers. Thus, in 
the years since the two Irish states joined the EEC the wealth gap 
between them has narrowed to the point where, for the first time since 
Partition, there are grounds for challenging its economic justification.
Naturally, such economic progress allowed the Taoiseach to proclaim
his confidence in the EEC, which he did in 1979 with a statement that
67
Ireland's expectations of the Community had been 'fully justified'. 
Somewhat surprisingly, this was intended to apply across the whole range 
of expectations, because it was clear from a close reading of his 
statements throughout 1978-79 that,in terms of Northern Ireland, his 
views reflected less of the certainty which was found in those of other 
Irish political leaders.
Notwithstanding the hopes that were voiced at the start of the 
decade, the Community itself underwent only a slow development from the 
time of Ireland's membership in 1973. As Keatinge observed, it
was then —  and still is [ 19781 —  rather more than a 
purely economic system and a good deal less than a 
European Federation.68
Whether Community membership facilitated Anglo-Irish relations is 
open to question, but there were examples wherein it allowed other
66 ., . , 
ibid.
'Ireland's membership of the EEC 1973/1979: Message from An 
Taoiseach, Mr. J. Lynch T.D.', Ireland Today: Bulletin of the Department 
of Foreign A f f a i r s No. 953, 1 July 1979.
68
Keatinge, Issues of Irish Foreign Policy3 p. 78.
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the item of regional policy was placed on the 1974 Paris Summit agenda,
69
or when Ireland's position was opposed by Britain. A lack of 
certainty also applies to any conclusion concerning the effect of 
Community membership on the specific issue of Northern Ireland within 
Anglo-Irish relations. Initially it was thought by some commentators 
that the wider forum provided by the Community would remove some of the 
acrimony and claustrophobia which it tended to engender within a bilateral 
setting. But the record of Anglo-Irish relations since 1973 is ambiguous 
on this point as well. While the EEC has sometimes provided the occasion 
for a much needed reduction in tension —  as in the Copenhagen Summit of 
19787^ —  the dynamics of the situation in Northern Ireland, and hence of 
the diplomacy which concerns itself with this, have been 'sui generis'.
The diplomacy of the Ulster Question may, therefore, be regarded as 
having been conducted with minimal reference to Community politics in 
general.
These factors, even if they did not find expression in the 1979 
statement, no doubt influenced Lynch's views. Fundamentally, it was 
obvious that he simply did not subscribe to propositions which relied 
on the efficacy of economic measures. As he told Dail Eireann in June 
1978:
We share common interests with the North ... in a whole 
range of issues which are now increasingly being 
determined in Brussels ... But to suggest that present 
divisions are economic or can be solved by economic 
measures alone is not enough. There are social, 
psychological, religious and moral differences between 
the different sections of the community in this island.
Most of these divisions are based on misapprehension —  
or even on fear.71
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Michael 0 'Kennedy, was, however, 
clearly more impressed with economic progress and the promise he saw it
relationships to flourish —  for example with France in ensuring that
See: E. Moxon Browne, 'Ireland in the EEC', p. 429. More recently 
the Irish and French have organised their own sheepmeats protection 
scheme and prompted a 'lamb war' with Britain.
See Chapter 4, p. 224.
Adjournment Debate, 28 June 1978, as reported in the Irish Times,
29 June 1978, p. 4.
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to hold for North-South relations. His address to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations some three months later pointed to this, 
but by way of a slight difference of emphasis.
The new thinking and new hope, ... derive in part from 
progress and new developments in Ireland. Today the 
Republic has one of the fastest growing economies in 
Western Europe. The problems of inflation and 
unemployment are being brought under control.
Now that both parts of the island are within the 
European Economic Community we have become more 
conscious than ever of the extent to which the problems 
and opportunities we face are similar in both parts of 
the island. There is a new mood which recognises that 
on many questions we have common interests which are 
best pursued in common. My Government would like to 
ensure that there is a clear awareness abroad of this 
new mood and of the new possibilities in Ireland.?2
Subsequently, the Irish Government's policy was to admit more than
differing emphases. Whereas O'Kennedy had, a few months prior to his
UN address, stated his Government's strong opposition to outside
parties -  such as the United States Government or the European
73
Commission —  attempting a solution to the Northern problems, it became 
apparent, throughout 1979, that this position was being abandoned. (As 
an aside, it should be noted that O'Kennedy drew a distinction between 
the Commission, which is an executive organ of the EEC, and the EEC 
itself which, he hoped, would provide a role through which a North-South 
accord could be achieved.7^).
The first indication of this was provided on 19 July 1979, when the 
Taoiseach, as President-in-Office of the European Council, addressed the 
opening session of the European Parliament in terms which did not 
specifically mention Northern Ireland, but must have been clearly intended 
to apply to it. He spoke of the 'onus' upon the Community to end the
72
'Address to the 33rd General Assembly of the United Nations by the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Michael O'Kennedy T.D., on 28 
September 1978', Statements and Speeches 7/78: Bulletin of the
department of Foreign Affairs.
^  Times, 18 May 1978.
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'dark shadows and divisions' which existed in any part of the countries 
which comprised it. Towards 'the progress of Europe', he called upon 
the new European Parliament, as the 'most widely-representative, freely- 
elected international assembly in the world', to use its 'great
75
influence and powers to help to root out' the causes of disruption.
In all, it was a cryptic but unmistakeable appeal for, international
assistance towards an initiative in Northern Ireland, and very much
consistent with the return to the assertive posture adopted by the Irish
7fi
Government in Anglo-Irish relations in early 1978.
Following this, Richard Burke, the Irish member of the European 
Commission, expressed what he called a 'personal' view, to the effect 
that it was legitimate to ask what Europe and the United States could 
do towards a solution in the North.77 Although couched in cautious terms, 
and notwithstanding that it was a private opinion, Burke's remarks 
constituted a departure. By tradition, European Commissioners kept well 
clear of domestic political issues and issues between member states.
By the end of 1979 there was no question that the two statements 
above reflected a profound change in the Irish Government's position. 
According to O'Kennedy, Northern Ireland was
the last remaining problem in the community for peace, 
it is an exception to the pattern in the rest of the 
EEC. The goodwill in Europe and the United States is 
there to be tapped to support a return to normal 
politics in the North.
A reasonable inference was that Ireland had decided upon a campaign to 
'Europeanise' (and 'Americanise') the Northern Ireland problem inasmuch 
as it plainly aimed to generate pressure upon Britain to provide some
75
'Irish Presidency 1979, Opening of the New European Parliament: 
Statement by the Taoiseach, Mr. John Lynch TD', Statements and Speeches
9/79: Bulletin of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
7^ See Chapter 4, pp. 210-17.
Address to a meeting of European and American journalists, Waterville* 
Co., Kerry, 21 September 1979, as reported in the Irish Times, 22 
September 1979.
78
As reported in Geoffrey Barker, 'Unity: An Irish Dream', Melbourne 
Age, 1 November 1979, p. 9.
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Somewhat disingenuously this was obscured, even denied, but
unconvincingly. O'Kennedy and Desmond O'Malley, Minister for Industry,
Commerce and Energy, continued to claim that they could not contemplate
any form of direct intervention —  and that, of course, was consistent
79
with their Government's previous position. But it was only possible
to accept their statements if the meanings commonly associated with
the expression 'tapping the goodwill' were debased so as to preclude
many of the meanings commonly associated with 'direct intervention'.
O'Malley for one, did not intend this. As he explained to a group
80
of (mainly European ) journalists:
Northern Ireland is not just an Anglo-Irish problem.
It is increasingly a European problem ... It is the 
one small place in the EEC where there is no peace, and 
I think the nine member states can make a contribution
by making their views k n o w n b y  expressing their 
inability to accept the situation3 by using the economic 
muscle to encourage a coming together of the two 
traditions in the-North. We would welcome that.
[emphasis added]°1
Moreover, the very fact that Europe and the United States were 
invoked, not in the spirit of anger and revulsion, as was the result of 
an event such as Bloody Sunday, but with a view towards a settlement of 
the problems in Northern Ireland, was an invitation to regard their 
dimensions as having been definitely expanded. Even if this was to 
consist of nothing more than bilaterial discussions of the issues between 
(say) a European party and Britain, the public manner in which these 
statements were made suggested a greater determination by the Irish 
Government to internationalise matters, and thus a conclusion that it had 
adopted a policy which was not previously evident.
political movement in the province.
79 -u-, ibid.
80
ibid., (Geoffrey Barker, Chief European correspondent of The Age3 
and writer of the article noted below, was the only non-European 
present.)
81 -L • Ji bid.
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Lynch's role, or lack thereof in this development, can only be a 
matter for speculation for the present time. Moreover, this particular 
aspect of policy cannot be viewed in isolation from either the remainder 
of his Government's Northern policy, or, for that matter, from the 
declining popularity of his domestic policies. In brief, it is not yet 
apparent whether Lynch moved to extend the international dimensions of 
the issue himself or whether he was obliged by pressure within his 
Cabinet to do so, perhaps as part of a general policy revision. A 
precedent for the latter existed: the uncompromising terms of Fianna 
Fail's 1975 policy statement on the North were reliably reported as not
being his own, but those of (later) Ministers such as O'Kennedy who
82
advocated a more forceful line. And after the fact, his unexpected 
resignation as Taoiseach in late 1979 would also support the suggestion 
that he was obliged to accommodate stronger views for a while prior to 
this.
Whatever the influences, the policy itself denoted more than a 
recrudescence of the belief in the 'Brussels rope trick': that device, 
as Brian Garrett had pointed out, relied on undefined forces or mechanisms 
to levitate Ireland into a unified state. Instead, what O'Kennedy and 
O'Malley had proposed, all euphemisms aside, was to bring to bear such 
political pressure upon the United Kingdom, that it would be required to 
force an accord in Northern Ireland. Thus, what the British Government 
had seen itself as incapable of imposing in 1974, and indeed throughout 
this century, was to be effected through a 'deus ex machina' two steps 
removed from the scene. How this would be wrought was, and remains, 
unclear. And to this extent the proposition, if it may be called one, was 
simply not credible. At least the 'Brussels rope trick' posited a 
convergence of interests, North and South, as a basis for unity, whereas 
the 'international' solution had only a reliance on the existence of a 
dubious 'force majeure' to recommend it.
From such formulations, and the many others alluded to in the course 
of this chapter, it is obvious that the Community has been invested, by 
both optimists and pessimists alike, with something approaching a totemic
Vincent Browne, 'The artful ambiguities of Jack Lynch', Magill, Vol.l, 
No.l, October 1977, pp. 8-9.
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significance- While that may be particularly appropriate to a country 
whose conflicts are so frequently portrayed as 'tribal', it is also a 
measure, not only of the uncertainty, but of the hope, surrounding the 
EC. That is understandable, because hope simply makes no sense if the 
issue in question is settled beyond doubt. And though many of these hopes 
appear unrealistic, they have at least one advantage for those who hold 
them: by their very nature, and the period in which the states of 
Ireland have been in the EC, they a re less susceptible to analysis than 
are statements as to fact, or of intention. They stand, accordingly, 
as future possibilities rather than history. History, as was frequently 
noted in the preceding text, is on this matter too short and too recent 
to permit the clear discernment of patterns or forces which might 
influence the possible answers to the Ulster Question.
The European Monetary System (EMS): A Brief Note
In early July 1978 at the European Council (i.e., Heads of 
Government) meeting in Bremen, it was agreed that the establishment of a 
zone of monetary stability in Europe was a highly desirable objective. 
Thereupon, approval was given to Finance Ministers to prepare a plan of 
action to establish such a zone which could itself be approved by the 
following European Council in early December 1978. In addition, studies 
of what action should be taken to aid less prosperous member countries 
were to be carried out.
At the time it was widely believed in both Ireland and the United
Kingdom that both countries would be founder members of the new system.
There were, however, significant areas of disagreement between member
States over the way in which the system would operate. In particular,
some members proposed that the system should be based on a 'basket' of
all national currencies within the System, while others advocated a
'parity grid' approach which would oblige member States to maintain their
currency within a fairly narrow band relative to each other's currency
83
within the System. In the former approach a strong currency would be
Brendan Dowling, 'The European Monetary System', Ireland Today:
Bulletin of the department of Foreign A f f a i r s No. 947, 1 April 1979, 
p.2 (hereafter cited as Dowling, 'The European Monetary System).
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identified if it rose relative to the basket and the obligation to take
corrective action would fall on that country alone. Similarly, a weak
currency would fall relative to the basket. In the latter approach it
would not be possible to distinguish between weak and strong currencies,
and there would be a tendency for the system to move (relative to non-
System currencies) in line with the strongest currencies. Thus a
deflationary bias would be imparted to many of the European economies,
especially those with currencies which had depreciated significantly in
84
recent years.
Following the September 1978 meeting of Finance Ministers in 
Brussels, Ireland was faced with the realisation that what had been 
generally expected of itself and the United Kingdom was only half true: 
i.e., it was apparent that, while Ireland viewed the likely terms of its 
membership as favourable, and remained committed to a European Monetary 
System, the United Kingdom was implacably opposed to it. Thus the prospect 
of a break with sterling appeared likely.
The political connotations of such a move were unknown, but in
relation to Irish unity they appeared immense whatever formulation was
arrived at. There was, on one hand, an undeniable sense of excitement
about the prospect of finally ceasing to be an economic province of
Britain, of severing financial chains which had bound Ireland to Britain
not just since the foundation of the State, but for over one hundred and
fifty years. But, as Paul Tansey noted, there was a large, unspoken
assumption which underlay this line of thinking. It was this: Britain
was a declining economy, whilst the Deutschmark zone was on the crest of 
85
an economic wave. Protagonists of this view argued that the
resurgence of the British economy was only a temporary phenomenon which 
would recede in the 1980s, whereupon it would return to the same 
difficulties which had plagued it in the mid 1970s. And in support of 
their position they could point to an EEC Commission report which drew
8 4  • i *  ii bid.
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Paul Tansey, 'North is at core of EMS decision', News Focus feature, 
Irish Times, 26 October 1978, p. 12 (hereafter cited as Tansey, EMS 
Decision').
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less than optimistic contusions about even the short-term future
86
of the British economy.
From this it followed that Ireland was urged to depend for its 
economic well-being upon a linkage with the growth centre within the 
EEC. Obviously, if the principal assumption proved correct, the economic 
growth resulting in Ireland would allow it to extend the range and 
content of its social services. Hence it presented the Lynch Government 
with what economic commentator Tansey somewhat extravagantly 
described as
the opportunity to write themselves into the history 
books as the men who finally prepared the ground for 
the reintegration of the national territory by 
peaceful means.87
But on the other hand, the risks involved in an EMS entry without
the United Kingdom gave the move many of the qualities of a gamble.
Foremost among these was the lack of knowledge, even among those
88
intimately involved, of the consequences of membership. This allowed 
virtually every point in favour of membership to be countered by an 
argument the other way.
Economically, a case could be made that Ireland would not so much
rid itself of the British influence as merely disrupt a relationship
which accounted for nearly 50 per cent of its trade, and which, because
of the levels of trade and investment (not to mention social and
political relations) inherent in it, was unlikely to admit radical
change anyway. Similarly, and in the short term, the Republic would
stand to lose its best 'foreign' market, Northern Ireland, the only area
89
with which it consistently ran a large balance of payments surplus.
And then there was always the question posed in numerous articles at the 
time (late 1978), of whether a break with sterling would in fact signify
89
ibid. It was presumed that a revaluation of the Irish 'punt' would 
initially effect the competitiveness of the Republic's goods in the 
North, while Northern goods would become cheaper in the Republic.
ibid.
ibid.
ibid.
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Ireland ceasing to be an economic province of Britain,or only the 
trading one external influence for another —  perhaps West Germany.
Ironically, it was possible for a situation to ensue in which 
the worst of both worlds was true. According to Tansey:
A break with sterling would permit Ireland to exercise 
a credit (interest rate) policy independent of Britain's 
for the first time, but it would also involve branches 
of Irish banks in Northern Ireland coming under the sway 
of the Bank of England.
Administratively also, the difficulties, as they related to dual
currency systems within Ireland, and their attendant exchange control,
appeared to be formidable. In the resulting cumulative web of
inconvenience and confusion, one certain result was posited (again in
the short term): with the creation of different financial and currency
systems, the divide between North and South would be reinforced both
91
in real terms and psychologically.
Presented in these terms, it may appear as though the unity 
aspect was a central element in Ireland's decision to join the EMS.
It was not. The question of Northern Ireland only lingered at the 
periphery of the technical debate on membership; indeed, it received 
very little attention in official Government statements in the period 
leading up to the December 1978 decision. Although Lynch claimed that
the 'aspiration for the unity of Ireland by consent' was a 'vital
92
element' in whatever decision would be taken, there were sufficient 
indications that Lynch was paying little more than lip-service to it. 
Within days of his statement, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Michael 
O'Kennedy, dispelled any misconceptions to the contrary with a strong 
denial from Brussels that his Government would 'use' the issue of unity 
as an excuse for remaining outside the EMS. Consistent with his 
previously mentioned views on the effect of economic progress in the 
Republic on North-South relations, he proclaimed that Ireland would
90 ibid. 
91 ibid.
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Address to the Fianna Fail Gaul list Convention in Cork, as reported
in the Irish Times, 20 November 1978.
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further influence Northern attitudes by taking 'a full, positive and
93
confident role' in the EMS.
Moreover, it appears reasonable to infer from the report in which 
this was carried that O'Kennedy intended to convey the message that 
unity was only one of the vital elements which would be considered. 
Subsequent events confirm this. The newspaper reports covering the 
period September-December 1978, and Brendan Dowling's brief resume of
Irish entry, point to the fact that, however vital unity was, it was
94
not as vital as the more immediate financial considerations. Indeed,
95
it was a result of dissatisfaction over 'resource transfers' that the
Government decided it could not recommend Irish membership of the EMS
to Dail Eireann; and similarly, it was on the basis of an improved offer
• 96
on this outstanding issue that it decided to accept membership.
This decision was made on 16 December 1978, with effect from 13
97
March 1979. It was made the more historic because the United Kingdom
had, earlier that month, decided against entry, and thus the century-and-
98
a-half link with sterling was, in effect, broken. In the absence of
Remarks at a press conference following a meeting of European 
foreign ministers in Brussels, 20 November 1978, as reported in the Irish 
Times, 21 November 1978.
94
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evidence which would suggest otherwise, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the question of unity was irrelevant. Put quite simply, as the 
debate over entry proceeded, whatever significance the unity issue 
initially held, it receded to the point where it barely warranted a 
mention.
There was nothing in this decision that changed the conclusions 
which were to be drawn from the record of Ireland (and the United 
Kingdom) in the EC. The reintegration of the national territory, 
although a question for Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland, did not 
become a question for the EC. Those in the North who had political 
power were opposed to that, and by extension, so was the British Labour 
Government, particularly after 1976. Exactly what was implied by the 
apparent change in the Irish Government's attitude in, and after, 1978 
is so far not clear —  certainly no new 'European' strategy was in 
evidence in this time.
But unity is only one of the questions which comprise the Ulster 
Question. And it is possible to construe most of the statements which 
indicated a changed Irish position as referring primarily to the notion 
that the Community could effect an improvement in the Northern situation 
itself, rather than achieve a North-South rapprochement. Yet here, too, 
this lesser objective was invested with little in the way of an 
identifiable strategy by Dublin, nor was there any suggestion as to how • 
the Community would triumph where all others had failed.
All that seems certain is that Ireland (the Republic) appeared, on 
balance, to be doing very well financially out of its entry into the EC.
It was, therefore, to be expected that many of the country's political 
leaders would see therein only another advantage of the North uniting 
with the Republic. But it must be emphasised that they do so in the 
absence of any indication by Northern Unionists that they are sufficiently 
impressed with this performance to forego their reservations on issues 
which have kept Ireland partitioned for nearly sixty years. There is, 
therefore, scope for encouragement in the belief that the EC may provide 
a stimulus towards a greater harmony of interests between North and South, 
but, if history is any guide, substantially more grounds for concluding 
that those who hold such hopes are likely to be disappointed.
C H A P T E R  NINE
T h e  U l s t e r  Q u e s t i o n  a n d  t h e  E u r o p e a n
C o m m i s s i o n  (a n d  C o u r t ) o f  H u m a n  R i g h t s
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In August 1971, against a rising tide of violence, and perhaps as
a result of Brian Faulkner's personal commitment to it as a proven anti-
IRA measure, the Northern Ireland Government introduced a system of
internment without trial. Internment under the Civil Authorities
(Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922 had been a traditional
weapon at the disposal of the Stormont Government in dealing with
threats against the security of the state. Indeed internment, or
measures substantially similar to it, had been the recourse not only
of the Northern Ireland Government but also of successive Governments
(British, Irish Free State, and Republic of Ireland) in Ireland on at
2
least eight occasions since 1916. Although, for the greater part of 
their respective durations, it was introduced on an all-Ireland basis, 
and this accounted for its success in military terms, it was traditionally 
operated by the Northern Ireland Government exclusively against the 
Catholic population. There was no exception to this rule in 1971.
The underlying official rationale beneath its introduction that 
year was primarily to obtain more intelligence about the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and to detain individuals on a preventative
Accounts vary as to Faulkner's role towards introducing this measure. 
In his memoirs [Brian Faulkner, Memoirs of a Statesman, ed. John Houston 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1978), pp. 114-38] Faulkner claims 
that it was 'forced upon' his Government. James Callagan in his memoirs 
of the period [James Callagan, A House Divided: the Dilemma of Northern 
Ireland (London: Collins, 1973), p. 164] reached the same conclusion 
although he offers no evidence in support thereof. Reginald Maudling's 
account [Reginald Maul ding, Memoirs (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978), 
p. 184] offers no clear insight but the Sunday Times 'Insight' Team's 
Ulster, new ed., [(Harmonsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1972), p. 260, 
(hereafter cited as Sunday Times, Ulster)] is adamant that internment 
was introduced as a result of Faulkner's belief in its effectiveness from 
the time he became Prime Minister —  23 March 1971.
2
For an account of previous periods of internment, see JohnMcGuffin, 
Internment (Tralee, Co. Kerry: Anvil, 1973), pp. 20-78, (hereafter 
cited as McGuffin, Internment).
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This inadequacy of the normal legal processes in times of emergency 
was further elaborated in the Gardiner Report of 1975:
3
basis who could not be dealt with by the ordinary means of law.
When times are relatively normal, the needs of ordered 
society may be met by the criminal courts functioning 
with a high regard for the Common law's presumption of 
innocence and a strict observance of the rules of evidence 
and the standards of proof. But when normal conditions 
give way to disorder and lawlessness, with the extensive 
terrorism causing widespread loss of life and limb and the 
wholesale destruction of property, the courts cannot be 
expected to maintain peace and order in the community if 
they have to act alone. The very safeguards of the law 
then become the means by which it may be circumvented. 
Terrorism means widespread intimidation in all sections 
of the community. Material witnesses refuse to testify 
on the peril of their lives, and the law will not accept 
hearsay evidence; and furthermore police officers who 
have knowledge and belief about the commission of certain 
offences may find their conclusions inadmissible in court, 
because they cannot satisfy the law's necessarily stringent 
requirements.4
In response to this situation 'Operation Demetrius' was mounted 
in the early hours of Monday, 9 August 1971, with the objective of 
'lifting' some 450 men who were known, or suspected by the security 
forces, of being threats to the security of the state. In the event
5
345 were arrested and transported, first via Prisoner Collection
Council of Europe, European Commission of Human Rights, Application
No. 5310/71j Ireland Against The United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland: Report Of The Commission (adopted on 25 January 1976), 
p.97, (hereafter cited as Commission Report); and Report of the Commission 
to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in Northern 
Ireland, Cmnd. 5185 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, December 
1972), p.14, (hereafter cited as the Diplock Report after the Commission's 
chairman, and by which name it is more widely known.)
4 . . . . . . .
Report of a Committee to Consider3 in the Context of Czvil Libertzes
and Human RightsMeasures to Deal with Terrorism in Northern Ireland 
Cmnd. 5847 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1975), p. 42 (more 
widely known as the Gardiner Report3 and cited as such in this chapter).
5
342 according to the Report of the enquiry into allegations against 
the security forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out 
of the events on the 9th August, 19713 Cmnd. 4823 (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, November 1971), p. iv, (hereafter cited as the 
Compton Report), but 354 according to ECHR Report3 p. 1.
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Points, then Regional Holding Centres,^ and finally (if they v/ere to 
be detained beyond 48 hours) to places of detention —  either the Crumlin 
Road Jail in Belfast or the hulk HMS 'Maidstone' in Belfast Lough.7
The introduction of internment produced an unexpectedly violent 
reaction from within the minority community in Northern Ireland. 
Furthermore, soon after the arrest operation of 9 August, reports v/ere 
published in Irish newspapers, and subsequently also in Northern Irish 
and English newspapers, about persons making allegations of brutality 
and ill-treatment by security forces during their arrest, interrogation, 
g
and otherwise. In particular these centred around the treatment 
undergone by fourteen men, at various identified and unidentified 
centres, who had been selected for what v/as referred to as
g
'interrogation in depth.1 As a result of the storm of protest which 
ensued, a Committee of Enquiry under the chairmanship of the British 
Ombudsman, Sir Edmund Compton, was established with the following terms 
of reference:
Ballykinler Weekend Training Centre, Co., Down; v Girdv/ood Park 
Territorial Army Centre, Belfast; and Magilligan Weekend Training Centre, 
Co. Derry. After August 1971 these centres v/ere closed down, but 
replaced by others at Palace Barracks, Holywood, near Belfast; Girdwood 
Park, Belfast; Gough, Co. Armargh; and Ballykelly, Co. Derry. In July
1972, these centres were replaced by police offices at Castlereagh 
Police Station, Belfast, and at Ballykelly Military Barracks (Commission 
Report, pp. 1-2).
Subsequently Magilligan Camp, Co. Derry was used by it, the Crumlin 
Road Jail and the 'Maidstone' were eventually replaced as places of 
internment by Long Kesh Internment Camp (now, with internment ended, a 
prison for those convicted of terrorist-type offences, and known 
officially as The Maze .Prison).
o
See Sunday Times, Ulster, pp. 280-97. Note: allegations v/ere also 
made of late releases from Girdv/ood Park, but these did not comprise as 
signfiicant a number of complaints as did those v/ith which this chapter 
is concerned, 
g
The generally accepted figure is fourteen.' However, John McGuffin, 
The Guinea Pigs (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1974), pp. 76-7, 
and pp. 81-2 (hereafter cited as McGuffin, The Guinea Pigs), names a 
total of 17. The discrepancy is accounted for by the fact that, in the 
Compton Report, one person is unaccountably ommitted despite evidence 
that he was subject to the treatment referred to, and in relation to tv/o 
others, it took place while the Committee of Inquiry was sitting, Never­
theless, the accuracy of these figures is not helped by the acceptance,
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To investigate allegations by those arrested on 9th 
August under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 
(Northern Ireland) 1922 of physical brutality while in 
the custody of the security forces prior to either 
their subsequent release, the preferring of a criminal 
charge or their being lodged in a place specified in a 
detention order.10
It investigated allegations from forty men and concluded that 
eleven of them had been subjected to methods of treatment which 
included:
(i) keeping the detainees' heads covered by a black 
hood except when being interrogated or in a room by 
themselves;
(ii) submitting the detainees to continuous and 
monotonous noise of a volume calculated to isolate 
them from communication;
(iii) depriving the detainees of sleep during the early 
days of the operation;
(iv) depriving the detainees of food and water other 
than one pound of bread and one pint of water at six 
hourly intervals;
(v) making the detainees stand against a wall in a 
required posture (facing wall, legs apart, with hands 
raised up against w a l l ) . H
The Committee concluded that each of these measures, known
collectively as the five techniques3 constituted physical ill-treatment,
and that certain other actions taken in regard to prisoners constituted
measures of ill-treatment or of unintended hardship, but that in no
case had any of the grouped or individual complainants suffered physical
12
brutality as the Committee understood the terms. The crucial
in the Conmissioji Report (p. 2), of 12 instead of 11 in the Compton 
Report (p. 11); or of the former's claim (p. 2) that two further cases 
were added (so as to give 14), when McGuffin names three others (p. 77).
Compton Report, p . (iii).
11 ibid., pp. 15-17.
12
ibid., pp. 71-2. A second Compton Report, not available to the 
public, considered the case of three other men who had been subjected to 
the five techniques. There was one finding of ill-treatment. See the 
Times3 17 November 1971, p. 5.
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distinction, according to the Report, lay in the minds of the 
interrogators, which they explained by the following excursion into 
psychoanalysis:
Where v/e have concluded that physical ill-treatment took 
place, we are not making a finding of brutality on the 
part of those who handled these complainants. We consider 
that brutality is an inhuman or savage form of cruelty, 
and the cruelty implies as disposition to inflict suffering, 
coupled with indifference to, or pleasure in, the victim's 
pain. We do not think that happened here.13
As regards the number of other allegations, some of which were divorced
from interrogation in depth, the Committee concluded either that it v/as
unable to make findings as to their validity because of a conflict of
14
evidence, or that although substantiated, the treatment inflicted
constituted no more than 'a measure of ill-treatment', or 'some
15
measure of unintended hardship.' The Compton Report, therefore, 
was not so much concerned with the law as it was with what Ian Brownlie 
referred to as the 'normative fulcrum it took to be the concept of 
"physical brutality" contained in the terms of reference.'*^ Further, 
as this observer also noted, the conclusion it reached seemed to say 
that what is believed to be necessary cannot be brutal.
But the Report was deficient in many other areas besides. For 
example, its credibility was challenged by the procedural limitations 
under which it operated. The hearings were held in secret, and 
although a complainant was allowed to be accompanied by a legal 
representative, he was not permitted to cross-examine witnesses or to 
have access, as of right, to transcripts of evidence.*7 Consequently,
i bid ., p . 23 .
14
ibid., pp. 30-1, 33, 35, 51, 52, 56, 58, and 63.
15
ibid., pp. 26 and 30. These applied, respectively to the 
'Helicopter Incident', in which hooded detainees were forced to take 
part in a deception operation without knowing what was happening to them; 
and the 'Obstacle Course', in which barefoot men were forced to run along 
a route consisting in part of granite chippings and a hardcore path.
16
Ian Brownlie, 'Interrogation In Depth: The Compton and Parker 
Reports', Modem. Law Review, 35 (September 1972): 502, (hereafter cited 
as Brownlie, 'The Compton and Parker Reports').
Compton Report, p . 1.
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the inquiry was unacceptable to the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association and to all bar one of the complainants: only one of the 
latter appeared before the Committee.
In its examination of the five techniques the Committee chose to
conclude only as to their separate application, despite the fact that,
taken together, they comprised a regime of very severe sensory
deprivation. Since it was widely accepted that many of the lasting
effects of sensory deprivation were psychological, Compton may have
construed the Committee's terms of reference as precluding an
investigation into this aspect. But given that the refinement between
physical and psychological v/as, in this case, semantic rather than
operational, the decision not to consider the psychological impact of
the five techniques upon the detainees, by whatever course of logic it
was arrived at, v/as surprising. Moreover it even appeared to be at
odds with the 'Note on Interrogation' —  in effect an extract from the
official 'rules' to be observed in such matters —  which the British
Government requested it to receive. Among the actions expressly
prohibited v/ere 'outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
19
humiliating and degrading treatment'. Yet several detainees 
complained they had received treatment of this kind, or something 
similar to it.
Hov/ever, the Report was wanting in other areas besides. It did 
not, for example, say how many others (if any) besides those named in 
the Report, were subjected to deep interrogation. And although it 
included the 'Note on Interrogation' it neither published it in the full 
context of the 'general rules governing the custody of detainees' from 
which it was extracted, nor did it say whose responsibility it v/as to 
see that its requirements were adhered to. Thus the State appeared to 
be in default of its obligations within the area of authorised procedures 
(in the special sense that they were service policy), and in a wider 
sense, as pointed to in the following passage:
See Brownlie, 'The Compton and Parker Reports', pp. 502-03; and 
McGuffin, The Guinea Pigs, pp. 82-4.
19
Compton Report, p. 12.
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Still less did the three commissioners address themselves 
to the question of v/hether the State, as the guardian of 
law and civilized dealing, was justified or wise in 
subjecting to the routine described —  a punishing routine, 
by any standards —  men who were not proven criminals, and 
who were not even provenly in possession of the knowledge 
sought from them.20
While many of the deficiencies noted could be held to be derived
from the vastly inadequate terms of reference or the difficulties under
which the committee operated, it would have been a distortion to have
concluded that the absence of these factors could have substantially
altered the opinions which were expressed. Throughout the Report,
especially in the 'Conclusion' sections, there was demonstrated an
overwhelming willingness to accept the evidence presented by official
witnesses without comment or apparent scepticism. It was a habit of
mind well captured by a Sunday Times team of journalists who described
the Compton Report as a 'credulous' document: in their view 'the
committee was disposed to believe that because a rule existed, it was
21
therefore kept.'
The problem with this attitude was that it was neither appropriate 
nor politically desirable. Though they may not have appeared before 
the committee, too many people had in other places given detailed 
accounts of what they alleged had taken place, and these had been widely 
circulated by the media throughout Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
Furthermore it was clear even from Compton's jesuitical distinctions 
and understated conclusions that many authorised interrogation procedures 
had been misapplied.
Indeed, the very justification for their use in the first place 
was challenged by the evidence which the committee had available to it, 
but no opinion was entered thereupon. According to the Report, the 
official justification for the use of the five techniques v/as as 
fol1ows:
Sunday Times, Ulster3 p. 296.
ibid., p. 294.
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[They had] been used in support of the interrogation 
of a small number of persons arrested in Northern 
Ireland who were believed to possess information of a 
kind which it was operationally necessary to obtain as 
rapidly as possible in the interest of saving lives, 
while at the same time providing the detaineees with the 
necessary security for their own persons and identities.22
But at the time at which the Report was completed, 3 November 1971, the 
indications were that this was invalid, as instanced by the 'Insight' 
team's report:
... if any such information was elicited, it does not seem 
to have invariably led the forces of order to the people 
they wanted: of the more than 1,500 people arrested 
within four months of the internment sweep, well over half 
v/ere released again fairly quickly without charge. And 
Ministry of Defence figures show that arms, ammunition 
and explosive finds were at a scarcely higher level after 
than before internment, until there was a sharp rise in 
November -  three months after, the only acknowledged 
instances of 'deep interrogation'.23
Even then, the significance of the November figures was open to
24
question, but in the aftermath of interment two facts of the situation 
admitted little or no doubt. The first was that the operation had 
immeasurably set back the cause of a peaceful settlement in Northern 
Ireland. Not only were there spectacular increases in the incidence 
of rioting, the burning of houses, shootings, bombings and violent 
deaths, but Catholic refugees from the State fled south across the 
Border for temporary shelter in the Republic. And the second fact 
was derived from both these developments and their cause. Irrespective 
of the 'successes' which the security forces attributed to internment 
and interrogation in depth, there existed in Britain and Ireland a 
sense of unease about what had taken place. Stated plainly, a number 
of citizens —  innocent because not proved guilty —  in a corner of the 
United Kingdom had been subjected to treatment which at the very least 
constituted a grave injury to their persons and their community.
Compton Report, p. 13.
23
Sunday Times3 Ulster, p. 295.
24
See McGuffin, The Guinea Pigs3 pp. 106-08.
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it was virtually impossible to see it in a favourable light. In
terms of the psychological impact of the treatment to which certain
detainees were subject, it was manifestly a non-event. And with regard
to treatment which was about as psychological as a well-aimed blow to
25
the stomach it demonstrated what Michael 0'Boyle has charitably
26
termed an 'unsatisfactory, unconvincing, and limited approach.' Nor
could these perceptions have been allayed by further sworn allegations,
27
in October 1971, of cruelty to detainees, and disclosures by the
International Red Cross that the detainment conditions in the Crumlin
28
Road Prison, Belfast, required improvement.
In recognition of this situation, and less than two weeks after 
the Compton Report was presented, the British Government established a 
second committee, chaired by Lord Parker of Waddington to consider
whether, and if so in what respects, the procedures 
currently authorised for the interrogation of persons 
suspected of terrorism and for their custody while 
subject to interrogation require amendment.^9
Thus, from whatever perspective the Compton Report was viewed,
Commission Report, pp. 415-21.
26
Michael O'Boyle, 'Torture and Emergency Powers under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Ireland v. the United Kingdom', American 
Journal of International Law 71 (October 1977) : 676, (hereafter cited 
as O'Boyle, 'Ireland v. the United Kingdom').
27
Sunday Times3 Ulster3 p. 295.
28
Comite International De La Croix-Rouge, Report on the visits 
carried out by the delegates from the International Committee of the 
Red. Cross to places of detention in Northern Ireland3 October 19713 pp. 4-5. 
Note: Whether this Report was made available at the time to all 
interested parties (e.g. the Irish Government) is unclear. The writer 
experienced some difficulty in obtaining copies of this and other 
similar Reports as late as 1978.
29
Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider 
authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of 
terrorism3 Cmnd. 4901 (London: Her Majesty's .Stationery Office, March 
1972), p.v (hereafter cited as Parker Report).
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The Irish Government remained unimpressed. Well before the 
committee had reported back to the Taoiseach, John Lynch, had delivered 
himself of the expectation, that because of its serious procedural
defects, it seemed 'highly unlikely that an inquiry so restricted can
30
achieve the truth'. Later in the same adjournment debate he likened
procedures which were supposed to protect a detainee against wrongful
internment to those which Franz Kafka described in The Trial, so
31
hopelessly loaded were they against the individual concerned.
It followed, therefore, that the Report, when eventually released,
32
was hardly welcomed in Dublin. Ihe Tanaiste, speaking on behalf
of the Taoiseach, declared that it had 'not in any way' alleviated the
grave concern felt in Dublin by the allegations which the Committee had
33
inquired into. It thereupon took the decision, while the so-called
Parker Committee was deliberating, to challenge the exercise of the
emergency power of internment and, in particular, the legitimacy in
international law of the five techniques and other methods of
interrogation, under the European Convention on Human Rights. In answer
to suggestions that this move had 'surprised' the British Government, the
Taoiseach claimed that repeated warnings of such a course of action had
been given it following the introduction of internment —  in the context
34
of what he called ’private diplomacy.' On 16 December 1971, the
. 35
Government of Ireland filed with the European Commission on Human
30
Dail Eireann, Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, vol. 256,
20 October 1971, cols. 14-15, (hereafter cited as Dail Eireann, Official
Report).
31
ibid., col. 17. On this he appeared to be well supported. Dr Claire 
Palley, then Professor of Public Law in Queen's University, Belfast, was 
of the opinion that 'in World War II better safeguards relating to intern­
ment existed in the United Kingdom than do now in Northern Ireland'. 
(Claire Palley, 'Internment: the need for proper safeguards', in the 
Times, 23 November 1971, p. 14).
32
Deputy Taoiseach.
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 257, 23 November 1971, cols. 1-2.
34
Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 257, 1 December 1971, col. 907. 
'Private' it must have been; there is no reference to such 
representations having been made in any other official source.
Hereafter in this chapter cited as the Commission.
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Rights an interstate application in accordance v/ith Article 24 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. ^
This international treaty which the Irish Government invoked was,
like many similar efforts in the field of human rights, a post World
War II development. It had been in force only since September 1953
when the 17 signatory states, Ireland and the United Kingdom among them,
agreed to ensure protection through their domestic law of certain rights
and freedoms drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
Convention differed from some other attempts in this field, hov/ever, in
that it was recognised as the most advanced of any such treaty in terms
of the individual riahts it guaranteed and in its enforcement 
37
machinery. Included in the former v/as the right to life and personal 
liberty, fair trial, freedom of speech and assembly, family rights, 
and the prohibition of torture. Certain provisions including the 
prohibition of torture was declared to be absoltue, while other rights 
including freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial v/ere able to
be suspended, according to Article 15, 'at times of war or other public
38
emergency'.
In choosing to complain about alleged breaches of the Convention
within the territory of another state (i.e. to bring an 'interstate'
application) the Irish Government were acting in a manner seldom
resorted tor prior to the Irish applications, only five interstate
cases had been considered whereas, by the end of 1972, the Commission
had declared admissible over 100 petitions brought by individuals
39
against their governments.
In their original submission the Irish Government outlined in what 
way it considered that breaches of Articles of the Convention had occurred.
36
Hereafter cited as the Convention.
37
Kevin Boyle, Tom Hadden, Paddy Hillyard, Law and State: The Case 
of Northern Ireland (London: Martin Robinson, 1975), p. 153 (hereafter 
cited as Boyle, Hadden, Hillyard, Law and State).
38 • i • i 1C/1 
ibid., p. 154.
ibid., pp. 154-5. Even then, the number accepted by the Commission 
constituted less than 2 per cent of all (5960) petitions.
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Referring to the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern
Ireland) 1922 and to the related Statutory Rules, Regulations and
orders, it submitted that they contained provisions which were of
themselves a failure by the United Kingdom Government to comply with
obligations imposed on it by Article 1 (to secure to everyone the rights
and freedoms defined in the Convention). Further, that the methods
employed or permitted by that Government in the implementation of
emergency legislation, constituted an administrative practice in
40
violation of the Convention.
In relation to Article 3 of the Convention (proscription of
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), Ireland
submitted that the methods of treatment of persons in custody, in
particular the methods of interrogation, constituted an administrative
41
practice which did not comply with its provisions. As to Articles
5 (right to liberty and security of person) and 6 (right to a fair
trial), it v/as submitted that the powers of detention and internment
without trial considered in the cited emergency legislation, and their
42
operation, v/ere in breach thereof. While it v/as conceded that an
emergency existed for the purposes of Article 15 (derogation of a
state from its obligations in time of public emergency), the Irish
Government also claimed that the emergency measures taken by the United
Kingdom Government, derogating from its obligations under the Convention,
43
were not strictly required by the 'exigencies of the situation'. It
further submitted that the exercise by the United Kingdom Government, and
by the security forces under its control, of the powers to detain and
intern persons had been, and v/as stil I being carried out v/ith
discrimination on the grounds of political opinion and was, therefore,
in violation of Article 14 of the Convention (proscribing discrimination
44
on such grounds) read in conjunction v/ith Articles 5 and 6. Ireland
Commission Report, pp. 477-80. 
ibid., p. 221.
ibid., pp. 18-26 and pp. 35-43.
ibid. , pp. 65-9.
ibid., pp. 105-06.
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to life) in relation to the deaths of certain persons in Northern 
45
Ireland. These matters were the substance of the Irish Government's 
application, No. 5310/71.
At a later date the Irish Government made further submissions in 
support of their claim, in particular regarding the deaths in Derry on
n r
Bloody Sunday (30 January 1972), and also added allegations of breaches
of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention in relation to powers conferred
by legislation subsequently passed by the United Kingdom Government.
These referred to the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland)
Order 1972, and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 .^
Additional complaints and material relating to an issue under Article 7
of the Convention (non-retroactivity of crimes and punishments) were
48
registered as a separate application, No. 5451/72.
Between the 25-29 September 1972 the critical admissibility
hearings were held in Strasbourg and resulted in a decision that the
49
Irish application was partially admissible. The Commission declared
inadmissible those parts of the applications which contained
allegations under Article 2 of the Convention in relation to the deaths
of certain persons in Northern Ireland on the grounds that 'substantial
50
evidence' had not been adduced to support them. A complaint about
discriminatory searches of Catholic homes by the security forces,
51
brought under Article 14, was abandoned. In view of a satisfactory 
undertaking at the oral hearing before the Commission, by the United
also finally claimed a violation of Article 2 of the Convention (right
45
Council of Europe, European Commission of Human Rights, Application 
No. 5310/71, Ireland, against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland: Annexes I and II to the Report of the Commission 
(Adopted on 25 January 1976), pp. 42-3, (hereafter cited as Annexes).
46
47
48
49
50
ibid., p. 48.
Commission Report, pp. 35-43.
Annexes, pp. 120-1.
The decision is found in Annex II of Annexes, pp. 31-2. 
ibid., p. 115.
51
ibid. , pp. 118-20.
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guilty by reason of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offence at the time it was committed, application No. 5451/72
52
was withdrawn. The Commission thus retained, for consideration of 
their merits, the following allegations:
Kingdom Attorney-General, to the effect that no one would be held
(i) that the treatment of persons in custody, in 
particular the methods of interrogation of such persons 
constitutes an administrative practice in breach of Art. 3 
of the Convention;
(ii) that internment without trial and detention under 
the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1922 and the Regulations made thereunder 
constitute an administrative practice in breach of
Arts. 5 and 6 of the Convention in connection with Art. 15;
(iii) that the exercise by the respondent Government of 
their power to detain and intern persons is being carried 
out with discrimination on the grounds of political opinion 
and thus constitutes a breach of Art. 14 with respect to 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed in Arts. 5 and 6 in 
conjunction with Art. 15 of the Convention;
(iv) that the administrative practices complained of also 
constitute a breach of Article 1 of the Convention.^3
The Irish Government had thereby succeeded, where others had 
failed, in bringing before the Commission the question of human rights 
in Northern Ireland. However,' previous attempts, which became known as 
the 'Northern Irish Cases', had failed because of a protracted conflict 
about legal fees between the Commission and the American lawyer engaged
54
by the applicants —  i.e. before even the formal admissibility hearinas.
ibid., pp. 120-1.
^  ibid., pp. 120-2.
54
Boyle, Hadden, Hillyard, Law and State, pp. 155-6. This source 
(p. 157) also records the seven individual applications, Donnelly and 
others v. the United Kingdom3 Applications numbered 5577/72-5583/72, 
complaining of 'torture and inhuman or degrading treatment'. A decision 
on these cases was reached on 15 December 1975 by the Commission: it 
reversed the 1973 decision in which they were declared admissible and 
declared them inadmissible on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies (in the case of three applicants), and, in the case of the other
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Following the above decision, the Commission proceeded to an
investigation of the allegations made by the Irish Government. These
took the form of submissions, both written and oral, and hearings
which lasted from 29 November 1972 through until 20 March 1975. ^ As
it took another ten months beyond this date for the Report to be
submitted and adopted, and a further eighteen months before its contents
became public knowledge, two aspects of the entire interstate case were
highlighted. The first was the extended period which the case took just
56
to be partially completed, and the second was the observation that
it should have been persisted with, from late 1972-mid 1974 particularly,
during a time in which Ireland and the United Kingdom were enjoying both
a substantial measure of political cooperation and what Keith Kyle
57
described as 'intimate judicial partnership.' The suggestion, of 
course, was that the pursuit of the case at Strasbourg was inconsistent 
with developments which they together had wrought towards the long-term 
objective of Irish unity. While this course of action may have appeared 
impolitic in the context of Anglo-Irish relations, a critical examination 
of the context in which the allegations were made, and the British 
reaction to these and the events to which they related, both of which 
are outlined in the following pages, required a conclusion that the 
abandonment of the application was a less than tenable proposition for 
the Irish Government.
four applicants, on the ground that they had already received compensation 
in full satisfaction of their claims. See Kevin Boyle and Hurst Hannum, 
'Ireland in Strasbourg: Final Decisions in the Northern Irish Proceedings 
Before the European Commission of Human Rights', The Irish Jurist XI 
Part 2 (1976): 260-2 (hereafter cited as Boyle and Hannum, 'Ireland in 
Strasbourg').
55
Commission Reports pp. 5-6.
56
Although the Report was adopted by the Commission on 25 January 1976, 
and thereupon transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe, it was not made public until September 1976. In the interim 
the Irish Government, anxious to avoid a political decision on the Report's 
findinqs. exercised its alternative prerogative, and referred them to the 
European Court of Human Rights,in March 1977. (See pp. 367-8, this chapter).
57
Keith Kyle, 'Sunningdale and after: Britain, Ireland, and Ulster', 
World Today 31 (November 1975): 447. The reference here is to the 
decision by Anglo-Irish Law Enforcement Commission to recommend the extra­
territorial method of trying fugitive offenders for certain offences, and 
the subsequent legislation passed in Britain and Ireland to give effect 
to this measure. (See Chapter Two, Anglo-Irish Relations, March 1972-June 
1974).
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What needs to be established at this point is that the conflict 
which has been under way in Northern Ireland since 1968 has been 
distinguished by being both brutal and brutalising. Moreover, the 
catalogue of such incidents, alleged and proven is substantial in 
terms of the number c i t e d , ^  and impressive as to the range of people 
who have accused the security forces of them.
Certainly it is tempting to adopt a comfortable cynicism towards
the pronouncements of a number of these occasional 'dramatis personae' —
59
such as Herbert Marcuse, Jean Paul Sartre, and Angela Davis —  as their 
interest in Ireland may be measured in direct proportion to two 
variables: the 'popular' revulsion an atrocity may arouse beyond 
the thirty-two countries, and the period since its occurrence. Because 
they lack a sustained interest they appear as bit players who, to 
continue in the metaphor, observe the otherwise 'normal' circumstances 
of the country as 'personae muta'.
Nevertheless there are many among those who have brought accusations 
against the security forces in Northern Ireland whose credentials are
For figures see: Pariiamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, 
Official R e p o r t vol. 899, 4 November 1975, cols.143-144 (hereafter cited 
as House of Commons, Official Report); and Amnesty International, Report
of an Amnesty International Mission to Northern Ireland, 28 November-
6 December 1977 (London: Amnesty International, June 1978), pp. 2-3.
59
In 1978 all three were associated with an International Tribunal on 
Britain's Presence in Ireland, 'formed to investigate charges of 
violation of Irish human rights by methods including torture, special 
powers legislation, forced confessions and judicial abuse, crimes against 
women, denial of free speech and the extraordinary powers of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act.' (Source: undated broadsheet issued on 
behalf of tribunal; see also the Irish Times3 11 February 1978). A 
number of prominent Irish men and women were also associated with the 
tribunal but it is not suggested that their interest was less than 
sustained. However the writer is not aware of any reports as to the 
findings of the tribunal, nor indeed, of one relating to an earlier attempt 
by Satre to study such matters as 'cultural gen<?cide by the English 
establishment', and 'Ireland as a training ground for British imperialism.' 
Both v/ere to be considered by an 'international commission for the study 
of oppression in Ireland' v/hose sponsors included Vladimir Dedijer, vice- 
president of the so-called 'Russell tribunal', and American linguist 
Noam Chomsky. Irish and British participants v/ere excluded to ensure its 
'complete independence', (daily Telegraph3 7 April 1975).
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not so easily dismissed. Arguably they would include the panel of
Belgian, French, and Spanish lawyers which sat in Dublin in May 1978
and presented a report which concluded that Long Kesh was 'the only
official concentration camp in Europe', and that the treatment of
fin
Republican prisoners therein amounted to 'systematic torture'.
Without doubt a list of such accusers would also include the Roman 
Catholic Primate of All Ireland, Dr Tomas O'Fiaich, whose denunciatory 
statements on the same issue attracted so much controversy in August 
1978.61
Further down the ecclesiastical scale several volumes of allegations
have been published by two Northern Ireland priests, Father Denis Faul
62
and Father Raymond Murray. While they might not all be accepted as 
authentic accounts, by (say) a court of law, of each case that they 
claim to document, so many of their cases are wel1-documented with 
independent medical and other testimony that they cannot be readily 
dismissed. Moreover, they contain allegations of brutality brought by
Irish Times3 27 May 1978. The panel, which also included Irish 
members, was presided over by the French judge, Etienne Bloch, was 
supported by the French League of Human Rights and the French Reformed 
Church.
C 1
Specifically, these statements, etc., relate to the condition of 
prisoners confined in the H-Blocks of Her Majesty's Prison, The Maze,
Long Kesh, Northern Ireland. Between 1972 and 29 February 1976, prisoners 
convicted in the special non-jury courts v/ere treated almost as prisoners 
of war, or at least as being within a special category. This status was 
ended for those convicted after 1 March 1976. In protest, Republican 
prisoners refused to cooperate in any way v/ith the prison authorities: the 
result was that the H-Blocks which house these prisoners have deteriorated 
to the point where their conditions have been delicately described as 
'inhuman'. Although it v/arrants no more than a brief mention in this 
work, the H-Blocks issue has assumed considerable proportion in the 
domestic politics of Northern Ireland. The measure of this may be gauged 
from the fact that Archbishop O'Fiaich's statement resulted from a visit 
to the Maze undertaken on the recommendation of the Vatican representative 
in Ireland, Archbishop Alibrandi, who was voicing the Pope's concern for 
the prisoners. See the Times3 2 August 1978, p. 1; Irish Times, 2 August 
1978, pp. 1 and 5; and 23 September 1978 ('Saturday Column'). The 
controversy is recorded in both papers between the first and last dates 
mentioned.
62
A third priest, Father Brian Brady, is also listed as a co-author on 
some publications.
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Loyalists as well as Republicans. And substantially the same type of 
charges have been levelled at the security forces since 1968 from a more 
secular quarter, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA).^
In 1973 fllCRA v/as joined by two other British organisations —  the
National Council for Civil Liberties and the Association for Legal
Justice —  again in making substantially the same allegations —  in
support of their request for a United Nations investigation into human
65
rights violations in Northern Ireland. To this end they also 
forv/arded a comprehensive dossier to the Secretary-General, Dr Kurt 
Waldheim, but it appears to have met v/ith no greater success than 
attempts by the Irish Government to place the whole question of the Six 
Counties before the international body. However, the failure v/as not 
total: throughout the period under review both the International Red 
Cross and Amnesty International have given voice to their criticism of 
conditions in the Province. Insofar as the former was concerned, this
66
took the form of reports of visits to prisons and places of detention.
As a rule these tended to be more concerned with the physical conditions
under which detainees and internees were kept; but, as internment
continued, they increasingly contained references to the psychological
state of those incarcerated and, finally, conclusions as to the
desirability of retaining the policy of detention/internment. Thus, in
an early report, there was a finding that the Crumlin Road Jail was over- 
67
crowded, while later reports concluded that, although this deficiency 
had been remedied, the poor moral e which was evident in early 1971 had
6 3
Denis Faul and Raymond Murray, The Castlereagh File: Allegations of 
RUC Brutality3 1976-1977 (published in 1978; no other publication details 
available), pp. 123-9. From 5 February 1973 onwards, Northern Ireland's 
powers of detention v/ere used against Loyalists.
rn
These may be found in a number of broadsheets and pamphlets, but 
particularly in Civil Rights, the association's journal.
65
Times, 31 August 1973, p. 2.
66
All reports were styled as follows: Comite International De La 
Croix-Rouge, Report on the visits carried out by delegates from the 
International Red Cross to places of detention in Northern Irelands 
followed by the date of the visit. Hereafter they will be cited as 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Report3 date and page no.
International Committee of the Red Cross, Reports October 1971, p.4.
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become an entrenched characteristic. As a result, a 1974 conclusion
implied that detention in the Maze v/as provinq to be 'counter
69
productive, sterile and even destructive', and recommended, in the 
case of Her Majesty's Prison, Armagh, that the British authorities 
'should not lose sight of the psychological and moral problems of 
prolonged detention.
Amnesty International's tv/o missions and subsequent reports have 
been in marked contrast to those of the International Red Cross, both 
in their concerns and in the manner in which their conclusions are stated. 
Essentially, they were concerned with the same issues —  torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment —  which gave rise to the Irish 
Government's application. In 1971, the Amnesty Commission found that 
persons arrested under the Special Powers Act
had been subjected to brutal treatment by the security 
forces during arrest and transport. It also concluded 
that there were cases where suffering had been inflicted 
on those arrested to obtain from them confessions or 
information.71
In the light of allegations which were made to the organisation in later 
years, Amnesty International, with the ostensible cooperation of the 
British Government, sent a research mission to Northern Ireland in 
November-December 1977. Its findings were not altogether different 
from those which had been reached some six years earlier, as follows:
(i) On the basis of the information available to it,
Amnesty International believes that maltreatment of 
suspected terrorists by the RUC has taken place with 
sufficient frequency to warrant the establishment of a 
public inquiry to investigate it.
68
International Committee of the Red Cross, Report, December 1972, p.5.
69
International Committee of the Red Cross, Report, May 1974, p.10 
(of the Maze section).
ibid., pp. 6-7 (of the Armargh section).
Amnesty International, .Report of an Inquiry into allegations of ill- 
treatment in Northern Ireland (London: Amnesty International, 1975), 
pp. 26-7.
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(ii) The evidence presented to the mission does not 
suggest that uniformed members of the RUC are involved 
in the alleged maltreatment.
(iii) The evidence presented to the mission suggests 
that legal provisions, which have eroded the rights of 
suspects held in connection with terrorist offences, 
have helped create the circumstances in which 
maltreatment of suspects has taken place.
(iv) The evidence presented to the mission suggests 
that the machinery for investigating complaints against 
the police of assault during interview is not adequate.72
The evidence collected in support of the conclusions made the
Amnesty International report a damning indictment: it showed the
basic pattern of ill-treatment alleged in the Irish application to have
remained the same. If anything, the intensity, viciousness and degree
of ill-treatment recorded were far more extreme than that alleged in
1971-72. According to a member of the Irish Government's team at
73
Strasbourg for the interstate case, Aidan Browne, S.C., the Amnesty 
report was
immeasurably stronger in its detail and supporting medical 
evidence than ever was the initial ... case.74
Of course, a different view was taken by the British Government.
Secretary for Northern Ireland, Roy Mason, described it as an
'unsubstantiated Report' but nevertheless felt obliged by its contents
to promise an inquiry into the allegations it contained by an 'eminent 
75
judicial figure'. And well he might have. In the four year period 
between ending in October 1975, individual applications alleging ill- 
treatment or making complaints in respect of detention without trial had
Amnesty International, Report of An Amnesty International Mission 
to Northern Ireland, 2ft November-6 December 1977 (London: Amnesty 
International, June 1978), p. 70.
73
Senior Counsel —  the Irish equivalent of a Queen's Counsel.
Aidan Browne,'Britain1s "pompous solemn undertakings" a sham', 
Irish Timess 15 June 1978, p. 10.
75
House of Commons, Official Report} vol. 951, 15 June 1978, cols.
1164-8.
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As with the cases cited by Fathers Faul and Murray, a number of these
applications were lodged by Loyalists.77 Although the vast majority
of them were to be rejected without any further action, the residue
of new and oriqinal complaints concerning British treatment of Irish
78
prisoners was still a substantial 30 in December 1977. Furthermore,
in that month two test cases were referred by the Commission to London
for a detailed reply concerning submissions on the operation of the
79
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act.
Throughout 1978 further developments had the effect of embarrassing
the British Government and of foreshadowing the report of the judicial
commission. In July Donal Murphy, a member of the Northern Ireland
Police Authority, the body with responsibility for the overall
administration of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, disclosed that the
force's Chief Constable had refused to allow the Authority access to
80
files concerned with the alleged ill-treatment of suspects. At the
same time it emerged that the Chief Constable had also, without
consulting with the Authority, requested Mason to hold a private
inquiry into the Amnesty International al1egations, and that this had
led to the withdrawal from Authority meetings of Murphy and another
81
member. Four months later a Resident Magistrate at Newtownards found
that a suspect had been beaten during questioning by police but that he
could not allocate the blame between the five detectives involved. As
82
he explained, 'the guilty escape with the innocent.'
7 fi
been lodged in Strasbourg at the rate of approximately one per week.
The figure cited is 'about 200' (Boyle and Hannum, 'Ireland in 
Strasbourg') p. 263.
ibid., no specific figure is mentioned.
78 ;
Irish Times, 20 December 1977, p. 1.
79
ibid., the referral of cases to an accused Government is the first 
step in declaring the case admissible.
80
Irish Times} 5 July 1978, pp. 1 and 6.
81 • L • Ii bid.
82
Irish Times3 1 November 1978, p. 1.
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Immediately prior to the release of the judicial commission's 
report such charges received important support. Dr Robert Irwin, a 
police surgeon in Belfast, said that he had examined 150 prisoners whom
he believed had been 'physically ill-treated' during police questioning
83
in the Castlereagh detention centre. In considerably milder language,
the Bennett report itself came to some of the same conclusions, finding’
injuries that 'were not self-inflicted and were sustained during the
84
period of detention at a police office.'
The picture, then, whether viewed from Belfast, Dublin or London, 
was disturbing. It v/as one of apparent unremitting infringement of the 
human rights of large numbers of people who might or might not have been 
guilty of terrorist-related offences, but whose right to humane treatment 
v/as not diminished. Thus although many of the events referred to took 
place after the Irish case was brought, it would have been a nonsense for 
Dublin to have withdrawn its application: this action would have been
done in the face of mounting evidence that nothing, or too little, had
i ^ 85 changed.
Nor v/as this view relieved by the proven criminal behaviour of the
security forces in Northern Ireland, particularly the British Army,
86 87
which included: armed robbery, arson,
International Herald Tribune3 17-18 March 1979.
84
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation 
Procedures in Northern Ireland3 Cmnd. 7497 (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, March 1979), p. 136, known as the Bennett Report, 
after its chairman, Judge H.G. Bennett, Q.C.
85
The effect of unilateral action by Dublin may have been questionable: 
the Commission advised the Irish Government that, even if it chose to 
withdraw its application, it (the Commission) would pursue it in any case. 
(Intervi ew).
86
Committed by no less a personality than Costas Georgiou, subsequently 
Colonel Cullen, and then Colonel Callan of Angolan mercenary, and late of 
firing squad fame. As a member of the Parachute Regiment in Northern 
Ireland, the Cyprus-born soldier had threatened the staff of Clandeboye 
sub-post office with a weapon, relieved them of their cash, and made a 
getaway in an Army jeep. (Irish Timesy 12 February 1976).
87
In October 1976, the British Army admitted (and charged) that eight 
soldiers of the King's Own Borderers and the 2nd Light Infantry had been 
involved in the burning of the Gaelic Athletic Association Club in West 
Belfast. (Irish Times, 14 October 1976, p. 4).
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assault. blackmail, kidnapping, perjury, the unwarranted
92 93
seizure of political documents from the SDLP, theft, and the
94
needless taking of human lives. And this leaves to one side the
95
conduct of the RUC during the Ulster Workers' Council Strike of 1974,
96 97
which the Irish (and the British) Government found less than
In one case the victims were two teenage girls (Irish Times, 12 
November 1976), while in another it was a severely handicapped man, and 
holder of the MBE, for which he received damages of £150 (Irish Times,
11 January 1978).
89
Admitted by Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Defence, in 
reference to a 16-year old Belfast hotel porter. (Times, 10 May 1973).
90
Irish. Times, 15 December 1978, pp. 1 and 6; and 18 December 1978, 
pp. 1 and 5.
91
In October 1976 a former paratrooper gave evidence of officially- 
ordered perjured testimony during his period of service in Northern 
Ireland which was sufficient to reverse the conviction it initially 
helped achieve (Irish Times, 22 October 1976), pp. 1 and 4.
92
Times, 5 September 1977, p. 1.
93
Irish Times, 3 February 1978.
^  A case (of several) in point was the death of William Hanna, a 
passer-by, who was killed in the cross-fire of an Army ambush of 
Provisional IRA bombers at a Belfast postal depot in June 1978 (Times,
22 June 1978). What was not generally known at the time was that Hanna, 
a Protestant, was also on the Army's list of suspects but it lacked 
sufficient evidence to 'lift' him. According to an official who 
described himself as the 'Foreign and Commonwealth Office's expert on 
terrorism', the Army considered Hanna's death a 'bonus' to the operation 
in which three IRA members were also killed. However, in doing so the 
Army breached the 'yellow card' instructions, carried by each soldier 
in Northern Ireland, which define the occasions and circumstances in 
which he may open fire. After recounting this event, the official then 
described his department as frequently having to 'watch' the British 
Army and to act as its 'conscience' (Interview).
95
Robert Fisk, The Point of No Return: The Strike Which Broke the 
British in Ulster (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975), pp. 68, 70-1, 91-2, 
98-9, and 238.
^  ibid., p. 100.
97
ibid., pp. 186-7.
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comforting. The purpose of citing these instances is not to indict 
the security forces. Just as Edmund Burke remarked in another context 
that he knew of no 'method of drawing up an indictment against a whole 
people', there is no way of, indeed, no purpose in indicting the 
entire British Army or RUC. They are mentioned because they appear to 
be representative of the allegations made against the security forces 
since 1968 and because certain of them commended themselves to the 
memory by their nature.
But it is here that the attitude of the British Government
warrants closer attention. In both its general reaction to the seamier
side of operations in Northern Ireland, and in its conduct of the
interstate case in particular, it has consistently displayed a
disposition which was far from reassuring. The Compton Report was but
one indication of this; the Parker Report which followed was only a
re-run. This document on interrogation techniques, published in March
1972, claimed that an extraordinary volume of information came from the
exercise which began with the 9 August 1971 sweep: identification of
700 Provisional and Official IRA members, 40 sheets of information on
the organisation of IRA units, the discovery of individual responsibility
for about 85 incidents, and a wealth of details on possible IRA operations,
99
arms, casks, safe houses, morale, etc. The Report claimed there was no 
doubt that the information had directly and indirectly saved the lives of 
innocent civilians, although somewhat hypocritically, it went on to 
disavow the principle that the end justified the means.* ^ Thus it 
concluded that:
98
See also Robert Fisk, 'The Effect of Social and Political Crime on 
the Police and British Army in Northern Ireland', in International 
Terrorism in the Contemporary Worlds eds: Marius H. Livingston, Lee Bruce 
Kress and Marie G. Wanek (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), 
p. 91, (hereafter cited as Fisk, 'Effect of Social and Political Crime1).
99
Parker Report} pp. 4-6. Once again this justification was challenged, 
as it had been in the Compton Report, but this time on a basis of less 
documentary evidence (John McGuffin, The Guinea Pigss pp. 107-08). Also 
the Parker Report ignores the fact that internment itself escalated the 
conflict in Northern Ireland.
353
there is no reason to rule out [the five] techniques 
on moral grounds and that it is possible to operate 
them in a manner consistent with the highest standards 
of our society.101
It may come as a surprise, therefore, to observe that the
authors of this opinion, Lord Parker and J.A. Boyd-Carpenter, also
considered that some of the techniques could constitute criminal 
102
assault. To remedy this they proposed, not that the techniques be
abandoned, but that they should be incorporated into law and so as to
103
indemnify in advance those who might apply them! It was all within 
that less than commendable tradition of trying to make the law 
accommodate crude necessities -  which Ian Brownlie characterised as
rather like peopling a monastery with prostitutes and 
publishing the mere change of lodging as an exemplary 
rehabilitation.104
In justice it must be recorded that one of the three Privy 
Counsellors comprising the Committee, Lord Gardiner, strongly dissented 
from the opinions of his colleagues. He closed his minority report 
with the following statement:
The blame for this sorry story, if blame there be, must 
lie with those who, many years ago, decided that in 
emergency conditions in Colonial-type situations we 
should abandon our legal, well-tried and highly successful 
wartime interrogation methods and replace them by procedures 
which wpre secret, illegal, not morally justifiable and 
alien to the traditions of what I believe still to be the 
greatest democracy in the world.105
What followed saw the blending of further hypocrisy with 
obfuscation. On 3 March 1972, when the Parker Report was released, the 
British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, made a statement to the House of
101
102
103
104
105
ibid., p . 7. 
ibid., p . 8. 
ibid.
Brownlie, 'The Compton and Parker Reports', p. 507
Parker Report, p. 22.
354
Commons in which he both concurred with the Majority Report but 
accepted as an operating principle, the Minority Report of Lord
p 106
Gardiner.
This did not mean that the British Government repudiated the 
five techniques, only that, if it was found 'necessary to use some or 
all' of them in the future, it would also be necessary 'to come to the 
House first before doing so.' Nor did it mean that interrogation-
in-depth was to be discontinued in Northern Ireland; on the contrary, 
Heath gave notice that it would continue. However he did not specify 
by what means, despite the fact that allegations were then current that 
RUC Special Branch interrogators still used the wal1-standing technique, 
and reportedly, had added electric shocks and electric heat treatment to
i no
their range of persuasive measures. And Heath's statement certainly
did not mean that British servicemen were no longer permitted to use the
five techniques. In September 1976, the Minister of Defence confirmed
that military personnel v/ere still being trained in their use and
109
resistance thereto.
For all that, Heath’s decision illuminated the transcending 
reality of one of the central issues with which this chapter is 
concerned: courts and tribunals of inquiry have not prevented, and 
cannot prevent the ill-treatment of persons in the custody of the 
security forces. More positively, governments can, but unfortunately 
the record since Compton/Parker has not been encouraging.
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 832, 3 March 1972, 
cols. 743-9.
107 ibid., col. 748.
1D8
Sunday Times, Ulster, p. 307,
109
Irish Times, 4 September 1976, p. 1.' Not long after this disclosure 
a British Labour MP, Tom Litterick, accused his Party's Army 
Undersecretary, Robert Brown, of being 'less than honest' because of his 
inconsistent answers on a related matter —  'psychological operations'.
In one reply Brown had advised Litterick that 262 civil servants had 
attended courses ac the joint warfare establishment at Old Sarum in 
Wiltshire (House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 918, 27 October 1976, 
cols. 262-264. A week later, in answer to a further question on this 
matter, the number had been drastically reduced to 22 —  leading Litterick 
to complain of the Ministry of Defence’s dishonesty (House of Commons, 
Official Report, vol. 918, 4 November 1976, cols. 694-95.
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Within weeks of that episode Lord Widgery presented his findings 
on Bloody Sunday,***^ and gave to the English language a new verb.***
It was clearly not acceptable to the large majority of people in 
Ireland, as Conor Cruise O'Brien's moderately expressed view indicated:
... the introduction to the Report reflects the fact 
that a report unacceptable to the Army would have been 
extremely inconvenient.
I shared therefore in the scepticism with which 
the Catholics of Ireland, plus category two, received 
the Widgery report, largely exonerating the paratroops.
Even four years later the reluctance of the judiciary to grapple 
with similar problems remained undiminished. After a lengthy debate in 
1976 by, first, the court of Criminal Appeal for Northern Ireland, and 
then the House of Lords, no agreement was forthcoming on
(a) whether a soldier commits a crime when he fires to 
kill or seriously wound an unarmed person because he 
honestly believes that the person is a member of a 
proscribed organisation who is seeking to run away, and 
the soldier's shot kills that person; and,
(b) whether, if a soldier commits a crime in killing a 
person at whom he shoots in the circumstances set out
in (a), he is guilty of murder or guilty of manslaughter.
As a result of this collective indecision by eight of the United 
Kingdom's leading jurists one of the outstanding issues relating to the 
use of force by the British Army in Northern Ireland remained unresolved.
Known officially as the Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire 
into the events on Sunday, 30th January 1972, which led to loss of life 
in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, by the 
Rt. Hon. Lord Widgery, OBE, TD, HL 101/HC 220 (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, April 1972).
*** 'to widge: deliberately to draw conclusions totally at odds with 
the evidence hitherto presented —  specially during what are termed 
"whitewash operations'" (John McGuffin, The Guinea Pigs, p. 117).
112
Conor Cruise O'Brien, States of Ireland (Frogmore, St. Albans, Herts: 
Granada, 1974), pp. 263-4. The reference to 'category two' is to 'people 
of settler stock ... and Protestant religion' in Ireland who have generally 
cast in their lot with the descendants of the 'native' Irish (see pp.51-2). 
And presumably the attitudes of neither category were improved by the con­
ferring of a knighthood on the Commanding Officer of the paratroopers, 
within a year of Bloody Sunday.
113 Irish Times, 10 July 1976, p. 4.
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And it also provided an understanding of why, by 1976, of the sixty 
fatal shootings involving soldiers firing at innocent persons, only 
seven had resulted in charges of unlawful killing being laid against 
military personnel.**^
This brief list of unsatisfactory (at least to the Irish
Government) reports of tribunals of inquiry is not exhaustive. The
National Council of Civil Liberties, for example, found shortcomings in
both the Gardiner and Bennett inquiries —  to the extent that it refused
to appear before the latter.*^ And despite the Shackleton reivew**^
and the fact that mainland acts of terrorism related to Ireland have
diminished significantly since the Birmingham pub bombings of 1974,
the Prevention of Terrorism Acts continued to operate almost exclusively
118
against young, working class Catholics in Britain.
Since these reports were the conclusions of 'independent' inquiries, 
the objection that the British Government should not have been held 
responsible for their findings appears to be sustained. And yet it 
cannot be entirely. Irrespective of whether they were officially or 
independently arrived at, the quality of their findings is not altered. 
Furthermore, the independent nature of the inquiries (and the heavy 
criticism their findings attracted) raises the question as to just who 
should be entrusted to undertake them in the first place. It might be
114
Fisk, 'Effect of Social and Political Crime', p. 89.
115
With regard to the Gardiner inquiry, the NCCL opposed its 
recommendations that detention and no-jury trial be continued (Irish 
Times, 1 February 1975). The NCCL's decision not to take part in the 
Bennett Committee's inquiry v/as based on that body's inability to 
'consider the substantive working of emergency legislation in Northern 
Ireland' (Irish Times, 30-31 October 1978).
116
Known officially as the Review of the Operation of the Prevention 
of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1974 and 1976 By the Rt. Hon. 
Lord Shackleton, KG, OBE, Cmnd. 7324 (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, August 1978).
Four in 1979, according to the Guardian Weekly, 13 January 1980,
p. 5.
ibid. See al so Catherine Scorer, The Prevention of Terrorism Acts 1974 
and 1976: A Report on the Operation of the Law (London: National 
Council for Civil Liberties, 1976).
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argued that, if the work of those whose livelihood and eminence as 
jurists is not to be accepted, then either the standards of 
acceptability are ludicrously high or there is nothing further that 
can be done. Both suggestions are misleading. As two of the leading 
instances cited in this chapter indicate, the British Government 
contravened its own guidelines for the conduct of an impartial inquiry. 
In the case of the Compton Committee this has been well publicised: 
on at least seven counts, this report failed to comply with even the
basic standards laid down by the Royal Commission of Tribunals,
119
established under Lord Justice Salmon. Similarly, more attention 
could have been paid to the appointment of J.A. Boyd-Carpenter to the 
Parker Committee: according to McGuffin's account, his only son,
Thomas, was Company Commander of the First Battalion, Scots Guards,
120
stationed at Lurgan, Northern Ireland.
Admittedly, a closer attention to the detail of these matters
would not necessarily have ensured different findings in the various
reports. That type of outcome is hypothetical. But it might have
reduced the degree of callousness and insensitivity to suffering which
are characteristic of the Compton and Parker reports. In default of
this, far too many observers were left not only with the impression
that torture and inhuman and degrading treatment was officially
tolerated in Northern Ireland, but also that those who were in a
position to cast judgment on such activities were no better disposed to
do so than Shakespeare's Mercutio, of whom Romeo said 'He jests at scars
121
that never felt a wound.'
But a concentration on the technical inadequacies of the British 
Government in appointing the committees of inquiry, and upon their 
resultant unsatisfactory and inadequate findings, should not imply that 
the desire to see justice done in Northern Ireland v/as frustrated only 
by unintentional oversights in London. On the contrary, the conduct of
See McGuffin, Internment, pp. 128-9; and McGuffin, The Guinea Pigs, 
pp. 79-81.
120
McGuffin, The Guinea Pigs, p. 105.
121
Also cited by McGuffin (ibid.) in this context. The quote is from
Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene II.
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the British defence in the interstate case indicated an attitude 
consistent with the most cynical interpretations placed upon the 
aforementioned reports.
This was readily apparent in the resort which the British Government 
had to delaying tactics throughout the nearly five years that the case 
was before the Commission. These began when the Commission found that the 
Irish Government's application was admissible, in October 1972. In 
conformity with the rules of procedure, both the applicant and respondent 
Governments were requested to submit written observations on the decision
to proceed with the application —  the British to have theirs with the
122
Commission by 1 February 1973. It was not received until 15 March
123
1973.
In the same period the Irish Government v/as requested to submit
a list of '15 representative cases of alleged ill-treatment, and in
respect of each case the names of witnesses whom they proposed that the
124
Commission should hear.1 This list was then forwarded to the British
Government with a request to furnish 'the names of any other witnesses
and to indicate any other evidence in respect of these cases' by 14
125
June. It was the intention of the Commission to proceed with its
126
hearing on receipt of such evidence, on 10 July 1973. On 12 June
the British Government replied by requesting permission to make
'submissions, following the July hearing, on questions of procedure
127
including matters relating to the hearing of witnesses.' Ten days
later they successfully requested an adjournment of the July hearings
128
on the grounds of the impending Northern Ireland Assembly elections.
122
Annexes, p . 6.
123 ibid., p. 7.
124
Commission Report, pp. 224-5.
125 ibid., p. 225.
126 ibid., p. 226.
127 .... 
ibid.
128
ibid. The Assembly elections v/ere held on 28 June 1973.
359
On 25 September, and again on 28 September the British Government
again advised the Commission of their concern for the safety of
witnesses, and on the latter date submitted an 'outline of evidence'
which their witnesses would give. However the names of these
witnesses were not supplied; instead each was designated by a code,
and it was proposed that members of the security forces should be
screened 'from the view of all but the members of the Commission ...
and there should be such arrangements as will not prejudice the
129
security of such witnesses.' Proceedings were then subjected to
further delays by the 'inadequate' provision of information by the
130
British Government, and by the difficulty it found in arranging for
its counsel to appear on behalf of its witnesses who were due to go
before the Commission from 4-9 February 1974. The hearings were then
131
postponed until 25 February-2 March 1974.
However, when that date arrived, the concern which the British
Government had evinced since early 1974 for the security of its
witnesses culminated in a refusal by it to allow them to attend that
part of the hearings which required them to appear in Strasbourg.
Neither the living accommodation available in Strasbourg, nor the Human
Rights Building itself (including the Commission room and movement in
and out of the building), nor the method of arrival at it were found
132
to meet with the demands specified by the respondent Government.
The purpose of this move may be inferred from the following account of 
the matter by the Commission:
the [British] Government considered that, apart from 
the political difficulties of holding a hearing in the 
United Kingdom at that time, security reasons prevented 
them from providing a venue in the United Kingdom.133
ibid., p. 227-8. This proposal was agreed to with the proviso 
that the Irish Government's leading Counsel was to be allowed to see the 
witnesses (ibid., p. 236).
130 ibid., p. 228.
^  ibid. , pp. 231-2.
132
ibid., p. 232.
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Once again the hearings were cancelled and 'extensive efforts'
were made by the Secretary to the Commission to find, in consultation
with the British Government, an alternative venue which would enable
the latter to substantiate its claim that it would do 'everything
134
appropriate to facilitate the hearing of witnesses. It was not
until 10 April 1974 that the locality was selected as Sola Airbase,
135
Stavanger, Norway. Still further delays caused by the British
Government followed —  mainly because of its refusal, in breach of the
Commission's rulings, to furnish proofs of evidence by the date the
136
Commission had fixed.
Delaying tactics aside, two other devices were employed which
complemented them and which deserve brief consideration. The first
concerned the questionable practice engaged in by the British
representatives of allowing their witnesses, against whom allegations
had been made under Article 3 of the Convention, to read the transcript
of the evidence given by previous witnesses for the Irish Government.
This put the Commission in a dilemma. Such transcripts were meant to be
confidential and any breach of their confidentiality, as the Commission
pointed out, could have prejudiced the outcome of the hearings. On the
other hand these breaches had already occurred and to allow them to
dominate proceedings would have been to complicate matters further.
Consequently, the Commission ruled that 'in the circumstances' the
British practice was permitted, but expressed its regret that the
137
British Government did not consult with it beforehand. In effect the 
British representatives emerged from a situation in which they had taken 
considerable liberties with only a mark of mild displeasure recorded 
against them.
The second device made use of related to the proposal of the British 
Government to designate their witnesses by an alpha-numerical code rather
134
135
136
137
ibid.
Annexes, p.19.
Commission Report, pp. 235, 236, and 239. 
ibid. , pp. 238 and 239.
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than by name. Although this was agreed to by the Commission, the
British embellished it further by allocating different code-numbers to
the same officer or soldier, according to the case with which he was
listed. In turn this caused confusion among the Irish representatives,
only one of whom was allowed to see the British witness he was cross-
138
examining.
In the case of three witnesses heard in London in 1975 not even
this 'concession' applied: they were heard in secret, and then only
by the Commission. Moreover, an official request from Strasbourg to
allow senior Cabinet ministers and a former Northern Ireland Prime
Minister to give evidence before the Commission was blatantly, but
139
nonetheless successfully obstructed. It was developments of this 
nature that, in September 1974, prompted the Irish Government to complain, 
through its Agent, to the Commission of:
the attitude of the respondent Government at all stages 
of the present case which, in their submission, resulted 
in the requests, decisions and directions of the 
Commission and of its delegates being met by the 
respondent Government by (a) failure to comply, (b) 
seeking extension of time to permit compliance, and (c)
inadequate c o m p l i a n c e . 140
Finally, it is necessary to consider three elements of the British 
defence and their effect upon the willingness of the Irish Government to 
persist in its complaint at Strasbourg. The first consisted of a
138
While it is clear from a close reading of the Commission Report 
(e.g. p. 464) that this practice occurred, it is not as clear as was 
claimed in Jack Holland's knowledgeable article, 'Strasbourg Report 
Decoded1, Hibernia3 8 October 1976, p. 5. The reason for this is that, 
although Holland implies his argument is based on the Commission Report, 
it is obvious to anyone familiar with that document that his sources were 
wider than this. Indeed it is suggested that the conclusions he draws 
(more comprehensive than those above) could only have been predicated 
on (unacknowledged) access to the voluminous working papers, and perhaps 
a member of the Irish delegation.
139
Commission Report} pp. 108-22.
140
ibid., pp. 241-2. The Commission's response was to take note of the 
matters raised and to express 'its hope for the parties' co-operation in 
carrying out its tasks under Article 28 of the Convention.' (ibid., 
pp. 242-3).
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categorical denial by British witnesses that the allegations of ill-
141
treatment were true. In support of this they referred to the fact
that all of the Irish witnesses had signed a 'no complaints' form on
leaving the detention centres, and that the doctor who was in residence
at the Crumlin Road Jail where they were sent after their interrogation
at the various holding centres had not taken exception to the state of
142
the prisoners when he examined them.
Neither was convincing; the objection to the first was well 
outlined by Jack Holland.
As regards the first argument, it is so transparently 
weak as to suggest that the British were not prepared 
to take the proceedings seriously. A man who has been 
held, beaten and threatened for 48 hours will in all 
likelihood sign a No-Complaints form if he thinks that 
will help him to get out, and especially if it is put 
to him in the form of a threat as to what might happen
to him if it is not s i g n e d . 1 4 3
The Commission agreed, finding the value of such forms 'questionable'.*^
As regards the second element —  medical evidence from Crumlin 
Road -  the Commission was again openly critical of the reliability 
which could be placed upon it. Under cross-examination, the medical 
doctor concerned (referred to as 'Dr M' in the Report) admitted that he 
had not recorded any complaints in his log concerning injuries allegedly 
caused by the security forces, despite the fact that all of those 
brought before him may have so complained. The essence of this situation, 
according to the Report, was the antipathy with which the detainees 
regarded the doctor ('part of the establishment which they were against'), 
and which he returned to them ('a specially treated group, namely IRA
ibid., pp. 404-5. See also those sections of Part Two, II’, (C) of 
the Commission Report, headed 'The Evidence of the Security Force 
Witnesses1, pp. 418-54.
142
ibid., p. 407. See also those sections of Part Two, I, (B) of the 
Commission Report, headed 'The Respondent Government', pp. 274-314.
143
Jack Holland, Strasbourg: The Men Behind the Torture', Hibernia, 
8 October 1976, p. 5.
Commission Report, p. 407.
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I regretted that these things had to be done but they 
had to be done. This v/as not what was done all along
the l i n e . 146
The Report therefore concluded
If one puts these statements into the context of security 
operations in the Autumn of 1971, it seems highly 
probable that Dr M. just did not care to investigate 
into or even to report facts which he rightly thought to 
be outside his medical competence.147
The third element was covered by the general description
148
'preventive and remedial action already taken.' This included
legislation and a considerable number of directives, issued by the
British Government, with the objective of securing the protection of
human rights contemplated by the Convention. Foremost among these, or
at least the most publicised and, perhaps, the most successful, was
the practice of settling, frequently for considerable sums of money,
actions brought against the British Government by persons alleging ill-
treatment by the security forces. Between 9 August 1971 and 30
September 1975, 798 actions were commenced, of which 11 went to trial;
nine were dismissed, and judgment was given for the claimant in two;
220 cases were settled out of Court, and at period's end, 567 cases
were still outstanding. In the 220 cases disposed of, over £420,000
had been paid in compensation for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment,
149
and assault and battery.
In the light of these developments the Commission reported that
145
suspects'). This was supported by his statement
145
ibid., p. 417.
146 .... 
ibid.
147
ibid.
148 ibid., p. 485.
149
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 898, 21 October 1975, 
cols. 97-8. Read in conjunction v/ith Council of Europe, European Court 
in Human Rights, Case of Ireland against the United Kingdom: Judgment 
(18 January 1978), p. 49, (hereafter cited as Judgment). In the only 
case of alleged physical ill-treatment which seems to have been fought, 
namely the case of Moore v. Shillington, the judge disbelieved the 
evidence of the security forces. (Judgment, p. 49).
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... important measures have been taken to meet the 
complaints of the applicant Government, in particular 
as regards the individual victims who have been cited 
in the application ... the respondent Government have 
repeatedly manifested their intention and good will to 
do anything that is reasonably possible in order to 
ensure the observance of their obligations under the
Convention.150
Nevertheless the Commission was also obliged to include the 
observation
It is true that in most cases no criminal or disciplinary 
punishment has been imposed on persons who have committed 
acts of i1 1 -treatment.161
In doing so it lit upon the substantial mote in both the British
position and its own appreciation of that position. In general terms,
the Irish Government did not regard the action taken as sufficiently
152
preventive or remedial. More particularly, there was an objection 
to out-of-court settlements (apart from the pardonable inference that 
these awards somehow absolved the British Government of further 
responsibility in the matter of the treatment of detainees), and it was 
this: in the absence of action against those who otherwise should have 
stood accused, the British Government was seen to be buying protection, 
not to say disguising the real motives it had in making the settlements.
Hence, there existed the most unlikely grounds for the Commission
153
to have effected a 'friendly settlement' between the parties. On 
the contrary, the reasons adduced in the foregoing indicate both the 
strength of the Irish case in terms of the evidence of the detainees
150
Commission Report3 p. 487
151
152
153
ibid
ibid
Discussions between representatives of the British and Irish 
Governments, respectively, took place with a general view to such an 
outcome (allowed for in Articles 28 and 30 of the Convention). The 
record of these discussions comprises Annexe III of Volume II of the 
Commission Report (as per Commission R e p o r t p. ii). But, according to 
advice received by the writer, this document has not been made public 
(Letter from G. Guarneri, Principal Administrator, Directorate of Human 
Rights, Secretariat General, Council of Europe, 21 November 1980).
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and the unsatisfactory response by the British Government. However, 
it is emphasised that these arguments were distilled principally from 
the Report of the Commission and with a view to the broad politics 
of the issue raised. To the extent that these arguments exclude whatever 
motivating influence was provided by legal considerations it is a single 
factor analysis. Yet anyone who would argue from this latter stand­
point would need, first to discount the force of the political 
arguments presented, and second, to develop it in the face of such 
obstacles to inquiry as the Irish Government's silence throughout the 
period in which the application was 'sub judice1 the Commission. And 
then they would still need to account for developments following the 
publication of the Commission's findings which tended rather more to 
support the arguments which were the principal concern of the chapter 
to this point.
In September 1976 these findings were published as follows:
1. Article 3 of the Convention (torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
(a) Cases involving the five techniques:
The Commission was of the opinion that the combined 
use of the five techniques in the cases before it 
consituted a practice of inhuman treatment and torture.154
(b) Other Cases: The Commission, by unanimous votes, 
was of the opinion
(i) that in a further 11 of the cases examined
in depth, violations occurred by inhuman treatment 
of the persons in question at the hands of the 
security forces.
(ii) that there was a violation of the Convention 
by a practice of inhuman treatment by members of
the RUC in connection with the treatment of prisoners 
at Palace Barracks in the Autumn of 1971.
(iii) that no practice in breach was found arising 
out of other individual cases of treatment in breach, 
or in the conditions in Girdwood Park in August 1971.
(iv) that there was no violation by the conditions 
at Ballykinler Regional Holding Centre.155
Commission Report3 p. 402.
155
ibid., p. 473.
366
2. Articles 5 (personal liberty) and 6 (fair trial) of 
the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 15 
(derogation in emergency) regarding internment.
unamimous decision: no violation as the measures, 
although contrary to Article 5, were permissible 
under Article 15.156
3. Article 14 (discrimination on political grounds) 
regarding the implementation of internment.
unanimous decision: no viola t i o n . ^ 7
4. Article 1 (obligation to secure the rights embodied 
Tn the Convention)
by 12 votes to 1: no violation as this Article 
does not impose a separate obligation from the 
rights Articles and cannot therefore be separately
breached.158
Essentially, these conclusions represented a successful application
by the Irish Government although it preferred to comment no further
than to say that an examination of the report justified the proceedings 
159
it had taken. By its own measure it may have expected more. In 
fact the Irish Government had submitted written evidence in respect of 
228 cases of alleged ill-treatment, only 16 of which were ultimately 
examined in detail by the Commission as 'illustrative' cases. Thus 
the Commission's findings were specific to them, not the 'overall 
situation' and then mainly to the period of autumn 1971.* *
Subsequently it became clear that Dublin had sought a more complete 
measure of satisfaction than was found in the Report. On 10 March 1976, 
before the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had considered 
the Commission's findings, the Irish Government invoked the appelate
156 ibid., pp. 92, 94, 99 and 103.
157
ibid., p. 220.
158
ibid., p. 485.
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Ireland Today: Bulletin of the department of Foreign Affairs3 
No. 893, 1 October 1976, p. 8.
Commission Report, p. 461.
161 ibid., p. 459.
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jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, which was its
prerogative under the Convention. It thus achieved a redirection of
the case away from a primarily political forum in which the balance
of political power could possibly tell against the moral and legal
suasion which elements of the case were seen to have before the 
163
Commission. But this was not openly admitted at the time: instead 
the object of the application was described as follows:
to ensure the observance in Northern Ireland of the 
engagements undertaken by the [British] Government as a 
High Contracting Party to the Convention and in particular 
of the engagements specifically set out by the [Irish] 
Government in the pleadings filed and the submissions made 
on their behalf and described in the evidence adduced 
before the Commission in the hearings before them.164
To this end the Irish Government invited the Court
... to consider the report of the Commission and to confirm 
the opinion of the Commission that breaches of the Convention 
have occurred and also to consider the claims of the [Irish] 
Government with regard to other alleged breaches and to 
make a finding of breach of the Convention where the Court 
is satisfied that a breach has occurred.165
Thus, the Irish Government's application may be summarised as requesting
the Court not only to confirm those findings of British guilt which had
been reached by the Commission, but otherwise to overrule or reject, as
appropriate, those Commission findings which were contrary to the
166
substance of the original complaints. In Janaury 1977 it also
162
1
Hereafter referred to as the Court. The Court has jurisdiction 
over the interpretation and application of the Convention and may also 
render limited advisory opinions at the request of the Committee of 
Ministers; its decisions are final. (Boyle, Hadden, Hillyard, Law 
and State, p. 155).
163
Interview with Dr Garret Fitzgerald, former Minister for Foreign 
Affairs (1973-1977) and Leader of Fine Gael, Dublin, 14 February 1978,
(hereafter cited as Fitzgerald Interview, 14 February 1978).
Judgment, p. 2.
The full submission to the Court is found in the Irish Times,
8 February 1977. They are also found at various points in the Judgment 
but not in as consolidated a form.
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Government ordering the prosecution of officers involved in the
167
aforementioned breaches of the Convention.
So much for the forum and the application. The question that 
still remained to be answered was why the Irish Government continued 
to press its case at all-. The Northern Ireland Secretary, Roy Mason, 
was obviously irritated by it as was evident in a statement to the House 
of Commons.
The more that they [the allegations against Britain] are 
pursued in the European Court the more they serve only 
the cause of the Provisional IRA. Some years ago we 
recognised that we had been guilty of ill-treatment and 
that 14 prisoners had been ill-treated. We admitted that 
and have now paid compensation. I thought that was a 
first-class example of mature democracy. Only the 
Provisional IRA can benefit as a result of pursuing this 
case.1^8
However, statements of this type appear to have been rare
occurrences as there are few recorded instances of the British
Government criticising or pressuring the Irish Government to desist
with its Court action. But, according to Fitzgerald, Irish civil
servants involved in bilaterial relations across a wide range of
activities, were left in no doubt by their British counterparts as to
169
the displeasure being expressed at ministerial level in Whitehall.
Added to this there v/as the general suspicion at large in Britain, and
acknowledged by Declan Costello, the Irish Attorney-General, in his
summing up in Strasbourg, that the Irish action had been motivated by
p o
'malice or spirit of vindictiveness.
This, despite the landmark circumstances of the case in Strasbourg,
it was, in terms of Anglo-Irish relations, a manifestation of the well-
established tradition of mutual misunderstanding, here encapsulated by 
Oliver MacDonagh:
Judgment, p. 62.
168
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 925, 10 February 1977, 
cols. 1635-6.
169
Fizgerald Interview, 14 February 1978.
170 Times, 23 April 1977.
requested that the Court address a consequential order to the British
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Britain is engrossed with an immediate problem. She 
assumes a common war effort because there is a common 
general interest. She sees herself as readily 
forgiving past transgressions, and therefore entitled 
to ready pardon. But these are not pleas which can 
be heard clearly by Irish ears. They are drowned or 
distorted by the noises of old coercion, old 
condenscension, old colonialism and old battles for 
parity and the rule of ordinary law.171
In the particular circumstances of the interstate case, the Irish
could, and did invest their actions with the quality of virtue and
denied the force of ulterior motives imputed to them. Indeed, Garret
Fitzgerald attempted to turn claims of this nature back upon his
Government's accusers —  describing them as 'propaganda'. Yet always
he and other Ministers could point, with considerable logic in their
favour, that the issues to be settled demandpd a conclusion in law3
and to the consistency of successive Irish Governments' concern for the
172
civil and human rights of the minority community in Northern Ireland.
The difficulty with such assertions, as it was also with the British
assumption of ready forgiveness by the Irish, was that neither was
completely deserved. Both admitted flaws which confirmed MacDonagh's
observation that 'it is perhaps the mass of commonplace, unnoticed
discordance of meaning and connotation which has set and still sets
173
Anglo-Irish communication most askew'.
While the substance of the Irish reasons for proceeding to the 
Court were demonstrably true they did not comprise the whole truth. In 
fact, before the formal Court proceedings had ended in Strasbourg, the 
Irish Government was itself embarrassed by allegations that a 'heavy 
gang1 in the Garda Siochana had been systematically beating up
Oliver MacDonagh, 'Time's Revenges and Revenge's Time: A View of 
Anglo-Irish Relations', Anglo-Irish Studies IV (1979) : 15, (hereafter 
cited as MacDonagh, 'Time's Revenge and Revenge's Time').
172
Fitzgerald Interview, 14 February 1978; and comments made by 
Fitzgerald on the BBC Television programme, 'Tonight', of 18 January 
1978, and of which a BBC transcript is held, (hereafter cited as BBC 
'Tonight' transcript, 18 January 1978).
173
MacDonagh, 'Time's Revenge and Revenge's Time', p. 22.
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Provisional IRA suspects. To many the charges bore an uncanny
resemblance to the allegations of torture which the British Government
were facing: prisoners v/ere allegedly locked in cupboards, deprived
of sleep, threatened with guns, and denied water in over-heated
175
rooms. Dublin, moreover, refused an inquiry.
This position became less tenable in June 1977 with the rendering 
of a report to the International Executive Committee of Amnesty 
International by a mission which visited the Republic that month.
In a letter to the Taoiseach of 26 August 1977, Amnesty International 
stated an opinion
... that the attached report constitutes grounds 
justifying an impartial investigation into the alleged 
maltreatment, in keeping with the United Nations 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being 
subjected to Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment of 9 December 1975 ...176
As with the allegations against the security forces in Northern Ireland 
the Amnesty report noted:
Most of these allegations have concerned persons who 
have been arrested on suspicion of involvement either 
in terrorist offences or in other serious crimes where 
there has been a suspected political motive.177
By its timing and its contents the report became a particularly
sensitive document. Its communication to the Irish Government
coincided v/ith the expectation that a verdict would be forthcoming from
the European Court of Human Rights within a matter of weeks, and demands
that sections of the Republic's year-old emergency (counter-terrorist)
1 78
legislation not be renewed.
174
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London Sunday T i m e s 20 February 1977.
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Letter from Martin Ennals, Secretary General of Amnesty International, 
to the Taoiseach, of 26 August 1977, and enclosing the report.
Report of An Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of 
Ireland in June 19773 Part I, first page.
1 78
Times3 3 September 1977, p. 1.
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The Irish Government, therefore, was in no hurry to respond to 
the Amnesty report. It took until 7 October 1977 for Gerard Collins, 
the Minister for Justice, to announce, first, the establishment of
... a special Committee to consider the situation 
arising from serious allegations and make recommendations 
as to whether —  and if so what —  additional safeguards 
are necessary for the protection against ill-treatment 
of persons in Garda custody and for the protection of 
members of the Garda Siochana against unfounded 
allegations of such ill-treatment.
and second:
... special arrangements whereby such allegations from 
identifiable persons can be speedily investigated and 
submitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions who is, 
by law, the authority in whom is vested the duty to decide 
if the evidence is sufficient to justify a prosecution.179
What the wording of these announcements implied —  an official
scepticism bordering on indifference —  subsequent developments confirmed.
By late February 1978, only the committee to advise on safeguards had
been appointed but little had been attempted to expedite the
180
investigation of charges against the Garda Siochana. According to
Collins the need to do so no longer existed as none of the complaints
made to Amnesty International had later become the subject of a specific 
181
complaint. However, in June 1978 this position was no longer
tenable. In the face of persistent allegations over four years that
Gardai in Monaghan had been ill-treating suspects, a Chief
Superintendent was appointed in accordance with a measure that had
182
been promised nine months before.
These episodes demonstrated a remarkable similarity in the 
reactions of both the British and Irish Governments to essentially the 
same issue. While it is not claimed that the extent of ill-treatment
Statement issued by the Government Information Services on behalf 
of Mr Gerard Collins, T.D., Minister for Justice, p. 1.
i on
Irish. Times3 28 February 1978.
Irish Times, 6 May 1978.
182
Irish Times, 30 June 1978, p. 1.
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was as widespread or as scientifically applied in the Republic as it 
was in Northern Ireland, it was nevertheless instructive that, in 
each case, the attempts by third parties to interest themselves were 
resisted. Moreover, when this proved unsuccessful, both governments 
reacted with measures designed to protect the perpetrators as much as 
to identify and prosecute them. And at the official level this 
appeared to be best explained by a belief that the complainants were 
probably deserving of no better treatment than they got anyway.
Beyond these similarities the differences are profound —
especially the difference in the resultant proceedings. The
allegations concerning the Garda Siochana did not find expression
against the Irish Government in an application before the European
Commission of Human Rights, and, what is more, appear unlikely to do so.
If Aidan Browne's observations are accurate, then the return of a
Fianna Fail Government in June 1977 heralded a cessation of the
'official tolerance' of such acts as led to the allegations, and hence,
183
of the acts themselves. But then this observer also had to admit
that, in the prosecution of one's own guilty parties, there was no more
184
enthusiasm to be found in Ireland than in the United Kingdom.
In these circumstances the decision to proceed with the interstate 
case to the Court lost a slight measure of the strength of its position 
which it otherwise accrued from an appeal to legal justice and 
morality. While to continue the action against Britain may have been 
reassuring to the Republican/Nationalist tradition throughout the 32 
counties —  particularly in view of the Irish Government's pressure 
against the IRA through emergency legislation —  it could not help, to 
the extent its higher motivation was impugned, but appear as perplexing, 
or even hypocritical. ^
183
Aidan Browne, 'Britain's "pompotis solemn undertakings" a sham', 
Irish Times, 15 June 1978, p. 10.
184 ibid.
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In one regard the direction of the case to the Court may have been 
an obligatory course of action. The Economists 30 April 1977, reported 
that it 'was the only way open to the Irish to get the commission's 
findings published and placed on record ...' However, the fact that in
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The British, if anything, displayed even more ambivilence.
Their submissions may be summarised as a request that the Court uphold
the findings of the Commission in respect of Articles 1, 5, 6, and
186
14 of the Convention and which were in their favour. As regards the
one article of which they were found seriously and extensively in
breach, Article 3, they submitted that while the findings of the
Commission were not contested, the Court should 'decline to exercise
its jurisdiction' on the grounds that the objective of the original
application had been accomplished. This was principally a reference
to the 'solemn and unqualified undertaking' not to reintroduce the
five techniques, given by the British Attorney-General, Sam S i 1 kin, on
8 February 1977. Accordingly the subject-matter of the Commission's
187
findings 'belonged to past history'.
In large part, therefore, the official irritation expressed by 
Mason (cited above) was accounted for, but both his statement and the 
posture of the British Government on the matter of Article 3, were 
misleading. The British Government did not, as Mason claimed, admit 
that 'prisoners' (who were, in fact no such persons —  but detainees) 
had been ill-treated. As a rule, where large sums of money had been 
paid in settlement, it specifically denied that this signified an 
admission of guilt, as the following two examples indicate:
1978, Ireland had not ratified (although its Ministers had signed) 
either of two UN Covenants —  on Civil and Political and Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, respectively —  the UN Convention on Racial 
Discrimination, did nothing to mitigate the above judgment. See 'The 
UN Declaration of Human Rights Thirty Years After', Text of address by 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Michael O'Kennedy, TD, at the 
International Consultation on Human Rights, Irish School of Ecumenics, 
on 30 November 1978, Statement and Speeches 1/79: Bulletin of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs; and Mr Sean McBride's reported comments 
on the same occasion, Irish Times, 1 December 1978.
186
The full submissions are found in the Irish Timess 8 February 1977. 
As was noted with the Irish submissions (note 152), the British 
submissions are also found throughout the Judgment but not in as 
consolidated a form.
187
Judgment, pp. 52 and 53.
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(i) Finally, with regard to these cases, the 
[British] Government submitted that the Commission 
should not assume from the settlements in the case 
... that the large sums of money v/ere in any way 
an admission of the assault ... 188
(ii) With regard to the settlements in the civil 
actions ... the [British] Government submitted that 
the fact that damages had been awarded was not 
evidence of admission of the cases. Settlement 
could be reached for a number of reasons. One reason 
was that it could be cheaper to settle the case and 
to avoid increased expenses by bringing in a lot of 
witnesses, particularly in the County Court where the 
limit was £300. Another aspect of the matter was the 
probability that the plaintiff might succeed in his 
causes of action. Finally the fact that a settlement 
was reached meant that the plaintiff deprived himself 
of conclusive evidence as to his allegations in the 
present case, [emphasis added].189
Hence, far from admitting the ill-treatment of detainees, the British 
Government had sought, as a matter of policy in so many instances, to 
preclude an almost certain guilty verdict against itself by purchasing 
a settlement which could be cynically exploited before international 
forums. It was a type of logic more often found in, and certainly 
more suited to the writings of Lewis Carroll, for where else would a 
defence be predicated on probable guilt yet distorted to represent 
its opposite.
A similar reservation applied to the British decision not to 
contest the Commission's findings of torture (Article 3). It was a 
matter of opinion whether this constituted an admission that torture 
had previously been used, but it might be noted that it was never 
positively expressed as such by the British Government. To this extent 
Britain avoided the painful experience of having to confront the fact 
that some of its citizens had received treatment at the hands of its 
own security forces which was thought to be appropriate in Aden and 
Kenya, for example, but not in the United Kingdom in the latter half 
of the twentieth century.
Commission Report, p. 275.
189 ibid. , p. 293.
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However, the avoidance was not complete: in an ironical and,
one supposes, an unintentional characterisation in 1976, the British
Army described the five techniques as the 'type of treatment1 which a
prisoner of war might be subjected to 'in the hands of an unscrupulous
190
enemy'. Evidently this was a sentiment which had permeated wider 
afield in Whitehall because Silkin's undertaking of 8 February 1977 
effectively made redundant Heath's undertaking of March 1972, which 
promised only that the five techniques would not be re-introduced without 
parliament being informed. In doing so Heath had strengthed Ireland's 
case for taking its case to the Court in the first place, for there was 
no indication prior to the date of Silkin's announcement that Britain 
would so act.
This could be inferred from the developments in one other area
also —  namely the Irish Government's demand that the individuals
guilty of torture and ill-treatment be prosecuted. This the British
rejected, most probably on the grounds that it would involve an uncertain
process of inquiry into matters some six years past, but also out of a
less worthy concern for the effect that it might have on the morale of
191
a reforming Royal Ulster Constabulary. The Court proceedings, if 
they did not effect a prosecution, at least made the respondent's 
dereliction the more obvious.
In terms of the Judgment which the Court delivered on 18 January 
1978, most of these developments, subsequent to the Irish Government's 
application to the Court, were either irrelevant or to no effect. With 
the exception of decisions made in respect of Article 3 (torture and
192
inhuman treatment), the Court upheld the conclusions of the Commission.
With regard to Article 3 it reached what must be described as a 
surprising decision. Having taken note of the British undertaking, it 
held unanimously that, although certain violations were not contested,
Irish Times, 4 September 1976, p. 1. Such was the wording used on 
the consent form signed by military personnel being trained in the use 
and resistance of the five techniques.
191
Economist, 30 April 1977.
Judgment3 pp. 82-3.
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a ruling should nevertheless be given thereon. That, perhaps, was 
not surprising. But having then proceeded to note that the techniques
(i) were applied in combination, with premeditation and for hours at a 
stretch, caused if not actual bodily injury, at least intense physical 
and mental suffering and led to acute psychiatric disturbances during 
interrogation, and (ii) were such as to arouse in their victims 
feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and 
debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance, 
it held, in respect of the unidentified interrogation centre or 
centres:
(1) by sixteen votes to one, that recourse to the five 
techniques amounted to a practice of inhuman and 
degrading treatment.
(2) by thirteen votes to four, that the use of the 
techniques did not constitute a practice of torture 
since they did not occasion suffering of the particular 
intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture.194
The Court also held, unanimously, that there had existed, at least
until the Autumn of 1971, a practice of inhuman treatment at Palace
Barracks, but by fourteen votes to three, decided that it did not
constitute torture since the severity of the suffering capable of being
caused by the acts complained of did not attain the particular level
195
inherent in the notion of torture.
With regard to the treatment of detainees at Ballykinler, in
August 1971, which included the compulsory performance of painful
exercises and which the judgment described as 'a discreditable and
reprehensible' practice, the Court held, by fifteen votes to two, that
196
this practice did not infringe Article 3.
Finally, it was the unanimous verdict of the Court that it could 
not direct, as the Irish Government had requested, the United Kingdom
193
193
194
195
196
ibid. , pp. 52-3.
ibid., pp. 56-7
ibid., pp. 58-9
ibid., pp. 60-2
and 82.
and 82.
and 82.
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to institute criminal or disciplinary proceedings against those who 
had committed, condoned, or tolerated the breaches of Article 3 found 
by the Court. ^
Undaunted by these findings, the Irish Government claimed
The Case made by the Irish Government has stood up to 
rigorous, international examination and the judgment 
of the Court, which is final, must be welcomed by all 
who are interested in the protection of human rights.
Yet, when stripped of all the proaganda, statements of vindication, and 
other claims and counter-claims, the Judgment was hardly satisfactory 
to the Irish Government. Garret Fitzgerald, the Foreign Minister 
throughout most of the period in which the case ran its course, 
accurately expressed the general reaction in Ireland as follows:
There is some surprise here about the torture decision, 
simply because in fact the decision of the Commission 
that the acts constituted torture was not contested by 
the British representatives, and naturally there is an 
assumption that if it wasn't contested the Court would 
accept it and of course the verdict seems by our legal 
standards a little eccentric in those circumstances.199
It was a decision which tended to be explained in official 
circles in Dublin by reference to very broad political influences. The 
eighteen judges who made up the Court were portrayed as being elderly, 
mostly former civil servants whose familiarity with torture was limited 
to a knowledge of Nazi methods and not with modern, scientifically 
applied v a r i a n t s . I t  could, therefore, be assumed that they reflected 
the political attitudes of their home countries which, conceivably, would 
account for the votes of Greece and Cyprus in favour of a torture 
verdict —  the suggestion being that an earlier Cypriot case alleging
ibid., p. 62.
198
'Strasbourg Case1, Issued by the Government Information Services, 
Dublin, 18 January 1978, p. 2.
19Q
BBC 'Tonight' transcript, 18 January 1978.
Interview, Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 1978.
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torture by Turkey was not unconnected. Conceivably this might also 
have explained why the Irish and British members of the Court followed 
their respective government's line and why they chose to file separate 
opinions to this effect.
For the British, however, the outcome must have been more than
pleasing. If the British newspapers were any indication, the mood it
engendered was one of understandable relief and gratitude, compromised
202
by a noticeable propensity towards gloating. Officially, the 
response in Whitehall was one of satisfaction, as was apparent in 
Mason's initial statement on being notified of the findings.
I have not yet seen the full text of the judgment of 
the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg on 
the allegations made by the Government of the Republic 
of Ireland relating principally to certain events which 
took place in Northern Ireland some six years ago.
However, it is a matter of satisfaction to HMG that the 
Court has rejected the charge of torture; has agreed 
with the Commission that the introduction of detention 
did not go beyond what was strictly required, and that 
there was no discrimination in its use; and has rejected 
allegations that the Commission's other findings did not 
go far enough. I regard this as a chapter now closed.203
Indeed, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was right: 
the chapter was closed. But it remains to consider its significance in, 
and its implications for the international politics of the Ulster 
Question. Of itself it was a hallmark for two reasons.
First, as Boyle and Hannum observed, it may be regarded as a 
triumph of and another step forward in the progress of international 
organisations:
201
Joe Joyce, 'Strasbourg: It Takes More to Make Torture', Hibernia,
20 January 1978.
202
This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the media 
coverage of the interstate case. The above assessment therefore must 
stand as an assertion —  but an assertion nevertheless based on an 
examination of voluminous clippings from the main English dailies. For a 
brief survey of coverage in support of the above claim, see the Irish 
Times, 20 January 1978.
203
Northern Ireland Office, Press Notice, N 10/1/7, Stormont Castle, 
Belfast, 19 January 1978.
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... in the larger view of human rights and international 
institutions, perhaps the fact that the Commission was able 
to deal at all with such a sensitive political issue as 
the Northern Irish conflict is the most significant aspect 
of the proceedings. Despite the most serious allegations, 
intense legal argument, and extremely embarrassing publicity, 
no governments have fallen; diplomatic relations, while
strained, have not ruptured.204
Second, and more particularly, whatever other reservations may be 
held about it, the interstate case was the first-ever non-British 
judicial inquiry into the conditions under which Northern Ireland was 
governed. Thus it emphasised both the erosion of domestic sovereignty 
which the Convention itself represented, and the operation of that 
condition as a feature of the politics associated with Northern Ireland 
since 1968. The force of the two in conjunction was manifest in the 
1972 Green Paper:
For the future any arrangements must ensure that the 
United Kingdom Government has an effective and a 
determining voice in relation to any circumstances 
which involve, or may involve in the future, the 
commitment of the Armed Forces, the use of emergency 
powers, or repercussions at international level.205
Furthermore, it was the opinion of some law scholars that the
'preventive and remedial action' taken by the United Kingdom (and noted
earlier), was a result of a Strasbourg-induced consciousness of the
2 Ofi
anomalous conditions under which Northern Ireland was governed.
For all that the Strasbourg decisions cannot truly be construed 
as the victory of an Irish David over a British Goliath. One obvious 
consideration precludes this: the arguments presented by each 
Government were legal arguments which, despite the adversary relationship
204
Boyle and Hannum, 'Ireland in Strasbourg', p. 267.
205
Northern Ireland Office, The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper 
for discussion (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972), p. 36. 
Essentially the same sentiments were expressed in a later document,
Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals3 Cmnd. 5259 (London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, March 1973), pp. 25 and 30.
206
Boyle, Hadden, Hillyard, Law and State3 pp. 159-60. The same 
conclusion is found in Boyle and Hannum, 'Ireland in Strasbourg', p. 267 
Note: the author Boyle is different in each case.
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that existed throughout the proceedings, ultimately appealed to, and 
depended on the Convention for their validity. Their force was 
neither enhanced nor diminished by the international status of whoever 
uttered them. From this it followed that 'victory' was a concept much 
out of place, and that the encounter was, in terms normally associated 
with the study of international politics, or even with the international 
of the Ulster Question, 'sui generis1.
But this should not imply that the conclusions and verdicts
reached during the proceedings were an absolute triumph of justice and
human rights either. Against the welcome developments which undoubtedly
flowed from them must be laid the scholarly caution that the 'impact of
207
the Strasbourg cases must not be exaggerated.' Although published 
in 1975 -  before the conclusions of the Commission or the Court's 
verdict were formulated —  thus warning proved to be prescient.
The Court, it should be remembered, eventually sat in
deliberation of issues which had been raised over six years before.
Although it was known by many other appellations the most common of these
denoted its principal concern: it was the 'torture case'. Yet it must
be regretted that, for whatever reasons, it avoided giving to the
208
people of Western Europe an operational definition of torture. All 
it accomplished in this regard was an opinion on what was not torture: 
it was not any practice which conformed to the descriptions in (i) and
(ii) previously noted. Also to be regretted was that the Court, having 
seized itself of the need to give a ruling on practices which the 
Commission decided were torture (and which the British Government did 
not contest), not only retreated to a position similar to that adopted 
by the Compton Committee, but failed to provide an objective basis for 
a definition. However there was some consolation in that the Court 
resisted the invitation, and thus the insensitivity of findings, 
presented by British Judge, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, 'to wonder whether 
Christ was really degraded by being made to don a purple robe and crown
ibid., p. 160.
For a wider discussion of this matter see, Barry M. Klayman, 'The 
Definition of Torture in International Law', Temple Law Quarterly 51 
(1978) : 449-517.
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of thorns and to carry His own cross.1 To this extent the Judgment 
admitted a touch of 'deja vu' for this very deficiency had been, in 
part, responsible for the unsatisfactory nature of the Compton Report, 
and hence, for the Irish Government's application in the first place.
Furthermore it could be argued that shortcomings were to be
expected of the Strasbourg proceedings because the Convention itself
does not mention specific sanctions which may be taken against an
210
offending party. The Committee of Ministers is empowered to take
211
'measures' but the weakness of its position was apparent in the Court's 
negative finding in relation to offenders against Article 3.
In the absence of a willingness to prosecute such persons in the 
United Kingdom, the progress towards the guarantee of human rights which 
was hailed by many following the Commission's and the Court's 
deliberations, was surely to be questioned.
Thus, in the final analysis, the particular failure to remedy
matters set in motion by the excess of Operation Demetrius was most
appropriately Britain's, or to be more precise, that of successive
British Governments. They had no need to rely upon the 1978 decision of
the Court, for they had in any case, defaulted in this obligation long 
212
before then. In part no action was taken out of a belief that the end
209
Judgment, p. 109.
210
Boyle, Hadden, Hillyard, Law and State, p. 158.
211 ibid.
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For a brief period on the night of 18 January 1978 this position 
was in doubt. On the RTE programme 'Politics', the late Airey Neave, 
then principal Opposition (Conservative) spokesman on Northern Ireland, 
said he 'would consider' Garret Fitzgerald's proposal to investigate those 
involved in the 1971 ill-treatment cases with a view to ensuring that they 
did not remain in positions of responsibility. Obviously this fell short 
of actual prosecution but was a measure seen in Dublin as going some way 
towards the reform of the RUC. (Tape of 'Politics' programme of 18 
January 1978). Within the hour, however, and before a predominantly 
British audience, he gave Fitzgerald a different answer to the same 
proposal:
'... I don't think six or seven years afterwards it is 
open ... to take any further action about this, insofar 
as no prosecution is intended ... no doubt under the 
Articles of the Convention the British Government can
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justified the means; that there v/as a need to react to the situation 
in Northern Ireland in a manner 'appropriate' to the atrocities that 
were being committed there. Successively, in political, military, and 
legal terms this proved illusory, but the illusion was obviously more 
agreeable to many than the reality afforded by all that followed 
Operation Demetrius, Internment, and Application No. 5310/71. From 
canvassing the British reaction throughout the period of the case, it v/as 
clear that the initial decision to introduce measures such as the five 
techniques was popularly received.
Furthermore, from the official and semi-official inquiries into 
allegations of brutality in 1978 and 1979, it is clear that the under­
takings given by two representatives of the British Government deserved 
no better description than Aidan Browne's: 'a sham'. While they 
emphasise that such decisions and the actions which logically proceed 
from them are government prerogatives, they also underscore the cynicism 
and scepticism v/hich so easily obtains in Britain's political and moral 
standards in Northern Ireland. But such reports are possessed of their 
own irony: they document not the sophisticated manipulation of mind and 
body by sensory deprivation which v/as current in 1971, but blatent 
physical abuse seemingly without regard for the consequences.
In all, this behaviour is probably less a reflection on human 
rights in Northern Ireland than it is on the British presence in the 
province. And this may be the most significant feature of the inter­
state case. The bringing of it by the Irish Government did nothing to 
advance, nor probably, to retard the objective of national unity. Yet 
it did raise the question once more as to how and why Britain's charge 
of Northern Ireland could have become so overborne with misrule, and more 
importantly, why it should continue. It has become a truism in the last 
decade that the behaviour of the security forces which has been condoned 
there v/ould not have been tolerated in (say) Birmingham, London, or
Manchester. About this behaviour there was, and as Lord Gardiner so
213
impressively argued in his dissenting opinion to the Parker Report,
consider what action to take if they see fit and 
that is not a matter for the Opposition.'
(BBC 'Tonight' transcript, 18 January 1978, p. 4).
See p. 337.
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something intrinsically alien to British traditions of justice and 
democracy as they apply in mainland Britain. From this it follows that 
Northern Ireland is such a special case within the United Kingdom that 
it should more properly exist outside that entity. This is a notion as 
old as the Ulster Question itself' indeed it is a form of the Ulster 
Question expressed as a statement. It is the particular sadness of 
Ireland that the Irish complaints, and the proceedings and judgment at 
Strasbourg which ended in 1978, should have posed it so starkly. Sad 
also that they should have done so in a manner which recalled, and 
affirmed, Macaulay's sorry view of Ireland, not only in 1844, but in 
times 'anterior even to the Reformation'.
I conceive that Ireland is in a most unsatisfactory, 
and indeed, alarming condition ...
How do you govern it? Not by love, but by fear; 
not as you govern Great Britain, .... not by the 
confidence of the people in the laws and their 
attachment to the Constitution, but by means of 
armed men and entrenched camps.214
Hansard’s Debates (Commons), vol. 72, 19 February 1844, cols. 1170-1.
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CHAPTER TEN
The Am e r i c a n D i mension
Part I: Cr u s a d e r s , Cr i m i n a l s and Cr azies 
1968 - March 1976
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The travails of Ireland have not very often impinged upon the 
attention of the American people. Even less have they commanded the 
attention of the politicians of the United States or the country's 
Government. But since the re-emergence of communal violence in 
Northern Ireland in 1968-69, the troubles have been accorded a 
special, if not alv/ays undivided and sustained, attention, albeit from 
different perspectives and towards divergent and frequently conflicting 
ends, at all three levels. Thus, while it was not surprising that 
surnames such as Kennedy and O'Neill should recur in accounts of Irish- 
American activity, it was curious that they should do so in competition 
with say a Flannery or an O'Dwyer for the right to interpret the will 
of Catholic Ireland and to be heard as the Voice of Irish America. It 
was still more bizarre that they should have been in competition with 
those whose names suggested interests v/hich were hardly Hibernian —  
Biaggi, Nedzi, Wolff, and Zeferetti —  to name but a few.
In other circumstances such situations might have qualified as 
'ephemeral' and, accordingly, not v/arranted a mention. However, in the 
context of this analysis, it is clear that at each level of the particular 
external interests which gave rise to the situations instanced in the 
preceding paragraph not only became the concern of international 
politics, but also in some cases exerted considerable influence upon 
the course of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Basically these 
effects v/ere in direct proportion to the support or commitment each 
interest group could marshal in support of four very general, and 
sometimes over-lapping objectives, v/hich were, in descending order of 
influence:
1. A united Ireland predicated on an immediate and 
total British withdrawal from the Six Counties.
2. A united Ireland brought about by what might be termed 
non-violent due process.
3. The acceptance of the situation in Northern Ireland as 
being entirely an internal matter for the British Government 
either out of conviction, or the belief that to do otherwise
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would be to unduly disturb the trans-Atlantic (Anglo- 
American) relationship.
4. The achievement of short-term specific objectives in 
Northern Ireland which may or may not have related to the 
future constitutional status of Northern Ireland.
It is from this miscellancy that the sub-title of the Chapter 
(Crusaders, Criminals, and Crazies) takes its inspiration.* Certainly 
it is not suggested that those people who are the concern of this 
chapter were terrorists; nevertheless it is suggested that in the 
period 1968-March 1976 all, or nearly all, of the activities of Irish- 
Americans mentioned in the following pages were consistent with those 
of people who could justly be described as crusaders, criminals, or 
crazies. Some, unfortunately, were all three, but the extent to which 
they may be precisely located, if at all, under any one head 
(particularly that of 'crazies') is very largely intuitive. Notwith­
standing this, the evidence presented in the following pages, and in 
the relevant appendices which follow the thesis proper, renders the 
collective description no less appropriate. However, what needs to be 
emphasised is that the impression intended to be conveyed by the 
subtitle is one of the ascendancy of crusaders, criminals and crazies 
rather than their absolute dominance over the period.
The starting point, inevitably, is the Irish-American community,
but since this is not the place to digress on the political sociology
of Irish-Americans, the need to extract from authoritative sources
those factors which contributed to their mental framework, and
ultimately to the determination of the role and influence of the
2
American Dimension, has been recognised in Appendix I. In many 
instances, therefore, references made in the following pages of this 
and the succeeding chapter proceed from the material and conclusions 
presented therein.
The term is not original to the writer: it was in fact the main 
title of Frederick Hacker's 1976 work on terrorism, Crusaders3 Criminals, 
Crazies (New York: Norton, 1976).
See Appendix I, 'Relevant Characteristics of the Irish-American 
Community', pp. 603-13 (hereafter cited as Appendix I).
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The interest evinced by Irish-Americans in events in Northern 
Ireland in 1969 was hardly a new development. Neither was it unusual 
that it should be expressed by some in cash and kind. In times of 
strife in Ireland since last century it had virtually defined the 
relationship between the Irish at home and those in the United States 
to the point where, in the Declaration of Independence of 1916, the 
support of Ireland's 'exiled children in America' was especially 
recognised. In December 1969 the breakaway Provisional Army Council, 
in the face of overwhelming evidence that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
which had existed prior to that time was unable to provide the maximum 
defence for the Republican population of Belfast, made a plea v/hich, 
although less specific, was clearly directed at the USA.
We call on the Irish at home and in exile for increased 
support towards defending our people in the North and 
the eventual achievement of the full political, social, 
economic and cultural freedom of Ireland.3
The message v/as clear: it was a call to provide aid for military 
action. And given the militant attitudes of a significant number of 
the Irish American community there was probably little chance that 
it could have been interpreted in any other way, although the likelihood 
that it would produce an effective and immediate response in military
4
terms v/as not overwhelming.
This was a consequence of a number of factors, perhaps the most 
important being the attrition due to Americanisation of the ethnic
5
Irish. But it also reflected the overall inability of the Northern 
Ireland conflict itself to inspire and mobilise, in any sustained 
fashion,groups (journalists, civil libertarians, American radicals, the 
Democratic Party, etc.), v/hich by tradition and/or their principal 
interests, might have been expected to have provided sympathy and 
assistance. This meant that no more than an 'emaciated framework' was
Irish Timess 29 December 1969.
4
See Appendix I, pp. 605-13.
^ ibid. , pp.605. 
g
Dennis J. Clark, Irish Blood: Northern Ireland and the American 
Conscience (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat, 1977), pp. 31-3, 
(hereafter cited as Clark, Irish Blood).
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The organisational malaise was exacerbated by the fact that, 
despite the claimed predominance of those with North of Ireland ties 
within it, it also included what Clark observed as an 1... estrangement, 
confusion of viewpoints, and a general perplexity about what could be
o
done in any practical w a y . 1 In turn, this determined the essentially 
negative character of the support network which resulted, and its 
aversion to any cognitive effort with regard to the future of Ireland —  
as instanced by its recourse to slogans —  'England Get Out of 
Ireland1 (or its equivalent).
It was probably no surprise, then, that James Bowyer Bell's 
1971 edition of his standard history of the IRA should have contained 
the following passage:
Any kind of armament acquired in Ireland is very dear 
indeed (a revolver may cost eighty pounds), and outside 
Ireland there are few sympathetic sources or sponsors.
American money flowing into Dublin in response to the 
troubles in the North was far less than the English Sunday 
papers liked to believe ... [emphasis added] 9
The amount v/hich Bell thought fit to dismiss thereby was of the order 
of 'hundreds of thousands of pounds'.*^
It v/as a surprise, therefore, to find that the English papers
were in fact closer to the mark, in their estimate of a general
American willingness to contribute funds to relief programmes in
Northern Ireland, and, more particularly to the IRA. In late August '
1969, Bernadette Devlin, then visiting the United States on behalf of
the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) claimed to have
received 'pledges' totalling $US650,000 for the 'homeless' of the Six
11
Counties. In October of the same year the actual amount estimated
available upon v/hich to build an aid network in 1968-69.
ibid., p . 34.
8 . ibid.
q
J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916-1970 (New York: 
John Day, 1971), p. 369.
ibid. , p. 372, note 12.
Times, 26 August 1969, p. 2.
389
$US92,000.*^ The following year, total US funds for a multiplicity
13
of uses was estimated at $US450,000, an amount which was consistent 
with Mick Flannery's claim that, for the three years to October 1972, 
the organisation which he represented (the Irish Northern Aid Committee)
. 14
had been responsible for forwarding some $US500,000 to the North.
Evidently, the IRA did not miss out on the bonanza. In Bell's 
1974 edition of The Secret Army his 1971 opinion was noticeably 
changed in respect of the US financial response to the Provisional1s 
appeals of 1970:
Already some money had begun to flow through a variety 
of pipelines, in some cases to independent defense 
groups in the North but increasingly through overt or 
covert conduits to Dublin G.H.Q. or various Republican 
aid committees. The response from America was like 
nothing since the Troubles ...
Exactly how much the Provisional IRA received Bell did not divulge
(if he knew). Indeed, apart from the inference that the financial aid
it received was substantial, the only conclusion which can be drawn
with any certainty, even at this time, is that stated by Clark —  that
'the full record of assistance to the Catholic minority and to the IRA
16
will ever remain obfuscated'.
Nevertheless, there were patterns and influences clear in those 
early years which were to govern American influence upon the Northern 
Ireland conflict until the mid-1970s. First, despite Bernadette Devlin's
to have been raised was a considerably less, but still substantial
Sunday Telegraph3 19 October 1969. This may be an understated 
figure; Clark (Irish Blood3 p. 19) claimed Devlin raised $US200,000 
from her American visit.
13
Financial Times3 24 June 1970.
14
Daily Telegraph3 26 October 1972.
15 •
J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: A History of the I.E.A. (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1974), p. 373, (hereafter cited as Bell, The 
Secret Army). An even later edition of this work was published in 1980 
by the Academy Press, Dublin, and covers the period to 1979.
Clark, Irish Blood3 p. 39.
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fund-raising success of August 1969, the socialist views she
professed were anathema to the essentially conservative Irish-Americans
who were the large majority of c o n t r i b u t o r s . I n d e e d ,  in view of
subsequent events-, the latter's generosity at that time must be seen
as an indiscriminate outpouring of sympathy for the plight of the
Northern Catholic community. The measure of American opposition for
Devlin's goals may be guaged from a report that a visit by her in
1971, during which she met Black Panthers and hippies, and after she
had given birth to a child out of wedlock, yielded only some £150 after
18
expenses.
Second, it followed that the Official IRA, with its openly
socialist orientation, was unlikely to be popular with the Irish-
American community, and this was, and remains, the case to this day.
By the same logic the Provisionals should also have been excluded from
the financial benevolence of that community. But they didn't, and the
reason was to be found in their not entirely deserved appearance as a
more 'traditional' Republican organisation. While the Provisionals
were certainly closer to the mainstream of Republic tradition than
their Official counterparts, their philosphy and policies, such as
they were, admitted some of the same left-radical elements which the
19
Irish-American community found so unacceptable.
The Provisionals, however, were possessed of more fore-thought 
guile, and dishonesty. They contrived, and quite cynically at that, 
to enhance their appeal to those who lived in the past while muting 
their adherence to socialist principles —  both being undertaken in the 
belief that the end, however ill-defined, justified the means, however 
disagreeable. It worked, as Maria McGuire testified:
ibid., p. 19. (See also Appendix I, pp. 606-10).
18
daily Telegraph, 9 September 1971.
19
The clearest exposition of Provisional Republican socialist 
principles is to be found in a document published by (Provisional) Sinn 
Fein, from whom the Provisional IRA is only notionally separate, i.e.:
Eire Nua [New Ireland] : The Social and Economic Programme of Sinn 
Fein (Dublin: Sinn Fein, 1971).
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There should be copious references to the martyres 
of 1919 and 1920-22 —  the period most of the audience 
would be living in. Anti-British sentiment, recalling 
Cromwell, the potato famine, and the Black and Tans, 
could be profitably exploited. By no means should 
anything be said against the Catholic Church. And all 
references to socialism should be strictly avoided —  
tell them by all means that the Ireland we were 
fighting for would be free and united, but say nothing 
about just what form the new free and united Ireland 
would take.
20
The formula was in general, very successful ...
Indeed, so successful was it that the Official's network of support in 
the United States could not be described as other than modest. Unless 
specifically excepted, all references to the IRA in the succeeding 
pages of this and the next chapter are to its Provisional wing.
The financial brokers for the Provisionals' trans-Atlantic fund­
raising is the Irish Northern Aid Committee —  NORAID, also known as 
INAC. According to its statement of registration with the US authorities 
under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 1938, (FARA), it was
founded in Mew York City in April 1970 by three IRA veterans of the
21
civil war period, Mick Flannery, Jack McCarthy and John McGowan, 'in
response to an urgent call from its foreign principal, the Northern
22
Aid Committee, Belfast.' Accordingly, since its foundation, NORAID's 
record has been consistent in four aspects: it has:-
(i) boasted of the large amounts it was remitting to persons
23
such as Joe Cahill in Northern Ireland,
Maria McGuire, To Take Arms: A fear in the Provisional I.R.A.
(London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 108, (hereafter cited as McGuire, To Take 
Arms),
21
Irish Northern Aid Committee, Registration No. 2239, two public 
files designated Section I and Section II respectively, held by the US 
Department of Justice at the Federal Triangle Building, 315 9th Street, 
Washington, D.C., (hereafter cited as US Department of Justice, NORAID files).
22
Focus: The Irish Question> by NORAID, 1975.
23
A Provisional IRA leader, who had barely escaped hanging for his 
part in the murder of the policeman in 1942, and who in 1973, was 
convicted of gun-running for his part in the 'Claudia' affair (Cahill 
was the ranking Provisional on board the vessel when it was intercepted).
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(ii) insisted that while these funds were intended for 'relief', 
it was up to 'the people on the other side' to decide how to 
spend them,
(iii) agreed that part of the money was used for the purchase 
of arms; and
(iv) repeatedly, and without reservation, supported the 
Provisionals' campaigns.
The organisational structure upon which NORAID's efforts are 
based has been variously estimated at 100 chapters (in 1972, by
24
Flannery) and 80 chapters (in 1975, also by the NORAID source).
The latter is generally regarded as the more reliable figure. Similarly, 
the NORAID claim of 80,000 members throughout the US has been discounted 
by official sources as an absurd exaggeration which was probably based 
on a paper estimate of members attending social functions over a period. 
The estimate which is favoured is 'several thousand ... possibly 
upwards of 2,000', who are sufficiently numerous and active to have a
considerable effect on most Irish-American organisations in the United
25
States. Of this number the largest concentration is in New York and
the National headquarters is in the Bronx. Otherwise the most
important centres are Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco,
Los Angeles, Baltimore, and various towns in New Jersey and 
26
Connecticut. Among those who have spent some time observing its 
activities, N0RAID has acquired a reputation, based on an apparently
high level of visible co-ordination, as a close knit and disciplined
27
group. In short, even if it drew its support from a wide spectrum
28
of Irish America, its complexion was indisputably 'Old Irish'.
See the Sunday Telegraph3 10 December 1972, and New York Times,
16 December 1975, respectively.
25
Confidential Briefing Paper, Embassy of Ireland, Washington, D.C., 
dated 17 April 1975 (hereafter cited as Embassy of Ireland, Briefing,
12 April 1975). Copy held by writer.
See Appendix I, pp. 606.
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full-time attention of Flannery, its President, and McCarthy and
29
Mathew Higgins, its Vice-Presidents. It also runs to a weekly
newspaper, The Irish People3 with a full-time editor. In addition,
in 1975 Flannery was knov/n to have a telex machine in his home in the
Bronx and, according to journalists who visit him there, received
30
continuous reports on it from Provisional sources in Ireland.
Unfortunately the use of modern technology has frequently failed to
advance NORAID's understanding of the issues in Northern Ireland: for
example, one report carried in the Irish People claimed that the
Irish Special Branch had attempted to break an IRA ceasefire by
organising sectarian murders in collusion with the Northern Ireland
31
Social Democratic and Labour Party!
To further sustain the fund-raising and lobbying operations, NORAID
has played host to a number of prominent Provisionals such as Billy
32 33
Kelly and Ruairi 0 Bradaigh, but they and others were hampered by
the US Immigration and Nationality Acts which exclude aliens 'connected
with organisations which advocate the killing of government agents or
the unlawful destruction of property.' While this provision undoubtedly
had an effect on the guest-of-honour lists for money-spinners such as
dances and dinners, it probably had little impact on the other main
source of finance, direct subscriptions.
To judge by reports and the schedules attached to NORAID's more 
recent six-monthly returns under the FARA, most contributors are
In support of its activities NORAID appears to command the
Higgins was McGowan's successor on the death of the latter in
1974.
30
Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975.
31
Irish People, 26 April 1975. For an account of Dr Conor Cruise 
O'Brien's comments on such 'infamous inventions', see the Irish Timess
30 April 1975.
32
Described as being the former 'commander of the Provisionals' Third 
Belfast Battalion' and also the 'first Chief of Staff of the Provisionals 
in Belfast' (Sunday Times} 'Insight' Team, Ulster3 (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin, 1972), pp. 25, 189.
IRA Chief of Staff in 1958-59 and 1961-62. In the period with 
which this discussion of NORAID is concerned (1970-76), 0 Bradaigh v/as 
President of Provisional Sinn Fein.
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working-class Irish Americans. In some cases the arrangements are 
institutionalised: a number of Locals of the Transport Union and 
the Longshoremen's Union in Mew York are said to contribute fixed
weekly amounts to the organisation (NORAID has close links with the
. 34
national presidents of both unions). In addition, a small number
of wealthy Irish Americans such as hotelier Billy Fuller are known
35
to be contributors, as are some Irish-born owners of chains of
bars in New York who both contribute funds themselves and allow their
establishments to be used as collection centres. However, it is
understood that the larger contributors in America, like those in
Ireland, try to maintain anonymity by insisting that their
36
contributions be 'laundered' secretly.
The results of these combined efforts have been summarised 
in the following table:
34
Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975.
35
Christopher Dobson, 'How IRA gets guns and cash', Sunday 
Telegraph, 26 January 1975.
36
Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975.
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REPORTED DETAILS OF FINANCIAL UNDERTAKINGS 37 
(All amounts in US Dollars)
IRISH NORTHERN AID COMMITEE
Six month 
period end-ed:
Income Expendi ture Disbursements 
to N.I.
Surplus
29 July 1971* no information 4,575 11,500 not known
29 January 1972 no information 12,738 128,099 not known
29 July 1972** no information 25,440 312,700 not known
29 January 1973 172,000 41,388 150,438 -19,826
29 July 1973 159,617 19,581 121,723 18,313
29 January 1974 129,968 10,826 99,966 19,176
29 July 1974 121,822 8,193 110,833 2,796
29 January 1975 115,522 11,620 102,648 1,254
29 July 1975 130,852 44,472 70,977 15,403
29 January 1976 no information 24,955 64,205 not known
Minimum Total $829,781 $203,788 $1,173,089 $56,942
* Information 
Statement'.
taken from document entitled 'Supplemental
** Information taken from hand-written draft.
As may be seen, Flannery's October 1972 claim (cited earlier)
that NORAID had sent close to $US500,000 to Northern Ireland in the three
38
previous years was probably not excessive; in just the eighteen month 
period ended 29 July 1972 the total remitted was $US452,299. But there 
were> and remains reservations about accepting many of NORAID's claims.
37
38
US Department of Justice, NORAID files. 
Daily Telegraph3 26 October 1972.
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The above, for instance, mentions a three year period —  presumably
from October 1969 -  yet NORAID's statement of registration also claims
39
that it was founded some seven months later, in April 1970.
Furthermore it is obvious from the table that, in default of income 
figures for the first three reporting periods, and of a complete absence 
of reliable information before that time, even the most informed 
estimates of NORAID's financial dealings could be hopelessly wrong.
In this regard it is useful to refer to the return for 29 January
1973, in which it will be found that nearly $US20,000 in excess of 
reported receipts was remitted. This suggests what latter figures 
detailed under 'Surplus' appear to confirm —  that part of each six 
months takings are retained, to bolster poor performances, aid special 
projects in the future, or establish a capital fund.
For undefined reasons this latter of a steadily accumulating
NORAID fund has received no attention from commentators, yet it is,
potentially, of some significance. At the very least it could, if
NORAID chose to falsify its returns, be used for a period of one —  two
years to disguise the falling away of financial report from the averacje
level since 1976. On the other hand, there is a widely held belief that
'blood on the streets' (of Northern Ireland), or what are euphemistically
termed 'spectaculars' (particularly daring IRA operations), induce the
sympathetic Irish-American community to renew or increase its
contributions, and the suggestion cannot be discounted that some of the
40
surplus has been used in sustaining or enhancing this. And if it should
US Department of Justice, NORAID files.
40
Daring as opposed to stupid —  although the difference very often 
escapes the writer: the term murderous could be applied with equal 
validity to many of the operations in either category. Nevertheless, if 
the distinction is made, it might be noted that following the Birmingham 
bombings of 21 November 1974, the amounts reported by NORAID decreased 
and this trend may have been assisted by the narrow escape of Miss Caroline 
Kennedy from a London car-bombing in October 1975. On the other hand 
the murder of Lord Mountbatten in August 1979 evidently met with approval, 
if the returns are any indication (see next Chapter, pp.456). It is 
likely, of course, that other influences contributed to these results, 
but these appear not to have detracted from the strength of the perception 
noted in the above text.
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be thought that such suggestions unwarrantedly impugn the honesty of
NORAID's officials, there is always the caveat provided by the attorney
responsible over some years for the monitoring of the organisation's
compliance with the FARA, that they were of a type who 'just can't
41
treat straight with any government'.
Thus it is only prudent to conclude that the figures produced in 
the foregoing represent less than accurate accounts of NORAID's trans­
actions. Indeed NORAID personnel were reported, in 1975, to have
boasted in private of much greater sums than those found in the table —
. 42
up to $US4 million per year —  being remitted to Northern Ireland.
As these claims were generally held to be-more in the nature of
romantic speculation, the conservative 'official' figures remain as the
best available, albeit probably understated, indication of the
intensity and fluctuations of popular Irish-American support for the
Provisionals.
By way of comparison, it is interesting to note the extent to
which the potential of Irish-America was not realised, as illustrated
by the following examples. Throughout the entire period which is the
concern of this thesis, the best NORAID appeared capable of, insofar
as attracting public figures in support of its fund-raising, was to
interest actor Richard Harris, thri 11 er-writer Len Deighton and
Longshoremen's President, Teddy Gleason, in attending a dinner for
43
which the Provisional Republican faithful paid $US18 per head. Yet 
an Ireland Fund Dinner, organised by Tony O'Reilly, probably the most
Interview, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 
1979 (hereafter cited as Department of Justice Interview, 1979).
Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975. Publicly (in 1975), 
Deidre 0 Connaill, wife of Daithi 0 Connaill (then a member of the 
Provisional's ruling Army Council), admitted that NORAID was sending 
$US36,000 per week ($US1 ,872,000 per year) to Northern Ireland, (Daily 
Express, 4 February 1975).
Daily E x p r e s s 4 February 1975.
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prominent and successful Irishman living in the United States, 
could count on the presence of leading members of the Irish-American 
establishment —  such as Speaker 'Tip' O'Neill —  and would command 
$US175 per p l a t e . ^
The distinctions, needless to say, were only superficially of a
culinary nature. What they attested to was the failure, foreshadowed
at the outbreak of the troubles, of the aid network to expand its
following beyond the narrow confines of the sectional 'Old Irish'
(Republican) interests.^ In general, neither the politicians nor the
wealthy Irish-Americans, nor the Catholic Church found the prospect of
associating with NORAID worth the opprobrium it would have earned
47
them. It was to be expected, therefore, that the isolation of the
44
Anthony John Francis O'Reilly, an outstanding international rugby 
footballer in the mid 1950s and early 1960s, whose achievements in 
business matched those in sport. His life and business interests 
require him to live both in Ireland and the United States —  in the 
latter of which he is widely known as President of the Heinz Foods 
conglomerate. According to an associate editor of Fortune, 'O'Reilly, ... 
figuratively speaking, has the longest reach of any living Irishman'.
See Thomas J. 0'Hanlon, The Irish: Sinners3 Saints3 Gamblers, etc. s 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 256.
45
David McMittrick, 'Irish Everywhere in the land of Immigrants , 
the first of four major articles on the Irish in America, Irish Times3
3 September 1979, p. 10. The proceeds of such functions go towards 
Irish charities and, according to McKittrick's report, 'O'Reilly's 
efforts raise much more than those groups associated with Republican 
causes'.
46
See Appendix I, pp. 609-10.
Clark, Irish Blood3 p. 40. Although the Catholic Church in 
America was one of the principal agents in breaking down the ethnic 
identity of Irish-Americans since the late nineteenth century, and 
although it avoided taking up the issue of Northern Ireland after 1969 
(see Appendix I, pp.605), certain clerics within it have provided what 
might be termed 'moral' support which may have been sufficient, when 
viewed through some eyes, to have countered any residual qualms about 
supporting organisations which subsidised or engaged in violence. In 
this three clerics were prominent: Bishop Drury of Corpus Christi 
Diocese, Texas, who appeared at N0RAID functions; Ruairi 0 Bradaigh and 
was a frequent speaker at N0RAID functions; Fr. Sean McManus, national 
chaplain to the Ancient Order of Hibernians, and National Co-ordinator 
of the Irish National Caucus in the US: and Sister St. Hugh of N0RAID,
New York, who was at one time editor of the Irish People (Embassy of 
Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975).
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activists should have extended to non-Irish-American organisations and 
the higher reaches of the US Federal Government, although the former 
was the more difficult to account for. After a promising beginning in 
which specialised groups of humanitarians concerned themselves with 
Northern Ireland, their interest withered; apart from a brief rally 
in support of the Fort Worth Five (see pp.447-9), groups working in the 
fields of foreign policy, interreligious understanding, and anti­
colonial concerns avoided the issues of Northern Ireland with a
48
consistency that was quite inconsistent with their stated objectives.
If there was any one reason for this behaviour it was to be 
found in Northern Ireland and in the terror bombing campaigns of the 
IRA. As Clark wrote of these other, influential and many 'friends of 
Ireland' and their view of the network:
... they saw it as tied to more of the same murderous 
violence without solution that they recoiled from in 
Viet Nam.49
In this they were perceptive. While NORAID spokesmen were wont 
to pretend that its funds were used purely for relief, there were far 
too many instances in which the lie was given to this claim. As one 
anonymous representative explained in 1971:
Our job is to get up the money and send it to the people 
over there. What they use it for is up to them. We 
attach no strings. Everything we do in this country is 
aimed at assisting the final phase of the struggle for 
freedom in Ireland.50
But there is irrefutable evidence that NORAID and several of its local 
officers were implicated in numerous arms offences which led to trials 
in Canada and the United States. The following year the same 
manifestation of support without responsibility was clear in Mathew 
Higgins' statement that:
ibid., pp. 33 and 67. 
ibid., p . 75.
As reported in the Irish Times3 20 October 1971.
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We're involved in supporting the activities of the 
Provisional I.R.A. and that Branch of Sinn Fein v/hich 
supports the Provisional I.R.A. We provide what funds 
we can and the people on the other side have to decide 
what has to be used for what purpose.51
In 1975 he was even franker:
We have no objections to it [the purchase of guns] if 
they have money to spare. They've got to get them from 
somewhere. If the overall kitty is big enough to buy 
weapons that's their business. We were formed for the 
purpose of supporting the Irish Freedom movement. We 
still support the Provisional I.R.A. -  no ifs and buts 
about that ...52
There is no irrefutable evidence that NORAID has engaged in
53
activities other than fund-raising and supply.
According to a report of testimony given in the trial of Frank 
Grady, convicted in New York in March 1976 for illegally exporting arms 
and falsifying documents, the organisation's intentions were clear from 
the earliest days of its existence.
Shortly after the formation of the [Yonkers] branch, they 
[Grady and others] were approached by Martin Lyons, then 
a senior official at Northern Aid headquarters and one of 
the founders of the organisation and asked to assist in 
the purchase and export of guns for use by the Provisional
I.R.A. in Northern Ireland.54
Thereafter, the most notorious case involved the 'Fort Worth Five' 
in 1972. This became a cause celebre in both Irish-American and US civil 
rights circles because of, from the viewpoint of the former, the issue 
of the supply of arms and ammunition to the IRA and, from the latter
Washington Post, 16 March 1976.
52
New York Times, 16 December 1975.
53
On the other hand, there appears to be little refuge for the 
organisation in Mick Flannery's protestations that allegations of gun- 
running were 'terrible' (Daily Express, 8 January 1976) and 'vicious' 
lies (International Herald Tribunes 14 January 1976) and his appeal to 
the Scottish juridical prerogative that 'no one has ever proved a thing' 
(International Herald Tribune, 14 January 1976).
Dublin Sunday Independent, 14 March 1976.
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perspective, constitutional and civil rights questions (see pp. 447-9.) 
Among other cases which came to light were those of Charles Malone, 
a NORAID member living in San Francisco, and James O'Gara, a New York
NORAID official, both of whom were convicted on arms charges in 1973.
And within a year, four people —  two Irish and two Irish-Americans —
were convicted in Baltimore, Maryland, of conspiring to smuggle 158
semi-automatic rifles (worth about $US30,000), plus armour-piercing
shells and other explosives from New York to Ireland. According to
56
reports this was the United States biggest case of gun-running, 
and although there was no indication in the course of the trial as to 
who or what provided its financial backing, the Baltimore District 
Attorney, Jeff White, left little doubt as to what inference should 
have been taken:
The statements [at the trial] didn't actually mention 
the Irish Northern Aid Committee, but it was clear who 
was meant ... We didn't make radical distinctions between 
the two groups [NORAID and the IRA]. Statements made at 
the trial in reference to the group which came up with* 
the money were to 'Irish' and 'I.R.A.', but we considered 
them to mean the Irish Northern Aid Committee.
Further grounds supporting this conclusion were provided by three
instances in the two succeeding years. The first concerned the 1975
conviction of Joseph Myles, described by police as 'an executive
officer of a US organisation, Northern Irish Aid' (sic), on a charge
58
of conspiracy to export arms to Ireland. The second was the Grady case,
55
Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975. It is regretted 
that, in relation to the above trials, it has not proved possible to 
obtain evidence from official US sources. Unfortunately, the writer's 
written and verbal requests to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms (BATF), Department of the Treasury, met with no success in this 
regard. Information concerning Malone, O'Gara, and two others not cited, 
was refused under the general provisions of the Privacy Act 1974, and by 
the specific requirement that the written consent of those whose record 
was to be examined, be obtained. [Letter to the writer, from the 
Assistant to the Director (Disclosure), BATF, 12 October 1979. ]
56
Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975.
57
Sunday Herald Advertiser3 9 June 1974.
Times3 7 June 1975.
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already mentioned, while the third related to two Philadelphians —
59
Neil Byrne and Daniel Cahalane (head of NORAID's Delaware County 
Chapter) —  who were found guilty of illegally exporting arms to the 
IRA.60
Such examples not only highlighted the value of the United States
as an armoury to the IRA, but also pointed to the potential which
existed for a widening of the conflict by involving American citizens
in ancillary, or actual, fighting roles -  or at least the fear of this
development. In this regard even the (Protestant) Ulster Defence
Association (UDA) warrants a mention: in October 1972, it announced
that American Vietnam war veterans v/ere training its members in weapons
usage and guerrilla warfare. However, the reliability of this claim
was somewhat weakened by the knowledge that the UDA had within its
own ranks many men who had served with the British Army in Aden,
Cyprus and Malaysia, and thus possessed a residue of knowledge and
experience that was in many ways, and in the Northern Ireland context,
superior to that available from Protestant sympathisers in the US.
Similarly, earlier reports that a group calling itself the United
Ireland Committee of New York had enlisted volunteers to fight in aid
of the Catholic population in the North, seem now to be either overstated
62
or simply patriotic fiction. Scepticism, also, was attached to
reports that the IRA had obtained the services of 'former American
63
servicemen' and that some of them were under investigation by the Army
64
Council for spying and treachery: they relied heavily on the judicious
59
Cahalane had previous spent five-and-a-half months in jail in 1973 
for refusing to testify to a Federal Grand Jury.
fin
For a brief reference to this case, the recovery by the British 
authorities in Northern Ireland of almost half the arms in question, and 
the subsequent loss of Byrne and Cahalane's appeal to the Supreme Court, 
see the Times, 24 January 1978.
* International Herald Tribune, 16 October 1972.
^ Times, 16 August 1969.
63
Sunday Telegraph, 18 February 1973. A denial by the IRA was 
reported in the Daily Telegraph, 30 March 1973.
64
Sunday Telegraph, 1 April 1973.
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use of statements (by unidentified British military and IRA personnel) 
v/hich did not necessarily confirm the claim of the articles, and
they appear to have been carried only in the papers of the Berry group.
The same dismissive attitude v/as not appropriate to, nor was it
adopted by any of the governments concerned, in respect of the Trans-
Atlantic traffic in arms for the IRA. According to Stanley Orme, a
Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office, the evidence from
recovery operations conducted by the security forces in the Province
indicated that 85 per cent of the Provisionals' weapons originated in 
66
the United States, thus establishing that country as its most
67
important single source of supply.
The American Government, notwithstanding the seriousness with 
v/hich it viev/ed this matter, disputed the British estimates. One agent 
of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Don Zimmerman,
countered that a claim of even 75 per cent was 'a ridiculous
68
exaggeration'. Moreover, the available data appeared to support his 
position, although certain juxta-positions of time are required to do so. 
In the same June 1975 article v/hich carried Zimmerman's statement, it
65
Proprietors of the Daily Telegraph, and Sunday Telegraph.
66
As reported in the Daily Telegraph, 10 January 1976, Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson made a similar claim at this time which deserves inclusion 
because of the different inferences, emphasised in the following, which 
he appeared to draw from recovery information: 'The fact is that most 
of the modem weapons now reaching the terrorists in Northern Ireland 
are of American origin, possibly as much as eighty-five per cent of them. 
They are bought in the Uyxited States and they are bought with American 
donated money' (London Press Service, Verbatim Service, 'IRA Fund 
Raising', 243/75, 17 December 1975, an extract from Wilson's speech to the 
Association of American Correspondents, Savoy Hotel, London, 17 December 
1975).
Pari iamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 901,
4 December 1975, col. 1924, (hereafter cited as House of Commons, Official 
Report). See in conjunction with R.D. Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry in 
Northern Ireland', British Army Review (April 1978): 17, (hereafter cited 
as Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland').
68
As reported in the London Sunday Times, 2 November 1975.
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was reported that 1,581 'guns of American manufacture' had been
found in Northern Ireland connected with the IRA. This figure, when
compared with the overall (Ulster-wide) total of 4,974 for the period 
69
1.971-19753 represented a proportion of approximately 30 per cent.
(And this appeared to be a steadily decreasing ratio over time: when 
figures to 1979 were taken, it fell as low as 23 per cent, for weapons 
which were 'said to be of US manufacture'.7 *^)
If allowance is made for the fact that the 1971-75 percentage
was artificially high because of the figure of 1,581 included recoveries
of US arms for 1969 and 1970 as well, but omitted total (Ulster-wide)
recoveries for the same period which must have increased the figure of
4,974, then it would seem that there'was a wild divergence between the
competing British and American estimates. And irrespective of the
interpretation given to the statistics of arms recoveries, they confirmed
in a rather obvious way the relative ease with which the IRA was able to
replenish and maintain its fighting requirements in Ulster, a point made
by Bell and Jones. Indeed, some arms were reported to have travelled
the greater part of their journey in style —  aboard the Cunard liner,
72
Q.ueen Elizabeth II.
It is possible, however, to effect a reconciliation between the
American and British claims by reference to the impressive record of the
actual weapons which the IRA came to use. In 1969 it was poorly armed,
73
where it was armed at all. By 1971 it had introduced the Armalite 
AR 130 (the civilian, semi-automatic version of the selective fire AR IS)
69
Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland', p. 24 (See Table).
International Herald Tribune3 25 September 1979, p. 3. According 
to this report 2,300 of a grand total of 10,000 weapons conformed to the 
above description.
Bell, The Secret Army, p. 373; and Jones 'Terrorist Weaponry in 
Northern Ireland', p. 24.
72
Interview with William V. Shannon, United States Ambassador to 
Ireland, Dublin, 24 April 1978, (hereafter cited as Shannon Interview). 
The Ambassador also mentioned the involvement of some stewardesses of 
Aer Lingus in smuggling small quantities of arms into Ireland.
73 See Chapter 14, pp. 549-50.
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and the Ml Garand into its arsenal. From 1972 on these were supplemented 
by military surplus and commercial variants of the Ml carbine, the 
AR IS, and the M3 SMG ('Grease Gun').7^ As from 1974, recoveries in 
Northern Ireland included the above weapons plus small quantities or 
single examples of the following:
AG 42b semi-automatic rifle (Swedish Army surplus)
NATO MIA semi-automatic rifles (commercial name for 
M 14 US Army rifles).
GA1/42 semi-automatic rifles (Wehrmacht surplus)
SAFN semi-automatic rifles (Venezuelan Army surplus)
M 62 semi-automatic rifles (current Finnish Army rifle)
NATO Beretta 59/69 semi-automatic rifle (current Italian 
Army rifle).
75
According to R.D. Jones of the British Intelligence Corps, the
above list was 'very significant'. Apart from the M3 SMG, all the
weapons listed were available over the counter in the United States —
with the last two having the names of firearms dealings engraved upon 
76
the receiver. If to this is added the knowledge that the AR 180 was
made under licence in Japan for sale and distribution by the Armalite
company at Costa Mesa, California,77 and hence forwarded to the IRA
from the US, and the claim made by (US) Assistant Attorney-General,
William Olsen, that some Americans were involved on behalf of the IRA
in attmepts in Mexico to illegally purchase, inter alia, this same
78
weapon, then it is possible to understand how the differences between 
the British and United States Governments may have arisen. Whether or 
not such factors fully accounted for the conflicting views is not clear, 
but it may be inferred that they were substantially a consequence of the
Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland', p. 17.
7^ ibid., p. 19.
7fi
ibid. Note: the M3 SMG was capable of automatic fire and hence 
illegal in the United States; nevertheless it was believed by the 
British authorities that this weapon was also obtained in the US, 
probably on the Black Market (ibid., p. 17).
New York Times} 17 July 1972, p. 17.
New York Times} 14 March 1973.
406
British Government's position that the term 'American arms' should 
be interpreted so as to encompass those which were 'modern' (as per note 
66) and to include weapons which were not only of US manufacture, but 
also of a loosely defined US origin.
But the list also indicated that the IRA possessed a multiplicity
of types and calibres among both their longarm and pistol weaponry. In
Jones's opinion this reflected the success of the security forces in
repeatedly depriving the IRA of its weapons, and its subsequent recourse
to piecemeal procurement. The further consequence was that insoluble
problems of maintenance were created, which in turn exacerbated the
supply situation by rendering useless weapons with relatively simple
79
faults. Thus, despite its success in obtaining arms and ammunition
in quantity, it was evident by 1978 (the year of Jones's article) that
the IRA had probably failed in its objective of obtaining them according
80
to its criterion of 'identical ... and recent manufacture.'
From the vantage point of 1981 this conclusion is confirmed only
more so. The record of US financial and material assistance of the
early and mid-1970s now appears as a guttering of a candle rather than
the advent of a truly trans-national movement. Although the figures do
not show it, it is Clark's contention that 'apathy reconquered the
spirits of many' in the Irish-American support network after the Ulster
8i
Workers' Council Strike in mid-1974. Certainly NORAID's reported 
disbursements to Northern Ireland show a dramatic tumble in 1975, and 
by that time, too, the major attempts at running guns to the IRA were, 
apparently, a matter of history. An American interest in Ireland was to 
be revived, but as will be seen in the next chapter, the initiative that 
accompanied it was undertaken by those who were more pragmatic, and 
ultimately, more responsible than those whose activities so coloured this 
early period.
Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland', p. 24. As this is 
not a technical discussion, specific reference to calibre types has been 
omitted, but they (eight pistol and nine rifle calibres) are to be found 
in the article cited. Note: Jones makes no mention of where the IRA's 
pistol inventory was obtained from, but it is clear from his account 
(when used in conjunction with a small arms reference manual) that it 
was predominantly of non-US manufacture.
McGuire, To Take Arms3 p. 40. 
Clark, Irish Blood3 p. 69.
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It was ironic, therefore, that when militant support was so 
clearly on the wane among the Irish-Americans, NORAID should have 
proved capable of a misleading expression of vitality that was both 
innovative and politically astute: the founding of the Irish National 
Caucus in September 1974. Prior to that time the successes which 
could be attributed to the 'Irish lobby1 (if this is defined so as to 
exclude politicians) were few in number and slight in content.
Although the powerful American Federation of Labour and Congress of 
Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO) had, in 1971, passed a unanimous 
resolution condemning 'the policy of internment and the torture in 
Northern Ireland' and had demanded 'the end of the Stormont Government, 
the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation, the
withdrawal of British troops and the establishment of a free and
82
united Ireland', all that resulted, and those mainly after Bloody
83
Sunday, were small scale anti-British campaigns. The International
Longshoremen's Association, supported by the Transport Workers Union,
84
carried out a one-day strike against British exports, but the
limitations of this type of pressure were apparent when the American
Committee for Ulster Justice (ACUJ —  see Appendix II, 'Notes on Paul
O'Dwyer', pp. 614-19)evidently failed in its attempt to introduce an
embargo on the supply of American-made rubber bullets being used by
85
the British Army in the North. In these circumstances it was of little
86
consolation that ex-Beatle John Lennon and his wife Yoko Ono joined a
Irish Times, 24 November 1971. In 1975 the AFL-CIO adopted a 
similar resolution calling for an all-Ireland plebiscite on the question 
of partition and the replacement of British troops by a United Nations 
force (Daily Telegraphy 16 October 1975).
Clark, Irish Bloody p. 42.
84
Times, 7 February 1972.
85
Irish Timesy 3 February 1972. The qualification was made because 
obviously the British Army have continued to use rubber bullets throughout 
the period under review. However, one reason for the ACUJ's failure may 
have been that the British Army were either not being supplied from the 
USA, or were not dependent on them if they were: see Carol Ackroyd,
Karen Margolis, Jonathon Rosenhead and Tim Shall ice, The Technology of 
Political Control (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1977), p. 210.
86
Times, 7 February 1972. At this same time another former Beatle, 
Paul McCartney, with his group 'Wings', recorded a song entitled 'Give 
Ireland back to the Irish' —  and promptly had it banned on BBC, ITA and 
Radio Luxembourg.
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demonstration in New York, or when, in 1975, no less a Republican
supporter than Teddy Gleason, President of the International
Longshoremen's Association, Vice President of the AFL-CIO, and Vice-
President of the Irish National Caucus, announced that he thought
boycotts were unlikely to either save lives in Ulster or bring the
87
sides to the bargaining table.
In terms of a demonstrable political effect the advent of the 
Irish National Caucus would appear to have made little difference. 
Certainly, its very foundation was a recognition of the shortcomings 
of the support network which were obvious in earlier years, as 
illustrated by its pledge to:
establish Irish freedom as an American moral issue 
through every possible legal avenue at our disposal.88
But, when refined, its objectives of:
1. the release of all internees and an amnesty to 
political prisoners;
2. the withdrawal of British troops from the streets 
of Northern Ireland by a specific date; and,
3. a British declaration of an intention to withdraw 
from Northern Ireland in general.89
were the same as those of the Provisionals.
No doubt this reflected the fact that the Caucus's leadership was 
of the same complexion. Its Executive Council included Sean Walsh 
(National Director), Father Sean McManus (National Co-ordinator), Fred
Burns O'Brien (Information Director), Brendan McCusker (National Liaison
90
Officer), Jack Keane and Teddy Gleason. All were closely 
identified with the Provisional cause as was the membership of the
Daily Telegraph, 16 October 1975. 'Republican' in the above refers 
to his Irish, and not his American, political sympathies.
As cited in Clark, Irish Blood3 p. 70.
89
Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975.
90
ibid., see in conjunction with Clark, Irish Bloody p. 69.
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Drury (see note 47), Paul O'Dwyer (see pp. 614-19) and Philadelphian
91
Daniel Cahalane. The Caucus also claimed the 'endorsement' of a
wide range of Irish-American groups such as the Ancient Order of
Hibernians (AOH), of v/hich Keane was the National President in 1975-76,
ACUJ, Connradh na Gaeilge, the Celtic Cultural Society, the Irish Arts
Centre and, of course, NORAID. Gleason's membership was alleged to
92
place the AFL-CIO in this same category of support.
Hov/ever, in the opinion of some knowledgeable observers of the
Caucus, it was important not to overestimate the extent to v/hich it
was representative of quite disparate Irish-American groups. They
believed that it consisted of those whose motivation was 'personal vanity'
(Keane, O'Brien and Walsh), or v/ere in reality 'interested hardliners'
who just happened to be members of the groups, rather than the groups
93
themselves. This interpretation is at least consistent with the
appeal that the Caucus's objectives had held for the majority of the
Irish-American community before 1974. It was in those years clearly
limited and there was no reason to suspect that they became more
attractive simply because they were espoused by a new organisation.
The Caucus, after all, was the creation of an older organisation which
had been isolated from the mainstream of that communtiy. And it was
surely significant that none of the ranking Irish-American Democrats in
Congress at the time the Caucus was founded —  such as Mike Mansfield and
Thomas P. ('Tip') O'Neill, Majority Leaders in the Senate and House,
respectively —  had found the new organisation any more attractive than
the other manifestations of the support netv/ork. They kept their
distance. Notwithstanding this, after only six months in existence
the Caucus claimed to represent 30 Irish-American organisations, which
emboldened it, no matter how spuriously, to speak as if this was a matter 
94
of fact.
Caucus's Board of Governors, among the membership of which was Bishop
91
Clark, Irish Bloody p. 70.
92
Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975.
93 ....
i bid.
94
ibid.
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In testimony that it had learned of the need to sharpen its focus 
and provide a 'unified' front the Caucus obtained the ear, indeed the 
energies and undivided attention, of a small number of local and 
national-level politicians who came to behave as though the woes of 
Ireland v/ere one of their constituencies' larger worries. But, 
whereas it was difficult, it not impossible, to make the distinction 
between the Caucus's endorsement of the IRA's ends and its means, these 
men from American public life —  with but one clear exception —  attempted 
to maintain a discreet distance, through their disavowal of terrorist 
violence, and their abhorrence of the abuse of state force, between 
support for the end, however defined, and the methods by which it was 
to be achieved. In short, they sought to practise advocacy without 
responsibi1i ty.
The one clear exception v/as that luminary of the New Irish —
95
New York City Council President, Paul 0'Dwyer. But even he, though
holder of the second-highest elected office of America's most populous
city, was unable to give any significant political advantage to the
Irish-American support network. It may have been that his close
association with NORAID, combined with his somewhat clouded and confused
views of the situation in Northern Ireland, were sufficient disincentives
for the majority of Irish-Americans to change their attitudes about
96
organisations they already held in disfavour.
0'Dwyer was at least a Mayoman by birth. But the early
1970s saw the beginning of the involvement in the troubles of some most
unlikely (and unknov/1 edgeable) Hibernians who, with their frequently
apocalyptic vision of events in the North, and their diverse ethnic
backgrounds, were reminiscent of what the Book of Revelation described
as 'a great multitude ... of all nations, and kindreds, and peoples,
97
and tongues ...' Their relevance to this analysis arises from their 
habit of regarding disdainfully the activities of the British and Irish 
Governments, respectively, and from their attempts to have the Ulster
See Appendix I, p. 607 , and Appendix II, 'Notes on Paul 0'Dwyer' 
(hereafter cited as Appendix II).
96
See Appendix II.
97
Rev. 7:9.
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Question transcend ethnic politics in the United States and take a 
place as an issue of truly national concern. Hence it is in 
consideration of such dramatis personae that the focus of this chapter 
shifts —  from that which predominantly v/as, or approximated to, the 
criminal -  to that which predominantly was, or approximated to, the 
crusading.
Foremost in this category was the Congressman from the 10th 
Congressional District, New York (East Bronx and North Queens),
Mario Biaggi. Before being elected to Congress on a hardline law-and- 
order ticket, he had been a member of the city's police force. His 
campaign literature described him as 'New York's legendary hero cop.', 
in support of which he claims to have been wounded 10 times and 
decorated more than any other law enforcement officer in the United 
States. Biaggi's record in this regard was also commented on by David 
McKittrick who, when presenting a profile article of him, observed
♦
that he 'seems to have shot more people, in the line of duty, than just
98
about anybody else.'
The same unreflective disposition was evident in his stands on
Northern Ireland, but on which subject it was inexcusable. They appear
to have begun in the wake of the introduction of internment without
trial, with a demand that United Nations Secretary-General, U Thant,
intervene immediately to end the 'Gestapo-like arrest binge' of the
99
security forces in Northern Ireland. Thereafter, with the tone
thus set, Biaggi's sympathies led him to associate increasingly with the 
American-Irish support network —  first with NORAID, then v/ith the Irish 
National Caucus. He was, for example, in attendance at several of the 
former's f u n c t i o n s , a n d  in 1975 described activities such as a then
David McKittrick, 'Biaggi thought the British Army v/as in the 
Republic', Irish Times, 5 September 1979, p. 10 (hereafter cited as 
McKittrick, 'Biaggi').
99
As reported in the Daily Telegraph, 13 August 1971.
Notes titled 'Congressman Biaggi', originating with Irish Government 
sources in the United States; undated, but appearing to be written in 
mid-1975 (hereafter cited as Notes: 'Biaggi').
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and a letter to Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, as having been
102
undertaken 'at the request' of the latter.
During that visit, the purpose of which was to 'personally
investigate1 certain visa refusals by the US State Department to
prominent Provisionals, Biaggi associated publicly with well-known
supporters of the IRA's campaign of violence —  among them Ruairi
0 Bradaigh (with whom he co-chaired a press conference), and Joe Cahill,
Maire Drumm, Sean Keenan and Seamus Loughran (with all of whom he was
103
photographed. ) Evidently, the company was persuasive: before
leaving Ireland he stated his intention of presenting a case for
allowing the otherwise prohibited Republicans into the United States
to appear before a Conqressional Committee so that their cause might be
104
explained and better understood there. To further this end he began
to press, but without success, for the convening of Congressional 
hearings on Northern Ireland.
In this venture he was aided by other Congressmen, of whom the two
most notable were Benjamin Rosenthal, Chairman of the House Sub-Committee
105
on Europe, and Lester Wolff, his successor to that position in 1975.
Both were Democrats from the State of New York. Their involvement 
signified a reciprocity in what might be termed ethnic politics. Just 
as 0'Dwyer, who was Irish-American, had a record of Zionist sympathy,
recent trip to Dublin in the company of Dr Fred Burns O'Brien,*^*
New York Times, 1 May 1975, Fred Burns O'Brien was the Information 
Director of the Irish National Caucus.
102
(United States) Congressional Record —  Extensions of Remarks,
18 June 1975, p. E3294; and cable from Kissinger to the United States 
Embassy in London (Ref: State 95093, 0 291327 Z APR 75), as published 
in the New York Irish People, 7 June 1975, respectively.
Notes: 'Biaggi'.
104
As reported in the New York Irish People, 17 May 1975.
105
By that time, however, the name of that body had been changed to 
the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development; 
like its predecessor, it was a subcommittee of the House Committee on 
International Relations (previously, Foreign Affairs).
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Rosenthal and Wolff, who were identified as part of the Jewish lobby 
in the United States, lent their support to’ the cause of a united 
Ireland. And in this there was no little irony: all three would have 
been embarrassed severely had it become common knowledge that the 
Provisional aid network in which they were enlisted v/as at the same 
time associated with militant Arab regimes and organisations in its 
quest for further funds and bulk supplies of arms (see pp. 564-83).
Of the two Congressmen, Wolff was the more active, and probably
106
the more strongly influenced by NORAID. He was it seems inspired
by a sense of the melodramatic (and encouraged by the knowledge that
he represented a heavily Irish district.*^7 ) In 1972, after having
failed to obtain permission to visit the Long Kesh detention camp,
he posed as a family friend of one of the detainees, adopted the alias
'Joe Brannigan' and, restricting his conversation to mono-syllables so
as to avoid this being discovered, entered the establishment to hear
108
complaints of rough treatment.
In other respects the successes of the Caucus and its 
Congressional auxiliaries v/ere limited. The Irish Government, in a
109
letter from its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Garret Fitzgerald, 
as well as in numerous representations by its Embassy in Washington to 
both Rosenthal (once in the presence of Secretary Kissinger) and Wolff, 
stated its opposition to proceedings v/hich would in any way recognise 
or advantage the IRA.**^
Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975
Financial Times, 19 July 1972.
106
107
108
ibid., and (United States) Congressional Record —  House, 9 April 
1979, p. 42113 (speech by Wolff alluding to 1972 episode). Hereafter 
this source will be cited as Congressional Record —  House.
109
Letter from Garret Fitzgerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Ireland, originating from the Embassy of Ireland, Washington, D.C., 10 
October 1975, and addressed to the Hon. Lester Wolff in his capacity 
as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy (cited in 
Congressional'Record - House, 4 December 1975, p. 38722).
110
Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975.
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On this Dublin and London were agreed, and it was a tribute 
to their respective abilities to mobilise counter forces in the 
Congress and the Administration, considered later in this and the 
succeeding chapter, that the hearings so sought after by the Caucus, 
Biaggi, et. al., were literally a non-event. All that took place was 
a 'special ad hoc pre-hearing' in New York on 15 October 1975 at which 
a group of 12 already-converted Congressmen from the metropolitan area 
indulged representatives from various Irish-American/Provisional
support groups to present testimony which the former were already well
, 111 
aware of.
Obviously, if these politicians thought it necessary to exploit 
the Northern Ireland situation, the results they achieved were 
disappointing in terms of a demonstrable effect upon the issues involved, 
or even upon the United States Government. There was, therefore, 
little that Wolff, for example, could boast of to the sizable Irish 
component of his electoral district. But that begs the question as to 
whether his action, or that of his colleagues, was determined by 
electoral imperatives.**^
But tne stands taken by such politicians as Biaggi, Rosenthal 
and Wolff were worthy of more than an out-of-hand dismissal.
Consider these extracts from Rosenthal's opening address to the hearings 
of his Subcommittee in 1972:
The hearings which begin today represent a deep and 
continuing concern by the American people, and their Congress, 
for the tragic situation in Northern Ireland.
By historical and cultural ties, and because many of our 
antecedents came from England and Ireland, this country sees 
itself as a close friend and a sympathetic witness to the 
terrible human, social, and political problems v/hich engage 
both countries in Northern Ireland.
For an account of these proceedings see Congressional Record. —  
House, 4 December 1975, pp. 38721-35.
112
Where this motivation could be imputed to (say) Wolff, Biaggi 
on the other hand, could be excused —  at least insofar as it applied 
to his district: the Irish component comprised only 6 per cent of the 
total constituency. (McKittrick, 'Biaggi'j.
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The burden of finding solutions to these problems rests 
primarily on the countries involved. Yet no man of conscience 
can rest easy with that assertion and no country can subsist 
any longer behind the fiction that the nation-state system 
demands or even allows that injustices can continue simply 
because they occur wholly within national borders ...
For practical, as well as for moral reasons, we are all 
involved in the rights of other men. And when men begin to 
question the system of national authority protecting those 
rights, the legitimate interests of other nations are 
engaged as wel1.
The only apology, therefore, of Americans viewing the 
tragedy in Northern Ireland is that they know not how to 
help. Our country which still endures its own burden in a 
small country half the world away, cannot and should not 
maintain that questions of self-determination and peace­
keeping in the world community must stop at the edge of the 
Atlantic. Vietnam is the world's concern; so is Ireland.
Hopefully these hearings will point out some directions 
for the proper route to the goals of human freedom and 
justice. But if these hearings serve only to show our 
concern for these values and for the people in Ireland and 
England who must, in the first rank pursue them, our work 
in the next 3 days is justified as a testament to the 
common interests of world and community peace which we all 
share. H 3
Clearly, they comprised an eloquent, diplomatically sensitive, and 
compassionate approach to the issues from the other side of the Atlantic. 
Both Biaggi and Wolff expressed similar sentiments, although it must 
be admitted that they also tended occasionally to adopt a demonology in 
which the former would impute Nazi tactics to Britain for its operation 
of the Special Powers Act and the introduction of internment,**^while 
the latter would envision the same country as a threat to the 'very 
health and welfare of American families and their relations' because it 
(and France) operated the Concord supersonic transport into the United
Northern Ireland: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second 
Congress, Second Session, February 28 and 29; and March 1, 1972 
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 1 (hereafter 
cited as Northern Ireland: 1972 Hearings).
ibid., 'Statement of Hon. Mario Biaggi, A Representative in Congress 
from the State of New York', pp. 154-63.
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The most important weakness of these and similar politicians was 
their abdication of the practice of the politics with which, they 
were all familiar with. By this is meant their refusal, on the one 
hand, to discriminate between the IRA's objectives and its method of 
attaining them, and on the other, their habit of viewing the struggle in 
Northern Ireland according to Maria McGuire's contemptuous description 
of them.
... like spectators at a Morality Play, with right and 
wrong, good and evil, delineated in black and white.
Between being unable to forgive the violence of the state, and 
being unwilling to absolutely condemn the terrorist violence of the IRA, 
they were forced to take up a poorly constructed position antithetical 
to those of the British, the Irish, and their own Government. Among 
the senior and more influential members of Congress - such as Brooklyn 
Representative Hugh Carey and Connecticut's Senator Abraham Ribicoff —  
they were unable, despite the former's interest, to command a commitment 
beyond what was really a brief flirtation rising out of the sense of 
outrage following internment and Bloody Sunday (see Notes 118 and 128 
below). Accordingly, their effectiveness as a political lobby in 
Washington could n o t b u t b e  reduced. And if McGuire's remarks above 
were any indication, their status among those with whom their 
sympathies lay was as little more than dupes.
But not all American politicians interested in Northern Ireland 
were similarly deceived. They were, however, distinguished by three 
characteristics. First, unlike the federal representatives associated 
with NORAID and the Caucus, this group included prominent congressmen 
who tended to be Irish-American. Second, most of them were Senators.
And third, the attitude they adopted to developments in the North was
States!115
115
ibid., 'Statement by Hon. Lester Wolff, A Representative in Congress 
from the State of New York', p. 344; Sunday Telegraph, 30 March 1975; 
and Congressional Record —  Houses 4 December 1975, pp. 38721-2.
1 1
McGuire, To Take Arms, p. 108.
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reactive, but nonetheless more responsible. This last distinction, 
referred to earlier as 'the politics of the last atrocity' (see pp.273-4), 
they shared, but probably to a lesser degree, with numerous non­
governmental respondents in Western Europe.
Thus it v/as the introduction of internment in August 1971 that
drew the first substantial outcry from this quarter. Senators
Hubert Humphrey and Edmund Muskie both recorded their opposition to
the measure and their support for the reunification of Ireland.117
But it is interesting to note that both were likely Presidential
candidates for 1972 and both delayed their condemnation of the
measure until it had become 'safe' to do so —  i.e. after it had been
in operation for some time and a respectable number of their congressional
colleagues had set precedents. Among these the protests registered took
such forms as a demand for the withdrawal of the British Army lest
118
Northern Ireland become 'Britain's Vietnam' (Senator Ribicoff ),
119
its replacement by a 'peace-keeping' force, and a letter from 30
congressmen urging President Nixon to raise the subject of Northern
Ireland during his talks in Bermuda with British Prime Minister Heath,
120
scheduled for December 1971.
But towering over all such contributions in this period was the
contribution of one man. Although Irish-American, and (then) enjoying
89 per cent of the Irish vote in his constituency, he had never been
to Ireland, nor could it have been said that he saw himself primarily
121
as an Irish-American. If any man could be said to have spoken 
for the 'great submerged' of that community it was he, yet his 
popularity rested on more than that disintegrating identity could 
afford (see Appendix I, pp.605-08). He was, however, irrevocably joined
Daily Telegraph, 21 December 1971; and Guardian, 26 January 1972, 
respectively.
118
Remark made at a fund-raising dinner-dance sponsored by the ACUJ, 
and at which both he and Senator Duffey called for the withdrawal of all 
British troops (Daily Telegraph, 29 November 1971).
119
Irish Times, 29 November 1971.
120 ibid.
121
For reference to Kennedy's claim regarding his electoral popularity 
among Irish-Americans, see the Financial Times, 19 January 1972; for a 
brief profile on his background see Louis Heren's article 'Irish Ghosts 
in US Politics', Times, 21 October 1971.
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to it and possessed of its most illustrious name, almost like a 
Bishop in partibus infideliwn. He v/as, of course, the Democratic 
Senator from Massachusetts, Edward Moore Kennedy, a man who was then, 
and indeed could be until the year 2000, an essential consideration 
in every Presidential race. Kennedy, moreover, held a position in 
American politics v/hich was unique, as Conor Cruise O'Brien observed 
of his announced candidature for the Democratic nomination in 1979:
Senator Kennedy comes towards the Presidency in 
virtue of the same power which made Augustus emperor 
in succession to the murdered Julius ... the 
sacralising power of royal blood, spilled and again 
renewed. Senator Kennedy represents the hereditary 
principle in its pure form. Nobody pretends that he 
would have been thought of as a Presidential candidate 
—  or as a senator for that matter —  were it not for 
the name. His election would therefore be an event of 
a different order from that of any of the other 
candidates. It would be the election not of a person 
but of the head of a family, a quasi-royal h o u s e . 122
Thus, if it seems that excessive attention is paid to Kennedy in either 
this or the following chapter, it is only because it was widely 
appreciated on both sides of the Atlantic that his status, real and 
imputed, and his developing role, were such that no other person in 
American public life was as capable as he was of influencing events 
relative to Northern Ireland.
For Kennedy, the introduction of internment was the watershed of 
his involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland. As he told Mary 
Holland in 1977:
I really came to an av/areness of Northern Ireland 
through the civil rights issues involved. I had been 
very active in civil rights campaigns here —  the anti- 
Vietnam protests, racial issues and, internationally, 
on Greece. I'd watched the Civil Rights marches in 
Northern Ireland but it wasn't until the introduction 
of internment in 1971 that I began to get actively
Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'The Power of Magic Blood', Sydney Bulletin3
27 November 1979, p. 115.
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involved. It was becoming obvious to me that the 
one civil rights issue I wasn't speaking about was 
Northern Ireland.123
Thereafter he made up for this shortcoming very quickly with a
trenchant (and sometimes an emotional) criticism of Britain's
Northern Ireland policies. Thus internment itself was a 'cruel and
repressive policy' with consequences which were seen in terms of
124
"streams" of blood [that] have become rivers'. In the same
metaphorical vein, but with considerably more accuracy, the Compton
125
Report was dismissed as being based on an 'Alice-in-Wonderland
126
logic', and overall, an example of 'cruel hypocrisy'.
Correspondingly, the British Army were 'part of the problem,
127
not the solution' —  which in his view was to be attempted by either
(or both, it was not clear) the intervention of President Nixon as a
128
mediator or some form of UN involvement.
The culmination of Kennedy's 1971 campaign of rhetoric was
reached on 20 October with his impassioned introduction of the six-
129
point Senate Resolution 180, co-sponsored there by Ribicoff, and 
introduced in the House as Resolution 653 by Congressman (and then 
ACUJ member (Hugh Carey, later to become Governor of New York State. 
It requested the Government of the United States at the highest level 
to urcie the immediate implementation of the followino actions:
123
'Interview - Edward Kennedy', (conducted by Mary Holland), Magill3 
vol. 1, No. 1, October 1977, pp. 5-6 (hereafter cited as Kennedy 
Interview, Magill, October 1977).
124
International Herald Tribune, 19 November 1971.
125
Official title: Report of the enquiry into allegations against 
the security forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising 
out of events on the 9th August, 1971, Cmnd. 4823 (London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, November 1971).
126
Letter from Senator Kennedy to the Times, 8 December 1971.
Similar criticisms of the Compton Report were discussed earlier, in 
Chapter 9, pp. 333-8.
127
Financial Times, 10 December 1971.
128
Times. 20 December 1971: and International■ Herald Tribune3 19 
November 1971, respectively.
129 por excerpts from this speech see the Times} 21 October 1971.
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1. Termination of the current internment policy and the 
similtaneous release of all persons detained thereunder.
2. Full respect for the civil rights of all the people 
of Northern Ireland and the termination of all political, 
social, economic and religious discrimination.
3. Implementation of the reforms promised by the 
Government of the United Kingdom since 1968, including 
reforms in the fields of law enforcement, housing, 
employment and voting rights.
4. Dissolution of the Parliament of Northern Ireland.
5. Withdrawal of all British forces from Northern 
Ireland and the institution of law enforcement and criminal 
justice under local control acceptable to all parties.
6. Convening of all interested parties for the purpose 
of accomplishing the unification of Ireland.130
The international response it provoked was predictable. The Irish
Government, wanting neither to offend the American Government nor
Kennedy, greeted it passively. The American Government was, of course,
less solicitous of the Senator's feelings, and issued a statement in
which it dissociated itself from the resolution, and noted that even
131
if carried in the Congress, it was not binding on US policy. And to
the British Government went all awards for directness: in taking issue
with just about every point in Kennedy's Senate speech, Prime Minister
132
Heath condemned it in the House of Commons as 'an ignorant outburst'.
In sum, Kennedy was no more able to influence matters in London and 
Washington than other Americans interested in Northern Ireland.
Then came Bloody Sunday, and a further round of Kennedy protest.
... one couldn't stay silent after that. At the time
I was protesting about what had happened at Kent State 
University here, and the parallels between the
circumstances surrounding the two tragedies were just
Northern Ireland: 1972 Hearings, p. 17.
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too much. The defence put up here was that no one 
would have got killed at Kent State if the 
protestors had stayed home. In both cases there was 
an official Commission of Inquiry set up, which just 
turned out to be a shameful white-wash. It seemed 
to me that I must question the sincerity of British 
motives and involvement in Northern Ireland. I 
likened the situation to our involvement in Vietnam 
and I called for the British to w i t h d r a w . 133
But this time there was a wider realisation that many of his 
demands were worthy of consideration. Just as the deaths at Kent State 
had inspired the 'days of rage' on a national scale, the killings on 
Bloody Sunday engendered a massive mood of outrage against Britain 
internationally, and this was widely expressed across the political 
spectrum in the United States. In the Democratic Party, there was 
strong support for some, if not all, of what essentially were the
134
positions taken earlier by Kennedy —  from Chicago's Mayor Richard Daley,
135
the Party's leader in the House, 'Tip' O'Neill, New York Congressmen
Rosenthal and Jacob Javits, and two of its Presidential front-runners,
137 138
George McGovern and Edmund Muskie. Among the Republicans the
139 140
Mayor of New York, John Lindsay, and Senator Edward Brook both
endorsed actions and objectives which had been contained in"Kennedy's
original six-point resolution. Even the Conservative-Republican James
Buckley, who had been elected in 1970 to Robert Kennedy's former
constituency, underwent a change of heart. Whereas it was generally
agreed by commentators that he owed his position to what was left of the
133
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135
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conservative 'Irish vote', in late 1971, he displayed a certain 
independence of mind by resisting attempts to have him 'speak out for
Ireland on the grounds that it constituted illegitimate interference.
Within six weeks, however, he appealed to the Senate to support a call
for both US assistance to aid the orderly withdrawal of British troops
143
and US settlement efforts.
In the wake of this outpouring of unfocused sympathy and support, 
American politicians interested in the subject of Northern Ireland, 
like politicians anywhere no doubt, took the one action which was in 
their prerogative, given a reluctant executive and administration: 
they discussed it further. Specifically, the Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Europe and the House of Representatives Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Benjamin Rosenthal, convened hearings which were held 
in the Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C., between
28 February and 1 March 1972.
They did not represent, as might be inferred from Rosenthal 's
involvement and the record of some of those who gave testimony, a
triumph for the support network previously discussed. While it was
probably encouraged by the facilities for publicity and propaganda it
received during the hearings, other factors overrode its interests.
Although evidence on this is scant, predominant among these must have
been the mood of sympathetic parties who desired that their feelings
should be allowed as near to the' formal national expression as
possible. This at least was consistent with the Chairman Rosenthal's
144
introductory remarks (cited earlier). Furthermore it was significant
that Kennedy attended the hearings where, prior to (and since) that 
time he had studiously avoided associating with NORAID and its related 
activities. The same was true of both Tip O'Neill's decision to submit a
141
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Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European
• 145 
Affairs.
As was noted earlier in this chapter, the Chairman's introduction 
was an eloquent, diplomatically sensitive, and compassionate approach 
to the issues at stake in Northern Ireland. The proceedings which 
followed could not be so characterised. As a reference to most of the 
600 pages of testimony will reveal, the tone of the event was decidedly 
anti-British and denunciatory.
Kennedy v/as again to the fore; indeed, received 'star' billing.
He opened the testimony with a lengthy prepared text, to which he
spoke, also at some length (and repetitively), and followed this with
further intermittant observations during a period allocated for 
146
questions. It was a wide-ranging address, difficult to capture in
simple terms, and without doubt the high point of Kennedy's interest 
in the Ulster Question in the period 1971-76. Although he denied that 
he was acting v/ith anti-British intent, it v/as his most bitter attack 
on Britain's Northern Ireland policies (and a sharp personal criticism
147
of Prime Minister Heath. ) Indeed, in this regard he appeared to
assume the role of Prosecuting Attorney before the Bar of History.
The kill inns in Derry, he implied, v/ere not an aberration; they were
only the most recent atrocity in a catalogue of 'cruel and bloody days,
... like the massacres in the Gordon Riots, and at Amritsar and Peterloo 
148
and Dublin'. From this and numerous other statements in the same
vein, Kennedy seemed to press for not only an acclamation of Britain's 
guilt but, were it possible, the consignent of its national soul to 
perdition.
It v/as also his most persuasive proposal to that time for a role 
for the American Government. From historical precedents in Anglo-American
statement, and the presence of a representative of the State Department,
145 /
(Under the rules by v/hich the sub-committee operated, representatives 
of governments other than the US Government, could not be heard).
146
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^  ibid., pp. 8, 14, and 22.
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Northern Ireland (see p. 519) the alternative deployment
of British troops in the Province to NATO, the involvement of the
Republic of Ireland and comparisons with US intervention in recent
times, he assembled, if not a compelling argument for direct action,
at least a reasonable case for a more active US interest in ensuring
149
that the conflict was settled. Consistency alone dictated the latter:
A few weeks ago, in the controversy over Britain's base 
on Malta, America was not so silent. We did not 
hesitate to intervene. The Administration was quick 
to prod the British then, when a few square miles of 
an obsolete island base of no military significance 
were at stake. Why is it so slow to act on Ulster 
now, where basic human rights and the lives of innocent 
people are in the balance.150
And again:
More important on the issue of intervention, Ulster 
cannot fairly be called the internal affair of Britain.
Not a cay goes by without new evidence of the deep 
involvement of the Republic of Ireland in the crisis —  
a separate and independent nation whose affairs and 
future are intimately bound up with the solution of 
the Ulster issue. We sent the aircraft carrier Enterprise 
to the Indian Ocean last December, and we intervened in 
other ways to try to tilt the balance between India and 
Pakistan, two nations with whom we have had long and 
friendly ties. But by some cruel irony today, we are 
unwilling even to make our good offices available to 
mediate a crisis over Ulster that involves two of our 
closest friends, Britain and Ireland.151
And once again the pervasiveness of the contemporary American
experience in Indochina was obvious. In the general sense, Ulster was
'Britain's Vietnam', and hence 'the most important single step', that
152
could be taken was the withdrawal of troops. In the particular sense, 
Londonderry was 'Britain's My Lai' —  of which the concomitant was that 
less than justice v/ould be done at the consequent inquiry.
relations, the presence of a US Naval Communications Station in
^  ibid., pp. 3-4 and 10 
ibid., pp. 3 and 10.
151
152
ibid., pp. 4 and 10.
ibid., p. 12.
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Just as at My Lai, there will perhaps be microscopic 
scrutiny of the soldiers at the scene, but the 
generals will go free.153
In short, while it was not difficult to find fault with the comparisons 
he made, Kennedy's criticisms, if they are regarded apart, were valid 
where they concerned recent developments such as the introduction of 
internment and the Compton Report., and accurate in their expectations 
as they concerned (say) the Widgery Tribunal which inquired into Bloody 
Sunday. (See Chapter 9, p. 355).
But there was, in the belief that between Vietnam and Ulster
a high order of comparability existed, a failure to go beyond the
level of superficialities. Foremost among the deficiencies to be
noted was a complete lack of appreciation that an American role in
Northern Ireland, even if diplomatic rather than military, would in all
probability be just as unsuccessful as had Britain's to that point —
an objection raised by the ranking Republican member of the subcommittee,
154
Peter Frelinghuysen. There was, simply, no grasp of the traditional 
intransigence of Ulster Unionists to initiatives from parties external 
to the Province. Nor, it could be inferred, was there anything in 
contemporary American diplomatic endeavours (with regard to broadly 
similar problems as were present in Ulster) which would have allowed 
Kennedy or others to propose a role for the United States with any degree 
of optimism.
Kennedy's testimony, however, could be faulted in other major
aspects as well. It was, for instance, flawed by its excessive
optimism. With the same fine disregard that 0'Dwyer (see Appendix II)
displayed for the capacity of the North to erupt in the most frightening
manner (as it had done frequently since 1969), Kennedy denied that
155
civil war was a likely consequence of a British withdrawal.
153
154
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Perhaps his greatest omission in this regard was (again like
O'Dwyer) a sufficient understanding of the paramilitary organisations,
specifically the IRA. It was not for example sufficient to account
for their strength and their support by playing on the theme of
156
justice denied for the Catholic community in Northern Ireland.
That was the truth. Kennedy failed to grasp a relatively simple 
fact, obvious from the autumn of 1970 (earlier on the other side of 
the paramilitary divide), that the explosive power of the revolution 
(and the counter-revolution) in Northern Ireland was derived in no 
small part from the desire to get even as well as equal. Moreover, he 
declined to recognise the constant theme in IRA mythology that was 
revenge, intrigue and forms of mysterious return in which it would 
reappear, as did the prodigal, and see the usurpers, in the North and 
in the Republic, humbled.
What this pointed to, it seems, was Kennedy's own ambivilent 
behaviour towards the men of violence. According to Maria McGuire,
'Kennedy's office' was, at or about this time, facilitating Provisional
157
spokemen in their efforts to obtain visas for visits to the US.
However, any suspicions that his account of the rise of the Provisional
was but a winking endorsement of their violence, must be set against
158
the absolute condemnations of it he made, also in the hearings.
But in his uncertainty, if that was what it was, there were
further grounds to query, as did the usually sympathetic New York
159
Timer, of his October Resolution, the judgment of a man whose status
was that of a possible leader of the West's most powerful country. From
a well of hope apparently based on nothing more substantial that the
160
occasional mollities of Brian Faulkner and Ian Paisley, and the
156 ibid., pp. 7-8.
157
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common membership of both states in Ireland of the European C o m m u n i t y , ^ 1 
he contrived to conclude that:
... the goal of uni fi 
Ireland to turn back ...
In all, Kennedy was found wanting in the very quality which his 
position and purpose demanded: a deep understanding of the issues in 
Northern Ireland. It v/as, therefore, a flawed performance. And it' 
failed. In Washington the Administration of President Richard Nixon 
was unmoved, but other factors probably dictated that outcome from 
the start. But it failed in Dublin, too, where Taoiseach Jack Lynch 
took exception to Kenendy's call for an immediate withdrawal of British 
troops, and suggested that he was less than adequately informed.
From February 1972 onwards Kennedy undertook, what seems now in
hindsight, a spasmodic withdrawal from his earlier positions. Some were
164
still in evidence —  such as a further appeal to Nixon, a successful
collaboration with O'Dwyer and Ribicoff to have included in the 1972
Democratic platform a plank condemning discrimination and repression
165
in Northern Ireland, and a minor furore over joint training exercises
166
between the US and Royal Marines. But they were increasingly overtaken
by what the Senator later chose to call, in early 1973, 'a more positive 
1 (S7
attitude'. And by this time he had lauded Heath for the prorogation of
cation is now too close for 
162
161 .... Q 
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Stormont1^  (which had been a proposal in his and Ribicoff's 
resolution) and bestowed high praise on the Northern Ireland Secretary, 
William Whitelaw, for his efforts to effect a ceasefire in the middle 
of 1972.169 (See Chapter 2, pp. 102-09).
There remained, however, some residential ambivalence in
Kennedy's position that was not to be completely removed until 1977.
While he claimed that his statements were modified in accordance with
what he saw as progressive initiatives by the British Government through
1972 and 1 9 7 3 , it was obvious from an article he wrote in Foreign
Policy in mid-1973, that his apolgia in this period was unchanged from
the testimony he gave at the Washington hearings.171 In fact, he had
found in the 'latitude given to the growth of Protestant paramilitary
organisations' in 1972, and in the March 1973 White Paper's 'lack of
commitment to the unification of Ireland', additional grounds to
172
criticise British policies. Yet it was also obvious that a trans­
formation in Kennedy's approach to the situation in Northern Ireland 
had been wrought: his tone in the above article was quieter (as befitted 
a learned journal?), and his arguments stated in such a way that they 
did not carry the Anglophobic overtones that his February 1972 testimony 
did.
If there was a catalyst outside of the British initiatives
responsible for this change, it could almost certainly be traced to the
influence upon Kennedy of the leader of the Northern Ireland Social
Democratic and Labour Party, John Hume. As early as November 1972 they
had met in secret in Bonn while the former was attending the North
173
Atlantic Assembly of NATO Pariiamentarians. There is now general
New York Times, 25 March 1972.
i fiq
Daily Telegraphs 24 June 1972.
17(^  Kennedy Interview, Magill, October 1977.
Edward M. Kennedy, 'Ulster is an International Issue'^Foreign 
Policy II (Summer 1973), (hereafter cited as Edward M. Kennedy, 
'Ulster is an International Issue').
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agreement amongst observers of the American Dimension that, 
subsequently, Kennedy came to be almost entirely guided on Northern 
Ireland matters by this man he described as:
With the getting of Kennedy's own wisdom the extra-governmental 
activities in the United States related to Northern Ireland took on a 
new complexion. In the spirit of the title of this chapter, the 
divisions became clearer between those who were both crusader and 
criminal, and those who were merely the latter. The former, who were 
never a majority, lost ground on their own account and to the coalition 
which formed around Kennedy and a number of his 'great and powerful 
friends'. And also there may have been the suspicion on the part of 
most politicians that too close an involvement in the affairs of 
Northern Ireland was a dangerous thing. Neither Benjamin Gilman's 
(Republic, New York) House resolution calling for a US embargo on
nor a move within the Democratic Party to include a call for a united
rather negative expressions (in the case of arms), or too simply positive 
expressions (in the case of unity). It was to be some time yet before 
greater understanding or sophistication would prevail over such views.
In the interim they ignored the realities of Northern Ireland, but more 
to the point of this thesis, they were inappropriate in terms of Anglo- 
American relations, and not really attuned to either the objectives of
As cited in David McKittrick, 'Horsemen of the Irish Apocalypse', 
Irish Times3 6 September 1979, p. 10. See also Kennedy Interview, 
Magill3 October 1977, p. 6. Further confirmation provided by interview.
175
Irish Times3 18 March 1975.
... one of the finest and most creative political 
leaders of our generation, a man of extraordinary 
courage and wisdom and understanding 174
... the exportation of all weapons and ammunition to 
Great Britain which are related to the suppression of 
the minority in Northern Ireland [and the unification
Ireland in its 1976 platform was successful.
176
But these were stil1
Guardian, 29 October 1976.
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Irish-American, or the nuances of Anglo-Irish relations. Thus it is 
to this third level, beyond the transnational and national-political 
levels that attention must now be turned.
Eight years before the current conflict in Northern Ireland broke
out an event took place which could have had some bearing on subsequent
events: Edward Kennedy's elder brother, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, was
elected President of the United States. It symbolised, as historian
Lawrence McCaffrey recalls, 'the Irish-Catholic climb from the murky
bogs of ward politics to the heights of national power'.177 And
while Lewis Namier's dictum that 'it serves no purpose to expostulate
178
with history' will be observed in the following analysis, it is 
tempting, indeed compelling, to reflect upon the milieu as did Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan in his essay 'The Irish':
The era of the Irish politician culminated in Kennedy.
He was born to the work and was at every stage of his life 
a 'prop'. He rose on the willing back of three generations 
of district leaders and county chairmen who, like Barabbas 
himself, may in the end have been saved for their one 
moment of recognition that something special had appeared 
among them. That moment was in 1960 when the Irish party 
chieftains of the great Eastern and Midwestern cities, for 
reasons they could probably even now not fully explain, 
came together to nominate for President the grandson of 
Honey Fitz ... It was the last hurrah. He was the youngest 
and newest, served in a final moment of ascendancy. On the 
day he dieds the President of the United Statess the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives 3 the majority Leader of the 
United States Senates the Chairman of the National Committee 
were all Irishs all Catholic} all Democrats.
[emphasis added].179
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By 1969 John F. Kennedy had gone to his death but the Speaker of the 
House and the Majority leaders in both the House and Senate were still 
'Irish ... Catholic ... Democrats'. The President, of course, was a 
Republican, but should that nave made a difference? Two months before 
the Presidential election in 1952, Richard Nixon, as candidate for 
Vice-President, stated that he was 'against the partition of Ireland 
absolutely'. And further:
... it is not easy to suggest practical steps to end 
partition right away. But one thing that occurs to 
me is the possibility of putting pressure on -the 
British when it comes to handing them out American money. 
Then it could be made clear that we don't favour their 
policy in relation to the division of Ireland.180
He v/as also reported as saying that he thought the United States could 
exercise considerable moral influence on the demand for a united 
Ireland, and that he was in favour of such action. What is more:
it can be said that there is a better chance of a 
Republican Administration doing something about 
partition than the Democrats ...We are more honestly 
concerned in trying to help in this partition than the 
Democrats. [emphasis added] 181
How then to explain his steadfast refusals throughout the period
of his Presidency to do anything remotely in accord with his 1952
utterances, his cautioning of Congress against making any sweeping
182
declarations on the Irish problem, or to account for Dennis Clark's
observation that: '... higher officials of the Nixon administration
183
treated the entire issue as if it were on another planet?'
Certainly, internal (to the US) political antagonisms must have played a 
part, particularly those between the Democratic Party and Nixon. However, 
by far the major determinants of the position taken by the US Government 
lay outside this explanation.
180
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In the first instance they v/ere traceable to various factors 
which collectively ensured what Clark termed the 'organisational 
isolation' of the foreign policy bureaucracy:
The United States State Department and higher government 
circles were largely inhabited by men without ties to 
the Irish immigrant community. The Ivy League and power 
broker careerists in Washington simply didn't know 
anything or give a damn about Northern Ireland. They 
did care about England and its requests and suggestions 
to the United States. England was an important ally.
Nor v/ere the Irish of much domestic political significance. 
Their old power had declined. They had attached to them 
a dual political image, that of old time ward boss 
vulgarity, typified by Mayor Edward Daly of Chicago, and 
the Kennedy family drama of pain and disillusionment.
Either part of the image was distressing to think about, 
and there was no longer any clear demographic and electoral 
Irish bloc of national significance to compel consideration 
of Irish concerns. In addition, the IRA supporters did not 
represent a broad base of adherents even among Irish- 
Americans. 184
Clark also implied that 'those two major characteristics of the Irish
185
conflict itself, convoluted complexity and raging violence' were 
even more potent disincentives to an active American interest, but it 
is not clear whether he intended that they be applied to the State 
Department as well as to the population as a whole. Whatever his 
intention the former proposition appears unlikely in the context of US 
intervention in other violent manifestations of intractable political 
problems. Whereas the two reasons cited no doubt deterred the majority 
of Americans from wanting any part of the conflict, they would have been 
but poor excuses for the American Government to abdicate a role. Indeed, 
a case could be made that such conditions only imposed a greater 
obligation on it to act —  according to the analogy that governments, like 
surgeons, are frequently required to perform what laymen have neither 
the license nor the stomach for.
Clark, it is apparent, had no high regard for the State Department, 
but tv/o further independently observed conditions lend evidence to his
ibid. , p. 67.
185 ....
ibid.
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claim. Both logically proceeded from them. The first v/as that Northern 
Ireland was regarded as a domestic and not a foreign policy by the State
i nf
Department. Statements originating from that source, until the
advent of the Carter initiative in 1977 (see Chapter 11, pp. 471-3) were
187
made on an ad hoc basis, without benefit of specific policy guidelines. 
Second, the position that Ireland (Republic and the North) occupied 
within State's bureaucratic structure reflected this view: only one 
desk officer was assigned to cover relations with Dublin. Thus, the 
troubles, in effect, 'competed' for the attention of the Office of North 
European Affairs along with the United Kingdom, the Benelux nations 
(Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) and the Nordics (Denmark,
1 oo
Iceland, Norway and Sweden).
In combination these factors determined that the United States 
Government said nothing, or at most very little, throughout the first 
nine years of the current troubles (i.e. until August 1977). During the 
period in which Ireland attempted to bring the Northern conflict before 
the United Nations, it simply declined to state its position on the issues 
(see Chapter 5, pp. 253). The sum total of its representative's 
contribution to the proceedings consisted of the following evasive 
action:
Mr Buffum (United States of America) said he had a 
statement to make on the inscription of the item.
However, before being required to take a stand on an 
issue confronting many with an unhappy dilemma, he would 
be interested to know whether the representative of 
Ireland would wish to respond to the very eloquent appeal 
made by the United Kingdom representative.
186
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Shannon Interview; and interview, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C., 1979 (hereafter cited as Department of State Interview, 1979). 
Note: a minor difference existed between the former, in which reference 
was made to the 'North-west European' section, and the latter, the 
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in the writer's note-taking.
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By early 1972, however, American policy with respect
to Northern Ireland was explicit. Without 'any particular request'
from either the Irish or the United Kingdom Government, Secretary of
State, William P. Rogers, advanced the argument that the United States
190
was 'not in a position' to intervene in the crisis then underway. 
Moreover, at an impromptu news conference given by him after receiving 
Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Patrick Hillery, he concluded 
that:
it would be both inappropriate and counter-productive 
for the United States to attempt to intervene in any way
in the area.191
In similar vein he responded to proposals by Senator Edward Kennedy 
and others that the United States press Britain to withdraw its troops 
from the Province:
I don't think we should do anything to suggest the United 
States can solve this problem. It's unrealistic, and 
suggestions that if we 'acted vigorously and in a diplomatic 
way' that we could solve it, are outrageous. 192
Rogers' successor, Henry Kissinger, was equally forthright. According
to a number of authoritative sources, in 1975 he rejected a US role with
the statement that 'Northern Ireland was not a fruitful area for US
193
diplomatic energies'. In sum the views of two successive
Secretaries of State confirmed the claim made by Dr Bernard Lee, 
executive assistant to Dr David Abernathy, President of the black civil
190
New York Times, 4 February 1972.
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ibid., but there v/as a lighter side: in 1971 a poster was on sale 
in New York which showed a smiling President Nixon, arms outstretched to 
gather in votes, over the caption, 'He kept our boys out of Northern 
Ireland' (International Herald Tribune, 22 December 1971).
193
The quotation may not be exact. It was, however, offered to the 
writer as an indication of the US Government's thinking in the course 
of the Shannon Interview, and confirmed in two further interviews —  
with DuBose (see note 185) and Thompson (see note 187). Unfortunately, 
none of the aforementioned were able to precisely locate it in time or 
to recall other than its general wording.
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rights organisation, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference,
that during their meeting in Bermuda in December 1971, President Nixon
had in fact discussed the situation in Northern Ireland with Prime
Minister Heath (as Kennedy and others had urged him to), but that the
result had been an assurance by the latter of US Government silence on
194
it (and Rhodesia).
The nearest the US Government came to departing from this 
unaccustomed 'hands off/no comment' policy was during the 1972 hearings 
when Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Martin J. 
Hillenbrand, faced with the need to comment on internment, took refuge 
in what he chose to call 'fairly measured words':
I intend to offer no defense of internment, either as 
principle or as a policy. But I do not believe that 
we should make declarations which in effect substitute 
our judgment for that of other democratic countries as 
to whether they do or do not face conditions of civil 
conflict which cannot be controlled by ordinary judicial 
processes. I know that we would accept no advice from 
them in similar circumstances.195
It required little imagination, therefore, to account for the
criticism of Kennedy (and others), or for the fact that Rogers, in his
meeting with Hillery, recorded only Nixon's 'deep personal concern' for
196
the Northern Ireland situation following Bloody Sunday. Or, for 
the matter of that, for the State Department's balancing act following 
the prorogation of the Northern Ireland Parliament —  which took the 
following form. Initially a statement was issued by spokesman Charles 
W. Bray that:
It would be inappropriate for this government to comment. 
This whole matter is one in which we have attempted not 
to inject ourselves unnecessarily and certainly not 
publicly.197
Irish Timess 12 February 1972, p. 7.
195
Northern Ireland: 1972 Hearings, p. 166. Hi 11enbrand's 
description of the above as 'fairly measured words' is found on p. 178.
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ibid., p. 164; the description is taken from Hi 11 enbrand's
statement.
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Then subsequently, it was accorded a more platitudinous reception, but 
the non-involvement disclaimer was maintained:
We hope that as a result of the action announced by the 
British Government and the attitude expressed yesterday 
by the Government of Ireland an opportunity will be 
created for all those involved in the Northern Ireland 
problem to now proceed in the spirit of compromise to 
secure peace with justice.
We express this hope on behalf of the United States, 
which is not itself involved in the problem but which has 
many close links to both Ireland and Great Britain.198
Notwithstanding this evidence, it might still be inferred from the
use of wording, such as 1unnecessarily and certainly not publicly' in
the first (Bray's) statement, and the similar disclaimer in the second,
that the US was 'protesting overmuch' and its influence had been brought
to bear. Furthermore this would be consistent with the view expressed
by one senior member of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs —
that prorogation was brought about sooner rather than later as a result
of friendly pressure (origin unspecified) being applied to the British 
199
Government. But in turn, 'friendly pressure' is also open to numerous 
interpretations, and that leaves to one side the increasing realisation 
in Whitehall during late 1971 —  early 1972 that Westminster would 
probably have to assume a more direct role in Northern Ireland. Thus, 
without a more substantial body of evidence to draw upon, the question 
of 'American influence' in prorogation must remain open. And even 
then there will probably be little which would overturn the conclusion 
that the foremost obstacle to US intervention in Northern Ireland was 
its own internal resistance.
There was another reason which strongly complemented this state 
of affairs, but was seldom, if ever, directly alluded to by any of the 
US Government's spokesmen. But this may have been because it was so 
obvious as to not require mentioning —  the special nature of Anglo- 
American relations. They were, and remain, of transcending importance to
New York Timess 26 March 1972.
Interview, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1978.
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the West; to them the Ulster Question was but an irritant.
Conscientious efforts were therefore made to ensure that, at worse, 
it would become nothing else.
Two events in the week following Bloody Sunday and involving 
the British Ambassador, Lord Cromer, demonstrated the extent to 
which the conventions of this relationship were so well established.
In the course of a television interview in Washington the following 
exchange took place:
Interviewer: I'd like to ask you at least one 
question about the incident last Sunday which 
heightened the present crisis. Those troops in 
Londonderry said that they were firing chiefly 
at people who were firing at them. But isn't ...
* the arithmetic of thirteen civilians killed and 
no soldiers killed circumstantial evidence against 
that position?
The Right Honourable the Earl of Cromer: Well, as 
you know, this most unfortunate affair is subject to a 
judicial inquiry so that I can't get too deeply 
involved in the detail of it. But I don't think 
that there's substance in what you say because the 
number of firings that were made on the troops greatly 
exceeded the returned fire by the troops. And of the 
people that were unfortunately ki l l e d o n e  man had 
nail bombs on him and four others were wanted for some 
other affairs.
And the troops certainly didn't lead in firing until 
they were attacked, [emphasis added] . 2 0 0
Within days of the above he was also reported as going so far as to say 
that the Roman Catholics of Northern Irleand could leave if they did 
not like it t h e r e . ^
In both statements he took liberties: in the first with the 
presumption, later found to be unjustified, that the substance of his 
claim would be confirmed by the evidence to be presented at the (Widgery) 
tribunal of inquiry, and by implying that it was somehow permissible to 
shoot unarmed civilians who were 'wanted for some other affairs'; and in
London Press Service, Verbatim Service, 'Northern Ireland —  Lord 
Cromer', 044/72, 7 February 1972, p. 1.
201
Timess 11 February 1972.
438
the second v/ith the sensitivities of the Northern Catholics. Furthermore, 
to the extent that Lord Cromer was responsible for informing the US 
Government of developments in Northern Ireland and of explaining British 
policy there, both of the above made a joke of Prime Minister Heath's 
statement that President Nixon did not have the 'misunderstanding'
202
of the situation which was notable in some other American leaders.
But, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, it was perhaps 
more to the point that both statements passed without comment by the 
Administration, such was the indulgence enjoyed by the British 
Government within the US.
For its part the British Government maintained the convention
that Northern Ireland was not a subject for polite Anglo-American
conversation until its preoccupation with security matters —  in
particular the discovery of arms and ammunition of US origin in the
North —  made such restraint untenable. Then, and only then, according
to information received from the State Department, did the troubles
203
intrude into Anglo-American relations. Using Jones's account of
the introduction of weapons of US origin, this would locate the above
204
development in 1970, yet the record of public statements by British 
Ministers indicates a much later emergence of the issue: 1975.
The explanation for this 'discrepancy' appears quite straight­
forward. In the intervening period, measures were taken by the US 
Government against various Provisionals and their sympathisers, but in 
accordance with the prevailing Anglo-American understanding on Northern 
Ireland. These are considered later in this chapter. But also in this 
period, or at least from late 1971-75, the British Government had 
overall responsibility for the operation of internment, a policy which
ensured the US support network of a steady supply of funds for the
205
'families' of those in prison camps. It would seem that with the 
strength of this appeal diminished by the formal end to internment in
202
203
204
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Irish Timess 28 February 1972.
Department of State Interview, 1979.
Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland', p. 17. 
Clark, Irish Blood3 p. 71.
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1975, the British Government felt less inhibited in its attempts
to counter the effectiveness of the Provisional support network in
206
the US. In the process it succumbed to an excess of vigour,
207
of which the claims made regarding US arms were an example, and 
became involved in a brief but inconsequential exchange of differences 
with a US Government agency (previously discussed: pp. 403-06). 
otherwise v/as unlikely to have occurred. And it has not since.
In view of the advantages enjoyed by the British Government in 
its American dealings it was only natural that the Irish Government, 
given its adversary relationship to the former on many Northern Ireland 
issues, should have fared rather poorly. 'Poorly', that is, if it can 
be ascertained just exactly what it was that Dublin was attempting 
in its relations with Washington, particularly during the period of 
the 1969-73 Fianna Fail Government.
Certainly, one theme was constant throughout the years which are 
considered in this chapter: anti 'aid'. However, because it was not 
illegal for American citizens in the United States to support the
Provisionals —  or any other foreign 1 iberation/terrorist movement for
208
the matter of that — nor was it likely that this would change, Dublin 
representations became essentially an appeal by the'government of one 
country to a small minority of the people in another. And for the most 
part it v/as an unrewarding labour, akin, to borrow from Anthony Cronin, 
to 'peddling visions to the blind and shouting slogans to the deaf'.
But it v/as on the government-to-government level that matters were 
decidedly clouded, as v/as instanced by the transactions following Bloody 
Sunday. Until then, there was no evidence that Dublin had attempted to 
interest Washington in an active role, however defined, visa-a-vis
206 .... 
ibid.
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Another was Wilson's exhortation to American correspondents to 
'strip away the romantic legends' attached to the IRA. As he told them 
'the men of the [current] IRA are to the men of the Easter Rising what 
Al Capone was to Garibaldi' (London Press Service, Verbatim Service, 243/75,
17 December 1975, 1 IRA Fund Raising', an extract from a speech by the Prime 
Minister to the Association of American Correspondents, Savoy Hotel,
London, 17 December 1975).
208 c, t 4-
Shannon Interview.
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Northern Ireland. Immediately after that date, the Irish Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Dr Patrick Hillery, appeared to promote a change in 
this policy, but in his various explanations of this he also appeared 
to take a lead from, and refuge in, the verbal obfuscation more commonly 
found in the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch.
On 2 February 1972, Hillery stated that, because it was unlikely
to be effective, he did not want the United States to take up a public
stand on Northern Ireland, but instead hoped that it would make its
209
concern felt privately. On the following day, however, Secretary
of State Rogers, announced that neither Hillery (nor Lord Cromer) had
210
'any particular request' to make at that time of the Administration.
A short time later a similar conflict of views on what the Irish 
Minister for Foreign Affairs had conveyed to the US Government was 
evident. In the course of Assistant Secretary of State Hi 11enbrand's 
statement to the House Subcommittee on Europe's hearings on Northern 
Ireland —  substantially a reaffirmation of Rogers' earlier statement —  
he was challenged by Congressman Morgan F. Murphy of Illinois, who 
cited Hillery as having told a joint (House and Senate) meeting of 
Congress that:
... he did request that the White House and State 
Department talk to the British, and further stated that 
he welcomed the action in Congress, specifically the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, on the resolutions pending 
before it for a full discussion of what was taking place 
in Northern Ireland.211
In reply Hillenbrand exercised considerable diplomatic caution, 
but he nevertheless raised the possibility that what Hillery had told 
the Senate and what he had told the State Department were two different 
things. As regards intervention:
209
Times} 3 February 1972.
210
A/,-;,) York Times, 4 February 1972.
211
Northern Ireland: 1972 Hearings, p. 176,
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I think it is fair to say that what I have indicated 
in my records reflects what we understood him to be 
telling us. Now, it is true he made a speech up in 
New York before he came down here, which went considerably 
further in its implications than some of the things he 
said subsequently.
But our understanding was that intervention in the sense 
that we would actively try to influence the situation was 
not on his mind when he talked to us ...
I do not know what he told you down here or what he told 
the Senate, but I think this represents what we think he 
was asking us to do nr what he was not asking us to do. 212 
[emphasis added]
And on the matter of the Kennedy-Ribicoff and Carey resolutions then
before Congress, Hillenbrand devoted considerable time to explaining
that the Administration's opposition to them was essentially derived
from recent statements by the Taoiseach which clearly signified the
213
Irish Government's opposition to them.
But Hillery persisted, and on the point of intervention anyway, it 
was difficult to reconcile the State Department's account with the reply 
he gave in Dail Eireann to a question by Dr O'Connell as to what had 
actually been sought in Washington.
What we asked was not to intervene in a hostile way but 
as a friendly nation to Britain to encourage Britain 
and to ask Britain to change from a military policy.
Not usiyig the word 'intervention' might give the impression 
we did not ask for action by the US. We certainly did. 214 
[emphasis added].
Unfortunately for the resolution of this controversy, the above 
explanation was bracketed by two exchanges which vividly illustrated 
the limits to which truth may be elucidated from pariiamentary debates 
if the responsible minister is of a mind to be disingenuous and the 
Ceann Comhairle (Chairman) is disposed to facilitate him. In the first 
instance:
212
Northern Ireland: 1972 Hearings> pp. 176-7.
213
ibid., pp. 165-7, 177-8 and 182. The statements in question were 
taken from Jack Lynch's speech of 19 February 1980 to the Fianna Fail 
Ard Fheis in Dublin.
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Dr.0'Connel1: I have here a transcript of a statement 
made by the US Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs. He said that the Minister told the 
US Secretary, Mr. Rodgers [sic], that he was not requesting 
US intervention in the Northern Ireland situation. Is that 
correct?
Dr. Hillery: It is quite clear that we asked the US 
Government and other Governments to speak to Britain and 
to encourage Britain to seek a political rather than a 
military solution in the North.
Dr. O'Connell: This document states that the Minister 
did not —
215
An Ceann Comhairle: We cannot have an argument on this.
And in the second:
Dr. O'Connell: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of 
the reply, I give notice that I intend to raise this 
matter on the Adjournment.
Dr. Hillery: My reply will be as unsatisfactory on 
the Adjournment.
Dr. O'Connell: I have some more supplementaries.
An Ceann Comhairle: The Deputy may not have more 
supplementaries. He will not monopolise Question Time.
Dr. O'Connell: I had seven questions —
An Cean Comhairle: That does not permit the Deputy 
to monopolise Question Time.216
217
Nor were attempts made some years later any more fruitful.
The inference to be drawn, then, was that either Hillery or the 
US Government's representatives were misleading their respective 
audiences. (The possibility that each misunderstood the import of the 
other's position is discounted since the reaffirmation and terms of their 
respective statements appear to preclude it). On balance, the available 
evidence suggests that the former was the more likely —  for two reasons.
ibid., col. 967.
216 ibid., col. 969.
217
A request by the writer, in 1979, for an interview with (then) 
President Hillery for the purpose of obtaining further information on 
the period of his Ministry was declined on the grounds that the 
protocol of the Office of President precluded him 'from engaging in such 
discussions'. (Letter from M. o'hOdrain, Secretary to the President, 
to the writer, 11 July 1979).
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First, given the consistency and priorities of the US Government,
it seemingly had nothing to gain by an admission that it had declined
to intervene in a dispute between two nations with which it had
friendly relations. Conversely, it is difficult to find a motive
which would have determined it to deny that diplomatic overtures,
however ouiet, had been made to the British Government. And second,
if the statements made by the Taoiseach in Dublin were an accurate
account of his Government's policy throughout3 and not a reconsideration
once the immediate sense of outrage had passed, then the substance of
Hillery's representations in the US and elsewhere could not have
included attempts to internationalise the situation in the North. Of
course this does not exclude the rather obvious possibilities that in
the prevailing crisis atmosphere, he might have sought to do so
irrespective of instructions from Dublin, or even that he was despatched
without a specific brief. By all accounts, therefore, the perspective
made most attractive by the evidence is that which saw the Minister's
odyssey as, to precis Dr O'Donovan in the Dail, essentially an 'ill-
218
prepared traipse around the world.'
No similar recourse was made again. There was, however, no event
of the magnitude of Bloody Sunday to warrant it anyway. The most
ambitious objective in Irish-American relations in the four years
following Bloody Sunday appears to have been Lynch's hope, reported
in January 1973, that Nixon would use his influence with the British
Government to ensure that Whitehall's forthcoming proposals for the
219
province would incorporate a positive 'Irish dimension'. To date 
no evidence has come to light which would allow attribution of this 
development, in any meaningful sense, to US agency.
In the circumstances of Anglo-American and Irish-American relations 
considered in the foregoing, the impression could be gained that the US 
Government opted to do almost nothing in relation to Northern Ireland. 
Despite the fact that no legal impediment was introduced to fund-raising
Dail Eireann, Official Report3 vol. 259, 7 March 1972, cols. 968-9.
Financial Times3 6 January 1973.
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by American citizens within the United States, even if it was for 
'terrorist' purposes, there was, as the previously mentioned arms 
suits indicate, an identifiable US Government response. This was born 
of reducing British and Irish preoccupations with security to a common, 
anti-terrorist denominator. ('Preoccupations' is preferred to 
'requests' because the former required no great skill to perceive and 
because evidence on the latter is lacking).
However, in the following analysis it is important to be aware
of one of the conventions of Anglo-American relations: representations
to Washington with respect to security measures that might be taken
regarding Northern Ireland are denied by London as a matter of
220
practice. Furthermore it has not been possible to differentiate 
between measures which may have been taken as a result of British and/or 
Irish representations and those which the US Government v/ould have 
taken in the normal course of events.
An impressive range of sanctions was marshalled against those 
who supported the Provisional cause. According to Clark, v/ho tended 
to view the Irish-American support network as harassed, the record
shows that five federal agencies or departments were used at various
221 222 
times. Reference to other sources increased this to six: the
Federal Bureau.of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Internal Revenue Service, Department of Justice, Department
of the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the US
Customs Bureau. In support of the counter-measures they mounted, heavy
reliance was placed upon the following pieces of legislation: the
Federal Gun Control Act of 1 % 8 ,  Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938, Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, and the US Immigration and
Nationality Acts. Thus empowered the US Government has sought to act in
three major areas which may be summarised as prevention, control, and
prosecution.
Interview, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 1978.
221
Clark, Irish Blood, pp. 63-4.
222
The Department of Justice (Embassy of Ireland Briefing, 17 April
1975).
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The first of these, prevention, took the form of cancelling 
or withholding entry visas from Provisional sympathisers intending
to visit the US for the purpose of publicity and fund-raising. Among
223 P24 225
those to be so treated were Joe Cahill, Maire Drumm, Sean Keenan,
226 227
Seamus Loughran, and Ruairi 0 Bradaigh. In the case of some,
however, this was a belated move. Both Loughran (1975) and
0 Bradaigh (1972 and 1973) had previously visited the United States
despite the Immigration and Nationality Acts which excluded aliens
'connected with organisations which advocate the killing of government
agents or the unlawful destruction of property', and other legal
provisions that barred visas to those seeking to overthrow a Government
228
recognised by the United States.
On one occasion these criteria were held to be sufficient to
refuse entry to four delegates who had been associated with the IRA to a
229
conference on Irish affairs. On another they appeared to provide the 
basis for denying entrance to the US to Joe Cahill, and it was perhaps 
this instance which best illustrated the political mechanics of American 
counter measures. On 2 September 1971, Cahill, with a valid visa, landed 
in New York on an Aer Lingus flight but was met off the aircraft by 
police and detained. His visa was revoked —  according to his lawyer this
223
Guardian, 2 September 1971, and as reported in the Daily Telegraph,
29 April 1975. For brief background on Cahill see note 23 this chapter.
224 /
As reported in the Daily Telegraphs 29 April 1975. (Maire Drumm
was then, April 1975, Vice-President of Provisional Sinn Fein; since 
murdered).
225
ibid., (Keenan was a leading Londonderry Provisional with a long 
IRA record).
226
ibid., and Daily Telegraph, 5 March 1975. These appear to represent 
two separate occasions on which Loughran, an organiser for Provisional 
Sinn Fein in Ulster, was unsuccessful in his attempts to travel to the 
United States.
227
ibid., see note 33 this chapter for brief background.
228
This latter criterion was attributed to an official of the State 
Department (New York Times, 23 August 1975).
229 ....
ibid.
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had been effected while he was in midair — and he remained under 
guard at an immigration office until his return co Dublin a week 
later.
According to a State Department official, Cahill had been seized
231
on 'information made available by the British Government1. This
confirmed an earlier report of a dossier on Cahill having been passed
from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) via the British Embassy
in Washington, to the State Department, and which also carried his
pre-departure statement that his Provisionals intended to shoot as
many British soldiers as possible and would continue the bombing of
232
military and economic targets. An FCO spokesman was quoted as
233
saying 'It was left up to them [US authorities] to take a decision.'
Obviously they did. It was therefore surprising that the FCO having
admitted that it instructed the British Embassy to act in the way
described, should then issue a strenuous denial of any suggestion that
234
Cahill was barred on the advice of the British Government.
In the second major area of US Government activity, control,
NORAID was the primary focus of attention. Under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938 (administered by the Department of Justice),
NORAID was required, as the agent of a foreign principal, to furnish from
21 January 1971 and at six-monthly intervals thereafter,'returns of its
235
financial activities. With the advent of an inquiry in Texas into
gun-running by five Irish-born residents of the New York area, NORAID
once again became the subject of a Federal investigation when it was
forced, as a result of a move intiated in July 1972, to open its books
236
for examination by the FBI. Although this action revealed that NORAID
230
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1979.
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was keeping a 'reasonably accurate' record of their transactions, the
suspicion remained in Justice Department circles that it was an
organisation run by people who 'just can't treat straight with any
237
•government', and, accordingly, a watching brief was maintained.
But it was in the third area of US Government activity —  that 
of prosecution -  that the support network was subject to the greatest 
pressure. The first cases came before the courts in mid 1972, and
1973 some twenty convictions of persons with 'Republican connections'
had been obtained from the numerous gun-running suits brought in the
238
intervening period. To some commentators this was typical of a
Nix-onian zeal for 'ferreting out subversives' but the evidence in
239
support of their claim was neither substantial nor conclusive.
To a considerable extent it rested upon a notorious case, begun
in June 1972 —  that of the 'Fort Worth Five' —  which became a cause
celebre both in Irish-American and US civil rights circles. From the
viewpoint of the former, it derived its prominence from the issue of
the supply of arms and ammunitions to the IRA; from the latter, both
the constitutional and civil rights questions it gave rise to by the
defendants' pleading the Fifth Amendment (in refusing to testify), and
the fact that they were New Yorkers who had been summoned to appear bsfore
a Grand Jury in far-off Texas which was investigating the purchase of
240
weapons in Texas and Mexico to be smuggled to the IRA.
Two of the men, Daniel Crawford and Matthias Reilly, were British 
citizens —  Catholics from Northern Ireland. The others, Kenneth
241
Tierney, Thomas Laffey and Paschal Morohan, were naturalised Americans.
All five claimed to be mystified by the summons since, reportedly, they
237
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House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 894, 26 June 1975, col.215, 
(Minister of State for Northern Ireland, Stanley Orme, in written reply 
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had never been to Texas before, though all were supporters of the IRA
242
cause. They were promised immunity from future prosecution if they
answered questions of the Grand Jury, meeting in secret. They
declined, however, on the grounds that this immunity would not protect
them from being extradited by the British Government and charged in
243
the UK, if the proceedings should be 'leaked'. They were also
suspicious that the US Department of Justice was in relaity acting
against them on information received from London —  a charge which v/as
244
also made on several occasions by Senator Edward Kennedy.
The Five's suspicions on this point were strengthened by the case
of James O'Gara, who, in February 1972, had been indicted on charges
of conspiring to export arms to Ireland. Seven alleged co-conspirators —
including Crawford, Reilly and Morohan —  were named in company with
O'Gara but charges against all seven were dismissed. Nevertheless, two
of them, James Lagan and Frank Henry, both stewards on the Cunard liner
QE II, were arrested by British authorities when they reached Britain
245
and charged with arms offences. Among the Grand Jury questions which 
the Fort Worth Five refused to answer were several concerning O'Gara, 
who was then awaiting sentence.^ ^
At the end of 1972 the Five were released on bail pending an
appeal against their imprisonment to the Supreme Court. In January 1973,
this body decided that it would not rule on the case and they were
247
promptly returned to jail. There then followed new appeals on
different grounds through various Federal Courts with the case once more
248
returning to the Supreme Court, but all were in vain.
/1lew York Times, 17 July 1972; and Times, 1 August 1972.
Times, 1 August 1972.
Daily Telegraph, 3 August 1972; and New York Times, 4 August 1972.
Observer Foreign News Service, 7 August 1973, p. 2.
Times, \ August 1972.
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Although Department of Justice officials maintained that the
Fort Worth case was an on-going investigation, by August 1973 (i.e.
10 months after the Grand Jury first sat), not one witness had been
called. The prospect therefore remained that, if at the end of that
Grand Jury's eighteen-month life the Five again refused to testify
249
before its successor, they could be kept in prison indefinitely.
In the event, their silence was maintained, and although they remained
250
accused of contempt of court, they were once again released. In 
all it was by far the most striking example of the pressure which was 
available to the Federal Government, but because it was a case in 
isolation it is difficult now to see it as part of a pattern of 
systematic harassment on the part of the authorities. Similar cases 
simply did not occur.
This may have been a consequence of the controversy which the
Fort Worth Five attracted. Kennedy's denunciations, based on principles
of civil rights and legal justice, were sustained and trenchant, as v/ere
those of a number of lesser-known federal politicians. His and their
concern came to be expressed institutionally, in the form of a
Congressional sub-committee, established in March 1973, in response to
a resolution by Congressman Bella Azbug, which questioned whether the
aims of the Department of Justice could have been satisfied by a Grand
251
Jury investigation closer to the homes of those summoned.
Furthermore, support for the Five was extended not just from the
political arena, which may have been predictable given the issues and
the burgeoning scandal of Watergate: it came, albeit briefly, from
liberal American circles in general, ethnic communities such as the Jews,
252
who had previously shown no interest in the issues of Northern Ireland,
and organisations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the
253
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights.
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Notwithstanding these developments, the basic questions of
whether the Fort Worth case was to be explained in terms of a British
request or Nixon's anti-subversive zealotry, remained unanswered. At
the sub-committee hearings both suggestions were aired, but then they,
particularly the former, had been current in the media throughout the
duration of the Grand Jury inquiry. Moreover, Clark's suggestion that
the inquiry and other counter-measures grew out of the Heath-Nixon
254
meeting in Bermuda in December 1971 must be viewed with caution: 
if it was so conceived the questions remain as to why it took Nixon's 
Administration six months to act and why he should choose to do so in 
the lead-up to a Presidential election in which the opposition had 
pronounced 'Irish' sympathies. And this begs the question of whether 
Heath, who v/as at that time not particularly active on Northern Ireland, 
and Nixon, whose specific purpose in Bermuda was to explain and 
co-ordinate the evolution of new developments in American foreign policy, 
especially v/ith regard to China, could have been expected to give other 
than the briefest attention to Northern Ireland.
Insofar as Nixon's alleged animus towards the support network 
was concerned, this, too, is dependent on material which, if it exists, 
has yet to be released. But, from the vantage point of 1980, how 
credible is the suggestion that Nixon, increasingly beleagured on the 
domestic front, and v/el1-occupied internationally with the run-down of 
the war in Indo-China, was so concerned with the troubles of Ulster that 
he would issue more than a directive that the relevant government agencies 
v/ere to take a stronger enforcement role with regard to the support 
netv/ork's possible breaches of the law? In this regard it was significant 
that NORAID was compelled to begin filing its financial records with the 
Department of Justice some five months before the Bermuda meeting.
And finally, it is not possible that the treatment accorded to the 
support network resembled harassment principally because, unlike various 
other movements and regimes of questionable legitimacy and equally 
questionable aims, the IRA was not regarded as a 'favoured faction' in 
Washington and so its sympathisers perceived themselves as persecuted?
ibid., p. 63.
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This theme, essentially derived from a sense of government inconsistency,
was elaborated upon by Clark with respect to NORAID end its
255
auxiliaries- but was not peculiar to him. Indeed, it might be 
recalled that it was a major premise of Kennedy's earlier argument for 
US intervention.
Nevertheless, it must be allowed that the British (like the 
Irish) Government was in accord with the general tone of the US 
Government's response between 1972 and 1975. Moreover, it seems not 
unreasonable to presume that the unseen hand of British diplomacy was 
responsible in substantial measure for guiding its probes. From this 
it is but a short step to the obvious conclusion that Washington did at
times act in a way which it may not have done without London's
256
prompting.
This, however, should not obscure the nature of the Ulster Question 
in Anglo-American relations, nor, in the wider frame, the extent of 
what is here termed the 'American Dimension'. As an issue between the 
Governments of Britain, Ireland and the United States the Ulster Question 
was of no great moment, despite the fact that it was, and remains, of 
great significance for Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Britain. Further­
more, from the analysis of the conditions which attended their relation­
ships, it was clear that this situation was dependent almost exclusively
255
ibid., pp. 64-5.
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An attempt to inquire further into this matter using official US 
documents relating to the Fort Worth Five and another group (The Baltimore 
Four) came to nothing —  as indicated by the following excerpt from a 
letter to the writer from the Assistant to the Director (Disclosure), 
Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 
dated 12 December 1979:
The records concerning the 'Fort Worth Five', and 'Baltimore 
Four' constitute a request under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA). Our records have been reviewed; however, the material 
is being withheld because of the following exemptions pursuant 
to the Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. 552: 1) disclosure 
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal property 
(b) (7) (C); 2) the material would disclose the identity of a 
confidential source (b) (7) (D); and 3) the records contain 
surveillance and investigative documents which would interfere 
with enforcement proceedings (b) (7) (E).
In addition, the records contain information outside the scope 
of your request and records from other agencies which we are not 
at liberty to disclose.
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on the attitude of Washington: with the Administration there 
uninterested, only the interest of British Government, with its 
perennial claim that Northern Ireland is a domestic matter, was served. 
With Washington interested, the possibility at least, existed for the 
province to loom larger in the trans-Atlantic diplomatic traffic.
But this possibility was remote. It required, as a prerequisite, 
a groundswell of domestic opinion urging US intervention. Instead, 
all that emerged was a support network —  small and isolated, within 
the country in general and the Irish-American community in particular —  
and an outspoken but relatively powerless domestic political voice.
Neither proved able to influence the US Government (or the situation 
in Northern Ireland) in other than a negative way. Both highlighted the 
essentially transnational character of the American Dimension, with the 
former being by far the more important. Yet, and here was an irony of 
the situation, the deeds of the support network achieved this status 
only because of the correleation between the smallness of the conflict 
in Northern Ireland and the smallness of the aid it was able to donate.
Had the conflict been on a truly large international scale, or had the 
support netv/ork claimed the active sympathy of the majority of Irish- 
Americans, the equations of Anglo-American and Irish-American relations 
must have been inapplicable.
Because these conditions did not arise, the scope allowed to 
each grouping of actors v/as just enough to bring into play the 'crusaders, 
criminals and crazies' which, it is submitted, colour so much of the 
period between 1968 and early 1976. In all, it was a baleful 
reflection upon those who, in the 1916 Declaration of Independence, were 
honoured for past generosity and looked towards with hope, as Ireland's 
'exiled children of America'.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Th e Am e r i c a n  D i m e n s i o n
Pa r t II : B e n e v o l e n t  B y s t a n d e r s
March 1976 -November 1980
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Just before the Democratic Primary in New York in 1976, a
presidential hopeful by the name of Jimmy Carter marched in that city's
St Patrick's Day parade with a button on his lapel reading 'Get Britain
Out of Ireland' (or words to that effect).1 Seven months later, as the
Democratic candidate, he appeared before members of the Irish National
Caucus at the Hilton Hotel in Pittsburgh, and told them that his party
2
was committed to 'encouranging a formation of a uniting Ireland'.
He also told them 'I do not disavow my own Irish heritage' and that it 
was a mistake for the US Government 'to stand idle' on the question of
3
Ireland. And finally, in a reflection of one of his major concerns 
Carter announced that he had just met with Cardinal Cook in New York 
and discussed the need to establish a Commission on International Peace
4
to pursue the concept of our country's standing firm for human rights'.
Despite the fact that he beat a somewhat undignified retreat from 
these positions in so far as they concerned Ireland the 
sequence of events was hardly an auspicious omen for a twelve-month 
period in 1976-77, punctuated by the celebrations of two St Patrick's Days, 
which was to be a watershed as far as the American Dimension was concerned. 
The man who was to become the thirty-ninth President of the United States 
had not only risked giving encouragement to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
by his election gambits, but may even have lent it respectability by his 
appearance with an organisation that v/as founded to further its aims via 
American political channels. Carter thus raised doubts and apprehensions 
at all levels in Belfast, Dublin and London as to what his intentions
Guardian, 29 October 1976; and New York Times, 31 August 1977, p. A6.
2
According to the Guardian, 29 October 1976, he used the expression 
yunited Ireland'; however, Sean Cronin, in an article in the Irish Times 
of this period, for which the writer has no specific date, entitled 
'Election Dairy: What Carter Said That Day In Pittsburg', claimed that a 
close examination of the tapes he recorded revealed that Carter said 
'uniting'. In view of Cronin's close and sustained interest in such matters 
his account has been preferred.
ibi d . 
ibid.
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might be in office, and above all, his sense of responsibility.
Nevertheless, the following year gave rise to developments which were 
to dull these feelings, and the period thereafter saw an initiative by 
Carter which probably dissipated them.
In order to understand this transformation, it is necessary to 
consider,first, the.standing and effectiveness of the Northern Ireland 
support network in the US after early 1976. In so far as the supply of 
arms was concerned, the record confirms the optimistic assessment given 
in 1977 by the US Ambassador to the Court of St James, Kingman Brewster,
0
that it was on the wane. An IRA claim, inspired it seems by low-grade 
science fiction, that it had shot down a British Army Air Corps Gazelle 
helicopter using a US-made M-60 machine gun firing 'specially developed 
magnetic bullets' was almost certainly a fabrication.7 About the only 
shred of truth in it was that the IRA was in possession of a small 
number of belt-fed M-60s, which it is now generally believed, were
g
stolen from a National Guard armoury in Danvers, Massachusetts. Exactly 
who stole them and how they were obtained is not clear. In any case, the 
possession of this weapon, a somewhat cumbersome one for the urban type 
of operations the IRA conducts, and the acquisition of useful field aids,
9
such as stolen US Army electronic binoculars, should not obscure the 
fact that, by September 1979, American-made arms comprised only twenty- 
three per cent of arms recovered by the security forces in Northern 
Ireland —  down from approximately thirty per cent in 1 9 7 5 . ^
Financial support, as reflected in the bi-annual returns of the Irish 
Northern Aid Committee (NORAID), and set out in the following table, was 
also diminished. The figures cited, however, are subject to the same
5
ibid., see also the following reports: Financial Times, 29 October 
1976; Times, 29 October 1976; and Christian Science Monitor (Weekly 
International Edition), 8 November 1976.
C
Irish Times, 21 June 1977.
Flight International, 18 March 1978, p. 756. The helicopter in 
question crashed close to the village of Jonesboro, Co. Armagh, in 
February 1978, killing the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, Royal 
Green Jackets, Lieutenant Colonel Corden-Lloyd.
g
Irish Times, 21 September 1978.
9
Guardian Weekly, 19 October 1980, p. 6.
^  i.e. approximately 2,300 of 10,000 weapons were said to be of US 
manufacture (International Herald Tribune, 25 September 1979, p.3.
See also Chapter 10, pp. 403-06).
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IRISH N O R T H E R N  AID C O M M I T T E E  
RE P O R T E D  DETAILS OF F I N A N C I A L  U N D E R T A K I N G S 11 
(All amounts in US Dollars)
Six m o n t h  
p e r i o d  e n d e d :
Income E xp e n d i t u r e
D i s b u r s e m e n t s  
to N.I. Surplus
29 July 1971 no i n f o r m a t i o n 4,575 11,500 no t  k n o w n
29 January 1972 no i n f o r m a t i o n 1 2,738 128,099 n o t  k nown
29 July 1972 no i n f o r m a t i o n 25,440 312,700 n o t  k nown
29 Jan u a r y 1973 17 2 , 0 0 0 41,388 150,438 - 1 9,826
29 July 1973 159,617 19,581 121,723 18,313
29 J a nuary 1974 129,968 10,826 99,966 19,1 7 6
29 July 1974 1 21,822 8,193 110,833 2,796
29 J anuary 1975 115,522 11,620 102,648 1,254
29 July 1975 130,852 44,472 70,977 15,403
29 January 1976 no inf o r m a t i o n 24,955 64,205 n ot k n own
4inimum Six year total $829,781 $203,788 $1,173,089 $56,942
29 July 1976 80,201 20,278 55,500 4,423
31 January 1977 81,262 12,342 48,000 20,920
29 July 1977 84,017 12,914 60,115 10,988
29 January 1978 68,713 11, 9 8 5 39,000 17,728
29 July 1978 84,091 19,179 73,857 8,945
29 J a nuary 1979 83,417 17,672 59,200 6,545
31 July 1979 74,550 21,653 61,616 -8,719
31 January 1980 140,074 15,625 105,230 19,219
F’our Year T o tal 696,325 131,648 502,518 80,049
minimum Ten Year Total 1 ,526,106 33 5 , 4 3 6 1,675,607 136,991
Irish Northern Aid Committee, Registration No. 2239, two public files . 
designated Section I and Section II respectively, held by the US Department 
of Justice at the Federal Triangle Building, 315 9th Street, Washington, D.C., 
(hereafter cited as US Department of Justice, NORAID files). The figures for 
31 July 1979 and 31 January 1980 v/ere supplied by letter from Brian K. Ahearn, 
Attorney, Registration- Unit, Internal Security Section, Criminal Division,
US Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 5 September 1980.
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qualifications and reservations which v/ere made in respect of NORAID's 
returns in the preceding chapter.
In general, the levels of both income and disbursement had fallen
av/ay from those of pre-1976. The only exception was that recorded in
the 31 Janaury 1980 return: this showed a massive swing back and v/as
widely attributed to the criminally perverse power of 'blood-in-the-
streets' ('spectaculars'), in particular the murder of Lord Mountbatten
and the killing of eighteen British soldiers at Warrenpoint, Co. Down,
in the preceding August, to loosen the purse strings of Irish-Americans
12
sympathetic to the Provisional cause.
In other respects, too, it v/as apparent that the support network
was faced with a lack of interest. In September 1978, Teddy Gleason,
a Vice-President of the Irish National Caucus, and President of the
International Longshoremen's Association, called for a world-wide boycott
of British goods in support of demands being made by four relatives of
13
Irish prisoners in Long Kesh (Her Majesty's Prison, The Maze).
Despite the fact that Gleason expected full support for the measure 
from the, Executive of the American Federation of Labor —  Congress of 
Industrial Organisations, seven of whom were first generation Irish- 
Americans, British commerce was not endangered. This should not have 
been a surprise to anyone, least of all to Gleason: he had, it will 
be recalled, disavowed boycotts in 1975 as being unlikely to either save 
lives in Ulster or bring the sides to the bargaining table (see Chapter 
10, pp. 408 ).
Furthermore, when American intervention from those associated with 
the network became more direct, lack of interest at home v/as replaced by 
hostility in Northern Ireland. Thus in 1978, the Deputy Leader of the 
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), John Hume, denounced the 
American Ancient Order of Hibernians for their crude attempts to sabotage 
US investment initiatives. According to him, there was evidence that the 
latter, under the sway of some of its leadership who sympathised with the
Interview (in 1979) with former member of Embassy of Ireland, 
Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited in this chapter as Interview).
Irish Times3 28 September 1978.
458
IRA, had resorted to suggesting that, in general, there should be no
American investment in the North as this would result mainly in
Protestant employment, and that one US company in particular should
be 'concerned about the possible safety of its plant1. As Hume was
quick to observe, the notion that a lack of investment would somehow
contribute to political change was not only 'misguided', but also
difficult to reconcile with the Hibernians' recent resolution at a
conference in Killarney which purported to offer friendship to
14
Protestants.
Overall, the situation in the US could be attributed to five
factors although their relative weight may be difficult to ascertain.
The first and most obvious of these was political developments, or
rather their lack, in Northern Ireland. The Ulster Workers Council
Strike in 1974 gave birth to a political stalemate which effectively
remains to this day. Furthermore it was followed by a decrease in
the level of violence (as- compared with the early 1970s). In combination
they served to deprive the support network of what Clark termed 'the
15
energizing effect [of] constant headlines.'
The second, also a Northern Ireland factor, compounded the effect
noted above. This v/as the erosion of support by conservative Irish-
Americans as a consequence of their increasing awareness of the IRA's
socialist orientation —  evidenced by its assassination campaign against
16
Northern businessmen. The third and fourth were internal circumstances. 
Weariness from years of activity had so sapped the movement that much of 
it, even before 1976, was pervaded by apathy.17 And it now appears that, 
by 1979 at the latest, a breach had developed between NORAID and the 
Irish National Caucus as a result of personality clashes and a conflict 
over which group was to provide the leadership for Irish-American
Irish Times} 3 July 1978.
15
Dennis J. Clark, Irish Blood: Northern Ireland and the American 
Conscience (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat, 1977), p. 69 (hereafter 
cited as Clark, Irish Blood).
16
Conor O'Clery, 'US Is Watching Provisional Fund-Raising', Mo.2 of a 
series entitled Report from Washington, Irish Times3 19 January 1978.
1 'Clark, Irish Blood3 p. 69.
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Fifth, the network and those associated with it were out of touch
with the prevailing mood which, from March 1976, and in both Northern
Ireland and the US, embodied a firm rejection of violence, and hence
of the Provisionals. In the former it rose from the courageous stand
taken by the Peace People and the promise and inspiration they
19provided across the sectarian divide. To many around the world, 
accustomed to being informed only of the carnage which was sweeping 
Northern Ireland, they were the best hope for a solution that had 
emerged in eight years of conflict.
But in the US the mood had begun to change even before the Peace 
People mounted their first campaign in August 1976. At the highest level 
it found expression on St Patrick's Day 1976, in the joint communique 
which was issued following discussions in Washington between Taoiseach 
Liam Cosgrave and President Gerald Ford. For the first time, such a 
document contained a condemnation of violence and an appeal to the
20American and Irish People to refrain from supporting it in any way.
It was an announcement which, despite the fact that Ford, a Republican, 
had only some ten months remaining to serve, signalled the advent both 
of an American Government more interested in Northern Ireland, and of a 
more responsible American public attitude towards the troubles it 
contained. This did not mean that the support network was cowed in the
18supporters of the Provisionals.
International Herald Tribune, 8-9 September 1979, p. 1; and Interview 
(in 1979) at Consulate-General for Ireland, New York.
19
An organisation, composed mainly of women founded in 1976 and 
generally associated in the public eye with the work of Betty Williams 
and Mairead Corrigan, who introduced a note of hope, based on Christian 
love and tolerance, into the otherwise violent atmosphere of Northern 
Ireland. In 1977, Corrigan and Williams were recognised by the award of 
the Nobel Peace Prize for the preceding year. It should be noted, however, 
that the Movement had, by 31 March 1978, received only £900 in donations 
from the US (daily Telegraph, 24 April 1978). See also Dairy O'Donnell,
The Peace People of Northern Ireland (Camberwell, Victoria, Australia: 
Widescope, 1977).
20
'Communique by the President of the United States and Prime Minister 
of Ireland, following discussions held in Washington, D.C., March 17,
1976', issued by the Office of the White House Press Secretary, 18 March
1976.
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period under review, or that the politicians sympathetic to it were
21any less vociferous. However it was clear that a significant trans­
formation which was being wrought in the political party to which most 
Irish-Americans owed their allegiance, and in particular, to the 
attitudes of four of its most prominent and powerful leaders.
In view of Carter's statements in 1976 the Democrats had more 
ground to make up if they were to appear responsibly interested in 
Northern Ireland. To some it appeared that, with their platform 
plank, they had missed the mark completely, or at least over-stated 
US interest.
The voice of the United States should be heard in 
Northern Ireland against violence and terror, against 
the discrimination, repression and deprivation which 
brought about the civil strife, and for the efforts 
of the parties toward a peaceful resolution of the 
future of Northern Ireland. Pertinent alliances such as 
Nato and international organizations such as the United 
Nations should be fully apprised of the interests of the 
United States with respect to the status of Ireland in 
the international community of nations.22
This however,, was to be considered in light of both a report that
the Democrats were, earlier in 1976, on the point of coming out for a
23united Ireland but deleted it at the last minute, and a close reading 
of the eventual document which revealed that it committed a Democratic 
Administration to no particular course of action. It appears that this 
occurred because Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan almost persuaded the 
party's drafting subcommittee that an expression in favour of Irish 
unity was not only desirable but necessary. According to the Guardian's 
Jonathon Steele, it was intended as an incentive to the predominantly
21
Nor were a small number only less stupid. One Congressman, Thomas 
J. O'Donnell, put down an amendment in Washington, that if passed, would 
have allowed Ireland to become the 51st State in the Union. According 
to this scheme, Ireland would then be freed of 'the Protestant-Catholic 
violence that has wracked that country' (Irish Times3 23 September 1978),
As cited in the Times3 29 October 1976.
23
Guardian} 29 October 1976. The G u a r d ia n 15 June 1976, carried a 
report of the same plank as cited in the foregoing except that after 
'... future of Northern Ireland' was inserted 'The US should encourage 
the formation of a United Ireland'.
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northern states' Irish lobby —  as represented by Chicago's Mayor 
Richard Daley —  to throw its weight behind southerner Jimmy Carter.
It was therefore a declaration without a great deal of meaning 
beyond the immediate concerns of internal Democratic Party politics.
And this was made explicit at the time. In so far as John 
Gilligan, secretary of the drafting subcommittee was concerned, the 
'United Ireland' plank 'border[ed] on the impossible' and was no more 
than:
... a ceremonial bow in the direction of a constituency 
in the party with no real intent to influence foreign
policy.24
Additionally, the Democrats' policy should be seen in conjunction
with a subsequent report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by
former Presidential hopeful, Senator George S. McGovern (Democrat, South
25Dakota), based on his July 1977 visit to Ireland. Although it took 
place outside the March 1976 —  March 1977 period here under discussion, 
it is included as a further illustration of the general trend among 
Democratic leaders. In tenor it was a long way from his April 1972 
statement supporting Senator Edward Kennedy's resolution calling for the 
immediate withdrawal of British troops and the eventual unification of
t -« i 26Ireland.
Even a brief historical summary demonstrates that the 
conflict in Northern Ireland is far older than the 1921 
partition of the country and contains far more complexities 
than can be conveyed by a short description of today's 
divisions. I emphasize that lest anyone conclude that the 
United States can simply assess the current situation, apply 
special diplomatic and managerial skills, and somehow arrive 
at the miraculous solution that has escaped the British and 
the Irish themselves ...
Guardian, 15 June 1976.
25
Ireland In 1977: A Report by Senator George S. McGovern to the 
Committee On Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: 
US Government Printing Office, 1977), hereafter cited as McGovern,
Ireland In 1977.
Daily Telegraph, 27 April 1972.
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Perhaps there are ways v/e can help. But there are 
dangers, too. From a distance, we may tend to 
romanticize the struggle, to discount the costs and 
perils, and to begin with our own conclusions about 
what the ultimate shape of Ireland should be. Well- 
meaning people can easily harm those they intend to 
help. Our first obligation, then, is far more basic —  
to recognize that the role of the United States and 
of concerned Americans can only be constructive if it 
is limited, cautious, and based upon the fullest 
possible understanding of the nature of the struggle.27
Accordingly, its recommendations reflected these same criteria. 
They were limited to denying support to any 'extremist or terrorist 
groups', encouraging the British and Irish Governments in their 
respective initiatives, having the US assist in the economic 
reconstruction of Northern Ireland when a new government was established
and offering encouragement to the leaders of both communities in their
28pursuit of a peaceful solution. Thus, it seems reason able to assume 
that, in this time, a certain caution prevailed over previous counsels 
which would have been self-defeating in terms of the responses they 
would undoubtedly have generated in the North.
Any doubt that this was so was dispelled on 17 March 1977 by the 
collective action of Governor of New York, Hugh Carey; Senator 
Edward Kennedy, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Speaker Thomas 
P. ('Tip') O'Neill — known popularly by the appel lation they were given in 
the New York Times, 'The Four Horsemen'. To their stand they brought 
two essential traits: they were powerful enough in their own right not 
only to command the attention of Irish-America, but also, it seems, to 
sway a President. On the day in question they broke the long and 
unbecoming silence of US political figures about the money that their 
fellow countrymen were sending to the IRA, and called upon them
... in a spirit of compassion ... to renounce any action 
that promotes the current violence or provides support or 
encouragement for organizations engaged in violence.29
McGovern, Ireland In 19773 pp. 21-2. 
ibid., pp. 23-4.
29
Text of Joint St Patrick's Day Appeal For Peace In Northern Ireland, 
supplied by Senator Kennedy's office, Washington, D.C.
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Kennedy was later to admit that the condemnation of violence 
was not an easy thing to do. As he told Mary Holland in 1977:
There's still considerable support in our community for 
the traditional line of thinking on Ireland, which is 
to get the British out.3®
For that reason it is tempting to look for ulterior motives or
external pressures or influences being brought to bear upon the Four
Horsemen by the British or Irish Governments but there was, and remains,
no suggestion that this was the case. Although Kennedy's office
maintained a practice of almost daily contact with the Embassy of
Ireland in Washinqton, D.C., and the Senator was regarded as being
31exceptionally wel1-briefed on Northern Ireland, the Irish Government 
was not aware that any announcement was pending until its Minister
32
for Foreign Affairs, Garret Fitzgerald, arrived in the US on 16 March.
Notwithstanding this, it would be unjust not to recognise that the 
joint statement was testimony to John Hume's profound influence upon the
attitudes of leading Americans. Indeed, this debt was confirmed by
33Kennedy, and acknowledged by O'Neill, who, in 1979, spoke on behalf
of Hume in his successful campaign for election to the European
34
Pariiament.
In the interim the Four Horsemen had undertaken what could best be 
described as an 'offensive against aid' which, in the months following 
their original announcement, increased in momentum. In part this was 
forced upon them by the persistence of the congressional lobby which 
had formed around Mario Biaggi and sought to counter developments which
'Interview —  Edward Kennedy', conducted by Mary Holland, Magill, 
vol. 1, No. 1, October 1977, p. 6 (hereafter cited as Kennedy Interview, 
Magill, October 1977).
Interview.
32 Interview with Dr Garret Fitzgerald, former Minister for Foreign 
Affairs (1973-77) and Leader of Fine Gael, Dublin, 14 February 1978.
33 Kennedy Interview, Magill, October 1977, p. 6; and David McKittrick, 
'Horsemen of the Irish Apocalypse', Irish Times, 6 September 1979, p. 10.
Interview.
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were eroding its self-acclaimed position as the voice of Americans
concerned with Ireland. Thus, on the day before Kennedy and the
others made their plea, twenty members of the House of Representatives,
led on this occasion by Lester Wolff, joined in urging American
recognition of human rights in Northern Ireland, and called for
35Congressional hearings to focus on the situation. There was nothing 
new in this proposal nor in those who put it forward, but it served to 
illustrate what was to become a familiar pattern. The Biaggi (and 
Wolff) lobbyists v/ere not about to cede ground gracefully, or at all 
if they could prevent it, to the forces which 17 March 1977 had ushered 
in. The result was that major statements or initiatives by Kennedy and 
his associates were nearly alv/ays accompanied by an alternative or 
pre-emptive action by Biaggi and his colleagues.
But some of these initiatives by Carey, Kennedy, Moynihan and 
O'Neill were difficult acts to follow. At the Ireland Fund Dinner in 
New York on 18 May 1977, the distance that Kennedy had travelled since 
his Senate Resolution 180 in 1971 v/as demonstrated most eloquently. In 
the language of a sermon he addressed his remarks to 'the violence of 
both sides, Protestant as well as Catholic, UDA [Ulster Defence 
Association] as well as IRA.' He called on Americans to 'pray for the 
patience and wisdom and understanding needed to make the [search for 
peace] effective' and to this end offered his audience the wisdom of 
Yeats, who understood that it might come by 'slow and painful steps'.
I shall have some peace there, for 
peace comes dropping slow,
Dropping from the veils of the 
morning where the crickets sing.36
Kennedy's conciliatory attitude was further to the fore in the 
following July when he spoke out on behalf of Northern Ireland's 
Protestants and stressed that Irish-Americans should consider their 
interests as well as those of the Catholics, with whom they tended to 
identify almost exclusively.
Irish Times3 17 March 1977, p. 5.
(United States) Congressional Record3 20 May 1977, p. S8247. The 
quotation is from The Lake Isle of Innisfree.
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In this sensitive period it is important for Irish 
Americans in the United States to do what we can to 
reassure the Protestants in Northern Ireland that they 
have nothing to fear from the Irish American community, 
and that we are concerned to reach a settlement that 
respects their basic rights as we are to secure the 
basic rights of the members of the Catholic community.37
As a token of his personal commitment in this matter he commissioned 
the Library of Congress to conduct research into, and publish a small 
paper on the 'Protestant Irish Heritage in America', the point of 
which, he claimed, was to 'demonstrate the goodwill of Irish Americans 
towards the Protestant community in Northern Ireland' by reminding 
them of what the Protestant Irish contribution had been to the
oo
development of the United States.
For those with a sense of recent history, Edward Moore Kennedy's
endeavours were not without precedent. His attempt to 'build bridges
39out to the [Protestants]' was, perhaps, 1960 writ small. Then,
his brother John v/ent to Houston to tell a meeting of Protestant
ministers - and the nation —  that they had nothing to fear from a Roman
Catholic President. In 1977, Edward was similarly attempting nothing
less than a radical re-orientation —  but of the Catholic Irish in
America and the Protestant Irish in the North. In both, as David Murray
observed, the intention was to give a 'decent burial' to the notion that
members of a particular ethnic/religious community owed their allegiance
40to that community above all else. John Kennedy, almost certainly, 
enjoyed a considerable measure of success v/hereas the verdict on Edward, 
who faced what was probably a far more sceptical audience across the 
Atlantic, has yet to be returned.
Even then it may prove difficult to distinguish from the overall 
Protestant reaction to the most significant development promoted by an
London Sunday Telegraphy 31 July 1977.
38
Wellington (N.Z.) Evening Post 18 August 1977; see also Kennedy 
Interview, Magill> October 1977, p. 7.
39 Kennedy Interview, Magills October 1977, p. 7.
40 David Murray, 'An Irish-American Political Shibboleth Is Laid to 
Rest1, New York Timess 13 August 1977.
American Administration in response to the partition of Ireland. This 
was, of course, what is now known as the Carter Initiative. In time it may 
come to be seen only as a curiousity, thrown up because of a fortuitous 
conjunction of circumstances which may have ceased to exist with 
Jimmy Carter's departure from office, and with him, the President's 
concern not to unnecessarily antagonise two of the most powerful 
Democratic politicians in the US. Nevertheless, between August 1977, 
when it was first announced, and November 1980, when Carter was defeated 
at the polls, it existed; the only official declaration by a President 
of the United States of an active interest by his country in Northern 
Ireland.
The genesis of the Carter Initiative is therefore deserving of 
attention. Clearly, it was mixed. Many saw in it the President's own 
concern for human rights throughout the world in general, and Northern 
Ireland in particular, 1 and by extension, a concern for the eventual 
settlement of the Ulster Question. These who favoured this explanation 
could point to the fact that, long before the initiative was bruited, 
at a time when Carter was President-elect, the State Department had 
given ample forewarning of a likely change in the expectations of the 
US Government. In a little-publicised report to the House of Commons, 
Stanley Orme, Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office, 
disclosed that he had been informed in Washington that, in return for 
US co-operation in enforcing the law against the Provisional support 
network at home, the British Government would 'have to be seen' to be 
basing its policies on 'partnership and co-operation in Northern
T i 42Ireland .
There are difficulties, however, in extrapolating from this exchange 
to the Carter initiative. For one, Carter was not then President nor, 
therefore, was he in a position to direct a government agency. Furthermore 
there is no evidence that he acted in a manner consistent with the State 
Department's warning to Orme, or even that the State Department repeated 
its warning to the British Government, until the advent of the initiative
466
HI -
Times, 3 March 1977, and Observer, 6 March 1977.
42
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 903,
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in the summer of 1977. On the contrary, the most reliable reports on 
this development are consistent with one another in attributing the 
initiative to sources outside the White House.
By far the greatest motivating force seems to have been provided
by those whose interests in the issue were either longer established or
more sectional (or both) than the President's. Foremost among these
was John Hume who, at the time of the St Patrick's Day announcement,
met individually with Carey, Kennedy and O'Neill, and suggested a
Presidential initiative on Northern Ireland which would involve the US
in a statement of support for power-sharing and a promise of massive
aid to follow a settlement.^3 All three apparently greeted the
proposal with enthusiasm whereupon a meeting was arranged, through
O'Neill's agency, with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and his deputy,
44Mathew Nimetz, on 9 June 1977. At this, two major components were
agreed upon: first, a draft was to be drawn up and the British and
Irish Governments were to be invited to make their submissions; second,
a figure of $US100 million for reconstruction in the North was suggested
45as an incentive.
Differences were immediately apparent on both, but it was London's
response that was the more hostile. It found in the very idea of a
Presidential statement an abrogation of previous Anglo-American under-
46standings, and in the draft proposal that a role for the Irish
47Government be recognised, an infringement of British sovereignty. It 
also required that whatever statement was issued should include.an 
American endorsement of British policy.^
Conor O'Clery, 'The US Initiative That Fell Flat in Ireland', No.l 
of a series entitled Report from Washington, Irish Times, 18 January 1978, 
p.10 (hereafter cited as O'Clery, Report from Washington, No.l, 18 January
1978.
44 ibid., and Mary Holland, 'Carter, Kennedy and Ireland', Magill, 
vol. 1, No.l, October 1977, p. 3 (hereafter cited as Holland, 'Carter, 
Kennedy and Ireland', Magill, October 1977). Carey was absent from the 
meeting because his aircraft had to return to Mew York with a radar 
problem; Moynihan, however was present.
45
Holland, 'Carter, Kennedy and Ireland', Magill, October 1977, p.4.
46 O'Clery, Report from Washington, No.l, 18 January 1978.
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On the question of US aid for reconstruct!'on, both Dublin and
London v/ere at odds with the draft proposals, but for different reasons.
The former (and Hume) were wary, in the prevailing circumstances, of
49the usefulness of what was, in effect, a 'US hand-out'. (According 
to Mary Holland, this view was partly determined by the view that the 
Republic v/as as deserving a candidate for aid as the North.) It also
objected to the mention of a specific sum being promised but leaned
50towards the notion of investment.
Britain's reservations had more to do with the implications of
agreeing to the aid proposal. Principally, it found the notion of aid
from the US objectionable —  and the notion of aid with 'strinas attached'
51still more. And, on the domestic political front, it faced the
difficulty of explaining why Northern Ireland would receive such
favoured treatment when the economic plight of parts of Scotland and Wales
52seemed also to justify it. For these reasons, and because aid could
also be presented by Unionist hard-liners as an attempt to bribe the
Northern majority into a political compromise, London was in accord with
53Dublin on the need to encourage investment in Northern Ireland.
What Holland termed the 'distinctly unpromising' circumstances
attending the project were subsequently exacerbated. On 17 June the
National Coalition v/as defeated in the Irish Election, and the State
Department, anxious to maintain cordial relations with Britain, was
prompted to seek a postponement of proceedings until the views of the new
54(Fianna Fail) Government were made known. Perhaps surprisingly, this 
situation was then ameliorated by British intervention —  in particular 
by the newly appointed Ambassador to the United States, Peter Jay. To the
Holland, 'Carter, Kennedy and Ireland', Magill3 October 1977, p.' 4. 
ibid.
52 Interview with William V. Shannon, United States Ambassador to the 
Republic of Ireland, Dublin, 24 April 1978.
53 Holland, 'Carter, Kennedy and Ireland', Magill3 October 1977, p. 4.
54 . .i bi d.
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politics that was described as 'cheerfully pragmatic and little
55influenced by protocol', which, in this case, meant that he saw a
need to support politicians such as the Four Horsemen for having taken
an unpopular and difficult course of action with some of the same
objectives in view as Britain herself. In making this point to the
Foreign Office he was also able to advise it that his information,
based on a recent in-country briefing, was that the St Patrick's Day
56statement had had a beneficial effect in Northern Ireland.
On the American side, Jay's efforts to accommodate proposals
which his Government found unwelcome v/ere matched by an attitude among
the original Irish-American proponents that was uncompromising. It was
also to be, for them, a winning tactic in terms of the eventual statement
which went to Carter for delivery (the President did not see the final
57draft until that time ), but not until, a certain amount of confusion had 
been created, and overcome, as to whether there was any 'initiative' 
at al1 in the wind.
The seeds of such doubt were sowed by 'leaks' of an impending 
American statement v/hich appeared in both the Dublin and London press, and
which served only to fan wild speculation and to place the eventual
58announcement in jeopardy. Probably for this reason, the Carter
Administration denied, in late July, that it v/as planning any such
59 60thing, as did Tip O'Neill. Nor was this wholly untrue —  their
respective denials v/ere made in reference to an 'independent political
initiative' and the possibility of the US becoming 'directly involved' —
stalemate that had developed he reportedly brought an attitude to
55 .. .. ibid.
56 ibid.
O'Clery, Report from Washington, No.l, 18 January 1978.
58 According to O'Clery (cited directly above), Irish officials viewed 
these as being inspired by British sources, but Holland (cited in note 53 
above), makes no reference of this.
59
Irish Times, 25 July 1977.
^  Irish Times3 26 July 1977, p. 6.
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v/hich of course, allowed room for semantic evasion. It was at this
time that an American spokesman saw fit to describe the United States'
interest in Northern Ireland as being that of a 'benevolent 
61bystander', and it was at this point also that scepticism and a sense 
of confusion on the part of observers could be excused.
On the same day, 25 August 1977, in the same newspaper, the 
International Herald Tribune3 and even on the same page, three reports 
were carried which, taken collectively, were baffling. The main article 
was headed 'US Interest in Solution for Ulster Spurs Rumors on an 
Initiative, Aid', and carried the familiar line that the US 'was quietly 
looking for ways in which it might help to end the civil strife in 
Northern Ireland'. It was, in brief, a piece of informed speculation by 
the paper's correspondent, R.W. Apple, Jr., and no different to numerous 
articles which were appearing in this period in Britain and Ireland.
Immediately below this piece, however, was a statement by President 
Carter's chief spokesman, Jody Powell, that reports of US economic aid 
to the North had been 'overplayed'. Since this may have been true, or 
was at least a matter of opinion, it was possible to accept his statement 
as both an admission that something was about to break, and that it 
would be, in his words, 'of a very limited nature'. But it was not 
possible to hold to that position when the White House also claimed, in 
the shortest article of the three, that it knew of no plans to offer US 
economic aid to Northern Ireland. As Powell told another newspaper, 
on the same day, of the suggestions which were current:
There is absolutely nothing to any of that. There is no 
speech. There is no initiative. No draft speeches have 
gone to London or Dublin. The President is aware of no 
American initiatives in this area.^2
On only one of these points could it be said that Powell may not 
have been attempting to mislead the media: as was noted earlier, the 
President is reported by another source as not having received the final
Irish. Times, 25 July 1977.
Timess 25 July 1977, p.l.
471
draft of the statement until just prior to delivery. Whether this 
meant that he was not aware of the consultations and negotiations which 
preceded it is another matter upon which there is no available evidence.
In the following days little was done in the US which would have 
resolved the question beyond doubt. In fact a similar reliance upon 
the imprecision of words, as v/as resorted to in the earlier Administration 
and O'Neill statements,was to be found in the replies the British Foreign 
Secretary, Dr David Owen, gave to questions on the American CBS 
television programme 'Face the Nation'. In his case he was of the 
opinion that the US would not take an 'active role' in the search for a 
solution to the conflict.
Only in Dublin was the 'initiative cat' let almost completely out 
of the bag. In an interview with the Irish Times —  indeed his first 
major statement on foreign policy since taking office —  the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Michael O'Kennedy, stated that he would welcome an 
initiative from President Carter which would help cut off arms supplies 
from the US to Northern Ireland and which v/ould boost industrial develop­
ment both North and South. He v/as, moreover, 'very hopeful' of a
rn
Presidential contribution towards these objectives. In so stating he
foreshadowed an optimism in the potential for American (and European)
65influence which was to mark several of his pronoucements in 1978-79. 
Perhaps he took encouragement from what was actually announced on 31 
August 1977.
In so far as British Government's objections and requirements 
relating to the first component (Presidential statement, role of the 
Irish Government, endorsement of British policies) were concerned, it lost 
out: the first was made; the second recognised; the third avoided.^
Dr Ov/en's remarks v/ere made on the 'Face the Nation' programme of
24 July 1977, and reported in the Irish Times, 26 July 1977, p. 6.
64
Irish Timesj 30 July 1977, p. 1.
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However, it could be classed as a minor success for their representations 
that the wording in respect of the second was changed —  from describing 
the settlement upon which a id/investment v/as conditional as:
a solution involving the British and Irish Government 
and the two communities in Northern Ireland.
to:
a solution that the people in Northern Ireland as well 
as the Governments of Great Britain and Ireland can
support.67
The second component —  aid —  was modified substantially, but this 
was probably to be expected in the light of joint Anglo-Irish 
reservations concerning the original proposal. It was replaced by a 
US commitment, still conditional on a political settlement, as outlined 
in the foregoing:
to join with others to see how additional job-creating 
investment could be encouraged, to the benefit of all 
the people in Northern Ireland.68
Exactly what impact this would have is hard to discern. American
investment in the Six Counties in 1977 already totalled £152 million
from thirty-one different companies and provided employment for one
69person in six in the manufacturing sector. But since the bulk of this 
injection of capital had taken place before the outbreak of the troubles — 
only one new US company was set up in the intervening period —  there 
was a deep uncertainty attached to how, in an incipiently unstable 
situation, new investment by private companies might be effected.
In its other aspects the statement was completely uncontro- 
versial: it echoed the Four Horsemen in denouncing aid to those who 
were engaged in violence and,as though nothing had changed, genuflected
O'Clery, Reporc from Washington, No.l, 18 January 1978.
^  Official Text: Carter Statement.
69
Times, 1 September 1977.
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towards traditional priorities by reaffirming the US Government's 
'policy ... of impartiality1 and 'friendship with both parts of 
Ireland, and with Great Britain.'71
In sum, it was as discreet, modest, and in the immediate sense,
passive an approach to the issues which could have been expected given
72the interests and influences which were brought to bear upon it.
Because.of that, because it was the highest expression of what
was acceptable to all the parties concerned, it was hardly accorded a
tumultuous reception in either Britain or Ireland. O'Clery accurately
73described it as 'the initiative that fell flat', but this was 
because he, like many observers in the two countries, was concerned with 
describing the reaction to the specifics of the Carter statement. Yet 
it was not that feature which made it noteworthy —  that was owed to the 
fact that the US President made it all. While his expression of 
support may have sounded bland, it was to be compared with the silence 
of his predecessors; while the Four Horsemen could speak to and for 
Irish-American Catholics, they could not, as Carter, a southern Baptist 
could, attempt this on behalf of Protestants. And finally, no matter how 
modest his exhortations and proposals may have been, they had established 
publicly an official US interest in the political and economic future of 
Northern Ireland. They were no more than that, and for the remainder of 
the Carter Administration there were few disturbances, and none that v/as 
serious,to either Anglo-American or Anglo-Irish relations which could be 
traced to this interest. In most respects the US Government conformed to 
the role the anonymous spokesman had assigned it —  that of a 'benevolent 
bystander'.
Official Text: Carter Statement. In a later explanation by the 
US Ambassador to the Republic of Ireland, William V. Shannon, the US was 
described as being 'neutral but not indifferent,' v/ith regard to the 
clashing viewpoints espoused by different elements in the North (Luncheon 
Speech to the US Chamber of Commerce in Ireland, Dublin, 8 September 
1977, as reported in the Irish Times, 9 September 1977).
72
For the benefit of those who had failed to grasp these points 
particularly the third, Ambassador Shannon, in the address cited in the 
note above, stated categorically 'There is no Carter Peace Plan for the 
North.'
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O'Clery, Report from Washington, No.l, 18 January 1978. Holland 
confirms this observation ('Carter, Kennedy and Ireland,' Magill, October
1977, p.4).
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As v/as the case in the characterisation of the first period (of 
the American Dimension) reviewed, the term was not universally 
applicable to this period but is used here with the intention of 
conveying the ascendancy of one attitude over several others. Thus, 
while NORAID and the Irish National Caucus were seldom benevolent 
parties, and Kennedy and his colleagues frequently exceeded the 
expectations which could be held of bystanders, such objections do not 
sufficiently allow for the relative transformation in the American 
Dimension. Although within itself it had become an even less 
hospitable environment for the Provisional support network, that was 
probably not the most profound difference that was made. Stated 
positively, and from the perspective of international politics, Carter 
and the Four Horsemen should be seen as having set a changed face to 
American involvement in Northern Ireland which, as a result, was more 
understanding of the issues involved, more considerate of viewpoints 
previously ignored, and ultimately, given to a greater reluctance to 
impose itself upon the situation.
There were, however, those who recognised neither the desirability 
of this development, nor seemingly, the fact that it had taken place and 
relegated them to a position of lesser significance than they held 
earlier. Curiously the expressions of vitality v/hich they mustered were 
in a similar context as those towards the close of that earlier period, 
occurring as they did at a time when their eclipse was almost compassed. 
What v/as even more curious was that the most publicised of these 
counter-developments —  the formation of the Ad Hoc Congressional 
Committee for Irish Affairs on 27 September 1977 —  should have taken root 
when it was so obviously alienated from American political leadership and, 
to judge by the pronouncements of its chairman, possessed of a prodigious 
ignorance of the very subject it took its name from.
But on reflection, there was nothing exceptional in the latter: the 
chairman in question was the Representative from the 10th Congressional 
District of New York (East Bronx and North Queens), Mario Biaggi. In 
the years since his first outburst on Northern Ireland, he had become 
a leading example of those who had succumbed to that trick of Ireland's 
which George McGovern so accurately identified as the 'magnetic pull in 
the juxtaposition of a breath-takingly beautiful land, warm and engaging
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people, and perpetual conflict and deprivation1, and yet had been 
unable to match the depth of their fascination with a corresponding 
comprehension. As might be inferred from David McKittrick's report 
in 1979, Biaggi would have been no more than a comic figure were it 
not for the consequences of his actions:
74
Mario Biaggi has been making statements about Ireland 
for maybe 10 years now, but 10 minutes with him in his 
office on Washington's Capitol Hill is enough to 
demonstrate that he knows little aboutthe place. He 
once protested about the'presence of British troops 
throughout Ireland'. A year ago, asked by a reporter 
what he thought of the Peace People, and of the 
Official IRA, he had to admit that he hadn't heard 
of either.
A man in his fifties with iron grey, curly hair and 
gold-rimmed glasses, Biaggi waves his hands a lot,
Italian-style, loses his words often, depends upon a 
sharp young aide called Bob Blancato to finish his 
sentences for him. His language is grandiose: 'I hope 
the Provos will attend the peace forum', he declares 
softly. 'It's important for the total world perception 
of the undertaking'. The handwaving and the stateman­
like pronouncements are unfortunately interrupted by a 
loose dental plate which demands his frequent attention. 
Blancato smoothly talks on until the Congressman's 
teeth are firmly back in position. 75
For all that, Biaggi saw himself as an 'activist, a crusader ... on 
behalf of a more positive United States role in pursuit of peace and
7 c
justice in Northern Ireland'. So evidently, did the Ancient Order of 
Hibernians (at whose request he formed the Ad Hoc Committee and became 
its chairman) and 133 of his congressional colleagues, including fifteen 
Republicans, whose sense of political discrimination proved no barrier 
to their membership of it.77
McGovern,Ireland In 1977, p.21.
75 David McKittrick, 'Biaggi Thought the British Army was in the 
Republic', Irish Times, 5 September 1979, p.. 10 (hereafter cited as 
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Biaggi claimed that this membership, approximately twenty-five
per cent of Congress, was 'helped in great measure' by an attack on
himself and the Committee in early 1978 by the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch 
78(discussed below). This, to put it mildly, was an exaggeration.
It took no account of the two factors which informed observers generally 
held to be the best explanation: Congressional courtesy and electoral
79pressure on Representatives with significantly 'Irish' constituencies. 
Nor did it explain why this 'support' was so unimpressive when trans­
lated into an active interest in Northern Ireland matters. According 
to Sean Cronin, the usual attendance at an Ad Hoc Committee meeting 
was 10-15.80
Correspondingly, many of the committee members displayed complete
ignorance of Irish matters. On 16 March 1977, for example, Biaggi set
the tone with a denunciation of the 'Irish Free State' and 'the presence
81of British troops throughout Ireland'. He was then followed by
Benjamin Gilman who spoke of Ireland as 'a land of gentle grace and
beauty' being besieged by the same barbarism used by the 'ruthless
Nazis' and suffering from the 'torture techniques used in the South-
82east Asia conflicts'. Nearly a year later there was little that would
support the proposition that education can proceed from 'contamination'
by an issue: Representative Christopher J. Dodd referred repeatedly to
the Taoiseach as 'President Lynch', while Gilman found in the Dail a
83person by the name of 'Fitzpatrick, the minority leader.'
These were not isolated instances, nor were they without a more
David McKittrick, 'Irish Caucus in the Corridors of Power', Irish 
Times, 4 September 1979, p.10; and Interview, State Department,
21 August 1979.
80
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Irish Government. The most celebrated case in this regard centred
upon Biaggi's attempt, following the Taoiseach's controversial
848 January interview on Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE), to make common
cause with the latter on the subject of a British military withdrawal
from Northern Ireland, and to request his 'comments on the overall
85prospects for peace' in the country.
Lynch's response was somewhat more extensive than this. Overall, 
it implied a dismissal of the condemnations of violence made by Biaggi 
and his colleagues on the grounds that they were not consistent with 
the activities undertaken in the name of the Ad Hoc Committee. But in 
the main, it admonished its chairman for not having ascertained exactly 
what had been said in the course of the interview and concluded with a 
stern lecture about his choice of partners in the practice of Irish- 
American politics.
One of the obstacles to progress is violence which, though 
it has time and time again been rejected by the over­
whelming majority of the Irish people, emanates from 
extremists of both political traditions and, in both cases, 
derives support and encouragement from small groups 
outside the country. One such group is the Irish National 
Caucus which, whatever its recent pretensions to the contrary 
has been closely associated with the cause of violence in 
Northern Ireland. It has been noted in media reports that 
the Irish National Caucus termed the establishment of your 
Ad Hoc Committee as a victory for itself and that you 
yourself have visited Ireland at the request of the Caucus.
We in Ireland have also noted your public identification 
when here with supporters of violence who have no democratic 
mandate from our people ...
It has come to my attention that my Government's policy on 
Northern Ireland has been seriously misrepresented to 
members of the Congress and in view of the extent of this 
confusion and of the seriousness with which I must view it,
I am issuing copies of our correspondence to members of your
serious side which caused the Ad Hoc Committee to run afoul of the
See Chapter 4, pp. 211-12.
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Letter from Biaggi to The Right Honourable (sic) Jack Lynch, of
24 January 1978, released for public distribution by the Taoiseach 
through the Government Information Services, Dublin.
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Ad Hoc Committee and other Congressional leaders.
I would hope that in doing so, the existing confusion 
will be removed and the cause of peace and political 
progress in Ireland advanced.86
In Biaggi's own estimation, this was a 'scathing' reply. Moreover,
on the facts of the interview it was accurate -  the transcript shows
87that Lynch did not call for a British military withdrawal — as it was
also with regard to other matters cited above. It was, therefore,
surprising that Biaggi and a number of his colleagues should have then
taken the opportunity in Congress not only to accuse Lynch of 'lying
and waffling', but also to demand from him an apology for his recent
87statements critical of the Ad Hoc Committee.
What the membership of that body appeared, or chose, to be 
mystified by was the Taoiseach's verbal obfuscation which had clouded 
the precise meaning of Fianna Fail's Northern Ireland policy from the
start, and which even skilled 'Lynchspeak' interpreters found difficult
88to discern. That policy stated, inter alia:
Fianna Fail calls on the British government to ... 
encourage the unity of Ireland by agreement, in 
independence and in a harmonious relationship between 
the two islands and to this end to declare Britain's 
commitment to implement an ordered withdrawal from 
her involvement in the Six Counties of Northern 
Ireland. [emphasis added]! °9
Lynch, furthermore, v/as at pains to point out that the objective sought
was not to be interpreted as either a 'declaration to a commitment to
90 . . .
withdraw', or a 'declaration of intent to withdraw'. The distinction
Letter from the Taoiseach to Biaggi, of 17 February 1978.
87 (United States) Congressional Record — House3 23 February 1978, 
pp. H1471-H1481; and Mews From Congressman Mario Biaggi, a release 
dated 24 February 1978.
^  See Chapter 4, pp. 200-01.
89 Statement by Fianna Fail on Northern Ireland, issued by Fianna Fail 
Research and Support Services, Leinster House, Dublin, 26 October 1975.
90 Vincent Browne, 'The Artful Ambiguities of Jack Lynch', Magill3 
vol.l, No.l, October 1977, p. 8.
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was elusive but the lesson was as clear on this issue as it had been 
ever since the Taoiseach's 'we won't stand (idly) by1 address in 
August 1969: his pronouncements frequently reflected a Jesuitical 
refuge in the multiplicity of meanings which could be attributed to 
words and phrases,and hence those who sought to infer a particular 
meaning were liable to miss the mark.
On this particular occasion, Biaggi had less cause than on some
others to plead that he had been the victim of Lynchspeak. The
British Army, although a defining characteristic of the British
presence in the North, was never mentioned, nor incidentally, had it
91been mentioned in Fianna Fail's 1975 policy statement. More to the 
point, it should have been clear to any informed and astute observer 
of the situation that the Irish Government was not then in favour of 
a British withdrawal of any description. This had been made
abundantly clear in the Taoiseach's remarks over RTE on 28 September
921977, and again 8 January 1978. In the course of the latter the 
following exchange took place:
Interviewer (Mike Burns): ... do you think the time has come 
for the British Government to make that long-awaited 
declaration of intent?
Taoiseach: I think it has, yes. You see this declaration of 
intent can be interpreted in a very stark way. We never 
intended that it be interpreted as, say, the British 
Government will get out at the [end] of a certain year 
... What we wanted them to do was to indicate their 
interest in the bringing of Irish people together and 
their indication as well that they have little to offer 
to Ireland as a whole.93
See 'Text of Taoiseach's Radio Interview', Irish Times, 11 January
1978.
92 As reported in the Financial Times, 11 January 1978; see also 
Chapter 4, pp. 203.
93 'Text of Taoiseach's Radio Interview', Irish Times, 11 January
1978. It might be noted that Lynch here followed Burns' example of 
referring to a 'declaration of intent' where previously he had avoided 
this term in preference for the wording of the original policy statement.
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In all Biaggi's position was barely tenable. He had mis­
represented the Taoiseach's position by imputing to it a call for a 
'declaration of intent' for a British military withdrawal. His House
Resolution 478 in support of this imputed 'declaration' was therefore
94a nonsense, and in general he had demonstrated his poor ear for the 
nuances of Irish politics. Indeed, the whole enterprise involving 
Biaggi and other members of the Ad Hoc Committee only confirmed the 
impression that, all too often, when Americans became involved in Irish 
affairs, they tended to reveal more about themselves than about the 
Irish.
Subsequent developments confirmed this: by its associations,
choice of issues, and objectives, the Ad Hoc Committee was never able to
divest itself of ,the image that it was, to a greater or lesser extent,
a Provisional proxy, or worse, dupe. Under Biaggi1s chairmanship it
concerned itself almost exclusively with playing upon what could fairly
be described as 'Provisional themes'. Some were recurrent: the denial
of US entry visas to Provisional spokesmen was never far from its
95attention, nor was its proposed Congressional Hearings (later termed
qr
a Peace Forum) on Northern Ireland. Some, such as the reported role
of the Ad Hoc Committee in having the Irish Ambassador to the United
97States, Sean Donlon, recalled, v/ere occasional. All were marked by 
glaring failures: the visa decisions were not overturned; the Hearings, 
in the face of strong opposition in Washington from many quarters,
(United States) Congressional Record — House, 14 February 1978, 
p. H1019.
95 See Biaggi's speech before the National Board Convention of the 
AOH, 12 November 1977 (News from Congressman Bario Biaggi, same date); 
Washington Star3 22 February 1978; and Irish Times of 31 August 1978;
2 September 1978; and 5 September 1979.
96 See Chapter 10, p.412 ; and Sean Cronin, 'Letter from New York',
Irish Times3 4 December 1978.
97 At the time of writing (December 1980) it was not possible to 
obtain reliable information on this matter in Canberra. Presumably, the 
Ad Hoc Committee were concerned about Donlon's lack of sympathy for 
Provisional-aligned organisations in the US and suggested that he should 
be replaced. Biaggi, in his speech to the AOH on 31 July 1980 (see note 
76, this Chapter) implied that there v/as an element of truth in such 
reports but that 'although flattering, [they] were largely fabricated.'
481
particularly Speaker O'Neill, have never been held; and the 
decision to recall Donlon was reversed. In all, a dismal record.
It reflected the Ad Hoc Committee's basic inability to approach
the Carey-Kennedy-Moynihan-0'Nei11 alliance in terms of the authority
and influence the latter could bring to matters bearing on the Ulster
Question. The clearest measure of this difference was that there was
barely an issue on which the two groups could be said to espouse
anything like a common approach. To judge from statements made by
their respective principal spokesmen, this applied even to matters on
which they might reasonably have been presumed to agree —  such as the
growing body of evidence which tended to confirm allegations of
systematic police brutality against Republican and Loyalist suspects
99in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, where Kennedy, for example, was 
slow to condemn the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) solely on the 
basis of an Amnesty International report and suggested 'the establishment 
of an independent special prosecutor' Biaggi accepted the same 
document as virtual proof positive of RUC guilt and neglected to mention 
that members of both communities had found grounds for complaint. ^
Biaggi's Republican bias also showed through later, when both
Dr Robert Irwin, a Northern Ireland police surgeon, and the official
Bennett Committee of inquiry detailed cases of brutality which put many
102of the allegations generally beyond doubt: he then went to some 
lengths to point to certain allegations of human rights violations by
98
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pp. S9908-S9010. Note: Kennedy was not pre-judging the various claims: 
he defined the task of such a person as someone with 'full powers of 
investigation to find and state the truth.'
(United States) Congressional Record — Extensions of Remarks,
13 June 1978, p. E3194.
102 ,
Report oj the Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation 
Procedures in Northern Ireland, Cmnd. 7497 (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1979), also known as the Bennett report after its 
Chairman, Judge H.G. Bennett, QC. See also Chapter 9, p. 350.
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the Irish Government in respect of persons detained under legislation
103designed to counter threats to the state. The aim of the response 
in each case, it seems, was to outflank those who held the more 
commanding heights in Irish-American politics.
This strategy was well illustrated in 1979 in a minor furore
over the State Department's decision to authorise the sale of 3,000
104magnum .357 hand guns and 500 .223 automatic rifles to the RUC 
and Speaker O'Neill's concern, expressed in a statement of 1 June 1979, 
that 'the past record of the RUC is not one of impartiality in 
maintaining law and order', and his recommendation to the State
105Department that it 'not authorise such shipments in the future.1 
Thereafter, Biaggi and members of the Ad Hoc Committee attempted to 
claim a central role in the affair which was introducing a note of 
tension to Anglo-American relations.
In the course of the congressional debates on the State, Commerce,
and Judiciary appropriations bill in July 1979, Biaggi went further
than O'Neill's recommendation and unexpectedly introduced an amendment
106barring the use of funds for the supply of weapons to the RUC.
It was not a new tactic -  Biaggi's colleague Benjamin Gilman had 
attempted something similar in 19751*"*7 —  but on this occasion it caught 
the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Clement Zablocki, 
off guard. The outcome of the ensuing holding action and heated debate 
was that Zablocki was required to give an assurance that his Committee 
would 'investigate this matter thoroughly' in return for Biaggi's
103
(United States) Congressional Record — House, 9 April 1979, 
pp. H2114-H2122. See also Chapter 9, pp. 369-72.
104 According to a report by Harold Jackson and Ian Aitken in the 
Guardian Weekly, 12 August 1979, p. 7, these figures related to that 
part of an existing 9,000 weapons order which had been delivered, 
although it was made clear by State that the entire order would be honoured.
105
Statement By Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr, on The State Department's 
Authorisation of Shipments of US Manufactured Arms To Northern Ireland 
Police. Note: This statement is undated but advice received from State 
was that it was released on 1 June 1979.
106
(United States) Congressional Record — House, 12 July 1979, p. H5809. 
Irish Times, 18 March 1975.
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to exact. He wanted 'a very exhaustive investigation and a hearing' —
109
what Zablocki termed, in his rejection of it, 'a Pandora's box'.
Yet, at the same time, all American parties to it could claim a 
victory or success of sorts. The substance, if not the form, of 
O'Neill's recommendation has been preserved intact; the State Department 
remained unfettered by a Congressional amendment;11^ Zablocki had 
promised only an investigation —  which Biaggi could take credit for.
Later, however, Biaggi and his group were seen to come out
ahead, although there were suggestions that the following development
was due more to O'Neill's influence than that of the Ad Hoc Committee.111
Following a meeting in private session between it, the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, and a senior State Department official, Mathew Nimetz,
it was announced that arms sales would be suspended pending a review of 
112policy. In true style, Biaggi publicly misrepresented this as a
decision that sales had been 'suspended indefinitely' —  a claim which
113State felt obliged to deny as an 'unfair characterisation'.
But Biaggi was incorrigible in this regard: he had previously 
attempted to endow Zablocki's proposed investigation with more status 
then the latter intended by referring to them as 'hearings'.11^
i no
withdrawal of the amendment.
It was therefore, a compromise, and less than what Biaggi had tried
108 (United States) Congressional Record — House, 12 July 1979, 
pp. H5809-H5814.
109 ibid., pp. H5810-H5811.
^  see note 109 this chapter.
111 Harold Jackson and Ian Aitken, 'US Denies Change in Ulster Arms 
Policy', Guardian Weekly, 12 August 1979, p. 7.
112
Irish Times, 3 August 1979, pp. 1 and. 5. According to Biaggi, AOH 
Speech, 31 July 1980, it was still in force as of that date. On 23 July 
1980 the writer wrote to the Officer in Ciiarge, Irish Affairs, at the 
State Department to inquire further of the policy review, but as of 
June 1981 no reply had been received.
113
As cited in the Irish Times, 3 August 1979, p. 5.
(United States) Congressional Record —  House, 12 July 1979, p. H5811
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Likewise there were discrepancies between official and Biaggi versions
of a meeting between President Carter and the Ad Hoc Committee
Chairman, on a train to Baltimore on 4 August 1979. Where the White
House termed it no more than a 'casual encounter' and let it be known
that the President had added nothing to his 'initiative' statement of 
115August 1977, Biaggi claimed to have been accorded a 'private meeting'
at which Carter had 'expressed "deep concern" about human rights and
terrorist problems which plague Northern Ireland', and had said that the
1 1
only real solution rests with a 'consensus solution'.
On later occasions there was something of a pathetic quality to 
the way Biaggi sought to inflate incidents to his own advantage. As 
he proudly told David McKittrick of the Presidential train episode:
As a matter of fact he [the President] had Mrs Carter 
leave her seat which was alongside him, and had me take 
her seat. '
It was to the fore when he took consolation from the fact that the
Taoiseach, Charles Haughey, in a speech in which he denounced both the
Irish National Caucus and NORAID, did not 'specifically mention [himself]
118or the Ad Hoc Committee'. This was true, butonceagain it ignored 
Haughey's admonition that:
No individual, whether private citizen or elected 
member of Congress, should by any statement or 
association, lend support to those whose actions 
serve only to delay Irish unity.
Biaggi, of course, consistently denied that his statements or
Irish Times, 9 August 1979.
^  News from Congressman Mario Biaggi, a release by his office 
entitled 1 Carter —  Biaggi Confer On Northern Ireland', dated 7 August
1979.
McKittrick, 'Biaggi'.
118
Biaggi, AOH Speech, 31 July 1980.
119
'Northern Ireland: A positive role for Irish Americans' (Address 
by the Taoiseach, Mr Charles J. Haughey TD, to the Fianna Fail 
Organisation in the Metropole Hotel, Cork on 27 July 1980), Statements 
and Speeches 4/80, Bulletin of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
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associations did any such thing; inedeed his denunciations of
violence by all parties in Northern Ireland were as eloquent as those
to come from (say) Kennedy and his associates. He was, moreover, on
120record as applauding (some would say patronising ) the efforts of 
the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and 
could, without difficulty, have provided a selected catalogue of 
statements and activities which purported to demonstrate both his 
respectabi1ity and responsibility. Yet this would still have missed 
the point: that in the overall context of his activities he had not 
the wit or the wisdom to realise that he may actually have been 
encouraging violence, and that condemnations of it alone are like 
condemnations of sin —  requiring little courage and about as much 
imagination.
In many ways the question of imagination, or lack of it, was 
central to the faults which may be found in Biaggi and those who 
followed his lead. They exhibited collectively a failure to grasp 
that their judgment was not only lacking, but in some cases, appalling. 
Where, for example, Kennedy gradually withdrew from the indefensible 
positions he held prior to 1972, the Ad Hoc Committee became a political 
vagrant on the Irish-American scene, wandering from one issue to the 
next, without any visible means of real support in Ireland or the US.
In its travels it has confused rather than clarified Irish issues in 
American politics, but perversely, a study of it does at least provide an 
understanding of why observers, within and outside of the US, frequently 
misunderstand the position which the troubles of Ireland hold in the US. 
And if this conclusion should seem harsh, the following words of Biaggi 
may dispell such an impression:
The Irish question has become a major issue of American 
foreign policy ... It will grow as we grow closer to 
the 1980 Presidential election.121
120 This inference is well justified by reference to Biaggi, AOH 
Speech, 31 July 1980, p. 3.
121
(United States) Congressional Record —  House, 9 April 1979, p. H2121.
486
The fact that the Irish Question did not then loom large
122('similar to Vietnam' ), as Biaggi claimed, did not mean that it was 
eclipsed completely by other, more pressing concerns. Kennedy and 
his colleagues saw to that —  in such a way that the issue was consigned 
to a sort of limbo, from where it could be elevated if the circumstances 
demanded. This happened frequently, to the consternation of. the 
British Government. Two factors, apart from those of a US domestic 
political nature (already discussed), greatly facilitated this. The 
first was the widespread perception that the British Government v/as in 
default of its obligations in Nortnern Ireland by allowing the situation 
there to drift. The second also related to the British Government's 
obligations, but in the positive sense that it felt required, 
particularly after March 1977, to pay attention to the Four Horsemen 
because of the common cause against violence it and they v/ere joined in.
Although, of itself, this cause may have been presumptive evidence of 
the existence of a generally pro-British stance by the Horsemen, a 
series of events which unfolded in 1978-79 as a result of the two factors 
outlined above in conjunction suggested otherwise. In fact the result 
was a demonstration of the marginal utility of some types of politics, 
whereby the British Government, having welcomed the support of some of 
the most powerful and influential figures in Irish-American affairs, only 
found that it had also increased the number of not overly sympathetic 
constituents it was answerable to.
This was first seen to operate on the occasion of the Four
Horsemen's second St Patrick's Day message, in 1978. On the one hand it
v/as a repeat of that delivered the previous year, with variations to allow
for the Carter initiative; on the other it took the British Government
to task for not providing 'more effective leadership' and its 'failure ...
123to end the festering stalemate.' Moreover, it appeared over the
signatures of an additional fourteen US politicians, including Senators
Thomas Eagleton and George McGovern, and Governor Brendan Byrne of
124New Jersey.
122 .... ibid.
123 'Statement of US Politicians on Northern Ireland', Ireland Today: 
Bulletin of the department of Foreign Affairs, No. 927, 15 April 1978, 
p.2.
124 . .l bid.
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The criticism which the above message contained was repeated, 
this time as a plea by O'Neill, at an Ireland Fund dinner in New 
York the following May. But the form could not disguise the fact that, 
in Irish-American eyes, the British Government were guilty of 
procrastination for ulterior motives, nor could it disarm the rebuke 
which the address clearly implied.
... nothing can flourish ... without evidence of 
progress. So I would appeal to the British Government 
to re-examine seriously its own role in Northern 
Ireland. The problem of Northern Ireland will not be 
solved if it is permitted to become a football in 
British politics. ... it seems obvious to me that the 
Northern Ireland crisis should be treated by all British 
parties without a view to party advantage. As an 
absolute minimum, it must not be subjected to extraneous
political considerations.125
It was a common enough view —  although held more acutely in
Belfast and Dublin —  frustration with British inactivity. And it was
justified. No matter what construction was put on events, or the lack
of them, it was plain that the affairs of Northern Ireland were not being
l 2fi
accorded anything like an urgent priority at Westminster.
Throughout the remainder of 1978, criticism and pressure from the Four 
Horsemen and their growing retinue to change this situation took the 
form of an inverse relationship —  the less the British Government did 
on various issues, the more it was berated and urged to act.
And the messages were both direct and couched in the most
unmistakeable terms. After meeting with the Taoiseach in Washington
in May 1978, Kennedy let it be known that the efforts and impact of those
in America who supported a non-violent solution in the North were, to a
very great extent, determined by 'active British support for power-
127sharing'. A month later, Carey stayed away from a Vice-Presidential
125
Text of a speech by O'Neill at an Ireland Fund dinner in the 
Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, 10 May 1978, as cited in the Irish Times3 
23 May 1978.
126
This was argued extensively in Chapter 4.
127
Irish Times, 26 May 1978, p. 1.
488
dinner in honour of visiting British Prime Minister, James Callaghan,
as a protest against his Government's slowness in eradicating violence
128and discrimination in Northern Ireland. In the same general period,
both Carey and O'Neill went on record to demand a public enquiry into
129alleged RUC brutality, and to condemn prison conditions in Northern 
Irel and ^respect i vely.
By early 1979 the combination of criticism and pressure had
intensified to the point where the greater part of the joint
St Patrick's Day statement, the longest of the three to that time,
consisted of a stern lecture to the British on the failings of their
Northern Ireland policy. Among those that the Kennedy group
identified were 'drift ... delay and neglect ... and ... conspicuous
tilt in favour of the majority and to the detriment of the minority.'
Furthermore, it suggested that, with regard to the allegations of
official brutality and violations of human rights then coming to the
fore in Northern Ireland, it was 'difficult to believe that such
practices could exist without the acquiescence, or at least the
131negligence of the British Government.'
This was strong language, even allowing for the circumstances in
Northern Ireland which motivated it. And to explain why it should have
been so, it is necessary also to understand two related events which
preceded the 1979 joint statement and could account for its tenor.
According to two reliable observers of the Northern Ireland scene, in
late 1978 or early 1979, O'Neill inquired of the British Ambassador
(and son-in-law of the Prime Minister), Peter Jay, whether a Callaghan-
132Unionist deal was operating at Westminster. Jay not only denied
1 Irish Times, 28 June 1978, p. 1.
129
Irish Times, 21 June 1978.
130
Irish Times, 12 August 1978.
131 Joint Statement on Northern Ireland, 17 March 1979, issued by 
Senator Kennedy's office.
132 Interview; and David McKittrick, 'Horsemen of the Irish Apocalypse', 
Irish Times, 6 September 1979, p. 10.
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that there was, but took the view that any such suggestion v/as a
133'personal affront'. Thus, when some months later (during the
British election campaign in early 1979), Callaghan himself admitted
to O'Neill that he had, without reference to the Parliamentary Labour
Party, concluded an arrangement with the Unionist bloc of precisely
the type which the latter had earlier suggested, the grounds existed
for a particularly critical line to be taken by the 'horsemen',
134together and individually. And it was in this vein that they 
conducted their public representations to the British for the remainder 
of the period under review.
On one occasion, however, this mood produced a positive, if
unconventional and unsuccessful local initiative by Carey. In August
1979, he announced that he had invited representatives of the British
and Irish Governments to meet in New York in an effort to bring peace
135to Northern Ireland. Although the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Michael O'Kennedy, accepted, the Northern Ireland Secretary, Humphrey
Atkins, declined, on the grounds that the future of the province was
a matter which could not be discussed by the British Government outside
136the United Kingdom. The whole enterprise thereby failed, but the
137fact that London was willing to contemplate such a meeting, even
after the Irish National Caucus let it be known that the Governor was
only paying off a pledge made in the course of the 1978 State
138gubernatorial election campaign, illustrated the extent to which the 
interests of the 'horsemen' had to be taken into account. Indeed, the
133 ibid., in the Interview version, Jay used the expression an . 
'insult to his country' (or words to that effect) instead of 'personal 
affront'.
134 ibid., and Mary Holland, 'Kennedy's New Irish Policy', New 
Statesmanj 11 May 1979, p. 679.
135
New York Times, 7 August 1979, p. 45. 
Irish Times, 24 August 1979, p. 1.
New York Times3 8 August 1979, p. A9.
136
137
1 38
Barry White, 'A Potent Weapon for the Irish —  Political Clout in 
the US', New York Times, 19 August 1979, p. E3. The alleged need for 
such action by Carey was reported in two of Sean Cronin's regular articles 
for the Irish Times, ('Letter From New York'), of 24 October 1978 and
7 November 1978, respectively.
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Northern Ireland Office statement announcing Atkins' decision was 
notably deferential in this regard: it went to some length to recognise 
the 'deep interest of Irish people wherever they might be' in the
problems of Northern Ireland and to acknowledge 'Carey's concern ...
139particularly his public stand against terrorism.'
In 1980 the obligation upon Britain to heed the more responsible 
US interests was once more emphasised with the inclusion in the 
Democratic Party platform of a plank which read:
Consistent with our traditional concern for peace and 
human rights, the next Democratic Adminstration will 
play a positive role in seeking peace in Northern 
Ireland. We condemn the violence on all sides. We will 
encourage progress toward a long-term solution based 
upon consent of all parties to the conflict, based on the 
principle of Irish unity. We take note of the St Patrick's 
Day statement '... that the solution offering the greatest 
promise of permanent peace is to end the division of the 
Irish people' and its urging of '... the British Government 
to express its interest in the unity of Ireland and to 
join with the government of Ireland in working to achieve 
peace and reconciliation.' New political structures which 
are created should protect human rights, and should be 
acceptable to both parts of the community in Northern
Ireland.140
Following the Presidential Election of November 1980, however, 
some of the obligation diminished —  the 'next Democratic Administration' 
was as far away as January 1985, if not further. Moreover, the domestic 
political circumstances which allowed the Horsemen to exercise the 
influence they did with the Executive no longer obtained to the same 
extent. Thus, it may be that the election of Ronald Reagan will denote 
both the eclipse of the small group of Irish-American political leaders 
whose achievement was to transform the American Dimension to the Ulster
As cited in the Irish Times3 24 August 1979, p. 1.
140 As cited in News From Congressman Mario Biaggi, a release entitled 
'Biaggi Commends Democratic Party Platform Commitment to Northern 
Ireland,' 22 August 1980. Note: In this document Biaggi claimed credit 
for helping 'to shape the final language' of the platform, and for the 
inclusion of the condemnation of 'all forms of violence, both civilian 
and official.' These, however, were to be found in the 17 March 1979 
joint statement by the 'horsemen' —  in fact there was nothing in the 
Democratic platform that was not explicit in either their 1978 or 1979 
statements.
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Question, and the corresponding re-confinement of an active US interest 
in that issue to the traditional levels of domestic politics from 
whence it emerged in August 1977.
To some the prospect of this development, or that part of it 
which might entail a reduction in the interest of the US Administration 
would be welcome. For example, Conor Cruise O'Brien has claimed that 
the Four Horsemen
... suffer from one fatal idee fixe: that Ulster 
Protestants are basically England's puppets and England 
(if rightly squeezed) can reverse their political 
al1egiances.141
According to O'Brien, the distinctions of substance and style between 
the two basic types of American interest groups were irrelevant: 'their
efforts are complementary in their effects and are so perceived by
142 /those who resist.' The Horsemen, therefore (he names them
individually), stand accused of 'unwittingly pushing Ireland —  all of
143it -toward the abyss [of civil war]'.
These views, it is emphasised, were not expressed by either the
British or the Irish Government in the (second) period under review.
They owe their inclusion here to the fact that one of Ireland's most
public and published figures espoused them. That he did so less by
argument than by opinion may be of no moment: his opinions are widely
read, and particularly in Britain, highly regarded (if the extent to
144which he is cited in that country is any indication). As hypotheses
Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'Hands Off', Foreign Policy3 37 (Winter 
1978-79): 110.
142
^  ibid., p. 108.
143 ibid., p. 109. Similar views to those cited above were also to be 
found in Conor Cruise O'Brien's open letter to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
Christian Science Monitor3 18 July 1979, p.22; and 'Americans and 
Ireland1, International Herald Tribune3 8-9 September 1979, p. 4.
144 Needless to say they v/ere not highly regarded by Tip O'Neill. In 
September 1979 he was reliably reported to have refused their author, as 
Editor of the Observer3 an interview, and to have referred to him as 
'a silly, senile, son of a bitch' (Irish Times3 22 September 1979, p.l, 
report from Sean Cronin in Washington).
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concerning a future state of affairs, they are acknowledged for the 
discussion they may provoke, and the currency they may achieve; for 
the same reasons their analysis is foregone as not being demanded by the 
time frame of this thesis.
The discussion of the American Dimension between 1976 and 1980 to 
this point has concentrated on the role of non-state actors —  and 
with good reason. With the exception of the pre-Carter initiative 
negotiations, the political relations between the nation-states 
involved —  Britain, Ireland, and the US —  were unremarkable. Initial 
fears that Carter might carry over to his Presidency the rash behaviour 
on Northern Ireland which he had exhibited during the election campaign 
were not realised.
In their stead he gave every indication of being avowedly anti- 
Provisional and determined not to allow their American support
organisations to misuse his concern for human rights for their own
145 146 147purposes. Accordingly, visa refusals, law suits against NORAID,
148and prosecutions for arms offences continued as part of US Government 
policy. Where these counter-measures differed notably from those 
applied under Nixon was in their low frequency, but this would appear to 
be explained by the general erosion of support for the Provisionals from 
the Irish-American community after 1976.
See reports of the visit to the US, in March 1977, undertaken by 
the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Garret Fitzgerald, in the 
Irish Press3 17 March 197/, pp. 1 & 4; Cork Examiners 17 March 1977;
Irish T i m e s 17 March 1977, pp. 1 & 4; and International Herald Tribune 
of both 19 March and 21 March 1977.
146 In 1978, Joe Stagg, Chairman of the Irish Civil Rights Association 
and brother of a hunger striker who starved himself to death in 1976, was 
refused a visa to visit the US on the grounds that, during his October 
1977, he had engaged in fund raising (Irish Times3 7 February 1978).
147 As of September 1980 a case was in progress against NORAID but the 
writer is not aware of the precise grounds (letter to the writer from 
Brian K. Ahearn, Attorney, Registration Unit, Internal Security Section, 
Criminal Division, US Department of Justice, dated 5 September 1980.)
148
In October 1980, a successful prosecution in the US resulted in 
three people being jailed and fined for running a total of 100 guns and
1 million rounds of ammunition to the IRA since 1972 (ABC TV News,
4 October 1980).
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In comparison with this level and range of activities on 
Northern Ireland the Carter initiative stands out clearly as the only 
prominence on an otherwise featureless diplomatic and political 
landscape. Yet, even then, there was less to his decision to venture 
into Ireland's bog of ancient hatreds than met the eye. As was argued 
earlier in this chapter, his reasons had as much (or more) to do with the 
imperatives of his domestic political relations as they did with any 
compassion or torment he felt over Northern Ireland. And while this 
aspect in no way diminished the achievement which the initiative 
represented, it did underline the modest and reactive role played by 
the US Government.
When translated to the realm of relations between the US 
Government and the British Government, these characteristics proved 
somewhat detrimental to the otherwise harmonious basis on which they 
were conducted. The principal reason for this was that, although a 
modest and reactive role within the US satisfied Carter's domestic 
political requirements, it introduced into these relations measures 
which challenged the conventions under which they had traditionally 
operated. By allowing into the international arena what had previously 
been defined as domestic concerns, it blurred the distinction between 
both. In doing so it bestowed upon such episodes as the criticism of 
British policy by the Horsemen and the Carey proposals a much greater 
status than they could have expected to enjoy had the President been 
less dependent on the goodwill of O'Neill. Where once these attempts to 
intervene in what Britain regarded as an internal issue would have 
received short shrift, as did Kennedy's pronouncements in the first 
period examined, Britain's response in this period was to pursue a policy 
of public reticence if no favourable comment was to be forthcoming. But 
this situation was not entirely of Carter's making. As was noted earlier, 
the British Government had not only gratefully received the support of 
Carey, Kennedy, Moynihan and O'Neill in 1977, but acknowledged thereafter 
that it had incurred an obligation to attend to them which v/as derived 
from the positions of influence they held in their own right. In essence, 
a conflict of three uneven interests v/as involved —  between the overriding 
need of both the US and Britain to maintain the quality of the trans- 
Atlantic relationship in general, the particular and competing need of the 
former to promote measures relating to Northern Ireland which cut across 
previous understandings, and the insistence of the latter on the status quo.
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For all that it was an occasional, rather than a besetting 
problem, and was to the fore only twice —  in relation to the Carter 
initiative and the embargo of arms to the RUC. As regards the first 
instance, it was obvious that the British Government would have 
preferred no initiative on Northern Ireland from the US President, 
but it v/as also just as clear that Washington, having embarked upon a 
general course of action, was at all times solicitous of the 
sensitivities involved. (That some Washington parties v/ere more 
concerned does not invalidate this observation.) While these factors 
no doubt accounted for the blandness of the statement which emerged 
on 30 August 1977, they also ensured its acceptability to the party 
whose sovereignty was eroded —  Britain. Furthermore, the eventual
welcome v/hich the Carter initiative was accorded by both the British
149 150Government and Northern Ireland political leaders generally,
indicated that minor disruptions to the harmony of Anglo-American
relations are perhaps, to be expected as a necessary but temporary cost
of incorporating American proposals for possible progress. The
conventions of the relationship, it seems, determined initial resistance
irrespective of the merits of what was put forward. However, an outcome
acceptable to both parties has so far not been reached on the second
issue —  the embargo of arms to the RUC. As of July 1980 it was still in
151force, with the question of a State Department review outstanding.
It must remain, therefore, as a slight irritant to Anglo-American 
relations, and since its continuation implies a suspicion of (RUC) guilt, 
a minor source of embarrassment to the British Government. Beyond that, 
because of the lack of subsequent publicity v/hich has attended it, its 
effect cannot be judged v/ith any certainty.
By way of contrast, it is certain that Irish-American relations were 
less troubled and more to the advantage of Ireland. In so far as a 
reduction of American 'aid' in its various forms v/as concerned, Dublin 
had, if the figures cited earlier in this chapter were any guide,
'Statement by the Prime Minister', London Press Service, Verbatim 
Service, 196/77, 30 August 1977
150
Irish Times3 31 August 1977, p. 5.
151
Inquiries were made by letter to the State Department, on 23 July
1980, as regards the continuation of the embargo and the proposed review. 
As of June 1981 no reply had been received.
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considerable cause to be heartened. And on the Carter statement's 
acknowledgement of a role for the Republic in a future political 
settlement in Northern Ireland, the Irish Government's cause was also 
clearly advanced. Neither, however, could be seen as entirely, or even 
predominantly, due to the efficacy of the sustained educational campaign 
of the Irish Government to persuade Irish-Americans to desist from 
provisioning the IRA. Indeed, the most important factor in their 
achievement was the ascendancy of the Four Horsemen and the fact that 
they shared certain objectives in common with the Irish Government.
Yet, as in Anglo-American relations, Irish-American relations
at the end of the period admitted one area which had yet to be resolved
and was of potential significance for the relations between Britain,
Ireland and the US as they concerned Northern Ireland. Basically, it
was a particular concomitant of the general differences in emphasis
within the Fianna Fail Cabinet in 1978, and the apparent shift in
policy in 1979, as to the attempts that should be made and the results
that could be expected if the Ulster Question were internationalised by
the Irish Government. This development was noted earlier, as it concerned
152the European Community. Whereas in May 1978 the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Michael O'Kennedy, had stated his Government's stronq opposition
. 153to external parties —  such as the US or the European Commission —
attempting a solution to the North's problems, he and leading members of
154the Cabinet (including the Taoiseach) were on record throughout late 
1979 as advocating a contrary position. According to O'Kennedy,
The goodwill in Europe and the United States is there 
to be tapped to support a return to normal politics in 
the North.155
152
See Chapter 8, pp. 317-21.
153 ibid. , p. 318.
154 'Irish Presidency 1979, Opening of the New European Parliament: 
Statement by the Taoiseach, Mr. John Lynch TD' , Statements and Speeches 
9/79: Bulletin of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Although Northern 
Ireland was not mentioned specifically in this address, it may be clearly 
interpreted as an unmistakeable appeal for international assistance 
towards an initiative on Northern Ireland.
155
As reported in Geoffrey Barker, 'Unity: An Irish Dream', Melbourne 
Age3  1 November 1979, p. 9.
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As regards the European states, 'goodwill' was defined by Minister for 
Industry, Commerce and Energy, Desmond O'Malley, to include
making their views knov/n ... expressing their inability 
to accept the situation [and] using their economic 
muscle to encourage a coming together of the two 
traditions in the North.156
It thus seems reasonable to infer that something similar was envisaged 
as regards the US. But as 1980 drew to a close there was no evidence 
to suggest that the Irish Government had encountered any success with 
this policy, or even that it had been implemented.
The American Dimension had, therefore, resumed a static state by
1980. At neither the domestic, nor the international level was there any 
obvious sign of activity or extension of influence. The high points of 
the period had been reached between March and August 1977 and nothing 
that happened after this was as important or as far-reaching as the 
first St Patrick's Day statement by Carey, Kennedy, Moynihan and 
O'Neill, or the Carter Initiative. It v/as as though, at the support 
network level, the attention of the minority of Irish-Americans who 
comprised it was reclaimed. They returned from their sacred and poorly 
understood cause of a united Ireland through the armed struggle of the 
IRA - perhaps to the more pressing demands which they faced along with 
other 'heritage' groups in the US, which David Murray saw as:
abortion, busing, swollen welfare rolls, crime and 
punishment and preservation of the Great American 
Autoniobi le.
Among the politicians of the Ad Hoc Committee the diminution of 
vital signs was equally noticeable. Although the arms embargo to the 
RUC could be taken to signify the opposite, the fact remained that they 
v/ere frustrated at every turn in their attempts to establish the 
Committee as the American focus and referent for the Ulster Question.
Thus it remained as an incongruity, a curiosity, adrift on the periphery 
of the Irish storm, and lacking both an ability to stay afloat to any 
real purpose, and the decency to sink.
156 .... ibid.
157 David Murray, 'An Irish-American Political Shibboleth is laid to 
Rest', New York Times, 13 August 1977.
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For those who held the position which the Ad Hoc Committee 
coveted, the Four Horsemen, the period under review was virtually their 
period. Not only did they over-shadow their domestic opposition on 
the Ulster Question, but they also proved strong enough to move, in 
varying degrees, the President and, effectively, three governments.
Yet, by the end of 1980, it was tempting to view their efforts and 
achievements as no more than a lamp briefly lit. With Carter about to 
depart the White House, and the Democrats less than the power they had 
been in Congress, it was no longer realistic to expect that their 
position of international influence on Northern Ireland could be 
maintained.
As a consequence, the Government of the US, and still more that of 
Britain, may be left somewhat at peace, at least until 1984, for there 
is no question that both were harried on occasions by the Four Horsemen. 
Nevertheless, the irritation which this no doubt engendered should not 
distort the fact that the outstanding achievements of the period were 
initiated and worked only secondarily by the Governments concerned. They 
were necessary parties, even principals, but left to their own devices 
they would never have produced the outcomes for which the period 1976-80 
will be remembered. To reach this conclusion is not to say that these 
outcomes should be regarded as other than modest steps in terms of the pre­
requisites for a settlement in Northern Ireland nor, correspondingly, is it 
to devalue them in terms of the traditional attitudes of the US towards the 
troubles in Ireland.
It might be claimed, of course, that the activism which this change 
required hardly betokened 'bystanding', or that there were sufficient 
incidents in the period which would gainsay its description as one of 
benevolence, but to do so would be to concentrate unduly upon certain 
levels or areas at the expense of others. It would be to allow the 
manifest activism on the part of the Four Horsemen to obscure the more 
significant outcome which was to change in the alignment of US interest to 
a more responsible, generally more passive, but potentially active 
position.
While there were occasions when the course of settlement in 
Northern Ireland was retarded, they were literally that —  occasions, 
irregular events which did not denote the predominance of a pattern of 
activity which was inimical to the future of Northern Ireland. Moreover,
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they v/ere overtaken by developments of such substance which could not 
but aid in the eventual reconstruction of the province. The measure 
of the American Dimension between 1976 and 1980 must be Edward Kennedy 
In (say) February 1972, it would have seemed probable to an informed 
observer in Belfast, Dublin, London or Washington that the Senator 
from Massachusetts would continue to be closely identified with this 
aspect of the Ulster Question. But it would not have seemed remotely 
possible then that, within a handful of years, he would have figured 
so prominently in the transformation of American interest to the point 
where it could be described as cautious, sympathetic and well disposed 
to both the Catholics and Protestants of Northern Ireland. It was of 
no great matter that these characteristies were relative, or that the 
understanding from which they sprung came, as Yeats' peace, 'dropping 
slow': in the previous period they were barely in evidence at all. 
Moreover they created, even if briefly, not only a greater field of 
choice for the Irish in the United States, but also better hopes for 
those in Northern Ireland.
CHAPTER TWELVE
T h e  'Ol d ' C o m m o n w e a l t h
C a n a d a . N e w  Z e a l a n d , a n d  A u s t r a l i a .
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The three remaining 'old' Commonwealth countries of Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand are considered jointly, not because they 
related to Northern Ireland collectively as part of the British Common­
wealth, but for three other reasons.1 The first is that each has been 
the terminus for significant Irish emigration; the second is that each 
was active, in an undistinguished way, vis-a-vis the current troubles 
in Northern Ireland; and the third is that because of the common 
British imperial heritage it is convenient to group them together. The 
fact that they are in addition to being 'old', also predominantly white, 
is a coincidence in terms of this inquiry.
Within this tripartite grouping, each country was marginally 
significant for a different reason. In descending order, the first of 
these was Canada because of several attempts there to supply arms and 
finance to both Catholic and Protestant paramilitary organisations in 
Northern Ireland. The first evidence of this supportive activity was 
seen in August 1969 with an announcement by some 150 Toronto Irish- 
Canadians that they intended sending money, which could be used to
buy guns if necessary, to the women and children of the (Catholic)
2
Bogside in Derry. Thereafter the networks of the US-based Irish 
Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) and the Irish Republican Clubs were 
extended to Canada but support activities on behalf of both the Official 
and Provisional movements were thought by observers to be limited by the 
mainly Protestant complexion of the estimated two million Canadians of 
Irish descent. Nevertheless, in 1972 (admittedly a 'high' year in 
relation to international interest in Northern Ireland), it was reported 
that 'about $40,000' had been forward by NORAID.3 (It has not proved 
possible to obtain other reliable estimates of financial aid.)
Of the five countries of the 'old' Commonwealth, Britain has been 
excluded from this chapter for obvious reasons, and South Africa has been 
excluded because it is no longer a member of the Commonwealth. However, 
there is a reference to a link between Provisional Sinn Fein and South 
Africa in Chapter 13, p. 541).
2
Daily Telegraph3 20 August 1969.
Irish Independent3 13 May 1974.
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In the matter of supplying arms the available record is slightly 
more forthcoming. Judging by this, 1973 and 1974 were the years in which 
would-be gun-runners were most active. And the police most diligent. 
Three arms shipments intended for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were 
intercepted - one on the Canadian side of the Canada/United States
4
border, and the other two as part of a combined operation involving
5
Canadian and Irish authorities, in Toronto and Dublin, respectively.
The total amount of arms involved was small, but in each case 
consistent with the numbers recovered in several other seizure 
operations originating in the United States:^ 15 rifles and ammunition 
in the border case;7 5 sten-guns, 12 hand guns, about 18,000 rounds of 
ammunition, and 10 hand grenades, in Toronto; and 17 rifles, 29,000
g
rounds of ammunition, and 60 pounds of gunpowder in Dublin.
Of particular interest in the border interception was the American 
affiliations of Joseph Myles, a resident of Michigan, who was described 
by the Canadian authorities as an 'executive officer of an American
g
organization Northern Irish Aid' (sic). For his pains he, and at 
least three accomplices, were sentenced to jail terms ranging from 17 
months to two years.
As regard's the combined operation, two aspects were notable. The 
first concerned the co-operation between the Canadian and Irish
Timesj 7 June 1975.
Toronto Star3 17 July 1973, pp. 1 and 2. The Dublin seizure was 
made at the docks, upon containers loaded from a British freighter, the
Manchester Vigour.
6 See Chapter 10, pp. 400-06.
7
Times3 7 June 1975.
8
Toronto Star3 17 July 1973, pp. 1 and 2.
9
Timess 7 June 1975.
10 ibid. According to information received from official sources, seven
'Irish immigrants' went to trial in Toronto in 1975 on charges of con­
spiring to export, and attempting to export, a machine gun, 20 semi-automatic 
rifles, 10 sten-guns and more than 8,000 rounds of ammunition. Unfortunately, 
the writer has not been able to establish for certain whether the Myles, et. 
al. case was part of this general attempt, or a separate attempt entirely.
But in the wirter's opinion, it was probably the former.
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shipment was intended for the Official IRA. This was somewhat curious,
because that organization had unilaterally declared a cease-fire on
1229 May 1972. However, it appeared not to denote a renewed campaign
of violence by the Officials. According to Commissioner Edward Lysyk of
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), investigations revealed that
13the man responsible for the attempt, one John Patrick Daniel Murphy,
14was engaged in a 'lone operation'. His efforts, therefore, were 
probably to be explained by the Official IRA's need, as a paramilitary 
organization, to maintain an armoury for self-defence and in case a 
situation arose in which it would need to reconsider engaging once more 
in an armed struggle. There is no evidence that it has done so since. 
Thus, with regard to both wings of the IRA, the influence of the Canadian 
connection upon their ability to operate in Northern Ireland was 
minimal.
The same was true in respect of the Loyalist paramilitary
organisations, although official estimates to concede that 'one or two'
15successful attempts have been undertaken to supply arms out of Canada.
In addition, at least two attempts were unsuccessful. Both v/ere related
and both involved consignments which were destined for the Ulster Defence
Association, either for the purpose of training members on the Yorkshire
16moors, or for use in Northern Ireland itself.
authorities over a three month period,11 while the second was that the
Toronto Star, 17 July 1973, p. 1.
12
The Secret /Im?/; The IRA 1916-1979 rev. and updated ed. (Dublin:
Academy Press, 1979), p. 388.
13 Sentenced to 18 months imprisonment in Dublin, on 18 November 1974.
14
Toronto Star, 17 July 1973, p. 1. In England, the Daily Telegraph 
was not impressed, with Lysyk's modest assessment —  it ignored his comments 
and carried the headline, 'Canadian Arms Ring Broken' (Daily Telegraph,
18 July 1973).
15 R.D. Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland1, British Army 
Review (April 1978): 21.
1 f)
Irish-Times, 19 August 1974.
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As was the case with the attempts in aid of Republican elements,
these Loyalist ventures v/ere of a small scale17and included World War II-
vintage arms (e.g. Sten-guns). In common with the Murphy attempt they
v/ere also frustrated by international (British and Canadian) police
co-operation —  involving the Hampshire police at the Southhampton docks
18and the RCMP in Toronto —  which led to the arrest of two Canadians and 
three Britons.
Subsequent to these events, there is little evidence of Canadian
involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland. In 1977 a claim was made
by one Jim Kennedy that Canada was being used by Loyalist extremists as
19a base for gun-running with the knowledge of the Canadian authorities.
However, since Kennedy was at the time in an immigration jail in
Vancouver and was thought to be not Kennedy, but James McCann, an IRA
20fugitive, the accuracy of his statement was open to considerable
scepticism. Yet it, or at least not that part of it which referred to the
continuing role of Canada as an arms source —  could not be dismissed out
of hand. In Dublin, just three months later, Donald C. Jamieson, the
Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, made a statement in
which he admitted that, because of his country's long undefended border,
it was possible that illegal arms movements to Northern Ireland were
21taking place. As he put it 'sometimes these things do happen.' Not­
withstanding this, he took care to emphasise that his Government had made 
every effort to counter such traffic.
The arms recovered in Toronto were 9 Ml rifles, 13 sten-gun 
housings, sten-gun ammunition clips, and 2,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. 
[Times, 9 April 1974). The quantity of arms recovered at Southampton 
was not cited; hov/ever, an idea may be gained from evidence that it was 
found within a box and a trunk within a container which also held other 
items [Irish Times, 19 August 1974).
18
Daily Telegraph, 18 April 1974. Unlike the Murphy case, there was 
a 9-10 day delay betv/een the Southampton and Toronto seizure operations.
19
Daily Telegraph, 11 June 1977.
20 • i • i ibid.
Irish Times, 7 September 1977.
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Jamieson then passed to a subject that was quite topical —  in view 
of the Carter initiativewhich had been taken only a week before. Canada, 
he remarked, would consider 'most sympathetically' any proposals,
including investment for jobs, for its participation in a suggested
22solution to the Irish problem. It was not a momentous announcement, 
nor was it reported widely or with much comment. But in its own way the 
Jamieson statement was, like the Carter statement in relation to US 
foreign policy, a cautious but perceptible departure from previous 
Canadian attitudes and policies.
In 1972, these had been expressed by Mitchell Sharp, Minister for 
External Affairs, in terms which were sympathetic and decidedly 
negative.
As a friend of the Irish and British peoples, we can 
only deplore the present situation in which violence and 
emotion feed on each other. We sympathize with those who 
are suffering and we urge that all concerned should abstain 
from lawlessness and violence, no matter what emotions are 
involved. But we cannot solve other people's problems for 
them and we cannot intervene in internal affairs of either 
the British or Irish Governments, nor would it be helpful 
to try to judge from outside rights and wrongs of particular 
incidents which should in any case be seen in the broader 
context of the whole situation in that area.23
Sharp's statement, therefore, seemed to imply that the Canadian 
Government would not exactly have been disappointed had Dr Patrick Hillery 
(the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom he was responding) 
omitted to visit Ottawa on this occasion. From the reports of this time, 
it was the most disappointing reply Hillery received on his international 
mission following Bloody Sunday.
Perhaps no more could have been expected from the Canadian Government. 
There was, and remains, a conflict of cultures and political aspirations 
in Canada which challenges the country's national unity. It could not, 
then or now, appear to take sides in Ireland without incurring domestic 
wrath from at least one quarter. For this reason, the studious avoidance
22
ibid.
23
'Northern Ireland', Press Release L .9/72 of 8 February 1972, Canadian 
High Commission, London, S.W.l, England.
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of the Ulster Question in 1972 was inevitable, and the modification 
to it some five years later, the parameter within which any Canadian 
Government might be expected to act.
New Zealand was not so constrained, but neither was its Irish 
community very active. Apart from a visit in 1972 by Miss Ann Hope of 
the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, there was little of a 
connection with the troubles. At the Government level it was not until 
1977 that they drew any official reaction from New Zealand. When it came, 
however, it was most appropriate for a country which was as far away from 
Northern Ireland as it was possible for one predominantly European 
country to be from another. And it was unique.
It originated with an idea put to New Zealand's Prime Minister,
Robert Muldoon, by the 'Peace People1 leader Miss Mairead Corrigan,
during the International Convention for Peace Action in Wellington, in
24February 1977. Briefly described, it took the form of an agreement
by the New Zealand Government to allow the country to be the terminus of 
an 'escape route' for former members of the various paramilitary 
organisations in Northern Ireland.
The rationale of this move was cloudy, but nevertheless appears 
to have been the result of an initial decision taken by Muldoon.
25According to him, it was a humanitarian gesture in a refugee situation. 
Others, commentators familiar with his family background as outlined in 
his book, The Rise and Fall of a Young Turk, pointed to his Irish 
connection —  a grandfather from Linaskea, Co. Fermanagh, who became a 
Methodist missionary and travelled to New Zealand to convert the 
inhabitants. Still others, members of his personal staff and close 
cabinet colleagues, were of the opinion that Muldoon was simply so 
impressed with Corrigan's sincerity and the merit of her case, that he
Wellington Evening Post, 21 February 1977, p. 1.
25 • i • iibid.
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2fi
agreed to do something without worrying overmuch about the details.
Whatever the reason, the subsequent period saw a minor controversy 
created by the 'escape route' decision, and many indications that the 
New Zealand Government's decision had not been thought out with any 
thoroughness. Nearly all of these indications stemmed from the 
inconsistencies and lack of clarity which pertained to those who were 
to avail themselves of the new exit from Northern Ireland.
Under the New Zealand immigration regulations then in force, Northern 
Irish immigrants were covered by the same restrictions as other United 
Kingdom citizens. They had to have a skill in high demand, be under 
45, healthy, and have no more than two children. Anyone who had served 
a one-year prison sentence, or more, was a prohibited immigrant. Hence, 
the first and most glaring inconsistency concerned the type of people who 
were to be allowed into New Zealand, arose when they were classified by 
Corrigan as follows:
They might be boys who were 10 when the violence started, 
and 17 when caught with a gun. There are also men who 
have never really been involved but live in areas where 
they have been pressed into {violence].27
In Belfast, however, Mrs Betty Williams, another of the founders of
the Northern Ireland Peace Movement, slightly complicated matters by 
stating:
Of course, we shall not be sending known criminals or 
wanted people, but people who genuinely wish to make a 
new start and have paid their debt to society.
Thus the picture that was presented was of once budding gunmen, 
others who had unwillingly been compromised by the situation around them, 
and rehabilited former paramilitaries, all of whom were seeking refuge on 
the other side of the world. If they had been convicted, many would have
This is a composite conclusion drawn by the writer from a number 
of interviews, including one with the Rt. Hon. Brian Talboys, Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Wellington, November 1977.
27
oo
Wellington Evening P o s t 21 February 1977, p. 1.
Times3 22 February 1977.
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received prison sentences in excess of one year and would, by virtue 
of that, have been ineligible to immigrate.
In London, the New Zealand High Commission provided a hint of how
this situation might be resolved. It stressed, inter alia, that anyone
with terrorist convictions or with a prison sentence of more than one
29year would need a further dispensation. (Presumably, as no other 
dispensation had been made explicit, this related to the 'dispensation' 
which applied when people with prison sentences of less than one year 
were accepted as immigrants). In other words, one criterion, was to be 
waived to enable the 'escape route' to operate. Nearly two months 
later, Air Commodore Frank Gill, the Minister for Immigration, confirmed
that certain normal criteria for immigration were to be suspended in
... ,30this regard.
But this still did not settle matters with regard to the type of
people who were to be admitted. In June 1977, some three months after
31the first applicant had applied, Gill contradicted previous statements 
by commenting:
What we've said all along is that the immigrant applicants 
would include people who have been detained by the 
authorities but not convicted, [emphasis added]32
And there the matter has rested, with no subsequent statements or other 
evidence which might have clarified the situation one way or another.
On the question of who was to be admitted, among the types of
people seeking sanctuary in New Zealand, an uncertainty was also evident.
Initially, as Corrigan has indicated, they were to be juveniles and young
men. This was reiterated by Muldoon in February 1977, after he had
obtained Cabinet approval for the 'escape route' scheme, although he then
33seemed more i ncl ined towards the former by hi s use of the word 'youths '. The
29
Guardian 22 February 1977.
30
Christchurch P r e s s 12 March 1977, p. 1
31
Wellington Evening Post, 25 March 1977,
32
Wellington Dominion3 27 June 1977, p. 3
33
Timesj  22 February 1977.
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following month Gill also used the same terminology and referred to
34the 15 to 17 years age group.
Yet in May, the Minister for Immigration announced that the
35Government had changed its criteria from single people to families.
But even that was not completely true. One week later, Mr Peter 
McLaughlin, a spokesman for the peace movement, was still talking of the 
'escape route' in terms of 'juvenile members of para-mi1itary groups'
oc
and 'youngsters' without any mention of families. Again there was no 
explicit resolution of the matter, except that the reports of Muldoon's 
surprise visit to Belfast in June 1977, made no reference to an age
37criterion but did refer to the fact that families were to be included.
By then, also, the scheme had been extended to include people who, for
their own safety, were living across the Border in the Irish Republic,
38or in England. According to these developments it was, therefore, 
a quite different scheme to that which had been announced in 
Wellington in February 1977.
About the only aspect of it which had remained unchanged was the
number of people involved, and this certainly placed the entire scheme
in a proper perspective. 'A handful' was the most usual expression
39used by the New Zealand Government —  by which was meant not five,
40nor even ten, but up to twenty. Obviously, this was not a great 
number in terms of even such a relatively localised conflict as that 
which existed in Northern Ireland, and was appreciably less than the
Christchurch Press, 12 March 1977.
35 Auckland Star, 31 May -1977, p. 1.
36 Auckland Star, 14 June 1977, p. 1.
37
Irish Times, 21 June 1977: and Dunedin Otago Daily Times, 
21 June 1977, p. 5.
38 .... ibid.
39
International Herald Tribune, 22 February 1977.
Christchurch Press, 12 March 1977, p. 1; and Interview with Air 
Commodore T.F. Gill, Minister for Immigration, Wellington, 18 November 
1977 (hereafter cited as Gill Interview).
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' 41420 Vietnamese refugees New Zealand had taken between 1973 and 1977.
Two reasons accounted for this. The first was to be found in
Muldoon's own description of his Government's decision on the 'escape
42route' as a 'humanitarian gesture' —  an emphasis which was made again
43some months later by the Minister for Immigration. The second was,
also according to Gill, the British Government's probable refusal to
44allow New Zealand to take larger numbers. How or why it would react 
in such a curious way was not explained, but it is recorded here for 
the purpose of showing that at least one member of the New Zealand 
Cabinet accepted its validity.
Overall, the restriction on numbers was probably fortuitous. It
rendered acceptable the minor controversy it created in New Zealand —
in which, inter alias many saw a contradiction between dispensing with
established immigration policy for the benefit of former 'terrorists' and
the continued repatriation of Polynesian islanders who had overstayed the
period for which their visas were valid. It also minimised the
apprehensions of those New Zealanders who saw in the 'escape route'
45only the importation of a microcosm of the Ulster conflict. And 
finally, it was less of an injury to those 'normal' applicants for 
immigration to New Zealand who had been rejected only to see former 
outlaws among their fellow-countrymen accepted.
As a 'gesture' it has been well nigh impossible to evaluate. 
Information on those that availed themselves of an antipodean sanctuary 
has been jealously guarded by the New Zealand Government. But neverthe­
less it stands as an innovative, if somewhat limited, development which
41 Gill Interview.
42
Wellington Evening Post, 21 February 1977, p. 1.
43
Gill Interview.
44 i bi d .
45 Gill admitted that even those former paramilitaries who had 
rehabi1itated, in the formal sense of committing no further crime after 
their release from prison, were probably still sympathisers of the 
respective cause they had served. (Gill Interview).
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Notwithstanding this, it was an example which appeared not to be
followed by New Zealand's closest international neighbour, Australia.
According to one report, Muldoon 'confronted' Andrew Peacock, the
Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at a ministerial meeting of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in Paris with 'the
47suggestion that Australia should follow New Zealand's lead.' Peacock,
according to Muldoon, saw sense in New Zealand's plan, but gave no firm
commitment and said that he would refer the latter's suggestion to the
48Australian Minister for Immigration. Judging from the lack of 
subsequent developments, there the matter must have rested.
Australia, therefore, of the three 'old' Commonwealth countries
considered in this chapter, has the least record of involvement at the
official level. Indeed, apart from the arrest, and subsequent visa
49revocation, of a visiting Provisional Sinn Fein official in 1979,
the Peacock referral seems to be the extent to which the Australian
50Government was at all forthcoming on Northern Ireland.
Non-government response was only slightly more substantial.
Limited fund raising for the Provisional movement was undertaken by the
46may have provided an example for other Governments to follow.
The peace movement claimed to have approached other Governments, 
among which were probably those of Canada and the United States (Daily 
Telegraph, 21 June 1977), and to have obtained the agreement of some to 
accept immigrants along the lines of New Zealand, but it refused to name 
them (Financial Times, 21 June 1977).
47
Wellington Dominion, 27 June 1977, p. 3.
48 ibid.
49 Phillip McCullough was in Australia as the guest of an Irish 
Republican organisation. He had previously been jailed for 18 months in 
Belfast for causing an explosion which destroyed a telephone booth. This 
matter was omitted from his visa application and he was, therefore, required 
to leave Australia voluntarily or face deportation (Sydney Morning Herald,
25 July 1979, p. 1) .
50 In 1972, Gough Whitlam, leader of the Federal Opposition (and later 
that year, Prime Minister), provided a contrast to his colleagues on the 
other side of the House by stating that Britain was causing the 
'catastrophic' situation in Northern Ireland by not grasping 'the nettle of 
the situation', and by not realising that 'military means of suppressing 
street demonstrations will not work' [Times, 7 February 1972).
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51organisation, Green Cross of Australia. In addition, an Irish 
Republican Information Bulletin was published by a Provisional Sinn 
Fein cumann in Melbourne. As the McCullough visit indicated, links with 
Irish Provisionals (and Provisional sympathisers) have been reciprocated. 
Probably the most notable of the latter was the April 1975 tour of 
Australia by James Kelly, Vice-Chairman of Aontach Eireann and former 
chairman of the Irish Civil Rights Association in Dublin (whose
Australian branch organised it). In the course of this, the former
52Irish Army captain of Arms Crisis fame, attacked security legislation
in the Irish Republic and 'supported the IRA as an inevitable and
53classic revolutionary group.' For its part, the Official movement was 
represented by the Irish Socialist Republican Clubs.
Outside these activities, which really had significance only for
the already-converted, the ability of the Irish-Australian community to
mobilise support for Republican objectives in Northern Ireland has been
minimal. The greatest successes have been registered in the area of
protest, and that mainly in 1972. In that year, following Bloody Sunday,
54some 5,000 were reported to have marched through downtown Sydney,
while in Melbourne, the Seamen's union refused to provide docking
55facilities for the British liner Canberra.
These events were not part of a pattern —  they were not even 
repeated in Australia in the remaining years of the decade. Despite the 
large number of Australians who are of Irish descent —  one in six 
according to many estimates —  the Ulster Question but lapped at the coast 
of Australia, nearly half the world away. It was thus significant that 
in excess of some three million people should react so passively to it.
But then the whole issue did not really prove a disturbance, nor 
extract more than a reflexive response to any of the countries considered.
As of 1981 the writer had not been able to obtain information as to 
the amounts involved.
^  See Chapter 1, pp. 54-5.
53
Sydney Australian, 3 April 1975.
54
New York Times3 7 February 1972.
55
Guardian, 2 February 1972 .
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Why this should be in relation to the Irish communities in Australia 
and New Zealand is an inquiry more properly undertakn in another 
discipline. Yet if on this single point, one is permitted to venture 
a reason based on personal experience and observation of the societies 
concerned, it would be that conveyed by Hugh Moran when describing the 
reactions of his father, an Irish-Australian,to the civil war in 
Ireland when he returned there in 1922:
For him this was the final stage of his disillusionment.
He could not understand it. So back he turned gladly to 
Australia. Between him and Ireland there was now more 
than a world of miles. There were centuries, aeons, the 
span of a man's struggle and triumph in a new land.56
Hugh Moran, Viewless Winds: Being the Recollections and Digressions 
of an Australian Surgeon (London: 1939), pp. 407-8, as cited in Oliver 
MacDonagh, 'Time's Revenge and Revenge's Time: A View of Anglo-Irish 
Relations', Anglo-Irish Studies IV (1979): 10. As Professor MacDonagh 
has recorded his indebtedness to Professor K.S. Ing1 is for this 
quotation, so the writer acknowledges the former for first making him 
aware of it.
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Many times since 1968 the circus of carnage which the situation 
in Ulster has often resembled has left observers so alienated that they 
were unable to explain what their senses described. In general this 
resulted from a confrontation with conditions which were unaccustomed 
to the point of being foreign, as this recent account illustrated.
Anyone accustomed to wandering around the countries of the 
Third World would find little in Ulster that is unfamiliar. 
Guerrillas, suspended democracy, armies and gunmen on the 
streets, unthinkable behaviour in prisons, questionable 
and questioned frontiers, squal id housing, grinding poverty, 
indifferent multi-nationals, once vibrant economies in 
visible decline —  these are the essential characteristics 
of much of the contemporary world. The uniqueness of 
Northern Ireland is that it lies, not south of the equator, 
but just off the shores of Britain.1
In particular it was a consequence of the inability to understand 
why the United Kingdom —  its political system stable and democratic, its 
wealth distributed reasonably well, its society open and obsessively 
moderate —  should include within its boundaries organisations, commonly 
denoted terrorist and paramilitary, which displayed an almost autistic 
fury across their whole range of actions. Many observers, therefore, 
adopted the habit of mind which Joseph Conrad so clearly manifested in 
The Secret Agent over seventy years ago in relation to an act of 
anarchist terrorism:
a blood-stained inanity of so fatuous a kind that it was 
impossible to fathom its origins by any reasonable or 
even unreasonable process of thought.
Since 1968 it is obvious that the 'circus' and the concomitant 
refusals to countenance rational explanations for certain violent 
phenomena in Northern Ireland have been matched by extravagant 
propositions concerning the international dimensions of the conflict.
Richard Gott, 'A Foreign Land',. Guardian Weekly3 24 February 
1980, p. 4.
2
Joseph Conrad, The Secret Agent: A Simple Tale (London:
J.M. Dent, 1947), p. x.
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And in turn these propositions have struck an answering chord in 
many putative strategists and others who were attracted to studies of 
violence which have earned the appellation 'international terrorism'.
This is not to claim that the conflict in Northern Ireland was, or is, 
without its influences from outside the Six Counties —  the American 
Connection refutes this. But the evidence to hand suggests a far 
different picture than Walter Laqueuer's multinational, corporate 
view of an international terrorist operation:
... planned in West Germany by Palestine Arabs, executed 
in Israel by terrorists recruited in Japan with weapons 
acquired in Italy but manufactured in Russia, supplied 
by an Algerian diplomat, and financed with Libyan money.3
Moreover, it is the purpose of this and the succeeding chapter 
to challenge the assertions that Northern Ireland was, by virtue of its 
geographical position, of crucial strategic importance to Western 
Europe; that the international contacts of the paramilitary organisations, 
particularly the Irish Republican Army (IRA), denoted both a conspiracy 
with (essentially) communist interests to expose Western Europe from 
this position, and the existence of an international terrorist network in 
the North. The reality, it will be argued, reflected these elements with 
neither the sharpness nor intensity which the principal protagonists 
claim.
While an inquiry into the strategic significance of Northern 
Ireland may not appear to be a strict requirement of this chapter, one 
has been briefly undertaken for two reasons. The first is that many of 
the claims made in respect of the conflict are in the wider context of 
the security of Western Europe. And the second is that the outcome of 
this inquiry will support the body of arguments which will be developed 
in relation to the contacts and influences described above.
Perhaps the most extreme formulation of the conflict, and hence of 
the significance of Northern Ireland, was provided by Jeremy Harwood, who 
saw it in terms of the descruction of 'everything that civilised man holds
Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study (London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p. 324, (hereafter cited as Laqueur,
Guerrilla) .
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dear1 by the forces of 'the new Anti-Christ1. However a colleague 
of his in the Monday Club —  a group of self-described Radical Right-
5
Wingers —  resisted the temptation to see it in such apocalyptic terms, 
but only just. John Biggs-Davison found the situation in Northern 
Ireland a forerunner to the downfall of Europe: 'First subvert 
Ireland, then destroy B r i t a i n . B u t  with further time to reflect 
upon the potentialities he became more expansive. As he told his 
consti tuency
We win in Londonderry or we fight in London. Appeased 
by Conservative ministers and the plaudits of the 
socialist Opposition, the IRA grows more dangerous and 
better armed ... The 1930s have come again ... the 
Ulster war is an urban guerrilla rehearsal for Western 
Europe and first of all for Britain/
So concerned with this issue did Biggs-Davison become that in
1976 he produced a paper under the auspices of the Foreign Affairs 
Research Institute in which he claimed that:
Ireland is another of NATO's explosed flanks.
The terrorist aim [is] a European 'Cuba' across the 
Western Approaches to Britain ... [and] is also a 
threat to NATO.
Historically, Britain would have been starved out by 
the U-boats in two world wars without ports in 
Ireland.
If ... revolutionaries there were to be successful 
they could deny the West port access, over flying rights 
and an effective early warning system.
4
Jeremy Harwood, 'Ulster —  a new departure', John Biggs-Davison, 
Jonathon Guiness and Jeremy Harwood, Ireland: Our Cuba? (London: Monday 
Club, n.d.).
5 • i • i ibid.
' John Biggs-Davison, 'The.speech the People's Democracy tried to 
drown', ibid. (The speech itself was an address to the Queen's University, 
Belfast, Monday Club's inaugural meeting on 1 December 1969), Jeremy 
Harwood, Jonathon Guiness, and John Biggs-Davison, Ireland — Our Cuba? 
(London: Monday Club, n.d.), pages not numbered, hereafter cited as 
Harwood, Guiness, and Biggs-Davison, Ireland — Our Cuba?).
As reported in the Timess 19 July 1972, p. 2.
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Northern Ireland offers Britain scope for dispersal 
in the event of a nuclear exchange. In a war at sea 
lasting longer than 90 days, the airfields and harbours 
of Northern Ireland would be essential for the 
protection of North Atlantic convoys.
And thus
the separation of the province from Great Britain would 
... introduce an area of instability and danger into 
the defences of Western Europe and the Western Approaches. 
Ulster might become even more of a magnet for subversives 
of every hue. She could not be quarantined from the 
Republic or from Great Britain. There would be a widening 
threat of 'law intensity' conflict, backed by the 
resources of an alien hostile power: the Soviet bloc.9
He was not alone, nor indeed, without much benefit as was provided 
by a staunchly Conservative tradition. In 1872 Lord Salisbury had 
identified the survival of the imperial system with continued British 
control over Ireland:
Ireland must be kept, like India, at all hazards: by 
persuasion if possible; if not by force.
In 1978, with the empire virtually dissolved, the senior Conservative 
spokesman on Northern Ireland, Airey Neave, joined his junior colleague 
with a more modest claim: the province was to remain British for 'the 
implications' it held not only for national defence but also because 
'Britain's role in NATO depended in part on having ports and bases in 
Northern Ireland.'11 Constituting as they did the views of two principal 
spokesmen of the Conservative Party, these opinions must be considered 
seriously, albeit critically. But in discharging this obligation it 
becomes clear that they were fanciful rather than solidly based in 
political and strategic reality. The positions adopted simply did not 
account for the decay of strategic wisdom which was extant in 1945, nor 
were they supported with evidence which would justify them.
John Biggs-Davison, 'The Strategic Implications for the West of the 
International Links Of The IRA In Ireland', A Foreign Affairs Research 
Institute Paper, No. 17/1976 (hereafter cited as Biggs-Davison,
'Strategic Implications, etc.'), p. 5.
9 ibid. , p. 6.
1 As cited in Patrick O'Farrell, England and Ireland Since 1800 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 37.
As reported in the Irish Times3 21 August 1978, p. 8.
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If the claims of Biggs-Davison and Neave are excepted, there
appears to be an interesting omission from other British contributions
to the debate on Northern Ireland since 1968: the strategic 'necessity'
to hold the province has almost passed without mention, And this applies
particularly to arguments presented from what could reasonably be
regarded as the same side of the left-right political divide. In the
main, neither the Ulster Unionists nor the Ulster Defence Association
(UDA) have used strategic arguments in support of their respective
positions. As recently as February 1980 the Ulster Unionist MP, Enoch
Powell, and the Supreme Commander of the UDA, Andy Tyrie, wrote
articles for a Guardian Weekly feature on Ulster without in any way
12invoking such considerations. Furthermore, the only occasion on 
which they appear to have received any prominence in official (government) 
deliberation was the 1972 discussion paper, and that stated no more than:
... Northern Ireland should not offer a base for any 
external threat to the security of the United 
Kingdom.13
It should be noted that this was the paper which first mentioned 
the 'Irish dimension'. It was an early expression of a Conservative 
Government's willingness to attempt an imaginative, even radical settle­
ment to the Ulster Question. As was argued earlier, it also represented
the Heath Government's acknowledgment that lasting peace in a politically
14divided Ireland might not be possible. It therefore contemplated
the possibility of a united Ireland, and as the above passage confirmed,
in strategic terms which were purely negative: there was no mention of
over-flying rights, access to ports, the provision of bases, or, for the
matter of that, the provision of any facility in time of war or emergency.
Indeed, the British Government subsequently began a gradual run-down of
15its defence establishments in Northern Ireland. Hence, unless recourse
Enoch Powell, 'Test of Britain's Will to be a Nation'; and Andy 
Tyrie, 'Independence is the Only Alternative', Guardian Weekly, 24 
February 1980, p. 5.
13
The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion (London: 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972), p. 32.
^  See Chapter 2, p. 112-14.
15 Examples of which were given in Chapter 3, p. 172.
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is made to a sort of Sherlock Holmes doctrine of strategy —  whereby the 
significance of strategic considerations is (like the dog's bark) to be 
inferred from its absence —  then it becomes apparent that British/Western 
European security was not seen as greatly dependent on what Northern 
Ireland had to offer.
Confirmation of this was also provided by the 1978 closure of the
United States naval communication base at Clooney Park in Derry's
Waterside, and its ancillary station at Benbradagh (near Dungiven) in
the Sperrin Mountains. Since the early 1960s these facilities had
reportedly provided both the VLF link with US nuclear submarines and
an unspecified service to the National Security Agency's headquarters
at Fort Meade, Maryland. Its role may also have included electronic
17 18
intelligence based in part upon SOSUS and CAESAR networks laid
19between Iceland and Ireland. However, with the onset of satellite
20communication, the introduction of CAPTOR, and the development of a
communications establishment at Thurso in Scotland, all operations from
21Clooney Park/Benbradagh ceased in 1977. With that event the US 
military presence in Ireland ceased. Later in conjunction with British 
statements and actions, it v/as again evident that no great strategic 
value attached to Northern Ireland.
16 Very Low Frequency —  a signal-type commonly used to communicate 
with submerged submarines.
Sonor Surveillance System: a major fixed underwater passive 
acoustic submarine detection and classification system, .comprising a 
series of hydrophones and special sonars linked by cable to shore-based 
installations that process received signals.
18 CAESAR: A system of bottom-mounted, upward-listening, inter­
connected sonars.
19 'Spying from Sperrin', Hibernia, 9 March 1978. Certainly by 1979 
Northern Ireland appeared to have no significance in relation to current 
trends in anti-submarine warfare. A map of 'known and presumed' 
locations of US and allied sea-bottom sonar arrays published in that year 
did not show them to be in any close proximity to the Six Counties.
[Word Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1979 (London: Taylor 
and Francis, 1979), p. 429.]
20 CAPTOR (encapsulated torpedo): A mine casing containing a US Mark 46 
torpedo instead of ordinary explosive, thus permitting an attack at much 
greater range.
21
'Spying from Sperrin', Hibernia, 9 March 1978.
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The significance of the international contacts of the parami1itary 
organisations in Northern Ireland is not so easily dismissed. Neither, 
by the same token, is it so easily established. However, they may be 
regarded as having existed at two levels. The lower3 or less important, 
of many cases it denoted no more than a loose association, or close 
proximity, which occasionally and temporarily matured into an actual 
meeting. It was as though the various organisations were agitated, as 
in Brownian motion, and that they were therefore subject to the 
probability of contact by virtue of existing as somewhat like particles 
in a common and restricted universe. When their paths, which seldom if 
ever obeyed the same compass, coincided, there was generally cause for 
concern as though it signified the conjunction of evil. In reflection 
upon such events, former Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave was of the opinion
that 'alien influences' had been at work in the North-South Border
22region. Exactly what he meant by 'alien' was unclear, but he never­
theless could have pointed to a curious assortment of interested parties 
in support of his view.
It seems that once the situation in Northern Ireland had established
its credentials as a conflict —  i.e. as a shooting match —  it attracted
the attention and, it is alleged, the attendance of the acolytes of war.
The appeal of some of these rested upon their past exploits, as with
Otto Skorzeny, a former Nazi SS Colonel who was wanted for war crimes
in his native Austria, and whose principal claim to notoriety v/as his
leadership of the raid to rescue Mussolini after the fall of the Fascist
Government in 1943. Twenty-eight years later he v/as linked with
Ruairi 0 Bradaigh of Provisional Sinn Fein. Despite Skorzeny's apparent
sympathy, however, the significance of his interest in the Northern
conflict existed very largely in the collective imagination of the
editorial staff of the Sunday Telegraph. All that that publication
could muster to justify its article on him was an unconfirmed report of
23a meeting with 0 Bradaigh in Spain.
Interview with Liam Cosgrave, Taoiseach from 1973-77, Dublin,
8 June 1978.
23
Sunday Telegraph, 31 October 1971, pp. 1 and 3.
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also came up with a World War II figure in support of their cause. In
241977 John McQuade, a former Chindit, claimed he had formed a secret
25'army' that would 'seek out and destroy' the Provisional IRA in Ulster. 
Evidently he was unsuccessful; indeed his only success may have been 
in securing a lengthy two-column coverage in the Daily Telegraph.
McQuade in any case was a Northerner and his enterprise was probably 
more notable for what it negatively emphasised —  that reports of 
foreign interest generally related to the IRA. But they did not always 
concern themselves with figures from the past.
According to Father O'Neill of St Eugene's Roman Catholic 
Cathedral in Derry, two North Koreans and an Algerian (not to mention a 
number of Englishmen), were present among the Provisional gunmen of
p r
Creggan and the Bogside in 1972. In 1977 a further measure of
notoriety was added to the Republican cause with disclosures made in the
Old Bailey of approaches made to a former member of the Parachute
Regiment and Angolan mercenary recruiter, John Banks, for the supply of
arms. As with so many of the instances cited in this and the following
chapter it was, for the IRA, an indiscriminate move. Everybody and
everything ended up in the wrong place: Banks in the service of the
Special Branch; British Provisionals in the Old Bailey, and later, gaol;
27and the arms in (probably) Antwerp.
However the IRA has not been without its 'successes'. According to 
David Barzilay, it was 'known' that the organisation had attracted two 
'foreign' electronics experts to work upon sophisticated trigger
28mechanisms for a bombing campaign to be conducted in Northern Ireland.
He also claimed that these experts were not to be found in the North but
'in the South', an allegation which appeared to be based on unspecified
29information provided to him by the British Army. Nevertheless, for
Much later in the period under review, Protestant militants
The name given to Wingate's special guerrilla force in Burma.
25
Daily Telegraph, 8 February 1977.
26
BBC Radio 4 Programme, 'Today', as cited in Clutterbuck, Protest 
and the Urban Guerrilla, pp. 217-18.
27
Daily Telegraph, 7 April 1977, and Guardian, 7 April 1977.
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those who were convinced that the Republic was a 'haven for terrorists' 
one subsequent allegation put the matter beyond doubt and confirmed 
Barzilay's cryptic reference to such people being 'very well 
protected'.
In his machinations to avoid a United States deportation order, 
a former Provo 'active', Peter McMullen, stated to the Boston Globe 
that the IRA had received training and encouragement from a regular 
Irish Army colonel in precisely the same type (photo-cell and radio- 
controlled) of explosive devices which Barzilay referred to the previous 
year. He also claimed that some of the electronic components were
31provided by an Irish television manufacturer sympathetic to the cause.
Naturally the Irish Army rejected these allegations out of hand, while
32McMullen, for his part, denied knowledge of the officer's identity.
It is difficult, therefore, to draw from the evidence a conclusion of
33any strength. Hence the most balanced which could be stated, of the 
period 1969-74 anyway, may be that of Lieutenant-Colonel George Styles, 
the commander of the British Army bomb disposal teams in Northern 
Ireland in that period:
... really we never could prove or disprove the rumours 
about foreign mercenaries. But, pressed to an opinion,
I'd say it's more than likely they existed ...34-
Notwithstanding this, one conclusion which may be drawn is that it 
is not always helpful to look beyond the borders of the United Kingdom,
Irish. Times, 28 September 1978.
29 .... ibid.
30 .... ibid.
31
Boston Globe, 7 September 1979, p. 2.
32 .... ibid.
33 Doubts about the reliability of McMullen's revelations also contribute 
to this difficulty. One interview source advised the writer that McMullen's 
statements, which appeared as a series in the Boston Globe, were a mixture 
of truth and falsehood. Unfortunately, without the several articles on 
hand the interviewee was unable to specify exactly what party should or 
should not be accepted. However the writer has found several inconsis­
tencies in McMullen's accounts, the most important of which will be noted 
in the course of this and the following chapter, wherever McMullen's 
claims are referred to.
34 /George Styles, Bombs Have No Pity: My War Against Terrorism (London:
William Luscombe, 1975), p.Ill (hereafter cited as Styles, Bombs Have No
Pity).
523
nor even the island of Ireland, for instances of external links to the 
'troubles'. Strictly speaking, of course, the Republic is a foreign 
country in relation to the United Kingdom, but given the unique 
relationship which exists between it, Great Britain, and Northern 
Ireland, it may seem a contrivance to classify as international or 
external linkages from the Republic and Great Britain into Northern 
Ireland. Also, it might be argued that, in this instance, North-South 
distinctions are meaningless. Provisionals on either side of the 
Border belong to the same organisation, and both the British and Irish 
Governments have recognised this. Further, that it would involve an 
unnecessary and meaningless division of labour to impose a North-South 
framework upon an analysis of the contacts between both wings of the 
IRA and various organisations in Britain. Yet such an approach (which 
regards Irish and British contacts as external) does serve one very 
useful purpose: it goes some little distance towards disposing of the 
notion that the linkages to the conflict were all to Irish or alien 
influences; that there were not also British influences at work. This 
view, it will be argued, can only be sustained if Britons who took their 
political inspiration from (say) Marx or Mao were held to have forfeited 
their nationality. This is not to claim that the role of such local 
groups as will be considered was significant, rather that they existed, 
and that to exclude them would result in a distortion of the analysis 
herein undertaken.
About one million people of Irish birth, and many more of Irish
35extraction, live in Britain. Among them both factions of the IRA have 
attempted to establish political organisations to organise fund-raising, 
social events, demonstrations and propaganda, but without notable success. 
Some of these activities have been restricted by the Prevention of 
Terrorism legislation under which support for, or soliciting by a 
proscribed organisation is illegal. However, a number of organisations 
sympathetic to the IRA have managed to exist —  such as Provisional Sinn 
Fein, Clann na hEireann (loyal to the Officials), and the Prisoners Aid 
Committee. The effectiveness of each of these organisations, and the 
splinter groups which their internal tensions occasionally generated, was
j  j
Kevin O'Connor, The Irish In Britain , rev. ed., (Dublin: Gill and 
Macmillan, 1974), p. 152.
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nevertheless limited. Disunity and a revulsion against the violence 
in both Northern Ireland and on the mainland ensured their rejection 
by the majority of the Irish community in Britain, who felt that its 
standing was endangered.
Partly as a consequence of this and partly as a matter of
strategy, Provisional IRA supporters also attempted to find common
cause with small non-Irish groups in Britain which shared its basic
aim of securing the withdrawal of the British Army from Northern
Ireland. Although they failed in their attempts to get support from the
British Withdrawal from Northern Ireland Campaign, which argued against
a British military presence in the province from a radical pacifist
36position, some was given by the Troops Out Movement, formed in 
September 1973, to campaign mainly within the trade union movement to 
make withdrawal a demand of the British working people.
In addition, the International Marxist Group (IMG), the
International Socialists, and other small Trotskyist and ultra-left
groups which formed the hard-core support for the Troops Out Movement,
generally supported the Provisionals as a supposedly 'anti-imperialist'
force, but in practice they also criticised the IRA's more indiscriminate
acts of violence, particularly in Britain. So far as the IRA has been
concerned the value of their support was, in any event, questionable. At
best it was lent by groups whose fissile tendencies were frequently
in evidence and whose efforts in support of the Republican cause
consisted of single-issue campaigns which exhibited no great staying 
37power.
Two reasons were primarily responsible for this state of affairs. 
The first stemmed from the British revolutionary-1eft conviction, 
reinforced by successive collapses of authority, that Northern Ireland 
was Britain's Achilles heel and that it must fall to revolutionary forces
Peter Shipley, Revolutionaries In Modern Britain (London: Bodley 
Head, 1976), p. 197 (hereafter cited as Shipley, Revolutionaries In
Modern Bri ta in ).
37
For examples: the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign (1969), 
the Irish Solidarity Campaign (1970), and the Anti-Internment League 
(1971).
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before the same process can succeed on the mainland. Thus there was 
less interest in the revolutionary merits of the Northern Ireland 
situation than in the instructions it provided for future British 
revolutionaries when the time came for them to act. And the second 
reason even questioned that likelihood, as Peter Shipley observed in 
1976:
British revolutionaries seem little inclined at the 
present time to engage seriously in that most 
characteristic form of modern city-based revolutionism, 
urban guerrilla warfare. There is much discussion of 
terrorism in other parts of the world, mainly to learn 
from its mistakes as a part of revolutionary strategy; 
there has also been a reaction against the horrific 
campaigns of terror carried out by Irish extremists ...39
Of course it v/as frequently suggested that these groups were in 
league with the established Communist parties in Ireland and Britain, 
and hence that the sinister hand of the Kremlin guided their activities. 
Certainly Irish and British Communists saw Ireland as a classic victim 
of British imperialism, no different in essence from British colonies in 
other continents, but their assessments of the troubles in the North 
met with problems. In particular, Communists and Marxists had the 
difficulty of reconciling their 'imperialist' interpretation (implying 
a continuing struggle betweenBritish 'imperialists' and 'oppressed' 
Irish) with the conflict between two separate local communities. Their 
objective therefore was to replace sectarian with class conflict, 
although the results v/ere often the opposite of what was intended, as 
Conor Cruise O'Brien pointed to:
The effect of their efforts, gestures and language ... has 
been to raise the level of sectarian consciousness. They 
have encouraged the Catholics and helped them to win 
important and long-overdue reforms. They have frightened 
and angered Protestants and if their efforts could be 
continued on the same lines and with the same kind of
38 Shipley, Revolutionaries Tn Modern Britains pp. 24, 118-19 and
123.
39 ibid., p. 215.
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success, they would bring to the people of the province 
and the island, not class-revolution but sectarian 
civil war. And in fact, even at present, language and 
gestures which are subjectively revolutionary but have 
appeal only within one sectarian community, are objectively 
language and gestures of sectarian civil war.^O
The outbreak of the current disturbances, which split the IRA, 
did however have the opposite effect on Irish Communists. In March 
1970, the old Communist Party of Northern Ireland merged with the 
Irish Worker's Party in the Republic to form the Communist Party 
of Ireland (CPI). Although it favours an eventually united Ireland, 
the CPI took a cautious line on partition in deference to the 
predominantly Protestant complexion of its Northern Irish membership.
It criticised the Provisional IRA’s campaign for destroying any 
immediate hope of a united, non-sectarian, working-class movement, and 
by implication recognised the importance of British troops in combatting 
terrorism by calling for their withdrawal to barracks only, not their 
immediate withdrawal from the Province as a whole. (Individual Irish 
Communists accepted the protection of the troops while participating 
in 'back to work' marches during the Ulster Workers' Council strike of 
May 1974). On most issues, including opposition to emergency legislation 
and advocacy of a Northern Ireland 'Bill of Rights', its policy was 
identical to that of Official Sinn Fein and both organisations used the 
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association as a conduit, some would say 
a 'front', organisation to promote their views.
The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and the Communist 
Party of Ireland have hitherto had similar views on Northern Ireland, 
reinforced by frequent meetings between the leaders of the two parties 
and the issuing of joint communiques. The CPGB, in common with the CPI, 
resisted calls for the immediate withdrawal of British troops but unlike 
the CPI experience, it led to an open disagreement with one of its most 
senior 'front' organisations —  the British Peace Committee (BPC) —  which, 
ignoring the party line, joined with the Trotskyist-inclined Troops Out
40
Panther°ni 9 7 4 r lne ?qB n fn ’ S\atc\l-°[ lr'.°iand (F™gmore, St Albans, Herts: 
Marxists ’ P - • * ^ Rlc,iard R°ses's comment on the role of
StS 3 d Communists in his Northern Ireland: A Time o f  Choice
Choice), ,llan’ 1976)’ P- 67 (hereafter cited as Rose, A rime of
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Movement to stage a major demonstration in London on 27 October 1974.
The subsequent debate (between October and December 1974)  in the pages 
of the CPGB newspaper Morning Star again emphasised the tendency for the 
Communists to succumb to 'paralysis by analysis'. Indeed, so much was 
this the case that the existence of those British revolutionary groups 
previously mentioned was, according to Shipley, an indication of a 
general dissatisfaction with the lack of activist fervour on the part 
of the Communists.
For many the deftness of improvisation has itself become 
a test of revolutionary purpose and the group least 
prepared to adjust its methods, invariably the Communist 
Party, has been the one least regarded on the left as 
revolutionary. Throughout the period ... the Communist 
Party has remained the largest single organisation on the 
far left and has also been the reluctant progenitor of 
so many other enterprises.41
And as for external control of these 'other enterprises', the same 
writer found:
The British movement ... is fervently internationalist 
in outlook; indeed obsessively so, to balance its 
otherwise parochial domestic roots and the introspective 
intensity of so many of its members. There is however 
very little evidence to support any notion of a 
centralised conspiracy organised by foreign powers to 
control the activities of any British revolutionary 
groups, or that revolutionaries are responsive to such
wishes.42
Thus there was no reason to doubt, nor correspondingly, little reason 
to be alarmed at Airey Neave's claimed possession of the names of twenty
organisations active in Northern Ireland which had links with the
43 . . .
Communist Party. Neither the IRA nor the British and Irish Communists,
nor the British revolutionaries have been able to successfully exploit
the opportunity for association which has been theirs for more than a
decade.
Shipley, Revolutionaries In Modern Britains p. 24.  
ibid., p. 215.
Daily Telegraph3 16 September 1976.
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Further afield —  in Western Europe -  a similar association of
both wings of the IRA with various ultra-left groups was reported. It
44included Provisional links with Red Aid and the Fourth International
45in Brussels, the alleged existence of a 'West German Committee' of the 
Official IRA,^6 and reciprocal support by various Trotskyite spokesmen 
for the Provisionals' activities. ^  And in a fittingly left-handed 
compliment to the Fourth International connection, a new affiliate, the 
Revolutionary Marxist Group (RMG), v/as established in Ireland in 1972.
Its principal activities appear to have been the despatch of Gerry 
Lawless, the IMG's Irish expert, to Trotskyist groups on the continent, 
and a visit to Dublin by Ernest Mandel, the Fourth International leader.
In so far as West Germany was concerned, the above reference v/as 
probably to the West German/Ireland Solidarity Committee, set up by a 
number of extreme left-wing bodies in 1972, and which grew to be the 
most active of all West European IRA support groups. Apart from 
directing propaganda activities, it collected contributions for Ireland 
and supported a campaign to urge British troops to desert. Up to the end 
of 1974 it supported Official Sinn Fein and IRA, but then transferred its 
allegiance to the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP), People's 
Democracy (PD), and the Provisionals. It also extended its activities 
both inside West Germany and in other European countries. Within the 
scope of the former it played a leading role in arranging the joint 
Sinn Fein/PD/IRSP European Tour of May and June 1975, and later in that 
year staged a 'Republican Exhibition' in Paris.
An anarchist organisation dedicated to 'armed struggle in West 
European countries as a necessary part of the struggle of people all 
over the v/orld, aimed at destroying Capitalism to be replaced by 
Socialism'. See Peter Janke, 'The Response To Terrorism', Royal United 
Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), Ten Years of Terrorism: 
Collected views (London: RUSI, 1979), pp. 24-5 (hereafter cited as 
RUSI, Ten Years of Terrorism) .
45
Albert Parry, Terror;sm: From Robespierre to Arafat (New York: 
Vanguard Press, 1976), pp. 171-2 (hereafter cited as Parry, Terrorism).
46
Dnihj Telegraph, 6 June 1972.
47
Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), 
p. 201 (hereafter cited as Laqueur, Terrorism).
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Publicity for the IRA in other countries generally followed this
pattern in as much as it v/as usually handled by local left-wing groups,
or by the IRA Solidarity Committees which they established. In Italy
the most active group v/as the anarchist Lotta Continua (Continuing
48
Struggle), which used a film (made jointly v/ith PD), a photographic
exhibition and other publicity devices to draw attention to 'repression'
in Northern Ireland. Fulvio Grimaldi, a journalist and leading member
of Lotta Continua, addressed meetings in the province and v/as present
49during the Bloody Sunday demonstration of January 1972. Later that 
year a Provisional IRA party which included Dolours Price (currently 
serving life imprisonment for her part in the London bombings of March 
1973) visited Italy under Lotta Continua auspices, but was then 
expelled by the Italian Government. Both PD and the Provisional IRA 
were represented at Lotta Continua's first national congress in Italy 
in January 1975, and four months later two Provisional functionaries, 
Richard Behai and Sean Keenan, v/ere in contact with Lotta Continua, the 
Maoist II Manifesto group, and others in the course of another visit.
In France a Committee for the Liberation of the Irish People was 
set up early in 1972. At its first public demonstration in Paris on 
10 February 1972, there were strong representations from the Trotskyist 
Lique Communiste and the unorthdox Communist Party of Brittany. The 
committee operated from the Paris address of Temoignage Chretien, an 
organisation which had also arranged conference and propaganda activities 
in favour of the Palestinian cause and against the Vietnam war.
But contacts v/ere also established between the IRA and 
organisations whose concept of action exceeded the type of tired debate 
v/hich could be had on any evening of the v/eek in Queen's, Trinity, or 
Liberty Hall. In the early 1970s the Officials claimed the support of 
fourteen self-styled national liberation movements, among them the Front
Entitled 'Ireland: The Flashpoint of Europe'.
49
He also presented to the Widgery tribunal bullets allegedly fired 
by the security forces during the demonstration; forensic evidence later 
showed that markings on them 'were consistent v/ith having been fired into 
sand' [lr;r,h Timer,, 15 [larch 1972).
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for the Liberation of Quebec and the Republic Army of Brittany.
Later, Provisionals v/ere reported to have attended demonstrations in
Brittany alongside local groups, and in 1971 a special committee,
Secours Populaire Interceltique, v/as established to collect contributions
for 'distress relief' in Ireland. Representatives from both groups (and
51the Basque ETA) are also knov/n to have met in Belgium.
While it may seem from the foregoing that there was little that
distinguished one wing of the IRA from the other in their contacts at
this level, there v/ere two primary differences, both of v/hich should
be seen as extending from general, rather than absolute principles
proclaimed by the Officials. The first v/as a sympathy for more orthodox,
pro-Soviet Communism, but this did not preclude their willingness to
identify v/ith a wide range of revolutionary causes. The second, which
was not altogether consistent with such associations, was the Officials'
29 May 1972 unilateral declaration of a ceasefire (excluding 'defence
52and retaliation') to v/hich they still adhere. At best this second
measure, and their avoidance of 'anyone ... having sympathy with the
53Provisionals', was a partial recognition of the dangers warned of by
Mairin de Burca, Joint Secretary of Official Sinn Fein, of 'becoming
identified in international affairs with small groups of people with
54handfuls of gelignite.'
In the subsequent hiatus in 'military' operations the Officials 
contented themselves v/ith attempts to maintain and develop the links which 
they had earlier established. Chief of Staff, Cathal Goulding, had 
interviews printed in Trotskyist publications in Britain and overseas, and 
Seamus Costello (since murdered), during his period as Adjutant-General,
50
Richard Ned Lebow, 'Ireland', Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, 
and John G. Stoessinqer, Divided Nations in A Divided World (New York: 
David McKay, 1974), p. 250, hereafter cited as Lebow, 'Ireland').
51 Parry, Terrorism> p. 407.
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J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA 1016-1079, revised and 
updated ed., (Dublin: Academy Press, 1979), p. 388 (hereafter cited as 
Bell, Th>' Secret Army).
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Sean 0 Cionnaith (Sean Kenny), Director of International Affairs for 
Official Sinn Fein, as reported in the Irish Times3 28 January 1976.
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had extensive links with ultra-left revolutionaries arising from his 
attendance at an international meeting organised by the Italian 'Workers' 
Power', in Florence in 1971.
Thus encouraged, in July and August 1974, Sean 0 Cionnaith (Sean
Kenny), Director of International Affairs, staged a widely advertised
'International Anti-Imperialist Festival' in Dublin and Belfast which
was intended, in part, to win over some of the Provisionals' left-wing
supporters abroad. In the event the only foreign organisations to send
delegates were the Republican Clubs of the United States and Canada,
Clann na hEireann from Britain, a handful of left-wing extremist and
separatist groups from Western Europe, and 'liberation movements' from
Puerto Rico and Rhodesia. Total attendance fell far short of the 200
expected by the organisers, which tended to support Frederick Hacker's
55view that it 'simply fizzled out.'
Undaunted, 0 Cionnaith scheduled a further Festival at the same
venues for 1976, and claimed early in that year that 1700 invitations
56had been sent out. However, a lack of subsequent references to this
proposed event suggest that, if anything, the success enjoyed by it, if
57indeed it was held, was even less than its predecessor.
But by 1976 the Officials had long ceased to be a force in the 
conflict. By then they had, in Bell's description, 'moved on into
Frederick J. Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and 
Terrorism In Our Time (New York: Norton, 1976), p. 37 (hereafter cited 
as Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies).
56 According to Hacker, a secret convention was held in Trieste, Italy, 
in 1974, of 'various ethnic groups, including Croats, Corsicans, Basques, 
Irish, and Welsh', together with 'representatives of terrorist 
organisations' (ibid.). However he does not distinguish between Official 
and Provisional Irish, and from published sources it has not been possible 
to accurately assess the importance of this gathering.
57
In flay 1978, the Northern Ireland Secretary, Roy Mason, made a 
passing reference to an 'anti-repression' conference having been held 
earlier that year. Like Hacker, he did not specify what arm of the IRA was 
responsible for it, and once again, the indications were that the event 
itself was not viewed, by the British Government at least, as being 
significant [Pariiamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Official 
Report, vol. 949, 11 May 1978, col. 1378 (hereafter cited as House of 
Commons, Official Report) ] .
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58discourse and ideological orthodoxy' according to Marxism-Leninism.
While this is not to deny that they could once more become a violent 
force in Northern Ireland, it is to accept Bell's view that the
Officials were, as early as the end of 1974, 'getting out of the secret
59army business'. For the purposes of this chapter, therefore, their 
prominence diminishes sharply in the categories v/hich will be 
examined in the following pages.
From the outset of this section of the discussion it was 
emphasised that the contacts to be discussed v/ere at a lower, or less 
important level, and, it is submitted, the evidence confirmed this. As 
Lebow observed, 'none of this support ... has been very meaningful. ' ^
And for those who are distrustful of such academic assessments there 
was always the 'insiders' viewpoint of these links, as expressed by 
Maria McGuire:
... they v/ere mostly rather unconvincing people: 
all they seem to want was to express their solidarity 
with us. We didn't want their sympathy —  we were only 
interested in concrete help.61
The difference between these groups and those considered in the 
next section is drawn principally from their capabilities, and sometimes, 
their intentions. This is to say that the linkages established (or 
reported) particularly in 1972 and 1973, assumed a great significance 
because the IRA was seen to be in contact v/ith groups which had 
demonstrated their ability to engage in sustained campaigns of violence 
similar in many respects to those of the former. As with the groups 
mentioned earlier, however, there was one element of striking similarity:
they comprised an almost kaleidoscopic selection of the terrorist spectrum.
62 63West German 'free-1ancers', the (Italian) Podere Operai, Japanese
58
Bell, The Secret Army, p. 413.
ibid., p. 414.
^  Lebow, 'Ireland', p. 250.
61 Maria McGuire, To Take Arms: A Year In The Provisional TRA 
(London: MacMillan, 1973), p. 110 (hereafter cited as McGuire, To Take
Arms).
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radicals^ (including the Japanese United Revolutionary Army^ and 
the Japanese Red Army^), the Turkish People's Liberation Army,^ the 
Iranian Liberation Front,^he Tupamaros,^9 and of course the mandatory 
influence of the Baader-Meinhof gang^ were all reported as somehow 
involved or interested in Northern conflict through the IRA. There 
was also mention of a meeting at San Sebastian, Spain, in February 
1979, between the Provisionals and members of OUT, the Portuguese 
Workers' unitary organisation.^1
Other contacts were developed by People's Democracy wh.ich, under
the influence of local Marxists and London-based International
Socialists, came to regard itself as part of the mainstream of world
revolutionary and student protest movements. Also interested was the
(British) International Marxist Group whose contribution was to help
stimulate the interest of foreign revolutionary groups through its
72liaison with the Fourth International in Brussels.
To this point the contacts, although with a different class of
organisation, in effect signified no more than those considered at the
first level. But the presence at San Sebastian of Euskal Izaultzarako
73Alderia (EIA) - the Basque Revolutionary Party — highlighted the common
64 Vail], Exprer.n, 17 March 1973.
65 Biggs-Davison, 'Strategic Implications, etc.', p. 4.
Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism: International Dimensionss Conflict 
Studies No.113 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979), p.8.
ibid., and Biggs-Davison, 'Strategic Implications,etc.', p.4.
ibid.
ibid.
ibid., and 'Terrorists' , East-West Digest, 7 (April 1978): 251
Peter Janke, Ulster: A Decade of Violence, Conflict Studies No.108, 
(London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979), p.14, (hereafter 
cited as Janke, A Dccade of Violence).
72 Anthony M. Burton, Urban Terrorism: Theory, Practice and Response 
(London: Leo Cooper, 1975), p. 189 (hereafter cited as Burton, Urban
Terrorism).
73
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cause macie by the Provisional IRA with a number of West European 
separatist groups which claimed to represent minority nationalities 
suffering from repression.
Over the period of the current conflict, the Provisionals'
journal has identified '30 nations' inWestern Europe in addition to
the 'four nations of these islands' which were struggling for 'a new
74set of equalised relationships.' In April 1972, the IRA, the Basque
75Eusadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) —  Basque People and Liberty —  and the
76Breton FLB were reported to have signed a political agreement which
was followed some two years later by a statement which embraced other,
smaller national minorities, such as the Piedmontese.  ^ Via the
auspices of the appropriate Sinn Fein, the Officials and various
ethnic groupings followed suit with the socialist equivalent in
78September 1974, known to initiates as 'The Brest Charter'. What this
brief catalogue of IRA-Basque contacts foreshadowed was confirmed by a
deeper study: the Officials lined up with a 'socialist revolutionary
party' in which the operative term was 'socialist', while the
Provisionals found common ground with a 'socialist revolutionary party'
79which supported 'armed actions' and 'refuses reformism'.
Although there were further similarities in their respective 
stands on national sovereignty and independence, and other areas besides,
80
^  An Phoblcchty 17 May 1974.
75 The ETA has been subject to numerous splits —  one of which led to 
the founding of EIA.
nc
Paris Politique Hebdo3 29 June 1972.
An Phobiaaht3 6 September 1974.
Galician, Breton, and Welsh groupings were represented in company 
with Official Sinn Fein and Herriko Alderi Socialista Iraultalea —  
People's Revolutionary Socialist Party —  to sign a 'Declaration on the 
struggle against colonialism in Western Europe' [Roger Faligot, 'Basques, 
Sinn Fein and the Brest Charter', Hibernias 20 January 1978, p. 12 
(hereafter cited as Faligot, 'Basques, Sinn Fein and the Brest Charter')]
i bi d .
80 . . . .ibid.
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it was the willingness of both the IRA and the (then) ETA to reciprocate
with firearms and technical (explosives) expertise that placed this link
in an altogether different category from those discussed previously.
Contact between the two organisations dates back at least to 1972 when
Jose Echebarrieia, one of ETA's most influential members, was reported
to have made two secret visits to Dublin to seek contact with both the
Officials and the Provisionals. According to Maria McGuire, Basque
leaders met Sean MacStiofain and in exchange for training in the use of
81explosives, provided 50 revolvers. For years, however, this was the
sole item of substance upon which wild speculations were made of an
IRA-ETA network. Yet the resemblance in the technical field, between
the assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister, Admiral Luis Carrera
Blanco, in December 1973, and that of the British Ambassador in Dublin,
82Christopher Ewart-Biggs, three years later, gave further credence to 
the Spanish Police's 1974 claim of the existence of a secret pact
oo
between the two.
Whether, as was alleged (but denied by the ETA), the IRA supplied
the explosives used in the former, or as Parry implies, the IRA trained
84the ETA on a continuing basis is, like so many questions in this area,
undertermined. Both were possible but neither necessarily followed. As
to the former, explosives appear not to have been an overly difficult
material for terrorists to obtain in the last decade, and with regard
to the latter, a training in explosives was surely within the range of
competence of the ETA once they had learned the first lessons. Besides,
there is no record of further 'quid pro quo' exchanges after that
mentioned by McGuire. Since the time of Ewart-Biggs' death, the
IRA-ETA/EIA link has been somewhat less substantial and confined to an
85exchange of visits and congratulatory statements. In marked contrast
McGuire, To Take Arms, pp. 71 and 110.
82 Both were killed by the detonation of an under-the-road explosive 
device as their respective motor vehicles passed over it.
83
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to the rhetoric which such instances of international terrorist 
co-operation have often attracted, the IRA's association with Western 
Europe would appear to have yielded little practically. As Peter 
Janke concluded of them:
The point about these links and one could go on 
adducing evidence of contacts, is that it is not at 
all an international revolutionary conspiracy, but 
rather a network of tiny groups acting illegally that 
comes across one another in their search for arms and 
are prepared to help when called upon for a meal, a 
night's shelter, an overcoat, a hair dye or a railway 
ticket.
This conclusion is even more certain in respect of Ear,tern Europe,
and covers the rather erratic ventures made by the Soviet Union into
the 'troubles'. To say that Soviet propaganda organs have consistently
distorted events in Northern Ireland to conform to a pre-conceived
pattern of a popular uprising by an oppressed community against 'British
imperialism', is an understatement. Indeed they so grossly misrepresented
87the situation that their pronouncements were ludicrous. (Similarly,
the Soviet Government's attempts to provide support for stands taken
by the Irish Government, have been clumsy and quite inimical to the
88interests of those they sought to assist. ) Notwithstanding this, and 
the need to develop friendly relations with Ireland (with which it 
established diplomatic relations in 1974), Moscow has maintained a 
cautious public attitude towards the Official IRA and a critical one in 
relation to the Provisionals.
To Constantine Fitzgibbon the rough similarity in ideological
Peter Janke, 'The Response to Terrorism', Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), Ten Years Of Terrorism: Collected 
Views (London: RUSI, 1979), p. 25.
87 See Dev Murarka, 'Moscow Takes A New Look at Ulster', The Observer 
Foreign News Service, No.30023, 24 March 1972; and 'Soviet Distortions On 
Northern Ireland', February 1977, a paper held by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, and noted 'Source Not Known'. In the 
writer's opinion, this second paper, which juxtaposes Soviet comment with 
verifiable fact was produced by British Government authorities for general 
distribution to offices and personnel who might have a need to refute 
Soviet allegations.
See Chapter 6 concerning the Soviet 'support' lent to Ireland at the 
United Nations in 1969.
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but one conclusion: the Red IRA ... [is] now under the control
89of international Communism as directed from Moscow'. This must
have seemed even more so when Moscow's approval of the Officials was
manifest in two lengthy interviews with Chief of Staff, Cathal
Goulding, in Pravda, in April 1972; and when, in return, the Officials'
journal. United. Irishman, identified itself with Soviet policies which
included the treatment of dissidents and, retrospectively, the 1968
invasion of Czechoslovakia. Thus Parry, ever the alarmist, also
adhered to the position taken some four years earlier by Fitzgibbon,
but then he went further and maintained that the Officials, and by
extension, Moscow, 'had their tabs and even controls on the
90Provisionals.'
Despite the fact that bedfel1owship between them and the Soviets
was unlikely, the temptation to speculate upon its existence proved the
early 1970s to be vintage years for conspiracy. First, Foreign Report,
in January 1973, propagated the line that the Russians 'seemed willinq
91to help', and in the following month, two British journalists discovered
92the workings of the KGB in the planning of an IRA bombing campaign.
But Parry, based his observations on the 'voices of informed
suspicion' and appeared, therefore, to exclude the rigorous examination
93which his conclusions demanded. Foreign Report and the Daily Telegraph 
were even less forthcoming, but whereas the former's assessment was 
expressed as speculation, the latter's claim rested on alleged 
intelligence passed from London to Dublin. The absence of subsequent 
disclosures which would confirm either or both may be taken as an 
indication of just how accurate these two sources were on this particular
inspiration between Soviet Communism and Official socialism betokened
Constantine Titzgibbon, Red Hand: The Ulster Colony (London: 
Michael Joseph, 1971), p. 319.
Of)
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What they, Parry, and Fitzgibbon disregarded was a knowledge of 
conditions in Northern Ireland. As Conor Cruise O'Brien wrote
aspect of the Northern Ireland conflict.
In fact it does not appear that either the 'Green' or 
the 'Red' IRA is under the control of anything —  
certainly not of anything so remote and exotic as 
'International Communism ... directed from Moscow'.
This is the equivalent of the theory that the men of 
1916 were in the pay of Berlin. In reality, Irish 
rebels have responded to Irish situations in their own 
way, sometimes borrowing rhetoric and ideology from 
abroad, and often looking there for weapons and other 
aid, but seldom amenable to outside advice. In any case,
Moscow, like Rome (or even Dublin), would find it 
difficult to assess each crisis arising in Ardoyne or 
Andersontown in time for its advice to have much 
relevance. Things move quickly under pressure of local
competition.94
Perhaps against many expectations, the Soviet line on Northern 
Ireland has found only an incomplete echo among the countries of 
Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic 
remained in concert with the Soviet Union but the press in Poland,
• . 95Hungary and Romania exercised what may justifiably be termed objectivity.
Of this group a representative example of reporting would be that found 
in a Polish commentary on the Constitutional Convention which credited 
the.British Government with
... the position that the Catholic population have a right 
to power-sharing in Northern Ireland and [not sanctioning] 
Protestant monopoly of power because that would involve 
intensification of the civil war.9°
It was hardly a revolutionary approach to the conflict but it was never­
theless a welcome appraisal and a criterion against which an understanding 
of the Ulster Question Eastern Europe could be measured.
Conor Cruise O'Brien, Herod: Reflections On Political Violence 
(London: Hutchinson, 1978), p. 98.
Guardian, 19 August 1971.
Tribuna Ludu, 13 May 1975.
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In sharp relief to the differing approaches which the Soviet
bloc adopted on this issue, that presented by Yugoslavia is deserving
of special mention. In 1972 Radio Belgrade paid a startling tribute
to the British Army for its 'patience, constraint and self-discipline'
97in Northern Ireland. Moreover it condemned the IRA as a 'purely
98terrorist formation' and laid at its door the blame for Bloody Sunday.
But the surprising Yugoslav attitude was not really to be explained
in terms of support for the Governments of Britain and Northern
Ireland. It was, more likely, a justification and a warning intended
for internal consumption, directed towards dissident Croatian nationalists
99and separatists, against whom Tito had moved in December 1971. It 
should not be surprising, then, that florthern Ireland has failed since 
that time to occupy the same prominence in official Yugoslav pronounce­
ments.
Just as the change of focus from the Soviet Union to the 
countries of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe involved a diminution in 
involvement and significance for the conflict, so too did this apply in 
the shift from those countries to what may be called international 
'front' organisations, dominated by the Soviets. In 1972 a number of 
these, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International 
Union of Students (IUS), and the World Federation of Democratic Youth 
began to take a more than passing interest in Northern Ireland.
Of these the IUS appears to have been the most active, no doubt 
in reflection of the fact that the Union of Students in Ireland (USI), 
which maintained a permanent representative at the Prague headquarters, 
was one of its few affiliates outside the Communist world. In January 
1975, Jurij Sayamov, the Soviet Vice-President of the IUS, visited 
London to plan a campaign on Northern Ireland with representatives of the 
USI and the (British) National Union of Students,^ but the subsequent 
International Student Week of Solidarity with Ireland aroused little 
interest in the West.
97
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In Ireland, however, it was the Official IRA which played the
greater role through its contacts with another front organisation,
the World Peace Council (WPC),1^  a delegation from which, led by
India's former Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, visited the province 
102in May 1972. Subsequently WPC declared an international day of
solidarity, and despatched its Secretary, James W. Forrest, an American
Communist, to Belfast to attend a tribunal to mobilise public opinion
103against the British Army. Contacts were also developed with the
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), which in turn
resulted in overseas tours by both that organisation's functionaries
and those of Official Sinn Fein. Within the scope of the latter,
Republican literature was distributed at the WPC conference in Moscow
104'through the good offices of the Soviet representatives', and the
Officials' President, Tomas McGiolla, said later that the delegation
105had made useful contacts which it hoped to develop.
As best as can be ascertained such promise was still-born: the 
more recent attempts by these organisations appear to reveal no more 
than efforts to form Northern Irish links with the Communist women's 
movement following the attendance of a NICRA-organised delegation 
at an international women's congress in East Berlin in October 1975. 
Quite clearly, the international 'front' organisations were capable of 
offering only as much as those they covered for had a mind to give, 
which, in terms of an identifiable impact upon the conflict, was 
precious little.
Moreover this conclusion was no less appropriate when applied to 
the involvement of the majority of those states (extant and putative) 
whose international standing derived from their being located in the 
'third' world, and preferably possessed of a 'revolutionary' regime.
Shipley, Revolutionaries In Modem Britain, pp. 43 and 48. 
Foreign Report, No. 1277, 3 January 1973, p. 5. 
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Thus, with regard to Africa, the record showed occasional interest. 
Joshua Nkomo sent a solidarity telegram on behalf of the Zimbabwe 
African People's Union to Provisional Sinn Fein's annual conference 
in 1 9 7 8 ; ^  there were tenuous links with Okhela1^  in South Africa;1^* 
and in tribute to his catholic interests, Uganda's Idi Amin once 
demanded a briefing on northern Ireland from the British High 
Commissioner in Kampala. ^
Throughout Asia, the response was very insignificant. If one 
report in the Hanoi publication Nhan Dan v/as an indication, North Viet 
Nam's interest was perfunctory, predictable, and generally in conformity 
v/ith the Soviet appreciation of the Northern Ireland situation.11 *^
Latin America's alleged contribution v/as made from two quarters:
the first, not surprisingly, by Cuba. According to the Monday Club's
Biggs-Davison and Harwood, the Fidelist inspiration motivated
People's Democracy even in its early days.111 Later, Biggs-Davison
saw the Communist designs in clearer and larger detail: the KGB, the
Czechoslovak Secret Service (STB), and the Cuban Direccion General de
Intel 1igencia were all involved, ultimately v/ith 'the aim of breaking
through sectarian barriers to foment an all-Ireland class war and
112socialist revolution.' Unfortunately no evidence v/as offered in 
support of this proposition, and two years later, the clearest link 
between Cuba and Northern Ireland was to be found in the Official 
movement's attendance at Castro's World Festival of Youth in July-August
1978. But by the tenor of its feature report even the Sunday Telegraph
106
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failed to be convinced of the revolutionary threat posed by that
,, . 113 gathering.
The second Latin American contribution originated from a most 
unexpected quarter —  the ruling military junta in Chile led by 
Augusto Pinochet —  which was concerned with the existence of 
'concentration camps' in Ulster.1^  Understandably, a view of his own 
record in the field of human rights, Pinochet's attack drew an almost 
nil response everywhere.
The People's Republic of China is also required to be treated,
and dismissed, at this level. Despite claims made in 1972 by a former
Czech diplomat writing under the name of J. Bernard Hutton, and
reputedly based on NATO sources, that IRA (unspecified) terrorist
activity in the North was being financed and directed by subversion
115agents recruited and trained in China, there is virtually no
indication that the Chinese Government v/as at all concerned with the
c o n f l i c t . 1 ^  Apart from a pledge of support 'for the just struggle
of the Northern Irish People'1^  in the period of international
indignation following Bloody Sunday, there has been little since to
challenge journalist Jonathon Steele's 1971 assessment that 'The polite
118Chinese have said next to nothing'.
113 Andrew Stephen, 'Castro's £50 Million Jamboree', Sunday Telegraph,
5 August 1978,
114
Sunday Times, 14 September 1975.
115 J. Bernard Hutton, The Subverters of Liberty (London: W.H. Allen, 
1972), pp. 5-7, 93-4, 174-6, and 182-3.
116 But then Hutton also wrote 'In Africa and Asia, Australia and New 
Zealand, Canada and South America, terrorist violence is a carbon copy of 
what has happened in the USA' (emphasis added), ibid., p. 8. Apart from 
the dubious grounds for comparison which he claims, the writer has been 
unable to trace any evidence of violence which would qualify as 
'terrorist' in either Australia or New Zealand prior to 1972.
Guardian, 9 February 1972.
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In all, the record of the governments and organisations considered 
in this section is modest, no matter from what perspective of involve­
ment it is regarded. The reasons for this appear to vary —  from a basic 
disinterest in the affairs of Northern Ireland, to the political wisdom
which Richard Rose saw as resulting from an 'informed reconnaissance of
119the situation.' Conor Cruise O'Brien's dismissal of the suggestion 
that the Russians exerted a control over the conflict foreshadowed 
the latter, for, it is argued, Chinese, Cuban, or Czech influence would 
be no more easily effected in the same circumstances, even if the will 
to intervene existed. Hence, it is at this point that a brief 
consideration should be given to that habit of 'Irish rebels', noted 
by O'Brien, of 'sometimes borrowing rhetoric and ideology from abroad'.
To this end it should be understood that both the Official and 
Provisional IRA claimed a lineal descendancy from an organisation —  
the IRA of the Easter Rising —  which pre-dates almost every other 
'terrorist' organisation in Europe, and certainly those of more recent 
notoriety, such as Baader-Meinhof, the Red Brigades, and the Red Army 
Faction, with whom they were allegedly linked. The IRA's doctrines, 
therefore, tended to be of a type formulated prior to Partition and 
developed in succeeding campaigns.
Admittedly, there were indications that their inspiration, 
particularly that of the Provisionals, v/as not drawn entirely from the 
Irish experience. In this regard former Chief of Staff, Sean 
MacStiofain, was illustrative of a most catholic taste. Lessons were 
taken from the Finnish defiance of the Soviet Union (at the start of 
World War II), the Warsaw rising of the underground army led by General 
Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski in 1944, and the success of Menachem Begin's Irgun 
in Israel as well as Ireland's Tom Barry in an attempt to compose an
120appropriate IRA strategy to achieve British withdrav/al from the North.
And sustaining all, was a 'belief in God and in the practice of
121religi on.'
Rose, A Time of Choice, p. 67.
120 Sean MacStiofain, Memoirs Cf A Revolutionary, (n.p. Gordon Cremonesi, 
1975), pp. 10, 17, and 41 (hereafter cited as MacStiofain, Memoirs Of A
Revolutionary) .
ibid., p. 62.
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But MacStiofain like other IRA leaders, also made early contacts
with members of EOKA, the Greek paramilitary army on Cyprus, at the
time of their unsuccessful campaign of 1956-62. Both he, and Cathal
Goulding, later to be the Officials Chief of Staff, were facilitated
in this regard by being placed in the same prison (Wormwood Scrubs)
122as EOKA leaders such as Nicos Sampson. Evidently it v/as an 
experience which proved durable: in the early months of the 
Provisional IRA's existence it was reported
There was much reading of guerrilla manuals, notably 
the writings of General Grivas.123
Confirmation that the anti-British campaign in Cyprus (and Aden) was an
124
example for the Provisionals was also provided by Maria McGuire.
Of some interest, in view of the way in which their campaigns were
later waged, was McGuire's claim that the FLN's methods in Algeria were
125rejected 'because of the indiscriminate casualties ... caused'.
However, the strength to which this was adhered was questionable. Parry
claims that the film, 'The Battle of Algiers' was vigorously approved by
126the Provos, and presumably he was referring to something other than
an artistic appreciation. More substantially, at the Provisional Sinn
Fein Conference in 1977, Daithi 0'Connaill spoke with obvious approval
127of the 'Algerian formula'. The precise cause of this development 
remains unclear.
If McGuire's account is accurate, the Provisionals had recourse 
to many other sources as well. She wrote that Ruairi 0 Bradaigh at one 
time bought seven copies of the paperback edition of Robert Taber's
122
ibid., pp. 74-9. However, by MacStiofain's account, he and Sampson 
'didn't hit it off very well' (ibid., p.77).
123
124
125
126 
127
Sunday Timess U l s t e r p. 196. 
McGuire, To Take Armss p. 74. 
ibid.
Parry, Terrorism3 p. 451.
Comments made on the BBC television programme, 'Tonight', of 
15 December 1977.
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War of the Flea, and gave one to each member of the Army Council, who
129then studied it closely. Whether they were any the wiser for the
effort was not reported. In any case they would still have needed to
relate their studies to the pecularities of Northern Ireland, in
130support of which there is no wealth of evidence.
Historically, it was no more easy to discern principles distilled 
from Begin, Grivas, or Guevara in the IRA campaign which commenced in 
1970, than it v/as to identify the influence of foreign theorists in 
earlier instances. Indeed, the current conflict appears to be well 
within the tradition of those previous 'troubles', the principal 
distinguishing characteristic being the weapons employed. As Stewart 
observed:
Terrorism in the advancement of a political cause is at 
once part of, and a new pattern imposed upon, the 
tapestry of civil disorder. It first appeared in its 
familiar modern form during the troubles of 1919-23, 
but it is probably a mistake to distinguish too sharply 
between traditional violence and that motivated by 
contemporary politics. The distinction lies in the use 
of more deadly weapons; the bomb and the machine-gun 
have been added to the pistol and the pike.131
And in a passage which threw further doubt the way of those who saw 
external influences, he wrote:
The whole process of muted insurrection, so familiar in 
Irish history is an elaborately structured and ever- 
changing development which obeys no laws except those 
intrinsic to it.132
128
Robert Taber, War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory 
and Practice (St. Albans, Herts: Paladin, 1970).
129 McGuire, To Take Arms3 p. 74.
130 Actually McGuire cites Tauber as the author, which may give some 
indication of how closely she studied the work. It may also be 
significant that both she and MacStiofain, on another matter, display 
the same unawareness of a Northern nuance. In their respective books they 
refer to a particular suburb of Belfast as 'the Ardoyne' —  which is a 
recent Britishism -  when Northerners always refer to it as 'Ardoyne'.
131
Stewart, The Narrow Ground} p. 153.
132 . . . .ibid.
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Stewart's comments are a necessary reminder. Although the 
conflict with which this chapter is concerned dates from 1968, in the 
light of Irish history it cannot be regarded as other than an ancient 
quarrel upon which certain contemporary influences have been ever so 
lightly superimposed. In general, the available evidence indicates 
that the force of these influences have been minimal where they have 
not been absent in relation to the international aspects of the conflict 
so far considered.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
T h e  S i t u a t i o n  in N o r t h e r n  Ir e l a n d  
a s  a n  In t e r n a t i o n a l  Co n f l i c t :
T h e  E x t e r n a l  S u p p l i e s  t o , a n d  O p e r a t i o n s , o f  t h e  
P a r a m i l i t a r y  O r g a n i s a t i o n s  in N o r t h e r n  Ir e l a n d .
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The international supply of arms to the conflict in Northern 
Ireland was, not surprisingly, one of the areas in which Bond culture, 
or perceptions of Bond culture, abounded. In the absence of 
corroborative evidence many accounts, such as those involving submarines 
off Tramore at night, seemed fanciful.1 Nevertheless, the ranks of 
would-be quarter-masters to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and others, 
included as wide a variety of interested parties as did the first two 
categories (of contacts). Yet there is a need, as there was at the 
outset of the discussion in each of those two categories, to place 
foreign suppl iesin the context of total supplies, a significant 
proportion of which must be regarded as of domestic origin.
If licensed firearms were an indication, the population of
Northern Ireland in the early 1970s appeared to be exceptionally well
2armed. In 1973, 105,000 firearms were registered, prompting Alun 
(Lord) Chalfont to express his horror as follows:
And added to this [Irish volatility and unreliability] 
for good measure is the strange frontier mentality of 
the Northern Irish, a mixture of cowboy and mafioso 
which has led them, like some Americans, to assume that 
they have some kind of inalienable right to possess 
firearms ... The civilian population, in fact, possesses 
more small arms than the security f o rc es . 3
While issue may be taken with his spurious character assessment of 
the Irish race as regards the qualities cited in parentheses, it did 
seem that the justifications offered by the British Government in 
respect of over 86,000 of these weapons —  gun clubs and protection of 
livestock on farms, etc.—  were facile and insufficient. By these 
figures the rural areas v/ere overrun with marauding beasts and the
For such an account see an article by Dick Dowling in the Cork 
Examiner, 7 February 1978.
2
Pariiamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, vol.850,
8 February 1973, col. 632, (hereafter used as House of Commons, Official
Report). J
3
Alun Chalfont, 'The Army and the IRA', Survival XIII (June 1971) :
209.
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population as a whole was passionately addicted to target shooting.
And if that was so, there was still the need to account for estimates 
which placed the majority of licensed firearms in Belfast which, with 
a decidedly un-rural character, v/ould have been a curious place to 
find very many of the 73,000 shotguns.^ The British Government, however, 
maintained a dilatory response to this situation throughout those 
years and was given, whenever challenged, to either affirming the 
original justifications noted above, claiming it was prerogative of 
Stormont to rectify the situation, or simply refusing to introduce 
legislation to recall some or all of the weapons.
The Catholics thereby had grounds for concern. Not only v/ere 
they out-numbered in the Northern population by a ratio of two to one, 
but by virtue of repressive legislation and Unionist excesses it must 
be presumed that they possessed but the smallest percentage of licensed 
firearms. Furthermore, in the field of unlicensed firearms they v/ere 
doubly 'disadvantaged'. Large quantities of such weapons were known 
to exist in the armouries of unspecified Loyalist paramilitary 
organisations. In one case, that of the 20,000 weapons and 1,000,000 
rounds of ammunition landed for the then Ulster Volunteer Force in 
1912, it was estimated that a great number had never been recovered and 
were still in the hands of their successors.^ This was in marked 
contrast to the resources of the IRA in 1969: most of its hardware had 
been sold the previous year to the Free Wales Army in order to subsidise 
the Sinn Fein newspaper, the United Irishman.
House of Commons, Official Report, vol.853, 29 March 1973, col.1673.
House of Commons, Official Report, vol.817, 13 May 1971, col. 599; 
vol .838, 8 June 1972 , col.125; vol.843, 25 October 1972, col.325.
6 R.D. Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry In Northern Ireland', British Army 
Review (April 1978): 21, (hereafter cited as Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry 
In Northern Ireland'). In 1975, however, a former leader of the Army Bomb 
Disposal teams in Northern Ireland was of the opinion that most of the 
UVF's weapons had been recovered [George Styles, Bombs Have No Pity: My 
War Against Terrorism (London: William Luscombe, 1975), p. 29, (hereafter 
cited as Styles, Bombs Have No Pity).} In the opinion of the writer, more 
reliability should be placed upon Jones in view of his position within the 
Intelligence Corps, the focus of his article, and its later publication 
date.
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In fairness it must be entered at this point, that up to March 
1973, there was no evidence that licensed firearms had been used in 
acts of terrorism.^ The point of emphasising such a high level of 
Loyalist arms possession was, rather, to establish one of the bases 
of threat to the minority population, upon which subsequent attempts 
by the IRA to acquire arms were probably based. (Indeed, a highly 
credible case may be made that the need to defend the Northern Catholic 
community so moved senior members of the Fianna Fail Government in the 
Republic that they became, effectively, midwives to the birth of the 
g
Provisionals). But it in no way is presented to justify such 
attempts, nor to discount the force of other motives such as the 
need of the IRA to be adequately equipped when confronting the British 
Army.
Even if the IRA had not disposed of most of its arms to Wales, 
the problem they faced in regard to the two basic reasons mentioned 
above would still have been formidable. Both those it disposed of, and 
those it retained were more suitable for collectors items. Many of them 
had been obtained during and after World War II, but some, mainly the 
'Thompson guns', which were as much a part of IRA legend as the trench
9
coat, were survivors of the early twenties. In addition, those 
weapons which were in reasonable working order, and even some of those 
acquired after 1969 in small lots, performed unreliably because of the 
widely differing quality of the ammunition. Clearly, being interred in 
a suburban garden or farm paddock for long intervals over forty or fifty 
years was undesirable. It gave to each bullet a disconcerting individ­
uality which determined the Provisionals on a policy of purchasing a 
large shipment of 'identical weapons and ammunition of recent manufacture'.1^
House of Commons, Official Report, vol.850, 8 February 1973, col.631.
g
For a brief outline see J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA 
1916-1979, revised and updated ed., (Dublin: Academy Press, 1979), 
pp. 369-72, (hereafter cited as Bell, The Secret Army); Conor Cruise 
O'Brien, States of Ireland (Frogmore, St. Albans, Herts: Granada 
(Panther), 1974), various references; and Conor Cruise O'Brien, Herod: 
Reflections on Political Violence (London: Hutchinson, 1978), pp.139-40. 
g
Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland', p. 17.
Maria McGuire, To Take Arms: A Year In The Provisional IRA (London: 
Macmillan, 1973), p. 40 (hereafter cited as McGuire, To Take Arms).
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To finance such purchases, but also other activities (payments to 
those on 'active service' and operational expenses), funds were raised 
from a variety of sources in Australia, Britain, Canada, Ireland, New 
Zealand and the United States by legal Republican organisations.11 
Efforts in Britain, however, were hampered by revulsion against the 
Provisionals' mainland bombing campaign and by the restrictions of the 
anti-terrorist legislation. The Irish Government also strongly 
discouraged fund-raising internationally, along the lines presented 
by former Minister for Justice, Patrick Cooney.
... the smallest coin is too big considering the 
purpose for which such funds are used.12
The point v/as, of course, that funds ostensibly for 'relief' or 'welfare' 
may, in fact, have been disbursed appropriately, but they inevitably 
freed other funds for other purposes.
This was clearly demonstrated by Joe Cahill's address to the 
first Annual Meeting of the Dublin-based An Cumann Cabhrach in May/June 
1975, in the course of which he said,
... all the [IRA] prisoners ... look to An Cumann 
to give them the assurance and the confidence to 
continue their work for what they are striving to 
achieve.13
In Belfast financial assistance was channelled through an organisation 
known as Green Cross; similar conduits existed in the other cities.
The amounts varied but, according to James McCashin, Chairman of Green
14
Cross, some £70,000 was sent north in 1974 and 1975 from Dublin alone.
While the relief organisations were channels for smaller donations 
some affluent supporters were believed to contribute more directly to
As the Commonwealth countries and the United States are the subject 
of other chapters, reference will be made in this chapter only to fund- 
raising in Britain and Ireland.
12
Irish Press, 27 February 1974.
13
An Phoblacht, 13 June 1975.
New York Times, 16 December 1975.
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Republic pledged an initial £200,000 to them in 1969, but the money
15never reached its destination. Furthermore, Provisional-for-a-year, 
Maria McGuire, wrote that when Joe Cahill needed to raise money quickly 
for an attempted arms deal in October 1971, he turned to
Provisional funds. According to one report, ten businessmen from the
... sympathisers in the Tv/enty-six counties, businessmen 
who were not prepared to help us publicly, but wanted 
to ease their consciences none the less.*°
Cash was also raised by the sale of books and artifacts, the 
latter made by IRA prisoners, but these did not realise the amounts 
required to wage and administer the type of warfare the Provisionals
conducted. They therefore turned to more lucrative but illegal sources
17 18which included armed robbery, blackmail, extortion, protection
19 20rackets and illegal drinking clubs. In these activities, however,
they were in competition with a number of Loyalist organisations and
the military wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) —  the
21
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).
While estimates understandably varied as to the yield in each of 
the above categories, bank robberies must heve been by far the most 
efficient in terms of time and takings. In the Irish Republic alone,
15
Sunday Times, Ulster, pp. 186-7 and 195.
i r
McGuire, To Take Arms, p. 42.. According to another Provisional 
IRA defector, Peter McMullen, assistance of a different type was also 
provided by a prominent politician in the Republic, who used his influence 
at the American Embassy in Dublin to have US entry visa refusals over­
turned. The man in question was one 'Charlie Haugh ... a former minister 
in the government in Dublin' (Boston Globe, 3 September 1979, p. 1). 
Presumably, McMullen meant Charlie Haughe?/, the current (May 1980) 
Taoiseach, but if he did, it is difficult to account for the inaccuracy 
in spelling - unless perhaps the tapes from which the Boston Globe's 
articles were made up from were indistinct.
21
A small, wel1-armed and extremely dangerous organisation with origins 
in the Official IRA. Its major claim to infamy, was the murder of Airey 
Neave, the Conservative Party's principal spokesman on Northern Ireland, 
on 30 March 1979.
Boston Globe, 3 September 1979, p. 1.
Irish Times, 5 December 1975 (example only).
Irish News, 30 June 1975 (example only).
Irish- News, 10 September 1975 (allegation made by leading clergyman)
553
estimated to have acquired more than £1 million in a series of raids.
And according to information supplied by the Detective Branch of the
Dublin Metropolitan Area, it may be inferred that 30 per cent of all
22armed crime within that zone was committed by 'subversives'.
In such activities the Officials were not noticeably active.
Their welfare organisation, Cabhair, provided funds for legal costs
23as well as for prisoners' dependants, but their reduced scale of
operations since 1972 obviated the resource problem which the
Provisionals were obliged to face. For a time, however, they were
ambitious: in 1970, one of their number in Britain, Gerry Doherty, was
jailed for conspiring to smuggle a £200,000 consignment of arms and
ammunition to Ireland. But after December 1974 the Official's need for
arms decreased even further due to the fact that they had less of an
establishment to support. With the founding of the IRSP/INLA at that
time, they suffered from defections which considerably weakened their
24organisation, particular in Belfast and Derry. And for its part, the
INLA does not appear to have had financial worries. It finances itself
mainly from bank robberies, one of which, at Barnagh Gap, Co. Limerick,
25in June 1979, was the biggest in Irish history.
If the information relating to the discovery of arms —  be they
actually in their possession, or intended for same —  is correct, the
Provisionals could have forgone few opportunities to obtain them from
every quarter. By 1973, at least 282 types of weapon had been 
2 6discovered representing fifteen countries of origin
betv/een October 1975 and March 1976, extreme Republican groups were
The information was expressed that '... 70% of armed crime has 
nothing whatever to do with subversive organisations. (Irish Times,
4 September 1978, p. 12).
23 Unlike the Provisionals, the Officials do not refuse to plead when
brought before the courts.
24
Guardian, 19 October 1980, p. 13.
25 • L • Iibid.
2 6
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 811, 15 February 1971,
col. 1237.
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(manufacture). Later disclosures were equally impressive. Official
figures released on the eighth anniversary of the British Army's
involvement in the Northern Ireland conflict showed that it had by then
recovered 902,554 rounds of ammunition, 257,489 lb. of explosives,
297 machine-guns, 2,667 rifles, 2,962 pistols, 881 shotguns, 18 rocket
launchers, 57 rockets, 427 mortar tubes and 441 mortar shells. In
28addition, Army personnel had defused 2,828 bombs. (And this does not
include the amounts recovered, etc., from paramilitary sources by the
Irish and other Governments). From a closer examination of arms
recovery information it became clear that not only had the numbers of
weapons increased, but also they had become both more modern and
29sophisticated as well. From the presence in the Provisional IRA 
arsenal of various semi-automatic weapons (see Chapter 10, pp. 404-05) 
Bell concluded that:
... basically the Provos were better armed for their 
business than the British Army for theirs. Equally 
significant by the end of 1977, the Provos v/ere far 
more elegantly armed than the Loyalist paramilitaries 
or the mi 1itias-in-being ... 10
These figures and reports notwithstanding, it is important to 
treat the following discussion of the actual supply of arms to the 
conflict in the North with caution. First, it must be emphasised that 
it is concerned only with the estimated (maximum) 40 per cent of arms
27
Austria, Belguim, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, West Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
the USA and the USSR (House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 851, 20 
February 1973, col .47). Later a sixteenth was added —  Venezuela (Jones, 
'Terrorist Weaponry In Northern Ireland', p.19).
oo
Times> 15 August 1977.
29 For examples, see the reports of a mortar attack on Belfast's 
Aldergrove Airport using electrical ignition devices (G u a r d ia n 8 March 
1975), and the hijacked beer train episode in v/hich it emerged that the 
Provisionals had become skilled in the use of light-sensitive circuits 
and what are known as radio-control led improvised explosive devices 
[Times, 23 November 1978).
Bell, The Secret Army, pp. 439-40.
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which originated from sources outside of the USA. Second, in
relation to these countries of origin, there is considerable merit in
the repeated caveats given by British Ministers of State for Defence,
to the effect that the place of manufacture of arms and explosives
32was not necessarily the place where the terrorists obtained them.
Third, it is necessary to attach the same scepticism to claims 
that some suppliers of arms were exerting a controlling influence over 
the conflict in other ways that Conor Cruise O'Brien demonstrated with 
regard to Russian control. As Richard Rose wrote:
Probably the outsiders who have benefited most from the 
Troubles have been dealers and brokers in arms from 
Hamburg to Libya. To continue to benefit, however, they 
must maintain their distance. Otherwise, they too will 
find themselves tagged as Catholic arms dealers, whether 
they are actually Christian, Muslim or atheist.33
And finally, the scale of the operation must at all times be borne in 
mind. By the standards of many conflicts the above inventory of 
recovered weapons was modest. Nevertheless, no-one. would deny the 
effectiveness of the IRA campaign since 1968, even it it has not been 
successful in its own terms. The point to be made, of course, in 
relation to arms, was simply but accurately expressed by Peter Janke: 
'very, very few suffice'.3^
31
And even this figure is subject to considerable doubt. As was 
noted in Chapter 10 (pp.403-06)there was some disagreement, both as to 
what constituted arms of US origin, and their proportion of total arms. 
British estimates placed arms of a non-US origin as low as 15 per cent, 
whereas the calculations done in Chapter 10 suggested they could be as 
high as 77 per cent. The figure of 40 per cent is therefore the writer's 
estimate of the maximum proportion involved, but it was also to be found 
in Conor Brady, 'Provisions of Violence', Irish Times, 25 March 1977.
IP
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 850, 13 February 1973, 
col. 321; and vol. 851 , *20 February 1973, col. 47.
33 •Richard Rose, Northern Ireland: A Time of Choice (London:
Macmi11 an , 1976), p. 68.
34 Peter Janke, 'The Response to Terrorism', Royal United Services
Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), Ten Years Of Terrorism: Collected 
Views (London: RUSI, 1979), p. 25 (hereafter cited as RUSI, Ten Years Of
Terrorism) .
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However, even these reservations do not sufficiently encompass
the fact that the protagonists in Northern Ireland have demonstrated
what in other circumstances might have been termed 'commendable
initiative1 in providing weapons from local resources. In the matter
of arms, this was noticeably the case with the Loyalists who, in
addition to the occasional raid on a unit armoury or 1 hold-up' of an
isolated sentry post, demonstrated their dominance in the engineering
35sphere with a certain enthusiasm for manufacturing their own. Against
this, the effect of 'home-made' weapons has been minimal: in 1978 it
36was thought that no more than a thousand were in existence, and a
number of these, according to Jones, presented 'a greater threat to the
37firer than to his intended victim!' As regards explosives, the 
Loyalists were not so resourceful within the Six Counties, but through 
the agency of sympathisers employed in the quarrying industries of
Scotland, they appeared not to be without occasional supplies of
i • ., 38 gel lgm te.
The IRA, on the other hand, accomplished its explosives procurement
task with a similar ingenuity to that which the Loyalists displayed with
home-made weapons, and frequently with as much risk to the user/
manufacturer —  an 'own goal' being the black-humorous term used to
39describe the demise of a bomb-maker/carrier/layer. To this end it took 
to making a powerful but unstable explosive from ingredients which could, 
initially, be purchased from a local supermarket. Indeed, it was from
Jones,'Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland', pp. 21-4. Although 
Loyalist paramilitary organisations such as the Ulster Volunteer Force 
(UVF) are known to have some modern weapons of US origin in their arsenal, 
the available evidence suggests that they have not been engaged in 
overseas arms procurement to anything like the same extent as the 
Provisional IRA. Furthermore, the available evidence relates to Canadian 
sources of supply -  which were treated in Chapter 12.
^  Irish Turn's, 16 November 1978.
37 Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland', p. 23.
TO
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 850, 18 February 1973, 
col . 321.
See Styles, Bombs Rave AJo Pity, pp. 83 and 98-9.
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the source of such materials in combination, weedkiller (chlorate of
40soda) and a solution of household sugar, that the term by which it
became colloquially known to the British Army derived —  'Co-op mix'.^1
42A similar use was found for agricultural fertiliser.
Outside of the Six Counties, but within Ireland, the Provisionals'
national organisation allowed them to receive additional supplies from
bomb factories located in the Republic. In some cases, however, the
principal components of Provisional devices, such as the detonator and
even the gelignite, were produced and appeared to have originated with
commercial enterprises across the Border which were legally entitled 
43to possess them. Naturally, the Irish Government was extremely
sensitive to charges that it was inadequately discharging its
responsibi1ity in this area, and to an extent it presented a strong
argument. The point to it was that over half of Northern Ireland's
legitimate imports of gelignite were manufactured in the Republic, and
hence it was quite probable that as much would be discovered in use by
44the terrorists of the Province. But only an act of faith would
proclaim that the safeguards in the Republic were absolutely effective.
Moreover, given the high level of improvisation required by the
circumstances in which they operated, the Provisionals made do with a
45variety of relatively innocuous devices (clothes pegs and photo-
4 6electric cells ) over which it was very difficult to exert any kind 
of stringent control. At the grisly but not fatal level, this was well 
illustrated once the conflict had reached what might be termed its self­
delighting phase. Instead of shooting through the kneecaps of those from 
whom it wishes to exact retribution, the IRA occasionally chose to perform 
the same operation with an easily available electric drill, thereby
40
41
42
43
44
ibid., p .98.
Times, January 1973, p. 2.
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 888, 13 March 1975, col.783. 
Styles, Bombs Have No Pity, p.. 108.
Dail Eireann, Pariiamentary Debates, Official Report, vol. 256,
20 October 1971, col. 16.
45
Styles, Bombs Have No Pity, p. 83.
46
Boston Globe, 7 September 1979, p. 2.
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associating a well-known American power tool manufacturer (Black and 
Decker) with the argot of atrocity.
From further afield, in particular the seven Western European
countries which produce one quarter of the world's weapon supplies,
came the bulk of the 40 per cent (maximum) of illegal arms that is the
47concern of this chapter. Having stated that, it must also be 
repeated that it is in this part of the discussion that the cautions 
mentioned before are particularly apposite. Thus a common feature to 
be noted was that the city in which the negotiations took place, the 
port of loading, and the city of origin of the arms were almost 
invariably different within each venture. Furthermore the distinction 
between Eastern and Western Europe v/as blurred to the point of 
meaninglessness.
Maria McGuire, for example, wrote of accompanying Daithi 0 Connaill
between Dublin, Zurich and Amsterdam, for the latter to negotiate a deal
in Prague with Omnipol, the sales organisation for the Czech arms
48factory at Brno, for a shipment ex Rotterdam. It was, for all that, a 
not unusual episode in which the elements of foreign venues, intrigue 
and (frequently) failure were to be repeated on numerous occasions.
Unfortunately for a work such as this, most of the publicity
available information has been derived from the successful interception
of illegal arms intended for Northern Ireland. The reports of such
operations were, therefore, subject to security considerations and devoid
of virtually all mention of the politics of both purchase and apprehension.
Furthermore, in many cases the arms in question appeared to be part of an
independent arms dealer's stock on hand, from which information the
conclusion to be drawn was that the deal was made on financial rather
49than political criteria. And this becomes more compelling in the 
common knowledge that no government in Western Europe has permitted either
Conor Brady, 'Provisions of Violence', Irish Timess 25 March 1977. 
The seven countries were given as: Belgium, France, Italy, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the U.K. and West Germany.
48
McGuire, To Take Arms, pp. 42-9.
49
This appears to have been so in the case involving the mercenary 
recruiter, John Banks, (Guardian3 22 February 1977 and 7 April 1977).
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its state or private enterprises to sell arms to the paramilitary 
organisations in Northern Ireland. Consequently, in those instances 
where only an antiseptic collection of facts were reported such that
Browning pistols (and matching ammunition) had been imported from the
50 51 52 53Continent, or that French arms, ammunition, and chemicals were
discovered, there are but poor grounds for deducing more than that the
Provisionals (in the foregoing cases) took advantage of the international
commercial availability of weapons and supplies.
Furthermore, nothing in the foregoing seriously challenges 
previous judgments in respect of communist intervention by 
Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union. There remains of course, a
✓
residue of uncertainty arising from 0 Connaill 's apparent success in,
54to use McGuire's words, 'making an arms deal with a Communist country. ’ 
(emphasis added). Subsequently, further doubt was added by the recovery
of Czech pistols so new that they did not appear in any standard works
55
of reference. Yet no matter how suggestive these facts were of an 
active and substantial Czech interest in the North, they must also be 
tempered by accounts which supported a contrary interpretation.
The first is that 0 Connaill, his negotiations with Omnipol in 
Prague notwithstanding, was required to work through an American 
intermediary and an arms dealer. As both were regarded by him as
56untrustworthy, and as the latter was to be contacted in Brussels, there 
are grounds for inferring that Omnipol did not agree to supply arms 
direct to the Provisionals.
50 Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ire!and' , p
51
])‘ish Times, 19 September 1978.
52
Sty1 es , Bombs Have No Pity, pp. 110-11.
53
Observer, 8 October 1972.
54
McGuire, To Take Arms, p. 4 5.
55 Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland' , p
56 McGuire, To Take Arms, p.44.
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The second concerned 0 Conail 1's certainty that he was shadowed
57
in Switzerland by the 'Czech or Russian secret police, which, if 
true, and taken in conjunction with the first reason, may have 
indicated that the manufacturers were in some doubt as to the wisdom 
of supplying those he represented.
The third was Jones' (presumably) expert opinion that the 
Browning pistols mentioned earlier, and the Czech pistols discovered 
at the same time, may well have represented arms obtained by a single 
purchase.^ If so, the case alleging Czech intervention would be 
weakened correspondingly, since the supply of arms of differing 
national origin would (again presumably) have been the prerogative 
of an independent dealer.
Finally, the absence of any further body of evidence which could 
implicate the Czech Government or its agencies since the time of
0 Connaill's 1971 approach to Omnipol, must question the resolve with 
which Prague v/as prepared to act, if at all.
The same is true of the Soviet Union, but in its case the
conclusion is less equivocal. This does not mean that Soviet-made
weapons have not been in evidence —  they have —  in the form of rifles,
59hand-grenades, and even rocket launchers, but the numbers involved have
r n
been small, and there was no serious suggestion that they signified 
Russian intervention. However, the discovery of Soviet v/eapons in 
transit for the Provisionals did signify that Soviet v/eapons v/ere quite 
widely available on the international market.^
ibid., pp. 43-4.
Jones, 'Terrorist Weaponry in Northern Ireland', p. 21.
Timesj  15 December 1977.
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 908, 30 March 1976, col.472, 
and Albert Parry, Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat (New York: 
Vanguard Press, 1976), p. 379.
61 See the following discussion of the Claudia affair, and the Irish 
Timess 19 July 1978.
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affair surrounding the use of Soviet-designed, but Bulgarian made RPG-7
fi2
rocket launchers in November 1972. Although the Soviet Government
rejected a Foreign Office request for its help in investigating the
63matter, and although it seems certain that it could have assisted,
the opinion in Whitehall was that there was no direct connection
64between the Soviet Union and the Provisionals. Indeed, the
likeliest source of the weapons was a group of Middle East states,
65at least four of which had been Russian clients for the RPG-7.
The case which perhaps best illustrated this was the celebrated
In turn this underscored the Provisionals' logistic dilemma.
Close co-operation between American, British and Irish law enforcement
agencies ensured that attempts to supply arms from the United States
66were made at a high risk and could be successful only in odd lots.
Hence a reliance on that source meant that the IRA would be slow to 
rearm. The alternative, it appears, was to expedite this objective 
by recourse to sympathetic organisations and regimes, but at even 
greater risk. The RPG-7s, despite their successful debut, are to be 
seen within the latter category. It is necessary, therefore, to return 
to a consideration of a small number of third world/revolutionary regimes.
Guardian, 29 November 1972; and Times, 30 November 1972. In 1981, 
Boris Shtern, a former Russian journalist, claimed that he was on board 
a Soviet trawler when it stopped off the Irish coast one night in 1971 
and unloaded a secret cargo to waiting boats. Unfortunately, Shtern's 
certainty on the matter goes no further than reporting that the cargo was 
concealed in a crate and that it was received by two Irishmen from the 
KGB officer on board the trawler. Exactly who they were, or what they 
represented, was not reported; similarly it was only Shtern's (and 
others of the crew) opinion that the crate contained arms. [Times, 30 
April 1981, p. 7). If it did, the quantity involved was obviously quite 
smal1.
r o
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 848, 21 December 1972, 
cols. 470-2.
Daily Telegraph, 11 December 1972.
65
Foreign Report, No. 1277, 3 January 1973, p. 5. The role of these 
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66 J. Bowyer Bell, /1 Time of Terror: llow Democratic Societies 
Respond To Revolutionary Violence (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 135.
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With but tolerable distortions, the term 'small number' is
easily reducible to two, the preference for the former being required
by reports of IRA arms purchases from African and Chinese sources. Of
these, the African appeared as the most substantial with one convicted
gun-runner claiming, in 1973, that he had taken advantage of some of
the surplus ammunition put on the market by the Nigerian Government
6 7following the Biafran war, to supply the IRA. But the subsequent 
lack of corroborative evidence from such sources as British arms 
seizures suggests that either the IRA have successfully concealed 
the shipment to this day, or more likely, that it was never received in 
the first place.
In another instance it was alleged that the Provisionals were 
involved in an exchange operation with the Zimbabwe African People's
Union (ZAPU) in which the former supplied arms and trained guerrillas
68in the use of explosives. What the IRA received in return was not 
specified; more to the point, given the needs of ZAPU, just what it 
could have provided which the IRA required is difficult to imagine.
The discovery of bomb-making equipment at the Dublin docks in the
69cargo of a ship out of Cape Town was hardly suggestive of the answer.
The quantity involved was small, and besides, once more begged the 
question as to why the IRA should seek overseas what they demonstrably 
possessed in relative abundance in Ireland. Moreover, neither case 
allowed more than a tenuously circumstantial nexus to be drawn between 
the IRA and African organisations.
With regard to supplies ascribed to a Chinese source this 
conclusion can be even less reservedly expressed. It rests on the fact 
that although 108 'Chinese or Japanese' grenades were uncovered in a 
large Provisional arms consignment in 1978, they were also found with 
arms manufactured in three other countries (Canada, France and the Soviet 
Union), and which court evidence stated were obtained through a deal
Daily Telegraph, 20 April 1973. The convicted gun-runner was 
Gunther Leinhauser, owner of the coaster Claudia, the exploits of which 
will be considered in the following pages.
68
Dail'i Telegraph, (n.d.), as reported in the Australian, 10 August
1977, p. 5.
Times, 14 April 1978.
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negotiated in Athens, from an intermediate supply in Cyrpus, which 
probably originated in the Lebanon!^ Neither during the trial of 
the Provisional agent, Seamus McCollum, nor since, was it suggested 
that China (or Japan) was involved. 1
The widespread belief that the Lebanon was the likely source of
that particular shipment was, however, not without significance.
The struggle of the Palestine guerrilla oroups had attracted the
interest of both wings of the IRA, but their support had been muted —
possibly to avoid alienating sympathisers in the United States who
were also supporters of Israel. Among leading Officials, Mairin de
Burca stated that 'the Republican movement ... openly sympathised
72with the Palestine resistance movement1 and a later declaration 
was made to the effect
[the war in the Middle East] will continue until the 
Arab people of Palestine can once again live in their 
own country ... We stand shoulder to shoulder with 
the Arab people.73
In return the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was 
among thirteen left-wing 'national liberation groups' which signed 
a declaration of support for the IRA, published in Paris in 1972, at 
the time of a visit to the continent by the Officials' Malachy McGurran.
Less formal contacts between Ireland and the Arab states were also 
stimulated by the Irish-Arab Society, founded in Dublin in 1969 under 
the aegis of Atif Matouk, a Syrian, who then ran the Arab Information 
Centre in Dublin. The main influence behind the formation of the Society
Irish Times, 19 July 1978.
The international complexion of the counter-measures was almost 
as impressive as that of the consignment. According to Bell, Israeli 
intelligence, operating in Cyprus became aware of the destination of 
the arms, and advised both the Belgian police, who siezed them in 
Antwerp, and the Irish authorities, who arrested McCollum in Dublin.
(The Secret Army, pp. 437-8).
7?
Irish Times, 6 September 1972.
United Irishman, June 1973.
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was thought to be Sean Ryan, an internee during the IRA's 1956-62
campaign. Other supporters included a number of Ryan's IRA associates,
Arabs resident in Ireland, Irish businessmen with Arab contacts and an
74
Anglo-Irish group. Also involved at an early stage was Louis 
Maguire, who had been expelled from Fianna Fail and later became 
chairman of a committee formed within Aontacht Eireann to raise 
funds for the 'relief of distress' in the North as well as treasurer 
of the Irish-Arab Society. The Society itself quickly became involved 
in arranging exchanges of visits between Ireland and the Arab world, 
with Matouk reportedly acting as a guide for important Arab visitors 
to Ireland. In September 1970, Sean Ryan, Jim Hamilton of the Union 
of Students of Ireland, and Mairin de Burca were reported to have 
attended a conference in Amman organised by the General Union of 
Palestinian Students on the theme 'Towards A Democratic State in 
Palestine', and a similar conference in Kuwait in February 1971. Such 
activities were then accepted as being the limits to which Irish-Arab 
liaisons had any substance.
Throughout 1972 this was still held to apply; indeed in that
year the British and Irish Governments generally discounted newspaper
reports that the IRA was then receiving considerable supplies of arms
75from Middle East sources. Hence the prevailing views on that subject 
at the time of the McCollum trial represented an almost complete reversal 
of the earlier position. The factor principally responsible for this 
change was the proven record of the Libyan Government of Colonel 
Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi in its attempts to supply large quantities of arms 
to the Provisionals. This was also bolstered by firm though not 
irrefutable indications that suggested a similar but reduced involvement 
on the part of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).
What the official attitude in Dublin and London appeared not to 
give due consideration to in 1972 was the growing importance of Libya 
as a supporter of guerrilla groups in general and the IRA in particular.
This Week, 22 June 1972.
75 See Financial Timer., 13 June 1972 and 11 December 1972; and Times3
12 June 1972 and 30 November 1972, where the June reports relate to the 
British response.
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At one level, of course, this was understandable: notwithstanding 
that various visits were exchanged between Ireland and Libya they 
appeared to have resulted in nothing more tangible than a scheme 
for Irish teachers to work in the latter country. (One such teacher, 
Eddie O'Donnell, became personally acquainted with President Qadhafi 
and later was appointed as an education adviser in the Libyan Govern­
ment service).^ Yet, at another level, there were clear warnings 
that Qadhafi was generally hostile towards Britain and sympathetic 
towards the IRA. Indeed, in June 1972, there were a number of 
contentious issues in Anglo-Libyan relations indicative of the former, 
the most important being the nationalisation in December 1971 of 
British Petroleum's half share of the Sarir oil field and the Libyan 
Government's subsequent decision to contract with the Soviet Union for 
the purchase of crude from that field.^ A more specific instance was 
provided- by his statement that:
... at present we support the revolutionaries of Ireland 
who oppose Britain and who are motivated by nationalism 
and religion. The Libyan Arab Republic has stood by 
the revolutionaries of Ireland ... There are arms and 
there is support for the revolutionaries of Ireland ... °
Between 1 revolutionaries' and 'religion' the former was the sole
consideration: Religion was of little, if any significance. When,
in 1975, Qadhafi perceived the conflict in Northern Ireland as 'not a
religious war' (see p.569 ) it in no way altered the basic criteria by
which he determined his original involvement. Furthermore, although
the Libyan Foreign Ministry was later to announce that its support
79would end after the border poll (eventually held in March 1973), Libyan
Whether he doubled as the alleged permanent representative of the 
IRA in Tripoli is not clear. See Edward S. Ellenberg, 'The PLO and Its 
Place in Violence and Terror', Marius H. Livingston, Lee Bruce Kress, and 
Marie S. Wanek, International Terrorism In The Contemporary World 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 175, collection here­
after cited as Livingston, Kress and Wanek, eds., I>itemational Terrorism 
In the Contemporary World); and Boston Sunday Globey 2 September 1979.
In the latter, McMullen refers to a 'school teacher from Donegal' who 
'travelled extensively to Libya' to arrange arms shipments for the IRA. 
Since O'Donnell was from Monaghan, it could be that McMullen was referring 
to someone else, or mistaken in his recollection.
Financial Times, 13 June 1972.
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leaders continued after that event to express themselves in terms 
consistent with their President's earlier statements. And well they 
might, for in March 1973 there occurred an event which clearly 
established the Libyan role.
On the 28th of that month, the Claudia a 298 ton coaster, was
intercepted by the Irish navy off Helvick Head, Co. Waterford, and was
80found to contain five tons of arms intended for the Provisional IRA.
It was an operation which not only provided a further illustration of 
the propensity for the conflict in Northern Ireland to exceed the 
boundaries of the Province, but also allowed brief glimpses of the 
complexities and ironies which have increasingly attended it.
It was complex because the voyage of the Claudia had been the 
subject of another one of those international deals, initiated in
81Germany and negotiated in two foreign capitals, Tunis and Tripoli.
The vessel itself had taken considerable pains both to conceal its
82route - by re-tracking, —  and to disguise the immediate origins of its
83cargo —  by loading it in international waters. It was, moreover,
registered in Cyprus by the German Giromar Shipping Company (for which
Lloyds had no address), a company 90 per cent owned by Gunther and
84Marlene Leinhauser, the former of whom had been convicted in 1967 
for attempting to smuggle arms from Czechoslovakia to Kurdish rebels in
Guardian, 30 March 1973. The arms recovered were 250 Russian-made 
(AK 47) self-loading rifles, 248 Webley .38 revolvers, more than 20,000 
rounds of Belgian and Russian ammunition, 100 anti-tank mines, 100 cases 
of anti-personnel mines, 6001b. of TNT, 5001b. of gelignite, and 300 
hand grenades (see also Guardian, 31 March 1973; Sunday Telegraph,
1 April 1973; and Times, 21 April 1975).
21
Daily Express, 2 April 1973.
09
Times, 30 March 1973; and Guardian, 30 March 1973.
Times, 3 April 1973.
84
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Leinhauser had been caught at an intermediate point, on the French- 
German border, with a consignment of American, German, Italian, and 
Yugoslav pistols and revolvers (Daily Telegraph, 31 March 1973).
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It was ironic because this most spectacular and public inter­
ception by the Irish navy was wrought with the almost certain
assistance of British intelligence, the Royal Air Force, and perhaps
86the Royal Navy. It was of little matter that Minister of Defence,
Patrick Donegan, was reticent concerning this aspect; the success of
the interception in Irish waters was logically and obviously
predicated on Anglo-Irish co-operation. And in this regard it might
be noted that two of the Irish vessels, the Fola and the Grainne, were
87formerly Royal Navy coastal minesweepers. That this modest flotilla 
comprised three-quarters of the ocean-going capability of the Irish 
Navy, or that it was thought necessary to deploy it in such strength 
to ensure the apprehension of an unarmed coaster, was to be seen less 
as a cause for derision than for concern. It emphasised both the 
vulnerabi1ity of Ireland to threats against its maritime and coastal 
sovereignty, and the inadequate resources which it possessed to counter 
them.
It was a concern which was only heightened by persistent reports
that the Claudia had delivered between one and three arms shipments to
88Ireland in the previous fifteen months. Furthermore, there were
questions which remained unresolved, although dismissed by the Irish
Government, as to whether the 5 tons of arms recovered were the entire
shipment or but part of a very much larger one which had been either
trans-shipped earlier or dumped overboard when the crew of the Claudia
89realised their predicament. The belief that the Soviet Union, despite 
the appearance of arms of its manufacture in the cargo, was probably not 
involved was of little consolation to the British and Irish authorities. 
The evidence all to clearly pointed to the fact that Libya was.
Guardian, 30 March 1973; and Times, 30 March 1973.
87 John E. Moore, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 (London: Sampson 
Low, Marston, 1973), p. 172.
88  Guardian, 30 March 1973; and 6 April 1973.
on
Guardian, 3 April 1973; Financial Times, 4 April 1973; Sunday 
Telegraph, 1 April 1973; and Times, 3 April 1973. Similar reports 
were to be found in other British newspapers throughout the two weeks 
after the operation and were also repeated by the above at different 
times in this period.
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One prior development in this general period prompted speculation
that another state (or organisation) had adopted a similar role. The
introduction of the Soviet-designed RPG-7 rocket launcher to the IRA's
arsenal in November 1972 did much to give this suggestion currency
some months before the Claudia affair. At that time, the general
suspicion which attached to Qadhafi as a supplier of arms to the IRA
was of a low order: Libya was not an arms client of the Soviet Union,
whereas Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria were reported to have received
90recent shipments of RPG-7s. As best as can be ascertained from
available sources, however, these four client states were not directly
implicated and the IRA's possession of the weapons in question is still
put down to an undetected arms deal negotiated in the Near or Middle
91East sometime in 1972.
The seizure of a huge quantity of British Lee Enfield rifles on
the Bremen docks in July 1973 may have been significant. Unfortunately
for this inquiry, little was published about it other than it was a
consignment belonging to a Dutch arms dealer, taken on in Aqaba, Jordon,
and that customs officials in Bremen could not exclude the possibility
92that the weapons were destined for Ireland. However, in view of
the age and type of the weapon, and the IRA's stated requirements, it 
must be regarded as a most unlikely purchase.
While the Claudia incident appeared not to dampen Qadhafi's 
enthusiasm for the Northern Ireland conflict, his subsequent attititude 
towards it was somewhat erratic. From being a benefactor of the 
Provisional IRA in 1972-73, he became, in 1974, the willing host for 
supplicant parties from the other side of the province's paramilitary 
divide. Early that year the Libyan Government began to consider whether, 
in addition to the Provisionals, some extreme 'loyalist' groups which 
favoured an independent Ulster might not also qualify for support as
Foreign Report-, No. 1277 , 3 January 1973, p. 5.
91 In its attempts to locate the origin of the rocket launchers, British 
Intelligence sent samples of the dust and sand found inside one of the 
weapons to scientists of all the leading petroleum companies in Britain 
in the hope that it could be geographically identified. But it wasn't. 
(Timer, 21 April 1975).
Timer, 13 July 1973.
'anti-imperialists'. Qadhafi himself was reported to have expressed 
admiration for the Ulster Workers' Council strike of May 1974 which,
according to Eddie O'Donnell, the Libyan leader viewed as a 'valid
93mechanism' that 'reminded him of his own non-violent coup in
94
September 1969'.
But it would be misleading to attribute the Libyan involvement
in any substantial measure to nostalgia. More to the point it
should be understood that Qadhafi on numerous occasions acknowledged
a certain 'hatred against the English' (and for the matter of that,
the United States) whom he saw as having to 'pay dearly for the
95wrongs and perfidy they inflicted on us'. And the obverse of this 
hatred was a clear sense of small power purity or virtue, corresponding 
perhaps to the magnitude of the crimes Libya had been historically 
unable to commit, but which in any case allowed Qadhafi to align 
himself with 'people struggling for freedom'. As if to emphasise the 
purity of his intentions he gave notice
If the British people are ever colonised, God forbid, 
we will stand by the British people.9°
This promise, however, was less notable for the dubious consolation 
it may have offered the British than for Qadhafi's habit of confusing 
both the people of Northern Ireland with the Irish people, and Northern 
Ireland with the island of Ireland. As the following was to show, it 
was as though he believed that the entire Irish nation considered 
itself aggrieved by Britain and was fighting a war of national liberation.
We are backing Ireland. We shall continue to assist until 
Ireland gains the final victory.9'
Overlaying these aspects of Qadhafi's reasons for helping the IRA 
v/as a messianism, derived from his own perception of the precepts of
569
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Islam, and by which he determined that it was his duty to 'guide' and
98'enlighten' the oppressed Irish people. And through such personal
revelation he also derived a 'sacred message' which, in addition to
the 'wrongs and perfidy' allegedly inflicted by Britain and the United
States, also commanded him as a 'faithful Moslem and patriotic Arab',
99to fight both of them. He told a conference in Tripoli in 1973 the 
conflict in Northern Ireland was for Britain a 'retaliation and 
retribution from God.'1^
While the aforementioned disposition would not necessarily
preclude it, the suggestion that Qadhafi was acting as a proxy for the
Soviet Union in this period seems unlikely. Apart from the fact that
his country was not receiving Soviet arms, the President was also known
to have directed his displeasure towards Egyptian leaders for their
over-dependence on such supplies,1^  and to have attacked the Soviet
102Union during the 1973 conference of non-aligned nations in Algiers.
Nevertheless, given the same disposition, Qadhafi's decision 
to treat with loyalist elements was curious, even contradictory, since 
by definition they represented 'British imperialism' rather than its 
antithesis. In this it would seem that Qadhafi's desire to further 
arrogate to himself the agency of divine punishment exceeded his grasp 
of the realities in Northern Ireland. Robert Fisk probably captured 
the essence of the situation when he wrote
The nature of the struggle seems to be of less 
importance than the fact it exists ...
Daily Express, 13 June 1972.
99
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^  Guatulian, 14 May 1973. With regard to the conflict in Northern 
Ireland, Britain was also unpopular with Israel. In response to the 
British Government's decision to allow the PLO to operate an office in 
London, the youth of the Herut movement in Beersheba invited the IRA to 
open an office in that city (Irish Times, 6 July 1971, p. 1).
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Such an appreciation would, therefore, account for the fact
that, late in 1974, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) was invited
to participate in a visit to Libya arranged for the Development of
Irish Resources organisation (DIR), a previously little known group
suspected of being subject to 'Republican' influences. However,
according to DIR's chairman, Walter Hegarty, the organisation was
not aligned with any political cause, and it had co-operated with
the UDA's involvement because of a common interest in the development
104of Ireland's offshore oil and gas resources.
This was a credible position as it was a motive equally
attributable to those seeking a united Ireland and those contemplating
an independent Northern Ireland (as the UDA were known to favour if
105the British link could not be maintained to its satisfaction. )
But it was not entirely consistent with Eddie O'Donnell's claim that 
he secured the UDA invitation so that the Libyans could meet the men
i nc
behind the Protestant strike, nor with the reports that the UDA 
had made representations to Qadhafi, particularly concerning his 
patronage of the IRA, and certainly not with the simultaneous 
presence of a Provisional Sinn Fein delegation at the same hotel in 
Tripoli at which the UDA were staying.
The reasons given were plausible, but in relation to the 
representations by the UDA and the presence of the Provisionals, 
incomplete. Whatever the truth in.UDA spokesman Tony Lyttle's claim 
that his organisation had been invited to Libya 'to enlighten [the 
Qadhafi regime] on the truth of the Northern Ireland situation'^ it
Irish Times, 15 November 1974, p. 1.
105 In view of the unionist orientation of the UDA, this may seem a 
contradictory statement. Basically, it arose because although the UDA 
demanded that Ulster remain British, it also came to the conclusion 
that the British may not wish to retain Ulster. Hence, the UDA's 
response was to opt for an Ulster identity, independent of Britain and 
the Republic of Ireland, which would preserve the Protestant character 
of the Province. For a brief exposition of this view see Andy Tyrie 
(supreme commander of the UDA), 'Independence is the only alternative', 
Guardian Weekly, 24 February 1980, p. 5.
106 Times, 22 April 1975.
 ^ Guardian, 15 November 1974.
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was surely to be expected that every opportunity v/ould be taken to 
do so in any case. In turn, the arrival of the Provisionals some / 
five days after the loyalists was guaranteed by the anxiety on the 
former's part that an attempt was under way to disrupt their
108
arrangement with Libya, and that this should be strenuously resisted.
In the ensuing period it was possible, without putting too 
fine a point on it, to conclude that the IRA had not been 
successful. The first indication that Qadhafi may have undergone 
a change of heart was provided by a statement made in November 1974 
by Glen Barr, a leading UDA figure on the visit.
... the Libyan Government appeared to be under the 
impression that the IRA were Freedom Fighters ...
We were able to show them the other side of the coin.
They were interested in our proposal for an independent 
Northern Ireland and I think we were successful in 
putting our case across ...109
From the time of this announcement until late 1977 there was no further 
evidence of arms reaching Ireland from Near or Middle East sources.
Yet in the month following the UDA visit, Qadhafi was reported as 
having told senior Maltese Government officials that his aid to the 
IRA to that point was £5 million, although he did not specify whether 
this was in cash or in kind.1^^ November 1974 also saw the report of 
a similar statement from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, made in this instance 
by the Libyan Prime Minister, Major Abdul Jalloud.
The late arrival of the Sinn Fein delegation might also have 
suggested that the DIR was either an inefficient conduit or less 
'Republican' than imagined.
109
Belfast Telegraphs 15 November 1977.
Sunday Telegraphy 22 December 1974. This claim was consistent with 
McMullen's 1979 claim that Libyan 'arms and loans' ran to $5 million per 
year (emphasis added). See Boston Globe} 2 September 1979, p.12.
Timesy 21 April 1975.
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Shortly after these affirmations of support for the IRA, an
example was provided of the type of conclusion which could follow
from Qadhafi's inability to differentiate between 'liberation
struggles'. Indeed, in his fascination with such causes he extended
the realm of his personal fantasy with a proclaimed, but largely
unpublished, support for what he called the 'freedom fighters' of the
112Scottish Nationalist movement.
In April 1975, the equivocal nature of the Libyan attitude
to the IRA became more apparent. In that month a delegation from the
113Oireachtas visited Tripoli to explain to the Libyan Government that
no assistance should be given to those in Ireland who used violence
114in their attempts to unite the country. At a luncheon in their 
honour, however, the Irish found that their hosts seemed to regard the 
IRA in much the same light as the PLO, as was evident in the speech 
of Ahmed Shahati, Secretary of the Arab Socialist Union's Foreign 
Affairs Committee:
We support the unity of people, we support the unity 
of Northern and Southern Ireland and the peoples of 
both parts of the country. We support liberation 
forces throughout the world.
The connection betv/een 'liberation forces' and Irish unity was not
lost on the Irish Delegation but its power to persuade the Libyans to a
more accurate assessment of the Northern Ireland conflict was, initially
at least, disadvantaged by three main factors. The first was the
delegation's seeming reluctance to question its hosts closely as to
just what their aid had consisted of. By one reliable account the Irish
did not even refer to the IRA specifically in the joint discussions, but
116chose instead to use the euphemism 'those who use violence'. The
112 • u • j ibid.
113 National Parliament of Ireland.
114
Irish Times, 18 April 1975.
115
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second v/as an exaggerated report that the Irish delegation v/as
divided,^ while the third, and perhaps the most substantial factor
was the condition imposed by the Libyans that any gesture they might
make would require a prior indication of support for the participation
118of the PLO at a forthcoming Euro-Arab conference. As the delegation 
could give no such assurance the prospects for even the promise of an 
uncontroversial trade deal v/ere held as remote.
Nevertheless, an apparent reconsideration by the Libyan 
Government was achieved. According to ex parte accounts by the Irish 
delegation, made from Malta, the Libyan Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, A. Dordah, had pledged:
My Government respects the wishes of the Irish people 
and does not want to interfere. My Government is 
looking to the future now, not the past.H^
From further statements made by the delegation leaders on their return
this was taken to imply that Libya v/ould no lonaer aid any illegal
120organisation in Ireland, including the IRA. On the other hand it 
fell short of both the delegation's principal objective, which had been 
a categorical assurance in this regard, and the lesser objective of an 
admission by the Libyans of their previous arms supplies to the IRA.
In so far as the supply of arms v/as concerned, further developments 
suggested that the Libyan Government, while it had come to a realisation 
that the Irish question was not as simple as it first believed, was not 
about to embrace a practice of self-denial with regard to Northern 
Ireland. In September 1975, two of its representatives, including 
Eddie O'Donnell, met with UDA leaders in Northern Ireland and, it was
It v/as, but only on the issue of whether a Dublin businessman, Frank 
Maguire, who was not a parliamentarian, should be included in talks with 
the Libyan officials, (ibid.).
118 .... ibid.
119
Financial Times, 23 April 1975.
120
Irish Times, 28 April 1975.
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understood, discussed in general terms the potential for Libyan
121investment in the event of British withdrawal. If this was 
true then the core of Libyan interest in Northern Ireland was still 
derived from, and defined in terms of, Qadhafi's Anglophobia. By 
extension, he was seeking, through discussions with the UDA, to 
manipulate the Province's tensions, if not to his advantage, then 
certainly to Britain's embarrassment and discomfort. Furthermore, 
given the strength of his hatreds, and the fact that his Government's 
(then) recent pronouncements eschewing support for 'illegal 
organisations' left much to be desired in Dublin and London, some 
residual doubt remained whether Libya had actually desisted from 
supplying arms to the IRA.
This impression was strengthened with the publication of an 
interview with Qadhafi by 11 Tempo of Rome in November 1975, in the 
course of which he told the newspaper's Paola Brianti
We are backing Ireland, which is fighting for its 
independence and not a religious war. We shall 
continue to assist until Ireland gains the final 
victory. But we shall never, for any reason, get 
involved in internal quarrels. ^
According to a corrected version released by the Libyan news agency, 
he also added:
We are not a party to other minority conflicts nor 
are we responsible for the method by which these 
minorities determine their own fate. ^
It was clear, moreover, that this self-absolution did not have the
effect of alienating the Provisionals from the Libyan regime. A letter
allegedly smuggled out of the Maze Prison (formerly Long Kesh) by IRA 
detainees in late 1975 stated:
We, here in our internment camp, greet the 1st September 
revolution and its leader, Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi.
121
Daily Express, 26 August 1975; and Financial Times, 15 September
1975.
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As reported in the Irish Times3 10 November 1975.
123 ARNA, 27 November 1975.
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The voice of this leader reaches us despite the 
solitary confinement cells and the prison guards.
We also greet the Palestinian Arab revolution and our 
companions in the Zionist internment camps. Long live 
the Arab-Irish struggle ...124
Two months later there was still no sign of a rift between the 
Provisionals and Libya. In February 1976, a highly complimentary 
appreciation of Qadhafi's political philosophy, as expounded in his 
Green Book3 was published in their journal and claimed:
[It] will have a familiar ring to Irish Republicans.
Like all great political thought, Qadhafi's message 
relates to a much wider canvas than the desert 
societies of North Africa and Arabia ...125
From that time until the close of the period under review, any
assessment of Libyan involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland
must be based on developments of an indeterminate and sometimes
conflicting nature. Following the December 1977 arrest of Provisional
Chief of Staff, Seamus Twomey, in Dublin, there were reports of IRA
1 2fi
leaders once more visiting Tripoli. In this period the IRA 
received both a military and a psychological boost with the 
introduction of the M.60 machine gun to its arsenal, a weapon then
127suspected in some quarters of being supplied from the Middle East.
A 1979 report by Peter McMullen, a former member of both the
Parachute Regiment (from which he deserted), and the IRA (from whom
128he defected), tended to confirm this suspicion. McMullen claimed
that in 1977-78 the Provisionals had received seven tons of arms
from Libya, including 'Russian surface-to-air missiles, RPG5s and
129RPG7s'. By his account the major obstacle to their use had been the
1 24
'Voice of the Arab Homeland', Tripoli, 22 December 1975.
12R
An Phobalacht, 20 February 1976.
126 Interview with Dr James Bowyer Bell, Dublin, 5 June 1978.
127 ibid. and interview with Dr Garret Fitzgerald, Leader of Fine 
Gael, Dublin, 14 February 1978, (hereafter cited as Fitzgerald 
Interview, 14 February 1978).
128
Boston Globe, 7 September 1979, p. 1.
129 ....ibid.
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prospective operators' inability to understand the Russian text
130of the instruction manuals! Finally it was alleged that Thomas
McMahon, convicted in early 1980 for the murder of Lord Mountbatten,
had perfected his remote-control bomb-making skills (under Russian
131supervision) in Libya.
The first was that it was later held, with near certainty, 
that the origin of the M.60 machine guns brandished
by the Provisionals in early 1978 was later held in a
National Guard armoury in Danvers, Massachusetts, from whence
132they were stolen in August 1976. The second was that, in the
period late 1977-mid 1980, which presumably was sufficient time for
a translation of instruction manuals to be effected, there was no
recorded instance of an attack' involving an RPG-7 or a surface-to-air
missile. Both indications were therefore consistent with, and
supportive, of the third, which was a report of discussions held in
Libya between Qadhafi and the British Conservative Party's Shadow
Foreign Secretary, John Davies. According to Davies, the Provisional
IRA had ceased to be regarded as among the world's liberation
movements, from which it was inferred that Libya was no longer
133prepared to support the Provisionals.
As on previous occasions when Qadhafi had given assurances to 
this effect there was much unsaid that encouraged doubt as to his real 
intentions. Davies v/as not then regarded as being within the top 
echelon of the Tory opposition's hierarchy, even less could he have 
been regarded as a representative of the British Government. Thus 
Qadhafi's choice of messenger was curious. Davies' report, moreover,
ibid. The abbreviation RPG stands for Rocket Propelled Grenade. 
Although the existenceof the RPG7 has been knov/n since 1962, there is 
no such v/eapon as the RPG5, or even a SA5 or SAM5 (both would refer 
to surface-to-air missile). However, the urge to dismiss McMullen's 
account out of hand may be resisted in the knowledge that there is 
a weapon of similar appearance to the RPG7, designated SA7.
(F.W.A. Hobart, ed. , Janes Infantry Weapons 1975 (London: MacDonald and 
Jane's, 1974), pp. 779-81.
131 A Daily Mail report, as cited in Encounter LIV (February 1980) : 25.
132
Irish Times, 21 September 1978.
133 Times, 24 June 1978.
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suffered not only from being based on inference but also from being 
given ex parte. (In combination, these considerations may have 
accounted for the poor attention given to it in the press). Even 
then its contents provided no answer to whether Libya had recently 
supplied the Provisionals with arms, or more importantly, whether 
it was absoltuely committed to not supplying them in the future. 
Furthermore, two additional reasons to doubt Qadhafi's sincerity 
were afforded by the knowledge that at the time of Davies' visit, 
a sale of trucks, aircraft and spare parts worth more than £200 
million v/as being held up by the United States Government in an
134attempt to persuade Libya from harbouring international terrorists.
Given Qadhafi's outlook and record of erratic behaviour it could
not be assumed that any action he took in the face of American
pressure v/as likely to become an established feature of Libyan policy.
And even if to all appearances it did, there remained a distinct
possibility that one or more of the numerous Arab liberation
135movements he gave considerable backing to —  such as the PLO —  might 
act as his proxy with the IRA. Indeed, there was evidence that this 
organisation had been so involved for some years, albeit it in a 
secondary and shadowy capacity. To be precise this activity was 
carried out by two of the PLO's constituent groups, the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Al Fatah.
One commentator on Middle East affairs, Yonah Alexander, dates
136IRA-PFLP co-operation from as early as 1968. Certainly, by May 
1972, it was more widely acknowledged, even heralded, as in Radio 
Cairo's exultant report of the massacre at Lod Airport, near Tel Aviv, 
by three members of the (Japanese) Red Army specially recruited for the 
occasion.
134
London Sunday Times, 25 June 1978.
1
Edward S. Ellenberg, 'The PLO And Its Place In Violence and 
Terror', Livingston, Kress, and Wanek, eds; International Terrorism
In The Contemporary World, p. 175.
136 Yonah Alexander, 'Terror International: The PLO-IRA Connection',
American Professors For Peace in the Middle East, Bulletin, October 1979, 
p. 3, (hereafter cited as Alexander, 'The PLO-IRA Connection').
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The participation of three Japanese members in the 
suicide action at Lod proves that the PFLP succeeded in 
obtaining international support as a truly revolutionary 
movement. Strong bonds exist between the Palestinian 
resistance organizations and other liberation movements 
in Africa, the I.R.A., the Vietnamese revolutionaries. 37
But as evidence of a substantial nexus with the IRA, this was very
thin. As was pointed out earlier, the contacts then in evidence
appeared to be at the ideological level and almost exclusively concerned
138Official Sinn Fein. Thus there was no suggestion that Irish 
revolutionaries were willing to emulate the Japanese example and be 
sacrificed for the Palestinian cause; ironically, only the night 
before the above broadcast, the Official IRA had ordered an immediate 
cessation of all hostilities other than those of a defensive nature.
Subsequently, whether as a result of this unilaterally declared
cease-fire or some other reason, the PFLP liaison with Ireland was
139expanded to include the Provisional IRA. In May 1972, at Baddawai
in the Lebanon, the PFLP and Black September hosted a meeting attended
by representatives of numerous terrorist and nationalist/separatist
140organisations including the IRA. In the same year subsequent meetings
As cited in Yonah Alexander, 'Terrorism and the Media In the Middle 
East1, Yonah Alexander and Maxwell Finger, eds., Terrorism: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York and Maidenhead, Berkshire: John 
Jay and McGraw-Hill, 1977), p. 177.
n o
See also Financial Times3 11 December 1972.
139 According to Garret Fitzgerald, it was just possible that the PLO 
did not altogether understand the nature of their association with the 
IRA. During Ireland's Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the 
European Community in 1975, he toured the countries of the Maghbreb as 
one of his official duties but in Algiers took the opportunity to hold 
discussions with a PLO spokesman. In the course of this Fitzgerald 
gained the impression that the PLO regarded the IRA as the 'Irish 
Government's underground army', and hence, Dublin's condemnation of 
their activities as no more than pro former statements intended to placate 
(say) the British Government! With some difficulty, he attempted to 
persuade the PLO otherwise. Among his measures were the withholding of 
Irish Government support for various PLO demands, which were otherwise 
considered just, for as long as the organisation continued to support 
the IRA (Fitzgerald Interview, 14 February 1978).
140 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism: International Dimensions3 Conflict 
Studies No. 113 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979), p.8.
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in Algeria, Japan and Dublin gave rise to reports not only of a
closer liaison between such groups, but also of agreements 'to supply
each other with arms and information and to carry out operations on
141behalf of and in the name of a brother movement'. Furthermore,
McMullen claimed in 1979 that a young Arab woman living in Dublin was
142the liaison officer between the PLO and the IRA.
To date, the IRA-PFLP co-operation has allegedly found a
tangible expression in three areas. The first concerns the provision
of training facilities. If testimony given in an Old Bailey trial by
mercenary-recruiter, John Banks, was to be believed, an IRA training
camp had existed in Algeria, in 1973, on the edge of the Sahara 
143Desert. While doubts as to Banks' reliability as a witness were
raised by his admission that he had previously lied on two counts
144to the London Evening Standard, the substance of his claim received 
confirmation the following year.
In a BBC documentary on terrorism, Abu Maher, a member of the
PFLP team which attacked an El Al aircraft at Athens airport in 1968,
told of a camp run by his organisation at which people from several
145 /nations, including Ireland, were being trained. (Neither the
location of the camp nor a more detailed description of the Irish
members was provided). In the same programme an IRA presence at a
training camp in Aden was reported by Israeli Colonel Elihu Lavite, who
claimed that this information was forthcoming from his interrogation of
146terrorist Lidwina Janssen. McMullen also claimed that in more recent
times (after 1977), the IRA leadership was able 'to attract money, arms
and training from the Palestine Liberation Organisation and reprentatives
147
of Libyan Leader Colonel Qadhafi'.
141 ibid. Wilkinson claims that, in May 1972, the West German Embassy 
in Dublin was bombed by the IRA with the Baader-Meinhof gang claiming 
responsibility for the attack.
142
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144
145
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Boston Sunday Globe, 2 September 1979, p. 12.
Guardian3 25 March 1977. 
ibid.
'Terror International', BBC 1, 30 January 1978. 
ibid.
Boston Sunday Globe} 2 September 1979, p. 1.
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Substantially similar accounts were provided following the
deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in
1978. While covering its activities, Irish Times correspondent, Conor
O'Clery, interviewed a PLO colonel in Beirut who advised that a small
number of IRA members had received instruction in explosives and
guerrilla warfare techniques, in Lebanon, until just prior to that
time (June 1 9 7 8 ) . O'Clery also noted that UN observers in UNIFIL
were in agreement that such an arrangement had been in existence for
149a period of years. In some quarters this was held to be a 
disingenuous assessment: Alexander, for example, contended that the 
training continued through the course of 1978 'apparently with the 
full knowledge of the UN officers serving in the area', and that at
least 10 IRA members arrived for training in each of the following
15015 months. Notwithstanding the differences as to place, quantity 
and time which were to be found between the foregoing accounts, they 
were sufficiently consistent to establish the IRA's client relationship 
with the PFLP for the provision of services.
McMullen's 1979 claim would extend this to a second area.
According to him the murder of Sir Richard Sykes, British Ambassador
to the Netherlands, in the Hague in March 1979, was a combined IRA-PLO
151operation. Unfortunately (again) for this inquiry, there were other,
conflicting accounts as to who might have been responsible: in
Holland, spokesmen for the IRA, and for the Italian Red Brigades on
152behalf of the IRA claimed the deed. And further doubt must be
attached to McMullen's claim as, by the time of the incident in question,
153he had been persona non grata with the IRA for at least a year.
148
Irish Timess 19 June 1978, p. 1.
149 .... ibid.
150
Alexander, 'The PLO-IRA Connection', p. 3. He also claimed that 
others were being trained in Libya and Syria.
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Boston Sunday Globe, 2 September 1979, p. 12.
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International Herald Tribune3 24-25 March 1979.
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By his own account he faced an IRA court of inquiry (for refusing 
an assignment) in February 1978, and flew to the US in April 1978 to 
escape an IRA squad charged to kill him (Boston Globe} 6 September
1979, p. 2).
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If either of these 'arrangements' also included the provision of
arms it was not readily apparent from the available information.
However a case may be made that this third area was the subject of
a separate understanding with another PLO constituent, Al Fatah. In
the literature on terrorism, Al Fatah (Yasser Arafat's group) was
cited as the source of IRA-intended arms on three separate occasions
since 1972. The first appears to have existed only in the mind of
154Alexander: there are simply no records of a seizure of such a
consignment in Antwerp in December 1972. (Perhaps he meant the 1977
episode, as follows). There was also some doubt as to the second,
which was John Barron's unsubstantiated claim that the Claudia's
captured shipment had been supplied from Al Fatah, and not Libyan 
155
stocks. The remaining instance concerned a consignment of arms
which was discovered in Antwerp, but in December 1977, and which led
to the trial of Seamus McCollum in Dublin in July 1978. While his
testimony in no way implicated Al Fatah, the markings on several of
156the boxes did. Of themselves they v/ere less than conclusive 
evidence of its involvement, but in the context of the RPG-7s used in 
1972, the Claudia interception, and Qadhafi's interest in Ireland, 
they v/ere sufficient to encourage the belief that Al Fatah, or an 
organisation closely aligned with it, was a likely source of some of 
the IRA's arms shipments.
The strength of this belief varied —  from numerous commentators 
on the right who, irrespective of the evidence, saw the Middle East 
suppliers as mere agents for what v/as fundamentally a Soviet enterprise 
of sowing disaffection where it could —  to the official and frequently 
expressed view of Her flajesty's Government, which was somewhat less 
sanguine. During one period of Question Time in the House of Commons 
in 1978 a number of Members who were inclined to the former view were 
assured by the Northern Ireland Secretary, Roy Mason, that the IRA's
1
Alexander, 'The PLO-IRA Connection', p. 3.
155
John Barron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents (New 
York: Reader's Digest, 1974), p. 255. Bell claims they were 'donated 
to the anti-imperialist struggle by Colonel Qadhafi' (The Secret Army, 
p. 398).
156 Irish Timess 19 July 1978.
583
contacts with 'Palestinian terrorists' were neither 'significant' nor
157even 'a real link1. Indeed, Mason extended his assessment to cover 
not only organisations in the Middle East but 'international terrorist' 
organisations in general.1^8
In support of his Government's position the Secretary relied in
part upon the relative ease with which arms could be purchased in
the Middle East and seemed to imply that such deals were commercially
159rather than politically inspired. In part though, he relied upon 
a form of wishful thinking v/hich was controverted by evidence cited 
earlier in this chapter, namely that
The appalling record of the Provisional IRA within 
the Province and its lack of political support do 
not enable it to establish any significant 
international links.-*-
He thereby left unanswered why it was that such organisations as the 
Red Army and the Red Brigade were seemingly able to operate on an 
international scale while enjoying considerably less political support 
than the IRA. Equally, Mason v/as ignoring the substantial support 
which had been lent the Provisionals from the United States, and even 
their ability, demonstrated over some eight years, to operate in 
Northern Ireland in the face of the very difficulties he described. 
However, his position was arguably reinforced by none other than 
Yasser Arafat who, when asked if the PLO supplied arms to the IRA, 
replied, 'No, I am searching for weapons myself'.1^  But in the same 
interview the Al Fatah leader v/as also reported to have denied that the 
PLO had 'any links' with the IRA which, in the light of the foregoing, 
questioned his credibility.
157
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 949, 11 May 1978, col.1378.
158
ibid., (see also House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 947,
13 April 1978, col. 1653).
159 ibid. , col. 1388.
160 ibid. , col. 1378.
^  Interview of Yasser Arafat by Barbara Walters for ABC Television 
News, 9 September 1979, as reported in the Irish Times, 10 September
1979, p. 1.
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Mention will be made of just one other area of external support
which the IRA may have received. Although there is no reference to
it in any published documents, the possibility —  more the probability —
that the IRA occasionally obtained the services of professional
assassins from outside Irealnd, for service in Northern Ireland, was
162suggested in two interviews with British officials. Because of the 
sensitive nature of security operations in the North, no further 
information was forthcoming, and it is therefore, not possible to 
elaborate on the matter beyond this paragraph.
At this point it is appropriate to consider the perspective
of what is being discussed in these pages. It principally concerns
the supply of arms to a relatively localised conflict which, between
1968 and 1978, claimed the lives of some 2,000 people. Sadly, in
terms of the natural and man-made hazards to which the world is
accustomed, it is frequently regarded as a small toll of a small war
in the north-eastern confines of a small country. Other indices confirm
this: according to a Foreign and Commonwealth Office authority on the
situation in Northern Ireland, ballistic signatures indicated, that in
163
1978, only about 1,000 weapons were in active use in the Province.
This, and the relatively small quantity described in virtually all of 
the IRA's attempts to acquire arms, both frustrated and successful, is 
a caution against taking too expansive a view of the current 'troubles'.
The record of paramilitary operations related to the conflict 
reduced its international dimensions even further. By far the greatest 
number of incidents were the responsibility of one organisation —  the
Provisional IRA —  although on a few occasions its pre-eminence was
164 • 165challenged by the Officials, some unnamed Protestant extremists,
1
One source was of the opinion that certain shootings in Derry, 
because of the circumstances surrounding them, were either the work 
of a freelance operator, or hired killer who visited the city 
specifically for the operation and left again.
163 T ,Interview.
164 The bombing of an Army Officer's Mess at Aldershot, on 22 February 
1972, which killed six civilians and a Roman Catholic chaplain was 
claimed by the Officials.
165 Persons so described were generally held to be responsible for the 
Dublin and Monaghan car bombings which claimed 28 lives in the space of
3 hours on 17 May 1974.
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the context of some of the more spectacular or news-generating activities
associated with international terrorism} the IRA's could only be
described as modest. It has not, for example, ever attempted to hijack
167an aeroplane, nor has it, the Niedermayer incident notwithstanding,
168been noticeably drawn to kidnapping. In other fields, however, such
as those of ambush, assassination and bombing, the IRA demonstrated an
ability to sustain a virtual urban guerrilla war which, in 1978 and in
Northern Ireland alone, continued to occupy a regular British garrison
169of over 13,000, the part-time Ulster Defence Regiment of some 8,000, 
and a considerable proportion of an expanded Royal Ulster Constabulary. 
Across the Border the comparable figure was less than 5 , 0 0 0 . ^  As a 
1978 British intelligence report concluded:
[The IRA] has the dedication and the sinews of war to 
raise violence intermittently to at least the level of 
early 1978, certainly for the foreseeable future ...
[Its] 'campaign' of violence is likely tn continue while 
the British remain in Northern Ireland.171
1 fifi
and latterly the Irish National Liberation Army. Even then, in
166 In March 1979, the IMLA murdered the Conservative Party's principal 
spokesman on Northern Ireland as he was leaving the House of Commons car 
park. According to McMullen, Provisional IRA co-operation was provided 
(Boston Sunday Globe, 2 September 1979, p. 12). However, David 
O'Connell (Daithi 0 Conaill), then of Provisional Sinn Fein, denied this 
(International Herald Tribune3 27 November 1980, p. 4).
^  A fatal kidnapping undertaken by a small group of volunteers without 
official approval of the IRA command. See Bell, The Secret Army3 
pp. 406-07.
However, the Provisionals have, on at least two occasions, hijacked 
a goods train on the main Belfast-Dublin railway and blown it up. See 
Daily Telegraphy 30 December 1975; and Times3 21 November 1978.
169 In 1978 approximately one quarter of the UDR's strength was on full­
time duties.
^  In the absence of official figures in the last few years the figure 
of 5,000 was estimated by the writer, perhaps generously, to allow for the 
increase in the numbers of the security forces on Border duties since mid- 
1974, when it was nearly 3,000 (Dail Eireann, Parliamentary Debates, 
Official Report^ v°^• 273, 26 June 1974, col. 1576). Even if the 
estimated figure is inflated, the order of comparability is not greatly 
affected.
1 Guardian, 19 October 1980, p.5. The report cited was a private 
assessment stolen from military intelligence by the IRA in 1979, and 
released by it. However, the authenticity of Document 37, as it was 
formally titled, was admitted by the British Government (Canberra Times3
12 May 1979).
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Although statistics are but poor indices of the suffering and
disruption to daily life which has been caused by the conflict in
Northern Ireland, they do at least reveal that its more violent
manifestations have.been contained within the Six Counties (1837 dead);
only secondarily and sporadically were they experienced in the
172Republic (73 dead); and mainland Britain (65 dead). Outside these
boundaries they were seen but fleetingly —  in Western Europe towards
the close of the period, and exclusively against targets defined as
173British (less than 5 dead). What these statistics suggest, then, 
was the intention, or perhaps the inability, on the part of the 
antagonists not to expand the conflict beyond the borders of Northern 
Ireland under 'normal' circumstances.
A close inspection of the records of out-of-state incidents lends 
considerable support to this interpretation. They appeared to have 
arisen out of various ulterior, as opposed to central, motives which 
otherwise governed the conflict in the North. And there were sound 
reasons for the general avoidance of foreign battlegrounds, as McGuire 
explained:
... it was our [the Provisional IRA's] definite policy 
then not to take the war to England. We knew we would 
not be able to sustain operations there: on classic 
guerrilla theory you fight only where the population 
will support you and give you refuge. Previous attempt 
to carry the war to England had been ... disastrous and 
counter-productive.
Thus revenge,1^  the need of a bargaining chip1^  and the desire to
17?
John Whale and Chris Ryder, 'Ulster 1968-1978: A Decade of Despair', 
London Sunday Times, 18 June 1978, p.15, (hereafter cited as Whale and 
Ryder, 'Decade of Despair').
173 The total of casualties resulting from European incidents, including 
the murder of Sir Richard Sykes (previously discussed) has not been 
published, but it would almost certainly be less than 5.
174
McGuire, To Take Arms, p. 92.
175 This motive, a consequence of Bloody Sunday, was clearly behind the 
Aldershot bombing of 22 February, 1972 (See note 164 this chapter and 
Bell, The Secret Army, p. 385).
176
The rash of bombings in London and Manchester in January 1975 was 
designed specifically for this purpose (Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of 
Despair', p. 15).
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dramatically re-focus British attention on the Province1^  were the 
motivating forces behind British operations when they were undertaken. 
It was as though the parami1itaries had decided upon a fundamental 
distinction —  regarding the war in Northern Ireland in the classical 
Clausewitzian sense of the practice of diplomacy by other means, and 
the terrorist operations further afield as the gruesome arm of public 
relations.
Developments in 1978-early 1981 may lead to a modification of
this view, if they continue. The murder of Airey Neave (by the INLA)
in March 1979, and Provisional IRA bomb attacks on the Hammersmith
Territorial Barracks, the Royal Air Force base at Uxbridge, and the
178
Bromley-by-Bow gas works in December 1980 may be indications that 
the principles of 'classical guerrilla theory' have been put aside 
with regard to operations in England.
Moreover, such instances were no less noticeable in Europe.
179There, too, British diplomats, Army establishments and military
1 80
personnel were the focus of attacks. There was also speculation
(in 1976-77) that the Provisionals were connected with incendiary
181attacks on British interests in Austria, and the murder of a 
Belgian bank official (presumed to have been mistaken for a British 
diplomat at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation headquarters) in
Two incidents in 1974 —  the bombing of a coach on the M62 
carrying servicemen and their families (12 dead), and explosions at 
Army barracks at Guildford and Woolwich (7 dead) were timed to coincide 
with the British election campaign of February and October/November of 
that year respectively (ibid., p. 16).
1 78
Guardian, 18 January 1981, p. 4.
179 On 3 December 1980, Mr Christopher Tugendhat, the British European 
Commissioner, was the subject of a shooting attack in Brussels 
(Guardian, 19 January 1981, p. 4).
180 In August 1978, eight explosions in six British military 
installations on the Rhine were reported (International Herald Tribune,
21 August 1978). Another example of this expanded theatre of IRA 
operations concerned the bombing of a stage, in Brussels, on which a 
British Army band was about to play (Irish Times, 30 August 1979).
181
Times, 19 July 1977; and Times, 6 August 1977.
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March 1979. This pattern (such as it was) in Europe appeared to 
confirm, albeit belatedly, McMullen's 1979 claim that the IRA had,
in early 1974, created a new position -  Director of European
n 183Operations.
But neither English nor European operations were the main thrust 
of the campaigns conducted by any of the paramilitary organisations in 
Northern Ireland. In the final analysis the conflict remained, through­
out the period under review, essentially within the dimensions of the 
questions from which it sprang. Although the antagonists garnered 
supplies from external parties, the fight itself never seemed likely 
to include, to any significant level, other than the Irish and the 
British in Ireland. For that reason, Sir Walter Scott's description 
of it all was as accurate in 1981 as it was in 1825.
Their factions have been so long envenomed, and they 
have such narrow ground to do their battle in, 
that they are like people fighting with daggers in
a hogshead.
182
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International Herald Tribunes 24-25 March 1979.
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Boston Globe3 5 September 1979, p. 1. The. appointee, according 
to McMullen, was Martin McGuiness.
184 As cited in A.T.Q. Stewart, The Narrow Ground: Aspects of Ulster 
1609-1969 (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 12.
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In 1978 the essential elements of the Ulster Question were no more 
resolved than they were in 1968. The question of civil rights for the 
Catholic minority was, if not solved completely, then well in train.
But since 1972 at the latest, no one had pretended that that was the 
issue: both Catholics and Protestants in the North, and the Irish 
Government in Dublin, had long since made the inductive leap from 
immediate reform to the Republican political ideal of a united Ireland.
No matter, in the terms of this thesis, that an 'objective' view 
of the situation in 1968-69 might have persuaded the more militant 
Protestants from reacting violently against the (predominantly)
Catholic demonstrators, and hence have possibly pre-empted the latter's 
demands from being over-borne by the national question. And no matter, 
again in the terms of this thesis, that the same purpose might have been 
served by a speedy and effective response by the Northern Ireland 
Government in implementing the necessary reforms. First the Protestants, 
and then the Catholics, perceived their own peril in the situation as it 
was developing, and once so seen, their souls were moved, their defences 
mobilised, and it was but short remove to the fundamental question of 
whether Northern Ireland had the right to exist. In the process the 
landscape and the life of the Province changed, and gave forth what many 
took to be a foretaste of damnation.
How then to view the sum of the international politics which these 
transformations gave rise to?
The Spectator of 23 February 1934 carried a work by the great poet, 
William Butler Yeats, entitled, 'Three Marching Songs'; it was written 
out of the passionate belief that disorder in Ireland, and the 
fanatacism which enflamed it, was about to turn the country's 'noble 
history into an ignoble farce'. In the second Song he wrote:
Justify all those renowned generations;
They left their bodies to fatten the wolves,
They left their homesteads to fatten the foxes,
Fled to far countries, or sheltered themselves 
In cavern, crevice, hole,
Defending Ireland's soul.
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Justify all those renowned generations, 
Justify all that have sunk in their blood, 
Justify all that have died on the scaffold, 
Justify all that have fled, that have stood, 
Stood or have marched the night long 
Singing, singing a song.
Fail, and that history turns into rubbish,
All that great past to a trouble of fools; 
Those that come after shall mock at O'Donnell, 
Mock at the memory of both O'Neills,
Mock at Emmet, mock Parnell:
All that renown that fell.
As Conor Cruise O'Brien has pointed out, a 'blight of cynicism and 
disgust' settled on 'free Ireland' following the Civil War with the 
intolerable knowledge that the Republic proclaimed by Pearse and Connolly 
was not attainable. In the confrontation between that reality and the 
loyalty to a vision of a small nation 'not free merely, but Gaelic as 
well', it very often seemed that Irish history had turned into rubbish, 
and the past into a 'trouble of fools'.
As in so many of his observations, Yeats' prescience now seems 
both chilling and inspired. Events since 1968 have shamed the achieve­
ment of Irish history, questioned the sacrifices which were made in the 
name of the Irish nation, and cast a blight upon the generations which 
will take the country, North and South, well into the twenty-first 
century. Indeed, are not the recent and the present as much a 'trouble 
of fools' as any time since the Civil War? This interpretation, however, 
is not laboured, nor was it reached in anger or scorn; rather it 
pervaded the generality of dealings with which this thesis is 
concerned. Like snatches of a melody demanding to be played in the mind, 
it was heard, now in crescendo, now in a muted, disjointed fashion. But 
always it was there - in the most important of political liaisons and in 
the most peripheral of involvements.
In 1977, Oliver MacDonagh examined a few selected events from the 
previous eight years in the light of 'time frames and casts of mind'
Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'The Embers of Easter 1916-1966', New Left 
Review (June 1966): 7.
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going back three and three-quarter centuries to the final conquest of 
Ulster in 1601. He wrote then that the Irish problem (which he 
defined as including the Ulster Question) had persisted because of the
3
power of geographical and historical images over men's minds. Not 
only did this apply to Ireland, between Catholic and Protestant Irish 
men and women, but to the relationship between Britain and Ireland. 
According to the arguments and more extensive evidence presented in the 
body of this thesis, this was also an accurate assessment of the period 
from 1968 to (and beyond) 1978.
But there was one important qualitative difference between the 
modern period and most of that which preceded it. In so far as Britain 
was concerned, the power of geographical and historical images was 
without any foundation in strategic or imperial necessity. This latter 
fact was implicit in the steady reduction of Britain's post-1945 
circumstances, and was in any case explicit as early as 1972 in the 
Northern Ireland Discussion Paper of the same year. Britain simply had 
neither the desire nor the interest to maintain a foothold, much less 
retain power, in Northern Ireland. Thus, while there was an 
equivalence of traditional British attitudes to Ireland, there was an 
increasing lack of comprehension in the Republic of Ireland as to why 
this should be so.
It was evident from the early days of the current 'troubles' that 
Britain regarded Northern Ireland as somehow distinct from the remainder 
of the United Kingdom, of which it v/as constitutionally a part. In 
1968-69 the British Government was faced with a revolutionary situation: 
the minority community in Northern Ireland wanted nothing less than the 
replacement of the system of government in the state which effectively 
disenfranchised it. London's response was to encourage a reluctant 
Northern Ireland Government towards a policy of reform —  which was
Oliver MacDonagh, 'Time's Revenges and Revenge's Time: A View of 
Anglo-Irish Relations', Anglo-Irish Studies IV (1979): pp. 1 and 17.
The publication of this article took place some time after it was first 
presented, as a lecture, in June 1977 (hereafter cited as MacDonagh, 
'Time's Revenge and Revenge's Time').
ibid. , pp. 1, and 11-13.
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inevitably debased by both a lack of urgency and a certain 
superficiality. In short, a situation in what had historically been 
the most violent part of the United Kingdom, at least since the Battle 
of Culloden, was to be redressed by less than adequate measures 
introduced in a spirit of moderation.
When this policy failed, the British Government, through the agency 
of its constitutionally subordinate executive at Stormont, had recourse to 
coercion. It then took until March 1972 —  i.e. four years from the 
first manifestations of civil rights unrest —  for this policy to be 
acknowledged as bankrupt. But by then it was late; probably too late.
A great number of important reforms were still outstanding, the British 
Army was, after April 1970, regarded as but another arm of Stormont, 
large numbers of the population —  all Catholics —  had been interned 
and many shot, seemingly without good cause. Despite the emergence 
of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (both wings) in an offensive role, 
there was much about Northern Ireland in early 1972 that echoed 
T.P. O'Connor's conclusion of some ninety years before on the steward­
ship of Ireland.
To any Englishman, whatever his party, such a record 
... by any other people but his own, and in any other 
country but in Ireland, would bring prompt condemnation 
and swift resolve.4
From the vantage point of 1981, the prorogation of the Parliament 
which had served Protestant Northern Ireland for half a century did not 
greatly change matters, except negatively- inasmuch as it closed off 
one cause of the unrest. Granted, that event ushered in one of the most 
hopeful periods in the history of the Ulster Question since Ireland had 
been partitioned. Granted also, that in this period, which ended with 
the defeat of the Conservative Government in early 1974, there was 
courage and imagination shown by all parties interested in a lasting 
settlement based on agreement and conciliation. But the courage and 
imagination were devoid of strategy, and after February 1974, courage 
and imagination were exercised only by the Loyalists.
T.P. O'Connor, The Parnell MovementWit h a Sketch of Irish Parties 
from 1843 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Co., 1886), p. 557.
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Consider what was being attempted in this high period of 
political development. Essentially, it was an attempt by London 
(and Dublin, for the matter of that) to insist that Northern Ireland 
should continue to exist, but not in the manner, or according to the 
purpose, of the Protestant state it was set up to be. Consider 
further the delicacy of the Sunningdale Agreement of December 1973, 
here captured by Hugh Munro.
It asserted that the (Protestant) identity of Northern 
Ireland was so strong, that the area had to have its own 
government and at the same time so weak that Protestant 
Unionists could be expected to join in running that 
government with Catholics who wanted to abolish it.5
Sunningdale, and the Executive which it established, therefore, 
obliged the British Government to be aware that it might have to 
confront the Loyalists, and even more, be prepared to follow its 
policies through. The events of May 1974 demonstrated the extent to 
v/hich this obligation was evaded.
The consequences have been as obvious as they have been profound.
By embarking on the enterprise in Northern Ireland without vision, and 
failing, Britain enhanced the myth that the situation in Northern 
Ireland was also without hope. The years since the fall of the 
Executive have borne this out. They have been truly 'the years the 
locust ate'. Northern Ireland has demanded, but not commanded, the type 
of concentrated effort and attention over time v/hich is necessary to 
re-establish a political dialogue on its future. Accurately, Munro has 
described the Province as a 'political corpse':
... it will never again generate a government —  even 
were London to permit it a Protestant one —  again, or 
say what future it wants for itself.
In the field of international politics nowhere was this lack of 
commitment to Northern Ireland the catalyst for tension and disturbance 
more than in Anglo-Irish relations. They v/ere a clear manifestation
Hugh Munro, 'Irish Unity: the long-term answer to stalemate in 
the North', Times,, 25 October 1978.
of the truth that friends suffer from each other's expectations. Britain 
required understanding in the face of a seemingly intractable problem 
sel f-restrai nt, if not self-denial , on the question of uni ty. In Ireland,
however, the appeal to forbearance was rejected. There, the Government 
found the basic issue to be what it always had been since Partition and 
reaffirmed Yeats who, in a speech to the Seanad in 1925 said 'it is 
perhaps the deepest political passion with this nation that the North 
and South be united into one nation.'
Subsequently, the tenor of Anglo-Irish relations was determined 
according to the urgency with which Britain was prepared to satisfy 
this 'passion'. A general rule was seen to operate. Almost anything 
the British Government did on the periphery —  such as engage in 
conferences with the IRA —  was tolerable to the Irish Government, 
provided progress was being made in the centre —  towards unity. When 
such progress was not in evidence almost anything that was done by 
London on the periphery was intolerable to Dublin. And when the 
British Government was inactive on both central and peripheral areas, or 
was ambiguous as to what it might be doing, or both, everything was 
intolerable to the Irish Government, all the time.
Conversely, it became an almost certain method of ascertaining the 
state of Britain's Northern Ireland policy to extrapolate from 
contemporary issues in Anglo-Irish relations. If the whole British 
intervention in Northern Ireland was being loudly denounced (as it was 
from 1969-71), then this was a demand by Dublin to be recognised. If 
the Leader of Her Majesty's loyal Opposition (Harold Wilson) could 
deceive his hosts in Dublin by talking to the Provisionals and yet 
Anglo-Irish relations suffer no injury, then Stormont was about to be 
prorogued. If tensions were high over security concerns (as they 
frequently have been since 1974), then it was because all formal political 
activity was abated. It was as though Ireland arrogated unto itself the 
role of Britain's selective conscience: understanding and forgiveness 
were not dependent on contrition for particular 'wrongs' but on the 
latter's general disposition towards national re-unification.
Yet despite cycles of demand, accommodation, co-operation, 
withdrawal, and assertiveness, the objective of unity v/as not advanced
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by the conduct of Anglo-Irish relations. When the National Coalition 
passed from office in mid-1977, the Sunningdale Agreement was 
virtually in tatters. But by that time, anyway, it had adopted a low 
profile on Northern Ireland. Subsequently, the Labour Governments of 
Harold Wilson and James Callaghan did likewise (albeit for different 
reasons), and the contrast with the heady, innovative days of 1972-73 
was marked. Who now speaks with any conviction at Anglo-Irish summits 
of power-sharing and the Irish Dimension? They are no longer well 
understood principles -  they are probably not even principles —  but 
rather private thoughts, spoken aloud only where the faithful are 
gathered.
In the gloomy light of this conclusion it is worth considering 
whether the pressure from Ireland upon Britain contributed, in any 
significant sense, to progress even in the civil rights area. The 
British Government was bound by its own conscience to do something 
about the justifiable grievances of the Catholic community in 1969. 
Whether the representations by the Republic during its period of 
'second guarantor' extended or accelerated this process is arguable.
At the time, the Irish (Fianna Fail) Government was dissatisfied with 
the pace of reform; when the National Coalition came to power, the 
whole substance of Anglo-Irish diplomacy had changed. Thus the course 
of progress throughout the years was set and maintained by Britain 
without any apparent evidence that the Republic's influence was to the 
fore.
It is at this point that Yeats' phrase 'a trouble of fools' strikes 
a sympathetic chord. For what the conclusion to this point has stated is 
that Anglo-Irish relations, with their agreements, controversies, 
and all their panoply, were simply a waste of time - a necessary, 
sometimes elegant but frequently prosaic and irrelevant 
discourse between one nation that v/as effectively powerless to act, and 
another nation that would act, for the most part, in its own good time 
and according to its own bent. Britain and Ireland: two parties to a 
dispute, victims of untoward circumstances, perhaps not entertainers on 
an international stage, but inclined to deceive and divert, themselves 
on each other.
597
In the wider field of international politics, the Ulster Question 
offered more scope for this spectacle, although the drama which 
unfolded was inconsistent, varying with time and place from high 
tragedy to low farce. That at the United Nations was essentially played 
out between Britain and Ireland, with light relief being provided by 
the Soviet Union, and a cameo appearance by the United States. It was 
notable, however, less for the fact that it was an event with a pre­
arranged format, and an inevitable outcome, than it was for its value 
as the earliest indicator of the response Northern Ireland would be 
accorded by the international community. What this episode in 1969 
suggested, was later proved to be an enduring truth: the social and 
political injustice, and resultant civil violence within a country, is 
no more important than that country would otherwise be without such a 
disturbance. And judging from Ireland's later recourse, or lack thereof, 
to the United Nations, it was obvious that this lesson was learnt 
particularly wel1.
The general truth of the above conclusion may seem surprising 
in view of the statements made by successive Irish ministers for Foreign 
Affairs that governments throughout the world were concerned for the 
Northern Ireland problem.^ But those countries too, suffered from the 
expectations of their friends. Where the countries of Western Europe 
had previously been interested in Ireland because of their rivalries 
with Britain, they were now only saddened by the spectacle which 
confronted them in the Six Counties. It was always out of the question, 
for the most compelling reasons of European co-operation, that they would 
intervene, without invitation, either in regard to the situation in the 
North, or in the disputes it gave rise to between Britain and Ireland.
The only real exception to this was the Vatican, which maintained 
an apparently close interest throughout the period and was given to 
making occasional statements which were, as the circumstances demanded, 
critical or supportive of developments in Northern Ireland. It was, for
E.g. Dr Garret Fitzgerald, in Dail Eireann, Pariiamentary Debates, 
Official Report, vol. 275, 5 November 1974, col. 928; and 'Speech by 
Mr Michael O'Kennedy, T.D., ... outlining the principles of Irish Foreign 
Policy on the occasion of the formal launching of Patrick Keatinge's 
A Place Among the Nations at the Institute of Public Administration', 
p.4, Dublin, April 1978 (issued by the Government Information Services).
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all of that,a modest role, rendered even more modest by the knowledge 
that the Vatican was not a country, nor even a state constrained by the 
same considerations as the countries of Western Europe. Its record, 
therefore, underlined the general passivity of those countries on the 
Ulster Question.
Within those countries, a somewhat different picture emerged.
Numerous groups, it was clear, were moved by the tragedy of Northern 
Ireland and voiced their opposition by way of protests and 
demonstrations. Yet the frequency and loudness of their voices 
depended on the extent to which an event in Northern Ireland surpassed 
the almost daily excesses of life there. They were, in every sense, not 
only reacting to 'the politics of the last atrocity' but were doing so i n a
superficial way and without serious purpose. Like all dilettanti, they 
contributed nothing to the amelioration of the particular situations 
which grabbed their attention, and when the memory of them faded, their 
voices were stilled.
Again, there v/as but one exception —  the movement in Holland which 
attempted, in a largely unpublicised way, to counter sectarian 
bitterness by providing the environment in which greater understanding 
might begin. Whether it had any success is hard to say. But it must be 
lauded for its frontal assault upon bigotry, and its refusal to be 
discouraged in the face of continuing adversity.
It was only in the international organisations of Western Europe 
that the Ulster Question was to any marked extent 'Europeanised'. The 
Council of Europe's interest was comprehensive and the Report produced 
in its name acknowledged a 'European dimension' to the problems of 
Northern Ireland. More importantly, it was understanding of the 
complexities involved. Potentially, this may be significant for it 
created a precedent in terms of expected standards of future responses.
But no more than that. The acknowledgement of a dimension was an 
exercise in definition, not of solution; and as for understanding, it 
determined the Council only upon a course of further study. Realistically, 
no more could have been expected. The 'European dimension' to the Ulster 
Question, did not make it a European question. Thus, in so far as the 
Council of Europe Weis concerned, its ambit of action was cautiously and 
narrowly defined.
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By way of contrast, the role of the European Community (EC), as 
proclaimed by Britain and Ireland, was to be more extensive. The 
shift in emphasis was due of course to the hope that was invested in 
it, rather than the record of its influence. The governments of both 
countries (but the Irish more so) saw in the EC a means by which closer 
economic interests and relations between North and South could be 
forged. Furthermore there was evidence which allowed such hopes to be 
entertained as reasonable, if not certain, expectations. And therein 
lay Western Europe's greatest potential contribution towards 
rapprochement in Ireland.
The same evidence, however, did not support the hope in, or the 
predictions of, political unity made by the more optimistic observers 
in the Republic. Three reasons account for this judgment. First, the 
EC has not developed politically to the point where it could adopt the 
Ulster Question, even if it wanted to. Second, notwithstanding the 
first reason, there was no apparent strategy on the part of the Irish 
Government to have the EC's influence exerted towards the objective of 
unity. Third, since the EC's character was determined by its sovereign 
member-states, there was never any likelihood that it would attempt to 
venture where they had feared to tread. And to this extent, the talk 
of Europeanising the Ulster Question in 1978-79 was as misleading as it 
was futile.
Only in the inter-state ('torture') case heard by the European 
Commission of Human Rights did a Western European organisation make a 
substantial contribution to the situation in Northern Ireland. But it 
was short-lived and unrelated to the central issue of unity. It was short­
lived and, some would say, peculiar, because within twenty-eight months of 
the Commission finding that certain practices carried out by the security 
forces in Northern Ireland constituted torture, the appelate Court diluted 
the finding to 'inhuman and degrading treatment' without itself coming to 
an objective definition of torture. Short-lived also, because in 1978-79, 
documentary evidence of treatment similar to that which had been 
complained of in 1971, indicated that practically speaking the effect of 
the Strasbourg decisions was minimal. While this did not invalidate the 
the principles behind bringing the case, it surely questioned the 
political will which Britain had to ensure the good government of 
Northern Ireland.
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Thus, at each level of analysis in Western Europe, the 
relationship between a country or organisation, and the Ulster Question, 
was more or less well-defined. Where national governments had refused 
to respond, it was clear; where various organisations had chosen to 
respond, that also was clear, either from the definition of their 
interest or the role they assumed.
Beyond Western Europe the overall international impact was 
almost invariably malign. Essentially this was because the Ulster 
Question was approached from the perspective of the conflict it had given 
rise to and with the purpose of encouraging, and in some cases, escalating 
the campaigns of the various paramilitary organisations in Northern 
Ireland of which the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) was the 
predominant. In the United States this influence was exerted without 
effective restraint for some seven years. And even in the leaner years 
which followed 1976, funds from the Irish-American support network were 
still providing the IRA with the sinews of war.
It is because of this continuing commitment in aid of Provisionals 
that the counter-measures taken by the US Government, the initiative of 
President Jimmy Carter, and the campaign against US support conducted 
by the Four Horsemen, are depreciated in this section. Notwithstanding 
that only a minority of Irish-Americans lent their support to the 
network, and that a great transformation was wrought in the American 
Dimension after 1976 to make it responsible, the fact remains that to 
US support down the years must be attributed a substantial (if 
undetermined) fragment of the violence, suffering and death which has 
been the lot of Northern Ireland.
A similarly undetermined fragment was the responsibility of the 
Libyan Government which appeared to be the only source which at any time 
rivalled the US network in the magnitude of its contribution to the IRA. 
And joined closely with Libya in this regard must be the various 
Palestinian organisations which the available evidence suggests were 
also involved. But here a certain cynicism must enter the assessment.
In the United States, there was at least an understanding of the Ulster 
Question, poor though it may frequently have been, in terms of Ireland's
601
struggle against oppression. There v/as also a sympathy for the land 
and its people, in particular its Catholic people. As the focus 
shifted to the Middle East this quality was understandably and quite 
plainly lacking. What existed in its place was opportunism, perhaps 
buttressed, but certainly not determined, by a sense of revolutionary 
solidarity. The criterion for support seemed to be that the conflict 
existed and was available for exploitation to the embarrassment of 
Britain. Beyond that there was no ennobling motive to be discerned in 
the supply of arms from Libya and the Palestinians.
The remaining international influences upon the Ulster Question are 
diffuse and harder to assess. In descending order of likely importance 
the arms dealers, the Irish abroad in the 'old Commonwealth', and the 
matrix of international contacts obviously all played their parts, but 
they did so to no great effect. Their involvement, to whatever purpose, 
v/as either too infrequent or too shallow to alter the disposition of 
forces. In this sense they were so much ephemera when related to the 
basic issues in Northern Ireland.
But this conclusion is really the inversion, or reverse binocular 
image, of the main conclusion of this thesis: that outside Anglo-Irish 
relations, the Ulster Question has been accorded only the status of a 
messy, bloody little footnote to contemporary international concerns.
It simply has not generated an imperative requirement for the inter­
national community to respond in a sustained or active manner. Surely 
it was significant that only the extreme left in Britain and Western 
Europe, and the extreme right in Britain agreed upon the contemporary 
strategic significance of Northern Ireland. If, as MacDonagh claimed, 
the Ulster Question persisted in Ireland, and between Britain and 
Ireland, because of the power of geographical and historical images over 
men's minds, then it failed as an -international issue for precisely the 
same reason. The relations which were the concern of this thesis were 
located towards the diminutive end of international politics.
Should this be surprising? Ireland in general, and Northern Ireland 
in particular, lacks just about every characteristic which could thrust 
it into prolonged international prominence. In general this has been 
appreciated by the principal parties to the Ulster Question. Although
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recourse was occasionally made to various material and spiritual 
cafetarias in the international arena, the force of the action has been 
centripetal and not centrifugal. There has been no escape from the 
knowledge that the international locus within which all must be 
decided was defined by Belfast, Dublin and London. For those without, 
there was only fascination; for those within, the compulsion to be rid 
of persistent ghosts:
King, nobles, al1,
Looked aghast and strange;
The minstrel-group sate in dumbest show!
Had some great crime 
Wrought this dread amaze,
This terror? None seemed to understand ...
I again walked forth;
But lo! the sky
Showed fleckt with blood, and an alien sun 
Glared from the north,
And there stood on high,
Amid his shorn beams, a skeleton! Q
'Vision of Connacht in the Thirteenth Century', by James Clarence 
Mangan, as cited in Oliver MacDonagh, 'Time's Revenges and Revenge's 
Time': p. 18.
APPENDIX I
RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
IRISH-AMERICAN COMMUNITY
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The angry response of certain Irish-Americans to 
any attempt to discuss the realities of the question 
has, I think, to do not so much with love for 
Ireland -  certainly not in the sense'of loving the 
actual Irish who live there —  as with the natural 
human tendency to resist any intrusion on a system 
of satisfying fantasies.
(Conor Cruise O'Brien)1
As a result of United States Government restrictions on
immigration, the Irish-born population of that country numbered only
2
290,000 in 1970. However, the population estimates of those considered 
to be Irish-Americans varied, then and subsequently, between a minimum 
of 13 million and a maximum of 30 million. Irrespective of which was 
the more accurate figure, it was obvious that the community which had 
produced over one-quarter of all US presidents was, in American terms,
thriving, and in relation to the population of the land of their
3ethnic origins, vast. Ironically, the Protestant Irish-Americans, 
who were overwhelmingly responsible for such a high level of 
representation in the office of Chief Executive, are not the concern 
of this analysis, as David McKittrick wrote of them:
[They]* have assimilated so well as to become practically 
invisible. Very few take an active interest in Northern 
Ireland affairs.4
Conor Cruise O'Brien, Herod: Reflections on Political Violence, 
(London: Hutchinson, 1978), p. 41.
2
US Census figure, as cited in Dennis J. Clark, Irish Blood: Northern
Ireland and the American Conscience (Port Washington, New York:
Kennikat, 1977), p. 33, (hereafter cited as Clark, Irish Blood).
3
On occasions there has been an almost excessive, if touching 
willingness on the part of some small area of Ireland to 'claim' a United 
States President. In 1976, for example the Longford News, alone of all 
the newspapers in Ireland, carried the front page headline 'Clondra Man 
Loses American Election' to announce Gerald Ford's defeat by Jimmy 
Carter, and the ensuing gloom which had settled over the Co. Longford 
village from whence his forbears were alleged to have departed (review 
of provincial papers, Irish Times, 8 November 1976).
4
David McKittrick, 'Irish Everywhere in the Land of Immigrants', the 
first of four major articles on the Irish in America, Irish Times, 3 
September 1979, p. 10, (hereafter cited as McKittrick, 'Irish Everywhere',
Irish Timer-, 3 September 1979.
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Even for the Catholic Irish-Americans this finding was not 
necessarily different. In relation to those born in Ireland, they 
(and, one assumed, the Protestants as well) were subject to what 
Dennis Clark described as that 'strange ambiguity' about exile groups 
and immigrant communities by which he meant:
They are mortgaged to the past, yet they have often 
advanced into a future not yet perceived in the old 
country. Inevitably the new host country deeply affects , 
immigrant ties to the homeland. Movement from a less 
developed nation to one resounding with modern media 
and sophisticated technology causes conflicts in the 
immigrants. Usually, the immigrant bears in himself 
the love and memory of the native land where he spent 
his most impressionable years. Yet, he must seek a 
livelihood in a nation frequently hostile to the 
values he was taught to cherish. This has been true 
in the mid-twentieth century for immigrants from Ireland 
to the United States.5
But perhaps the greatest irony of all was that this whole under­
mining of the Irish identity in America had been from the late 
nineteenth century, encouraged and accelerated by the Catholic Church 
in America, the very body which had helped forge it in the first place. 
According to historian, Lawrence 0. McCaffrey:
Although Irish-American Catholicism retained old country 
puritan, devotional, and peasant ideals, liberal bishops, 
mainly from the Midwest, insisted on Americanization 
while their conservative colleagues in the East demanded 
Romanization. In America, as in Ireland, the two 
cultural systems, Romanization and Anglicization, continued 
to modify the original Gaelic personality, and the Catholic 
church and its educational system literally became the 
agents of anti-Irish cultural imperial ism.P
In the '60s and '70s, too, the Church v/as faced with an issue —  
ecumenism —  and a problem —  that of an activist and sometimes rebellious 
clergy —  which determined it to adopt no more than a passive role with 
regard to Northern Ireland. The former, of course, did not preclude
Clark, Irish Blood, p. 73.
fS
Lawrence J. McCaffrey, The Irish Diaspora in America (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 173 (hereafter cited as McCaffrey,
The Irish Diaspora in America).
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an active role, it merely made the Catholic Church loath to risk 
re-opening old Catholic-Protestant antagonisms. The latter was a 
caution: with the effects of the hippie revolution and the Vietnam 
protest movement making their mark with a crisis of institutional 
confidence, the Church was not about to embrace a cause which might 
only exacerbate the disruption it was already experiencing.^
In addition, both the Irish-born and (particularly) those of 
Irish descent, were subject to secular influences v/hich decreased 
further the likelihood of them maintaining a real Irish awareness. 
Within the United States, following the First World War, they rapidly 
achieved prosperity and gained respectability in their own right, and
concomitantly, according to Lawrence McCaffrey, acquired a more
8American and less Irish identity.
In this process they spawned a whole range of confusing and 
conflicting paradoxes. Those upon whom journalist Pete Hamill bestowed 
the title, 'The Old Irish' (i.e. Irish immigrants to the USA in the 
first quarter of the twentieth century) underwent a transformation 
v/hich he obviously found contemptible —  from being advocates of 
revolution and social justice in the early years of their exile, to 
being conservative and even reactionary within little more time than 
a generation.
Men who had been members of Sinn Fein, the I.R.A.'s 
political arm, talked of revolution in Belfast in 1922 
and by 1952 v/ere convinced that Joe McCarthy was a 
great Irishman. Men who joined the Democratic Party 
because F.D.R. stood for social justice found themselves 
voting for James Buckley because he would control the 
unruly blacks.9
Not surprisingly, Professor McCaffrey reports that, by the early 
1970s, the erosion of an ethnic identity v/as even further advanced
Clark, Irish Bloods pp. 33-4.
g
McCaffrey, The Irish Diaspora in America, p. 153.
9
Pete Hamill, 'Notes on the New Irish: A Guide for the Goyim', 
New York. 13 March 1972, p. 36, (hereafter cited as Hamill, 'Notes on 
the New Irish').
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In February, 1972, I gave an Irish culture test to 
about 100 students in a large ethnic history course at 
Loyola University of Chicago. All of those who took 
the test identified themselves as Irish and had attended 
Catholic secondary schools. Less than three percent 
could identify important political figures such as 
O'Connells Parnell, Pearses or de Valera, and only about 
fifteen percent had some knowledge of literary 
personalities such as JoyceYeats, or O'Neill.
[emphasis added].10
But, according to Hamill, the falling away from the old identity
noted in the foregoing did not compass the destruction of the soul
of Irish-America. Indeed, this was countered by the emergence, during
the 1950s and 1960s, of a generation he styled the 'New Irish'—
'interior Irish exiles' —  largely of the Left and of New York,
sustained in their loyalty to the old ideals by an eclectic recourse
to the reading of Irish history (with a heavy overlay of Jewish thought),
the political example of Paul 0'Dwyer11 (the subject of Appendix II),
12and the 'new Christianity' as espoused by the Berrigan brothers.
Among those Hamill numbered in the new Irish were writers Jimmy Breslin
and Daniel Patrick Moynihan and (although he is not so clear on this
13point) politicians such as Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy.
With a somewhat different perspective to present, McCaffrey 
substantially confirmed the intellectual and political alignment of the 
New Irish claimed by Hamill, although he did not use that specific term:
by young Irish-Americans.
McCaffrey, The Irish Diaspora in America, p. 207, note 14; see also 
pp. 171-3.
An eminent Irish-born New York lawyer, civil rights activist, and 
in the mid 1970s, President of the City Council of New York. His 
interest in Northern Ireland dates back over forty years, and since 
1972 at least, has been strongly identified with sections of the Irish- 
American community which support, directly or indirectly, the Provisional 
Irish Republic Army. See Appendix II, pp.614-19.
12 Hamill, 'Notes on the New Irish', p. 39. The Berrigan brothers v/ere 
activist Catholic priests, prominent in the protest movement against the
Vietnam war.
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According to Andrew M. Greeley and his colleague 
William McCready at the National Opinion Research 
Center in Chicago, public opinion samples indicated 
that, next to American Jews, the Irish are the most 
liberal group in the United States on such issues as 
civil rights, religious and racial tolerance, social 
reform and peace. Harris and Gallup polls concur with 
Greeley's findings, [emphasis added].
However, as successful as the New Irish may have been in resisting 
American pressures towards isolation from their ethnic origins, they, 
in common with the Old and the young Irish, were subject to a form of 
imposed isolation from, of all places, Ireland. Of these complementary 
developments (rather than pressures), McCaffrey wrote:
In addition to the decline in Irish emigration to the 
United States, the decision of posttreaty Ireland to 
promote a more exclusive brand of nationalism, and, more 
recently, the Irish government's emphasis on the Irish 
as a European rather than a Diasporic people has widened 
the communication gap between the Irish at home and in 
America. Contemporary nationalism with its paradoxical 
combination of provincial Gaelic and cosmopolitan common 
market and European community dimensions neglects the 
rich, cultural potential of uniting the Irish at home with 
sophisticated, intellectual Irish colonies in the United 
States and in the British Commonwealth.15
Thus, as a consequence of these and a number of less clearly 
defined influences, Clark observed that the outbreak of the Northern 
Ireland troubles:
... simply did not engage all Irish-born or Irish American 
people. Many believed that Ireland's major problems were 
rooted in economic, social and religious conditions largely 
independent of England and Northern Ireland.16
With the passage of time, and the claim upon the imagination that 
events such as the introduction of internment without trial and Bloody 
Sunday could make, this resistance to become involved was overcome, in a
14 McCaffrey, The Irish Diaspora in America, p. 171 (McCaffrey lists a 
number of Greeley's analyses for further reference on pp. 206-07).
15 ibid., p. 153.
Clark, Irish Blood, p. 34.
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minority of the Irish-American population at least. As Hamill wrote 
of this transformation at the time:
[T]he Northern Ireland situation has been one of the 
great forcing grounds, because it allows —  after too 
long a time —  for direct rather than oblique confron­
tation with Irishness.l'
Nevertheless, what followed was not so much a confrontation 
between Irish-America and the conflict in Northern Ireland, as in 
effect, three confrontations —  between each of the categories of that 
community and the conflict. Hence, in considering support for the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) —  a very relevant and useful 
index in the light of developments throughout the period under review —  
Clark maintained:
There does not seem to be a single personality type 
supporting the Provisional IRA.±8
Once again, it was an observation substantially confirmed in the 
writings of the other two principal sources used to this point.
Hamill, for example, detected in the interest of the New Irish an 
intellectual, and, one infers, a moral ascendancy over that evinced by 
the Old Irish who, he claimed:
... wanted to know whether Bernadette Devlin was a 
Communist, and were'nt the Chinese trying to take over 
the Falls Road, and who were these new I.R.A. men who were 
asking for social justice? ... They did not recognize 
Wolfe Tone in Martin Luther King; they saw no parallel 
between the Famine and Dachau; they didn't understand 
that what Le Roi Jones was trying to do with black culture 
was precisely what the Gaelic Revival was all about in 
Ireland, what Yeats and Synge and Lady Gregory had tried 
to do, with astonishing success, with Irish culture.19
Whatever reservations may be held about the coarse mesh with which 
the above writer sifted his American and Irish histories, McCaffrey saw
Hamill, 'Notes on the Mew Irish', p. 39. 
Clark, Irish Blood, p. 52.
Hamill, 'Notes on the New Irish', p. 39.
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the Old Irish, and the young for the matter of that, in a similarly 
unflattering light.
In pubs ... Irish American college students ... sing 
nationalist ballads, demanding that Britain return the 
four green fields to Cathleen ni Houlihan.20 And a 
number of Irish-Americans contribute money to I.R.A. 
front groups.... Many of the young middle-class pub 
balladeers are ignorant of Irish history, untouched by 
Irish culture, and are only romantically reacting to the 
enthusiasm of youth, the Irishness of their names, the 
beat of the music and the need for a cause. Their 
elders who support I.R.A. violence by contributing money 
seem to represent the residue of Irish-American ghetto 
paranoia; most of them are still seeking an identity 
through the old slogans and hatreds of Irish national ism.21
In this at least he was in fundamental disagreement with Clark
who, although he found the historical knowledge of the Irish-American
22support community to be 'gross and truncated', found it also to be 
possessed of a common uncompromising animus insofar as Ulster was 
concerned.
The people supporting the activist network in the United 
States are hard-bitten North of Ireland types, whether 
actually born there or not. They are not zany bog men or 
fatuous American blarney stone lovers. They are mostly 
people with direct experience with the North, steeped in 
its rancor, and gritty as the stones of Antrim. They do 
not shrink from dreadful acts. If activists are American- 
born they tend to be people who have generally come 
through a hard school themselves, who perhaps served in 
one or more of America's brutalizing wars, and are imbued 
with a high tolerance for violence} a tolerance that has 
become something of a characteristic of Americans. The 
I.R.A. support network is not an Aer Lingus tourist crowd. 
It is more like an extension of the Falls Road ghetto, 
[emphasis added!.
'Four Green Fields' is a popular nationalist song written by 
Tommy Makem, in which Ireland is referred to as an old woman (the 
Cathleen ni Houlihan tradition).
21 McCaffrey, The Irish Diaspora in America, pp. 156-7.
22 Clark, Irish Bloods p. 59.
23 ibid. , pp. 29-31.
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As this is not a thesis in sociology, the above conflicting views were 
presented only to note that scholarly opinion was divided on a 
particular point rather than to argue the relative merits of one over 
the other.
Notwithstanding such obvious differences, two characteristics
clearly emerged from the cameos presented. The first was that support
for the I.R.A. was, albeit for different reasons, 'across the board';
this was in sharp contrast to the support which terrorist groups have
attracted over the past decade and a half —  and which was lent
exclusively by those whose philosophies could be located within the
24left or liberal parameters of the political spectrum. The second 
was that there existed in the United States, to a greater or lesser 
extent, the counterparts of those in Northern Ireland who were known 
as 'the hard men'.
In sum, the variety of nationalism which prevailed in the
interested Irish-American community in the early years of the current
troubles was 'ethnic' rather than rational, which, to paraphrase Clark,
25meant that it was derived from a process of 'direct socialization'. 
Furthermore, no matter what sub-group of the community was taken as a 
referent, the conclusion to be drawn was that it was conducting a long­
distance love affair with an organism which existed only in its 
collective imagination. So far as the situation in Northern Ireland 
was concerned, this was to have the most profound implications: 
because it was essentially the creation and pursuit of many illusions 
it was, in turn, to create its own comedy of errors. And, because it 
was understood among many if not all, that the affection aroused should 
be appropriately expressed in terms of arms and cash, the drama was to 
quickly descend into tragedy.
There were, however, two other traits of American society in 
general, and hence of the Irish-American community in particular, which 
should be noted. The first was noted in so many authoritative works 
on American political sociology over the years that it has attained the
See Chapter 14.
Clark, Irish Blood, p. 74.
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status almost of a truism. As Gabriel Almond argued, the American 
tends to be both 'an optimist as to ends and an improviser as to the 
means'. He is, moreover, 'compulsive' in his belief that one can 
'by effort and good will achieve or approximate one's goals.' 
Unfortunately, as Almond points out, this cheery, problem-solving 
disposition is flawed by a combination of 'anti-intellectualism' 
and 'simple rationalism'.
In complicated questions of social and public policy 
there is a genuine distrust of complex and subtle 
reasoning and a preference for an earthy 'common 
sense'. 26
Since there has been no serious challenge to the proposition 
that the conflict in Northern Ireland demanded, at the very least, 
'complex and subtle reasoning', it followed that the Irish-American 
community was given to expecting 'initiatives' from the British 
Government which took little or no account of the imperatives which 
the latter faced. When such moves were not forthcoming, or when they 
failed, it also followed that that community would be less than under­
standing of the difficulties involved in mounting further moves, and 
would mark its dissatisfaction with a somewhat petulant outburst of 
criticism for past failures and demands for renewed efforts, the 
scope of which were frequently beyond what even the Irish Government 
was proposing.
The second trait was a more recent phenomenon —  the scarring 
experience which had been the United States involvement in, and with­
drawal from, the Vietnam war. For many American observers the fact 
that Britain had deployed its military on the island of Ireland was 
sufficient not only to conjure up the ghosts of recent misfortune, 
but also to ensure that the American experience in Vietnam was equated 
with the likely course of events in Northern Ireland. In doing so 
they displayed, but to an even greater extent, not only the same 
coarseness of historical vision noted earlier in Hamill, but also a 
curious but understandable inability to forgive a close ally (Britain) 
for the sins they had themselves committed.
Gabriel Almond, 'American Character and Foreign Policy', Robert L. 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., ed., Politics and the International System 
(Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1969), p. 314.
613
Obviously, neither these characteristics, nor the attitudes 
of the Irish-American community previously mentioned, were solely 
responsible for the subsequent development of the American dimension; 
other factors within Northern Ireland such as internment and Bloody 
Sunday proved just as capable of provoking the same type of reaction. 
Nevertheless, it was significant that for the period these attitudes 
and characteristics enjoyed a free rein, the activities which 
distinguished Irish-America were those which contributed to the 
escalation and continuation of the more violent aspects of the conflict 
in Northern Ireland.
APPENDIX II
NOTES ON PAUL O'DWYER
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As a worker (and lawyer) for civil rights in the United States,
Paul 0'Dwyer's credentials were honourable, some would say impeccable.
For many years, however, despite his lengthy interest and involvement
in Northern Ireland political affairs,1 and despite the strongly Irish
character of the projection of his late brother and former Mayor of
New York, William 0'Dwyer, he was himself relatively unpopular in
conservative Irish-American circles because of his uncompromising
2
agitation on behalf of minorities. During this time he established 
himself as a firm supporter of the Zionist cause: by his own admission
3
he ran guns for the Stern Gang. In 1948, he successfully defended the 
nineteen-year-old son of the poet Louis Untermeyer who had been 
discovered with a cache of rifles apparently intended for the Irgun —  
arguing that the young man v/as only doing 'what every freedom-loving
4
person should be doing.
In 1968 he concentrated his attention on the civil rights movement 
in Northern Ireland and formed the American Committee for Ulster 
Justice (ACUJ) in 1971. Within a year, however, his commitment had 
led him to embark upon a path notable for its excesses and 
inconsistencies. On the one hand he, with the help of legal and other 
associates, campaigned over issues such as internment and detention, 
and succeeded in getting the Democratic Party to include in its 1972 
platform a plank condemning discrimination and repression in Northern 
Ireland. Four years later he availed himself of an opportunity 
presented to him by the Rev. William Arlow, writer Ulick O'Connor
Eugene McEldowney, 'O'Dwyer: Obvious parallels between Ireland and 
Vietnam', a feature article in the Irish Times, 21 June 1978, (hereafter 
cited as McEldowney, 'O'Dwyer', Irish Times, 21 June 1978).
2
Confidential Briefing Paper, Embassy of Ireland, Washington, D.C., 
dated 17 April 1975 (hereafter cited as Embassy of Ireland, Briefing,
17 April 1975). Co d .v held by writer.
3
ibid., a lengthy article by James T. Markham in the New York Times, 
17 July 1972, p. 17, claimed that the recipient group was the Irgun Zvai 
Leumi.
4
As reported in the New York Times, 17 July 1972, p. 17 (article 
cited in note 98 above).
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and Senator Trevor West to make an unpublicised visit to 
the North and meet representatives of various Protestant paramilitary 
organisations. In doing so O'Dwyer took considerable political risks 
in the event that his visit was made known to the electorate: he was 
due, the following year, to stand for re-election as President of 
the Council of the City of New York and such knowledge could almost 
have been guaranteed to prejudice his appeal with sections of the
5
electorate, Irish and non-Irish. He also displayed an understanding 
of those that he met which was, in this writer's opinion, remarkable. 
With clarity of insight and logic, O'Dwyer produced in his 'random 
notes' perhaps the most clear-headed assessment of the loyalists 
positions, their mood, and their capabilities,yet undertaken by an 
Irish-American, or even by a militant Republican outside of the North.
On the other hand, it v/as possible to regard this achievement as 
little more than an aberration in terms of the positions O'Dwyer took 
throughout the period under review. His legal firm, O'Dwyer and 
Bernstein, provided all its legal services for the Provisional front 
organisation, the Irish Northern Aid Committee (registration, 
representation corporately and of individual members in relation to 
alleged NORA ID-re-1 a ted activities) free of charge, and O'Dwyer himself 
was a guest of honour at a number of NORAID functions.^ For these 
and like purposes he succumbed to the rhetoric and unreal perspectives 
found in the more extreme Provisional formulations, as was evident in 
his description of the situation in Northern Ireland as one which,
'for sheer savagery, threatens to surpass the genocidal mania of Adolf g
Hitler.' It was surprising, therefore, that O'Dwyer should then
As it was, the electorate were kept in ignorance, but O'Dwyer 
lost anyv/ay.
Memorandum on official letterhead of the President of the Council, 
the City of New York, dated 10 December 1976, addressed to the Honourable 
Trevor West, Reverend William Arlow, Ulick O'Connor, Reverend David J. 
Bov/man, and entitled 'Random Notes on November 20th'.
Embassy of Ireland, Briefing, 17 April 1975.
g
'Testimony by Paul O'Dwyer', to an ad hoc committee of Congressmen,
15 October 1975, as cited in the United States Congressional Record - 
House, 4 December 1975, p. 38732, (hereafter cited as '0' Dwyer 
Testimony', United States Congressional Record, etc.
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proceed to a position from which he at once supported the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party and the Provisionals (whom he saw as 
frustrated agitators for human rights and defendants of the beleaguered
Q
Catholic community), for each of whom the other was anathema!
The perspective was only marginally less distorted when he 
attempted to see 'obvious parallels' between the British Government's 
experience in Northern Ireland and his own Government's involvement in 
Vietnam. As his NORAID connections suggested, he favoured the active 
participation of the IRA in any negotiations designed to settle the 
future of Ulster, on the rather dubious basis that it had 'some 
significance in the lives of the people'.1^ According to O'Dwyer there 
were lessons to be drawn from recent American experience:
For years, the United States Government refused to even 
consider talking to the Viet Cong and we were told that 
if the Americans withdrew the Communists v/ould come down 
from the North and murder everyone in sight. It didn't 
happen.H
Perhaps there were very few reprisal killings in Vietnam after 1973, 
but a cynic might point out that the situation which followed the Viet 
Cong victory must surely have been less than tolerable if more than one 
million of the population of South Vietnam chose to become refugees 
rather than remain. Moreover, O'Dwyer ignored the fact, supported by 
electoral and survey data in Northern Ireland and the Republic since 
the current troubles began, that both the IRA and its polticial wing,
Sinn Fein, had failed to be endorsed to anything like a significant 
degree by the Irish people.
However, in this matter he was at least in concert with two
successive British Secretaries of State, Whitelaw and Rees, who had under
various guises tried to bargain with the IRA and found the practice to
12be untenable. And, of course, it followed that O'Dwyer succeeded in
Interview with Maeve Binchey, Irish Times3 25 March 1975. 
McEldowney, 'O'Dwyer', Irish Times3 21 June 1978. 
ibid.
See Chapter 2, pp.102-110; and Chapter 3, pp. 166-72.
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distancing himself and his organisation from those parties which
otherwise may have found his record and civil rights activities
commendable —  among them the Irish Government. But by the time he
made his statement about the Viet Cong, he had in any case already
taken up a position hostile to Dublin. In 1975 he was critical of
Irish politicians for their indifference to Northern Ireland and for
their speeches in the United States telling Irish-Americans 'what
13to do and not to do with their contributions'.
For all that, the views of one of New York City's most prominent
politicians only became truly disturbing when it v/as apparent that,
despite his insight into the Protestant paramilitaries, he advocated
complete withdrawal of the British presence in Northern Ireland. As
he saw it, it was no more than the perpetuation of a three centuries-old
policy 'to keep the people divided'. Since Catholic and Protestant
Irishmen had demonstrated an ability to get along in other parts of
the world, he found the British Army not only a 'mischievous influence'
but also an 'unjustifiable indictment of the Protestant population'.
It was, therefore, an 'outrageous lie' to suggest that it was required
14in the North to keep the peace.
Thus in one, simplistic and uncomplicated stroke, O'Dwyer dispensed 
with the wisdom and the rare accord of both the British and Irish 
Governments, countless authoritative commentators, and the prevailing 
consensus among the Catholic community of Northern Ireland that the 
British Army v/as necessary for the maintenance of what passes as 
normalcy in the Province. Conveniently forgotten was the existence of 
tribal hatred which led to the bitter inter-sectarian street fights of
1969 and the early 1970s, and which then moved one Unionist Senator 
to proclaim at large in the members' dining-room at Stormont:
If only the bloody British Army hadn't come in we'd 
have shot ten thousand of them [Catholics] by dawn.15
Interview with Maeve Binchey, Irish Times, 25 March 1975.
^  McEldowney, 'O'Dwyer', Irish Times, 21 June 1978.
15 Sunday Times, 'Insight' Team, Ulster (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1972), p. 142.
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And inexcusably ignored by O'Dwyer was the fact that the British Army, 
by the time of his statement, was present in Northern Ireland to 
counter the terrorism of the IRA (which he did much to support), and 
which, if unchallenged, could very well lead to a Protestant reaction 
upon various hostage Catholic communities in terms of the outburst 
cited above, or even civil war.
O'Dwyer's views, therefore, were overall as dangerous and 
irresponsible as the activities and views of NORAID and the Irish 
National Caucus. His association with both, it followed, was unlikely 
to enhance the image of either among the great majority of Irish- 
Americans who were wary of them from the beginning. Insofar as the 
ability to influence events in Northern Ireland through the US 
Government was concerned, his high point would seem to be the 1972 
Democratic Party platform plank. From the perspective of non­
governmental influence there was little to distinguish him from the 
executives of the Irish National Caucus and NORAID except that he 
could, and did, claim to speak as the 'second ranking elected official' 
of America's most populous city.1  ^ And after the municipal elections 
of 1977, even that distinction could no longer be made.
16 'O'Dwyer Testimony', (United States) Congressional Record—
Housej 4 December 1975, p. 38732.
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APPENDIX III
SECURITY S T A T I S T I C S 1
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
)an. to 
Sept. 
1978
Total
Terrorist activity
Soldiers killed 0 48 129 66 35 20 29 29 14 370
Policemen killed 2 11 17 13 15 11 23 14 10 116
Civilians killed 23 115 322 171 166 216 245 69 42 1,369
Shooting incidents 213 1,756 10,628 5,018 3,206 1,803 1,908 1,081 591 26,204
Bomb explosions 153 1,022 1,382 978 685 399 766 366 260 6,011
Security forces 1
activity
Firearms recovered 324 717 1,264 1,595 1,260 825 837 590 305 7,717
Explosives recovered
(lb) ............ 798 2,748 41,488 38,418 26,120 11,565 21,714 3,809 882 147,542
Persons charged with
serious security-type
offences* na na 531 1,414 1,362 1,197 1,276 1,308 664 7,752
(31.7.72-
31.12.72) 
1______*
Including murder and attempted murder, firearms and explosives offences and theft. 
na=not available.
Northern Ireland, Central Office of Information Reference Pamphlet 135, 2nd ed. (London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979), p. 9.
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